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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a story of a particular type of behaviour of small states in their 
relations with a big state. The small states in this study are Nepal and 
Bangladesh while the big state is India and the behaviour examined is non- 
compliance. The non-compliant behaviours of Nepal and Bangladesh in 
their relations with India reveals an anomaly of power prediction based on 
the notion of power as universal, monolithic, quantifiable and highly 
fungible entity that can be acquired, possessed, accumulated, measured and 
used irrespective of time and contexts. Departing from such an explanation 
of power, which can only predict compliant and dependent behaviour of the 
small states, this study seeks to place its em phasis on a contextual 
explanation. An understanding of non-compliance, using a contextual 
explanation, requires focusing both on small state's 'Motivation to Defy' and 
'Capability to Resist'. Within a contextual framework, this study explores the 
conditions that generate Nepal and Bangladesh's motivation to defy. These 
conditions include 'Vital-ness of Issues', 'Ambition of the Ruler', and 'Political 
Tilt of the Ruling Party'. The contextual analysis implies that the non-tangible 
power resources show no less prospects than their tangible counterparts in 
aiding our understanding of non-compliance. Given policy contingency 
frameworks characterised by the motivational conditions, the non-tangible 
power resources (NTPRs) that appear to constitute Nepal and Bangladesh's 
'capability to resist' include popular pressure and popular support, leadership 
strength, external political support and geo-political leverage. The study 
concludes that, given the policy contingency frameworks, these non-tangible 
power resources enabled Nepal and Bangladesh to be non-compliant, but to 
a limited extent. The existence of non-compliance in the repertoire of the 
small states under study also suggests that their behaviours are not 
fundamentally different from that of the big states.
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IN TRO D U CTIO N
To a large extent, the politics of South Asia are covered by the Morgenthau 
paradigm; "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. 
N ot only the three w ars fought betw een India and Pakistan since 
independence, bu t also the continuing hostility, and rapidly heightening 
conventional arm s race, now with its nuclear dim ension, bear out 
Morgenthau's law in the context of South Asian politics. According to him, 
all states are impelled by the urge to amass, protect and manipulate power; 
power is the single 'national interest' of everyone^. But does the foreign 
policy behaviour of small states pose special problems of understanding, 
which challenge our general conceptions of the nature of international 
relations? Do we find boundaries to the applicability of the Morgenthau 
paradigm? Do we find small states challenging the widely acknowledged 
"laws" of power politics? What are the m ost advantageous ecological 
niches for them? Do large states behave differently in their dealings with 
small states, and depart from the rigorous application of these "laws"? And 
if small is different, what adjustm ent m ust be m ade in our general 
conception of international relations.? These are the questions examined in 
this thesis, in the context of India's relations with its much smaller 
neighbours: Nepal and Bangladesh.
The history of war and diplomacy in South Asia since 1947 reveals a steady 
development of power structures. Not long after the partition of the sub-
1 Morgenthau H. J, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 4th edition, 
New York, 1967, p. 25.
2 Ibid. p. 26.
continent, Nehru proclaim ed that the new India was the successor of 
British India and had inherited the mantle of glory that the British had 
w orn.3 To project itself as the security manager of the region India would 
therefore play a great role in the world starting with South Asia. Pakistan, 
on the other hand was equally conscious of its role: its true position could 
be achieved only by attaining equality with India. For India, parity with 
Pakistan meant abdication of a manifest destiny.^ In order to enhance their 
pow er positions in South Asia both India and Pakistan jockeyed for the 
support of extra-regional powers; this gave rise to the com peting alliance 
system in the region. The process started in 1954-55: Pakistan signed the 
M utual Defence A ssistance agreem ent w ith US and joined the US 
sponsored military alliances. South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 
and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).5 India in the face of this huge 
military posture by its staunch enemy looked around for allies and quickly 
endorsed a viable relationship  w ith the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
friendship  delivered India advanced m ilitary hardw are, a process 
accelerated following India's rup ture  with China over conflicting border 
claims in 1962. India, around the same time at Bandung in 1955 took the 
initiative of grouping the Third World countries under the banner of
3 Quoted in Akram A. I., 'Security and Stability in South Asia', in Cohen Stephen Philip 
(ed.). The Security of South Asia: South Asian and American Perspectives. 1987. p .166.
4 Gupta Bhabani Sen, 'Changing Patterns of Conflict in South Asia', Asian Perspective. 
Vol.9, No.2, Fall-Winter, 1985,p. 221.
5 Ahmed Imtiaz, The Superpowers Strategy in the Third World: The 1971 South Asian  
Crisis' in Emajuddin Ahamed, (ed). Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State's 
Imperative. Dhaka, 1984, pp. 113-114. See also, Burke S. M. and Ziring L., Pakistan's 
Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis. Karachi, 1991.
Panchsheel (Five Principles)^ thereby isolating Pakistan even more and 
increasing its own trade and cultural relationship with the underdeveloped 
areas of the world. The Bangladesh liberation struggle and Indo-Pakistan 
w ar of 1971 revealed a yet new alignment pattern in South Asia. To counter 
the Sino-US-Pakistan collaboration, India did not hesitate to sign a 20 year 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union thus 
abandoning its old stance of not entering into alliance with any of the 
power blocs. In reality, however, it did not make much difference to India's 
posture as one of the proponents of non alignm ent because even in the 
heyday of non alignment, Nehru was said to be non aligned in favour of 
the Soviet Union. A lthough since 1971, relations betw een India and 
Pakistan have not broken into open hostility, they narrowly escaped war in 
the winter of 1986-87 and the spring of 1990. Moreover, for the last 10 years, 
their armies have waged almost daily artillery duels on the 6,000-m-high 
glaciers of Kashmir's Karakoram m ountain range.
Since its own independence in 1947, India has invaded, annexed or 
militarily occupied more of its neighbours than any other country in the 
w orld. Indian occupation of the major portion of Kashmir in 1947-49 
despite the fact that the majority of the population were Muslims who 
w anted to be with Pakistan, its forceful annexation of Hyderabad^ and 
Junagad® , its seizure of a reluctant Goa and Pondecherry in 1962 
disregarding the democratic wishes of the local people, its approach to the 
McMahon line, its unilateral decision to put Nepal in its security orbit, all
6 The five principles are (1).Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty,(2).Mutual non-aggression, (3). Mutual non-interference in each other's
internal affairs, (4). Equality and mutual benefit. (5). Peaceful co-existence.
7 The Nizam of Hyderabad wanted to maintain a separate dominion status.
8 The Nawab of Junagad desired to accede to Pakistan.
undoubtedly confirm India's pre-occupation with power politics. India did 
not stop here but went on to assert its own version of big state chauvinism 
by annexing the princely protectorate of Sikkim in 1975, which it called 
vo lun tary  merger. Even the H industan Times, one of India's leading 
dailies editorialized, "If it is not outright annexation it comes close to it". By 
1977, India's indigenous arm am ent industry was the largest in the Third 
W orld non-Communist states in value, volume, diversity of manufacture, 
and  R&D facilities.^ During the past decade, India's defence budget has 
doubled in real t e r m s . T h e  country possesses a nuclear capability and 
conducted its first nuclear explosion A gni in May, 1974. Following the 
establishm ent of the Integrated Missile Programme in 1983, India has also 
been able to research and develop an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile and 
an Interm ediate Range Missile, tested in 1988 and 1989 respectively.^^ 
During the past few years, India has become the world's biggest importer of 
arm s. Its arm y is the fourth largest in the world, numbering over one 
million m en in 1 9 9 0 .^  ^ jtg airforce is impressive and its deep water navy is 
growing rapidly. Nor has India been hesitant to exercise its growing power. 
It w ent to the extent of occupying disputed territories on the borders of 
China and Pakistan in 1962 and 1965 respectively. It also intervened in Sri 
Lanka and  the Maldives in 1988-89, explaining that its actions were 
in tended  to help the governm ents of those countries. But was India's 
action dictated by altruism alone? In helping those governments, India
9 Marwah O., and Ziring L., (eds.), The Subœntinent in World Politics. New York, 1978, p. 
35.
10 In d e p e n d en t (ed.), 10 April, 1989. For details see Prakash S., Indian Defense: A
Conscious Attempt at Pragmatism', Defense and Foreign Affairs. April 1990.
11 Bradnock R. W., India's Foreign Policy since 1971. London, 1990, p. 27.
12 H ew itt V, M, The International Politics of South Asia. Manchester and New York, 1992,
p. 17. See also Appendix 1 for the actual size of her military strength.
confirmed its desire and capacity to be the regional super power. "India is, 
in short, coming of age as a regional power, and is doing so at a time in 
which such nations are able to exercise greater sway than would have been 
the case a decade ago."^^
Pakistan in its struggle for power did not lag behind India. Pakistan, which 
boasts American and Chinese friendship and holds the northwestern part of 
divided Kashmir, also did  some consolidating of its own by swallowing up 
the little Himalayan principality of Hunza. Pakistan also ranks among the 
top eight im porters of major weapons. While it has never been within its 
means to match India's military might, it has not abandoned its ambition to 
enhance its defence and deterrence capability and bring it closer to India. 
Like India, Pakistan has major nuclear programmes and has intensified and 
tested its own ballistic missile Hatf.
But have the weaker states in this system (Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri 
Lanka) behaved only according to the power paradigm? After all, the 
struggle for pow er has very little to offer them.^"^ To evade some of the 
disagreeable consequences of power politics, have they developed other 
modes of behaviour, m odes which may be part of a w ider repertoire of 
small state behaviour?
Annette Baker Fox observed that, "a traditional great power stereotype of 
the small state was that of a helpless pawn in world politics. The great states 
were perceived as cynical manipulators of power and the small states as
13 Independent. Op. Cit.
14 See Apj>endix 1 for the actual size of Bangladesh's and Nepal's military strength.
v irtu o u s law -abiding c o u n t r i e s . A s  Thucydides formulated in the 
Athenians message to the Melians: "The strong do what they will; the weak 
do what they must". Yet, on closer examination, there appears to be no easy 
answers to questions such as why do the smaller states behave the way they 
do?
The question is whether small state behaviour always conforms to the 
pow er politics paradigm. There is no denying the fact that power dictates 
term s which makes the weak compliant: being at the receiving end of the 
coercive power system, small states do sometimes yield to the will of their 
bigger neighbour. However, small states have not always turned out to be 
as compliant as they are expected to be. They are not always pawns in the 
gam e of pow er politics among the great powers. There is something else 
besides compliance in their foreign policy which inhibits the operation of 
power. The sense of weaknesses and limits to their policy choices did not 
hinder them from embarking on policies arising out of the need to preserve 
independent stances in their behavioural repertoire. The various efforts of 
the small states of South Asia to come out of India's orbit are the cases 
w orth  considering, when they have not conformed to the norms of the 
power system. It would therefore be useful if we could observe other modes 
in the behaviour of small states, who have little to gain from the struggle 
for power, (because they have none of the attributes of power in usable 
forms), and  offer some explanation of these non-compliant behaviours.
A lthough it is true that in the centre-periphery frame of international 
politics the small states are peripheries of the periphery, nevertheless they 
are not w ithout political significance in the present day multipolar and
15 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States : Diplomacy in World War II. Chicago, 
1959, pp.1-2.
interdependent world. First, they add up arithmetically as a force in the 
United Nations and other bodies. Second, in the specific geo-political and 
subsystem ic frame in which they are located, they possess geostrategic 
values often irrespective of their size. Third, as observed by Erling Bjol, 
"the small states are constantly sources of tensions and conflicts that 
dom inate the international scene. Not only have some of them been able 
to play prominent parts in international dramas, but often they have been 
able to defend successfully their interests, even against great p o w e r s . I t  is 
this last aspect that is recognised but yet not fully explored. "The study of 
the weak states has been sorely neglected", admits Michael H a n d e l . A n d  
Neils Arm strup complains that "although more research effort has now 
been directed towards this problem, the confusion seems greater today than 
say, ten years ago."^® Commenting on the status of international relations 
research in the mid 1970s, Kenneth Waltz deplored that .'"nothing seems to 
accum ulate, not even criticism."^^ "Studies of the Third World foreign 
policies are in an even w orse state and can still be called the 
underdeveloped study of the underdeveloped countries"^® moaned Bahgat 
Korany in the 1980s. My own literature review in the 1990s substantiates 
some of these views.
16 Bjol E., The Power of the Weak', Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 3,1968, pp. 157- 167.
17 Handel M., Weak States in the International System. England, 1981, p. 3.
18 Am strup N., 'The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts', 
Cooperation and Conflict. XI, 1976, p.l78.
19 W altz K., Theory of International Relations', in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, 
(eds.). Handbook of Political Science. VIII, Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975, p. 1-2.
20 Korany B., The Take-Off of the Third World Studies?' in World Politics. Vol. XXXV, 
April 1983, p. 465.
The study is an exploratory research. Historical narration is avoided except 
in so far as it is necessary to enrich understanding of particular events 
which are the focus of analysis. Nor do I attem pt to establish a precise 
definition of w hat may constitute a small state. The conceptual problems 
involved in finding a satisfactory definition of small states are quite distinct 
which is evidenced by the many contradictory and diverse attem pts to 
establish rigorous definition that can be accepted and agreed upon by all, 
attempts which abound in the literature on small states.^! The seminar on 
the small territories run by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies 1962- 
1964 concluded that it proved impossible for the seminar to decide what 
"smallness" m eans w ith any precision. It is a com parative and not an 
absolute idea. W hatever scales of magnitude are employed seem arbitrary 
and it is difficult to pick out on them where smallness begins or ends'.22 
Nevertheless, several scholars of international relations have attempted to 
define small states. For instance, David Vital defines a small state on the 
basis of population. To him a small state is the one who has a population of 
10-15 m illion in the case of economically advanced countries; and a 
population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries. 
Vital's definition of a small state is 'frankly subjective if not arbitrary'23 as 
he himself adm its and concludes that 'these definitions are put forward to 
make clear the identity of the subject of this study, not with a view to the
21 An excellent review  of the literature on the problems of the definitions of the small 
states is provided in Amstrup, N., Op. Cit. p. 163-182.
22 Benedict B., (ed.). Problems of Smaller Territories. London, 1%7, p. 29.
23 Vital D., The Inequality of States. A Study of the Small Power in International Politics. 
Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 7. A population size of under 10 million has recently 
been proposed as the most important criterion by Henderson J., 'New Zealand and the 
Foreign Policy of the Small State', in Kennaway R,, and Henderson J., (eds.). Beyond  
New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s. Aukland, 1991, p. 5.
creation of a precise concept for m anipulative analytical purposes’ 4^ Robert 
Rothstein gives a psychological as well as a material dimension.of the 
definition of a small state. To him a small state is a one "which recognizes 
that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that 
it m ust rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, 
or developments to do so".^^ if we accept his definition then all states in 
the current international system except the United States of America come 
under the heading of small states. Robert Keohane regards Rothstein's 
definition as anachronistic because 'it serves well only for those periods in 
the past in which obtaining"security primarily by use of its [a state's] own 
capabilities" was a live option for five to ten states in a system of limited 
scope. When only two or three states qualify for great-power status, with 
130-from West Germany (or atleast Italy) to Lesotho- categorized as "small", 
the definition becomes useless for a n a l y s i s . As such Robert Keohane has 
developed a definition of his own. To him a small state appears to be one 
'whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, 
make a significant impact on the system'.^^ Although all the scholars have 
struggled at length to define small states, none has reached an unequivocal 
operative definition of the subject.^® As such the problem remains: which
24 Vital, Ibid. p. 9.
25 Rothstein R, Alliances and Small Power. N ew  York and London, 1968, p. 29.
26 K eohane R, 'L illiputians D ilem m as: Small States in International Politics', 
International Organization. Vol. XXIII, 1969, p. 293.
27 Ibid, p. 296.
28 It certainly does not render the small states too broad a category for purposes of analysis' 
as held by Baehr P. R., in his Review Article, Small States: A Tool for Analysis?', 
W orld Politics. Vol. XXVII, April 1975, p. 456-466; See also, Thakur R., The Elusive 
Essence of Size: Australia, New Ziealand and Small States in International Relations', in 
Higgott R., and Richardson, J., (eds.). International Relations: Global and Australian 
Perspectives on an Evolving D iscipline. Canberra, 1991, p. 240-87, where he has 
challenged the utility of the small state concept in International Relations.
criteria are to be adopted?. Should one take size of population or size of 
territory? Or should the criteria be economic^^ or military strength? There 
may be states that may have a large population, for example, Bangladesh, or 
a large territory, for example, Brazil, yet be militarily and economically less 
powerful than states with a smaller population or territory.
I therefore follow a common sense division^. The countries examined are 
obviously 'smaller' than the big power that is involved in the region: 
I n d i a . A l t h o u g h  it is true that neither Bangladesh nor Nepal is a small 
country in the strictest sense of the term because compared with the 179 
United Nations mem ber countries, more than a hundred  countries are 
smaller than Bangladesh in terms of population and nearly seventy of them 
are smaller in size than Bangladesh or Nepal. Nevertheless, because of the 
sheer gigantic size of their common neighbour India and the power 
capabilities which it commands, both Bangladesh and Nepal obviously 
appear to be small states no matter how big they are in size or population 
com pared  w ith o ther sm aller countries in the international system. 
Likewise although India is treated as one of the m iddle rank powers of the 
world, it is nevertheless big in all respects in comparison with the other 
states of South Asia.
29 As suggested by Deutsch K, W, The Analysis of International Relations. Englewood  
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968, p. 31.
30 This idea has been borrowed from Charles Edward Morriscai and Astri Suhrke, Strategies 
of Survival. New York, 1979.
31 Although Maniruzzaman used conventional war capability (expressed in terms of GNP 
and military budget) as absolute criterion in defining smallness, the treatment of 
smallness as a relative term can also be observed in his definition. He defines a small 
state as 'a state with a very low  conventional war capability, not only in absolute global 
comparative terms ... but also vis-a-vis the Large Powers in its region.' (emphasis 
added). See Maniruzzaman T., The Security o f Small States in the Third W orld. 
Australia, 1988, p. 14.
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The aim of this study is to provide some key to the understanding of the 
behavioural repertoire of weaker states locked by the com pulsions of 
geography into a constant relationship with a far bigger and more powerful 
neighbour.
Chapter one looks at the differing perception of relationship between the 
small states under investigation and their bigger neighbour. Chapter two 
reviews the literature on small state foreign policy and tries to uncover 
what is wrong with the existing literature. Chapter three seeks to 
understand new and expanded ways of explaining the foreign policy 
behaviour of the small states. Chapter Four and Chapter Five deal with the 
particularized study of small state behaviour (Nepal and Bangladesh) vis-a- 
vis the big neighbour (India) and discovers the behaviours which do not fit 
the power model. Chapter Six shows the response of the big state and the 
extent of such behaviour of the small states. The Conclusion draws 
together the threads of the discussion and gives a summary of the findings.
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CHAPTER 1 
DI FFERI NG PERCEPTIONS OF RELATI ONSHI P
W estern analysts have treated small states as little big states, and this has 
led them  to see compliance as the main mode of small state behaviour, 
and  to treat non compliant behaviour as at best odd, at worst irrational. 
To achieve a better understanding of small state behaviour, we should 
start by observing it, and by listening to the accounts given by small state 
practitioners. So before we go to look for the factors that appear to be 
associated w ith Non-Compliance, "the perspective of the actor that 
perceives, understands and reacts to the perception and behaviour of the 
o ther actor needs to be taken into consideration"^ since perceptions 
m ould behaviour to a large extent. More importantly, the smaller states 
in question perceive their relations quite differently from the big power. 
A nd it is these big-small perceptual differences and interests gap that are 
very much responsible for their respective behaviour towards each other. 
It is a commonplace that perceptions shape a state's behaviours and 
perceptual differences are inevitable between interacting states in matters 
of external relations. Therefore, an understanding of the differences in 
perceptions of the interacting states is likely to provide insights into the 
w ays in which they behave in relation to the other. With this point in 
m ind, this chapter explores the perceptual differences between India and 
its sm aller neighbours to see how the two clusters of perception mould
1 Khan Abdur Rob, 'Post-Indira India and her Neighbours', BUSS Papers No. 3,1985.
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their behav iou r.^  The perceptual differences are discussed under four 
headings : Self Image ; Foreign Policy focus ; Ways of settling disputes ; 
and Security Issues.
PERCEPTION OF SELF-IMAGE
One of the factors that underline the behaviour or policy of a state is the 
perception of self-image. Such perception, as shown in fig-1, could take 
the form of one's ow n perception of self-image or others' perception of 
one's self-image. In this section attem pts are m ade to explore the 
differences between these two forms of perception with respect to India 
vis-a-vis its neighbours.
FIGURE 1.1 : THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF PERCEPTION
NEIGHBOURSINDIA
NEIGHBOUR'S 
SELF IMAGEINDIAN SELF IMAGE
NOTE: The arrows indicate the perception of 'Self-Image'
India's perception of its own self-image: I n d i a n  s e l f - i mage  as
described by its elites is one of pre-eminence; this has developed from its 
urge to play a pivotal role in the region in particular and an active role in
2 The main source for this chapter is interviews with academicians and policy makers 
of the countries under study conducted during field work in those countries as a part of 
the study.
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the third world and the w orld a t large. A num ber of factors have 
contributed to the generation of this self-image. These include its size, 
population, economic resource base and growth potential, quantum  of its 
foreign trade,^ military strength and finally viability of constitutional, 
political and administrative structures. India commands 77 percent of 
South Asian population, 72 percent of the total area of the region, and 78 
percent of her GNP.^ India has recorded spectacular growth in agriculture 
in terms of boosting food production; in health in terms of raising life 
expectancy by more than 20 years; in education in terms of doubling the 
literacy rate. Besides, India has earned the respect of the w orld 
com m unity for the preservation of a democratic system to whatever 
extent in a highly pluralistic society. Nehru asserted,
A free India with her vast resources, can be a great service 
to the world and humanity. India will always make a 
difference to the world; fate has marked us for big things.
Leaving the (se) three big countries, the United States,
The Soviet Union and China aside for the moment, look 
at the world. There are many advanced, highly cultured 
countries. But if you peep into the future and if nothing 
goes wrong, wars and the like, the obvious fourth  
country in the world is India.^
3 See A ppendix 2 for bilateral and overall trade figures of India, Nepal and
Bangladesh.
4 Dieter Braun, India's Relations w ith Indian Ocean States', in Ian Clark and Lawry
W. Bowman (eds.). The Indian Ocean in Global Politics. Boulder, Colorado, 1981, p. 27,
5 Quoted in Iftekharruzzaman, India Doctrine: Relevance for Bangladesh', in Kabir
and Hassan (ed). Issues and C hallenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign P o licv . 
Bangladesh Society for International Studies, 1987, p. 21.
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This thinking of Nehru has been carefully injected into the minds of the 
present day politico-strategic thinkers of India. It is not at all surprising 
therefore that scholars make claims which are resonant to the theme of 
the preceding paragraph. For example, Subramanyam states that,
India is within the top 12 industrial producers of the 
world, has the fourth largest armed forces, is a nuclear 
power, has launched satellites and has the world's second 
largest population. ^
Given these factors, the pre-eminence of India has been stressed by 
another Indian scholar who writes, "India is far superior to any one of 
her neighbours, or even to all of them pu t together"^. Such superiority 
and power potential constitute only a part of its self-image. If only the 
enormous character of Indian power potential mattered then there might 
not have been a substantive perceptual difference (rather perceptual 
conflict) between India and its neighbours. India's self-image, more 
importantly, is constituted by the projection of power and such power 
projections transcends Indian borders involving interaction with other 
states. Fundamentally, as we shall see later, Indian self-image, which is a 
product of the realization of its own potential, creates a substantive 
perceptual difference between itself and its neighbours.
W ith all this power potential, India perceives itsself to have a world 
mission which, as a m atter of fact, boils dow n to the projection of power. 
As Kreisberg writes.
6 Subramanyam K, 'India’s Image as a Major Power', Far Eastern Economic Review. 5 
March, 1982.
7 Muni S. D., 'South Asia’ in Ayoob M., (ed.). Conflict and Intervention in the Third 
World. Londcm,1980 p. 39
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India's perceived role in the international system has two 
related strands: a strong, stable nation and a world 
mission commensurate to its size, population, resources 
and power capabilities- military, political and economic.^
A more formalistic projection of its self-image took the form of its active 
involvem ent in the Non-Aligned M ovement^ as early as in 1950s 
although the sm aller states hold that non aligned m ovem ent which 
India set out to lead turned out to be neither nonaligned nor a 
movement. As Peter Willetts observed,
the Panchsheel were only a tool of Indian diplomacy 
and not the basis of policy, the real basis of policy was the 
claim to be a special type of Great Power
However, a more recent and ambitious aspiration of India's pow er 
projection is evident from the following expression made by one of the 
Indian elites,
India constitutes one-sixth of humanity, is among the 
leading industrial and agricultural producers, major 
military power and a R & D power. India has to look at
8 Kreisberg P. H, 'India after Indira', Foreign Affairs Vol. 3, Spring, 1985, p. 876.
9 For India and her involvement in Non-Aligned Movement, see, Willets P., The Non- 
A ligned M ovement. London, 1978; Nair N. P., 'History, Ideology, Prospects' and 
Devdutt, India, National Interest', in Karunakaran K. P., (ed.). Outside the Contest. 
New Delhi, 1%3, Muni S. D., 'Nonalignment in Asia: Recent Trends and Future 
Prospects', IDS A Tournai. Vol.XV, No. 1, July-September, 1982.
10 Willetts, Ibid. p. 8.
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international relations in terms of its interaction with 
China, the Soviet Union, USA and West Europe.
A  further variant of the them e of its pow er projection is India's 
lamentation which has been expressed in the following statement- "The 
priority which China compels on the foreign policy agenda of the Super 
powers has never been I n d i a ' s . India thus resents that the world 
powers are "still unable to fix for India a place in strategic schema of the 
planet which would respond to India's national pride and aspiration and 
reflect its considerable a c h i e v e m e n t s " ^ ^  ^  more pragmatic view is 
expressed by an eminent Indian scholar thus,
A major obstacle is that because of the given realities and 
the history of this region and even more the perceptions 
of these realities and history which prevail among India's 
neighbours, India's size and power potential become an 
obstacle instead of being the asset they could be to the 
region as a whole and to her individual countries. India 
is suspected to harbour hegemonistic ambitions. The 
obverse of this and equally an obstacle, is the suspicion 
which often arises in India that some forms of regional 
cooperation which are proposed from time to time are
11. Subramanyam K, 'India's Pre-eminence', World Focus. November-December, 1985,
p. 12.
12 Gupta Bhabani Sen, India, and the Super Powers', in Rajan M. S. and Ganguly Shivaji 
(eds.). Great Powers. World Order and the Third World New Delhi, 1981, p.l31.
13 Ibid,p.l31.
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only attempts to bring India into frameworks in which 
her neighbours can gang up against herJ^
Neighbours' perception of Indian self-image: W h i l e  I n d i a
perceives its self-image as one of pre-eminence, the neighbours perceives 
Indian self-image as one of pre-dominance. India is seen as a hegemonic 
power with a Big Brotherly attitude (a proverbial expression with all its 
negative connotation). They see India as an expansionist' power 
bullying its sm aller neighbours and  seeking the status of a sub­
superpower in the region. India's self-image as put by an Indian scholar,
generates legitimate and understandable, although often 
exaggerated apprehensions among India's neighbours vis- 
a-vis New Delhi. It makes the former feel insecure and 
uncomfortable in the company o f such a giant 
neighbour.
Com m enting on India's view of itself as alm ost unchallengeable a 
Nepali scholar (during the author's interview  with him) sarcastically 
endorsed  a report in the E c o n o m is t  w hich referred to India's 
unchallengeable role:
Britain and the rest of the world often forget India's 
claims to greatness. India is seen as a poor and faraway 
corner of a lost empire. Indians abroad are the people
14 Chopra Pran, 'South Asia Conflict and Divergence' in Gupta Bhabani Sen (ed.), 
Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia. New Delhi, 1986, p. 64.
15. Muni, O p.C it. p. 39.
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who run late-night grocery shops; at home they are the 
object of Oxfam charity
The sm aller states feel also that India preaches one thing and does 
something else. It claims itself to be democratic and talk of equality but in 
actual terms the situation is different. Basically, Indian politics operate 
from a power position.
India found no fault in negating its own principle of non­
interference and in critically challenging the Nepalis 
concept of independence in the process of 'legitimizing' 
its security interests in the country
One N epali scholar sum m ed up the Indian a ttitude  tow ards its 
neighbours thus: "What is ours is ours, what is yours is negotiable.
Nevertheless the sm aller states feel that the m istrust and misgivings 
stem m ing from asym metry in military and economic strength can be 
overcome if the use of the superior power is informed by enlightened 
national interest and moderated by due regard to the legitimate interests 
of the neighbours. India's neighbours are not averse to acknowledging its 
pre-eminence in the region. But the continuing suspicions are rooted in 
India's failure to convince them that it does not intend to convert this 
pre-eminence into pre-dominance.
16 Eocmomist. London, 27 March 1982, p. 28.
17 Author's interview  w ith  a Nepali scholar (Unpublished). The nam es of the 
respondents of this study, being confidential, could not be specified.
18 Author's Interview with a Nepali scholar. (Unpublished)
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The present gap between India's vastly superior and 
rapidly growing power- military and economic and its 
capacity to manage this power in furthering its 
enlightened self-interests without detriment to those of 
its neighbours is reflected in festering bilateral problems 
and tends to breed misgivings and mistrust
If the purpose of India's enhanced regional role is to maintain stability, 
protect democracy, and preserve national unity and generally shelter the 
area from superpower rivalry, it can be appreciated. Such policemen 
perform  a necessary international function. But there is a fine line 
betw een help and interference, between leadership and dominance.
I f  India thinks it is big, it has to act like that: it has to be 
more generous and should remember that there is no 
harm in becoming a leader but that leadership has to be 
well accepted by others.^^
Neighbour's perception of their self-image: The small states of South
Asia are  independent and sovereign states, which came into being with 
their ow n vision of identity (at least in political terms). This vision 
provides the impetus for necessary growth, development and progress. 
Given the independent political identity among the nations of the world, 
these states feel that they have, quite justifiably, the right to choose 
w hatever course of action they feel appropriate and act in whatever ways 
are necessary for their national growth and development. But whatever
19 Haque Shamsul, South Asia in a Changing World, a lecture paper delivered on the 
Thirty - Ninth Foundation Day Lecture of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 3 
January, 1991, p.7.
20 Author’s interview with a Bangladeshi academician. (Unpublished).
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the national aspirations of the South Asian small states, their self-image 
is characterised by fear and apprehensions vis-a-vis India. Such fear and 
apprehension emanates from three sources: India's power capabilities 
and  pow er projection as has been discussed earlier; their own 
vulnerability in terms of economic, socio-cultural, political, strategic and 
military factors; and the legacies of the past.
The small states are psychologically boxed in. Their 
feelings about themselves are that their history, economy, 
geographical position and previous relationship with 
India cast shadows on the present independence and self- 
assertion of their countries as independent nations.^^
As one Nepali political scientist puts it.
The problem is the gap in the psychology, gap in terms of 
power and gap in terms of discrimination between India 
and its smaller neighbours.^^
Basically, what is happening is that just as within each society, people and 
groups are asking for more economic, political and social rights, and so 
realizing their ownselves, the small states feel that they as nations are not 
getting what they should get in full measure. They expect India to be as 
m agnanim ous at heart as it is in size. They expect India to be 
constructive and rational and to initiate rather than react. As one former 
editor of a Pakistani newspaper advocated on behalf of the smaller states 
of South Asia in a seminar paper,
21 Author's interview with a Bangladeshi official. (Unpublished).
22 Author's interview with a Nepali academician. (Unpublished).
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India has to be large hearted and broad minded in her 
dealings with neighbours rather than being petty and 
niggardly, literally counting every paisa and penny, as her 
track record has shown so far. For instance, such pettiness 
extends to such areas including whether it is the Tin 
Bigha Island issue with Bangladesh or Nepal's purchase 
of arms from China.^^
A former foreign minister of Bangladesh told the author in an interview,
Curiously enough, the easing of tension between the two 
power blocs and growing cooperation between them did 
not produce a correspondingly favourable impact on the 
South Asia political environment. On the contrary, the 
structural change in the power pyramid boosting the pre 
eminence of regional powers has aggravated the 
situation.
He further assessed that,
this dialectical tension is due to the conflict in the 
conservative and progressive interpretation of pre­
eminence, the former equating pre-eminence with 
'predominance' with a hegemonic undertone, and the 
latter with a 'higher level of development' which is fully  
compatible with achieving a balance in interstate relations
23 Hussain M., 'South Asian Security: Perspective from Pakistan*,, paper presented at the 
International Seminar on South Asia's Security in the 1990s: Primacy of its Internal 
Dimension, organized by BUSS Dhaka, 5-7 Jan 1992.
24 Author’s interview (unpublished).
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and developing regional cooperation mutually beneficial 
to all peoples of the region.^^
India's perception of neighbours' self-image: India perceives the
South Asian small states as its backyard. The small states, in the minds of 
India, are incapable of m aintaining an independent course. Therefore, 
they have to remain within India's direct sphere of influence. An Indian 
diplom at asserts,
India's relations with its smaller neighbours are not 
purely an adversarial relationship like Pakistan and 
China. It is more a paternal relationship which to some 
extent the countries have accepted as part of their own 
interests.^^
Accordingly, India assum es the role of a regional police man w ithout 
considering whether it is acceptable to the smaller states. India expects 
the small states to confirm its policies in every aspect of state functioning. 
India looks upon itself as the heir to all the glory of Indian history: 
Mughal, British and all. Therefore, Indians feel that they have m ade 
great concessions by acceding to the plan for partition when Pakistan 
came into being, w ithdrawing troops from Bangladesh immediately after 
its liberation without being asked for it, allowing Nepal and Bhutan 
independence; and that all these acts of generosity have proved their 
credentials. Consequently, they feel that their neighbours ought to be 
grateful and show understanding of India's genuine security and other 
requirements; instead they see their neighbours being nasty to them.
25 Author's interview (unpublished).
26 Author's interview with a former Indian diplomat, (unpublished).
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Instead of trying to help India in its security concerns, they have been 
bringing people from outside (Americans, Chinese and others) and 
creating problems for them.
Such Indian view can be substantiated by the rem arks made by Gupta 
who states that South Asian neighbours "do not understand and 
recognize the sensibilities of India as the largest nation in South Asia".^^ 
India thinks that neighbouring states attempt to exploit India by keeping a 
high profile internationally; that they create problems deliberately with 
its to get better leverages elsewhere; and that they need to perceive an 
enemy to define their identity.
Finally, India perceives that neighbours should come to an agreement on 
its terms, that neighbours should not indulge in arm s build-up, that 
neighbours should not speak ill of its (while it may do so), that 
neighbours should have no right to talk of its internal affairs (while it 
frequently talks of democratic rights in the neighbouring countries). 
India does not see anything wrong in the patron-like behaviour which it 
justifies as being necessary to assert the undeniable and accepted fact of 
India's primacy in the region.
PERCEPTION OF FOREIGN POLICY FOCUS
The ways in which a particular state perceives itself and other states 
(including its neighbours) are manifested, am ong other things, by the 
focus of its foreign policy. One can observe stark differences in perception
27 Gupta Bhabani Sen, 'Regionalism in South Asia: Roles and Behaviour' in Gupta 
Bhabani Sen (ed.) Regional Cooperation and Development: Perceptional. Military 
and Nuclear Arms Race Problem. Vol. 1. New Delhi, 1986, p. 23.
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between India and its neighbours in terms of their respective foreign 
policy focus. Stated simply, as shown in fig 2, while India perceives its 
principal foreign policy focus to be concentrating attention on the world 
politics at large, India's smaller neighbours perceive their relations, with 
India as a single overriding concern.
FIGURE 1.2 : FOREIGN POLICY FOCUS OF INDIA AND ITS
NEIGHBOURS
World at large
NeighboursIndia
NOTE; The direction of the arrows indicate the direction of the focus 
and the darker the arrows the more the degree of focus
To quote one Indian scholar,
India's foreign and security policy has tended to operate in 
three concentric circles, namely the Super Power, the 
Third World and the Neighbours. The outer most circle 
received the most attention while the c l o s e s t  ones 
received the least, (emphasis added)^^.
28 Singh Baljit, Indian Foreign Policv: An Analysis. New York, 1976, p. 82. See also Dutt, 
V. P., India's Foreign Policy. New Delhi, 1984.
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His judgement is confirmed by a former diplomat who avers,
India had never really evolved a foreign policy vis^a-vis 
its neighbours. The reason basically was after India's 
independence under the leadership of Nehru we kept 
thinking of larger global issues, war and peace and so on, 
and evolved a concept of non-alignment.^^
The Nehruvian model of Indian foreign policy concentrated so much on 
Asia and Africa in general that the sub-continent, a small region, got lost 
and sunk into oblivion. Given India's overall foreign policy orientation 
relations w ith the South Asian states appear to be insignificant and 
tangential in the Indian perspective. Indian foreign policy aspirations led 
its to evolve a global perspective and consequently  the m atters 
concerning the im m ediate neighbourhood are taken for granted. Indeed, 
India's attention to its South Asian neighbours has been draw n only 
w hen the latter had  som e trouble-m aking value or when m atters 
impinged on its security.
On the other hand, if we examine South Asian smaller states' foreign 
policy content, we find that for them relations with India fill the horizon. 
Am ong other things, the physical contiguity and unfavourable power 
differential might help explain Indian pre- eminence in the minds of the 
small states of South Asia. First, South Asia is basically Indo-centric not 
only in geographical term s bu t also in terms of history, culture, politics 
and  economy. In geographical terms, all the South Asian states are 
physically contiguous to India but none of them is contiguous to one 
another. Consequently, the concern about India surfaces more strongly in
29 Author's interview with an Indian diplomat (Unpublished).
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their minds than about any other state. Besides, India is so close to each 
one of them  in terms of shared history and inheritance and a shared 
culture  (with all the pride of success, follies and misgivings) that one 
cannot help bu t recognize her overw helm ing influence. For them, to 
divorce the past which all these countries shared with the present India is 
to cu t them selves off from their roots. Similarly, the over-powering 
Indian  presence in their politico-economic system can hardly be over 
em phasized.
Again, given the power profile of the states in question, none of the small 
states matches the Indian power capabilities with respect to any of the 
attributes of power. The power differential is so enormous that no small 
state can either singly or collectively encounter the Indian pressures and 
th rea ts . Therefore, both m ilitarily and  strategically the states are 
extrem ely vulnerable vis-a-vis India. All these issues bear out the fact 
that India, a single overwhelming factor, looms very large in the minds 
of the  small states of South Asia when m atters not only of external 
relations but also of domestic importance are considered. India, therefore 
is very  im portant in their foreign policy calculus. Difference in power is 
not the only significant difference between India and its neighbours: they 
are also aw are that India matters more to them  than they do to India. 
Their perception of India's self-image is not simply that India sees itsself 
as big; they believe that India sees itsself as unaffected by relations with 
the neighbours. They see themselves as mice in the presence of an 
e lephan t which is indifferent to their presence and cares less of their 
interests and feelings. To quote a Nepali scholar, "India's overall goal is 
not survival but primacy, whereas ours is survival, and so we naturally
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consider India as p r e - d o m i n a n t . F o r  example, the w ater issue in 
Bangladesh or the trade and transit issue with Nepal are not crucial in the 
minds of the policy makers in New Delhi and hence get little attention 
there. But for smaller neighbours with little capacity for absorbing stress, 
with heavy burden of population and fragile socio-economic base, the 
issues are vital and substantive, at times putting their socio-economic 
survival at stake. Moreover, the emotional aspects never m atter in 
Indian minds because these are peripheral to them and peripheries never 
trigger emotions. But since the issues are vital to the survival of the 
small states there is a risk that a lot of emotions can be triggered. In the 
words of a former foreign minister of Bangladesh,  ^  ^ .
India's pre-eminence in the military and economic power 
should not be seen as predominance and it should not let 
India to seek predominance but this pre-eminence should 
be matched by a re-adjustment of the relations with its 
neighbours in such a manner that it serves its own 
enlightened national interest.
WA Y S  OF SETTLIN G  O U T S T A N D I N G  ISSUES
Perceptual differences regarding modes of settling outstanding issues can 
also be observed in the relations between India and its neighbours. India 
operates from a strong power position while India's neighbours operate 
from a weak power position. Consequently, India perceives that it can get 
the most out of a conflict situation if the mode of settlement is bilateral
30 Author's interview with a Nepali scholar. (Unpublished).
31 Author's interview with a former foreign minister of Bangladesh. (Unpublished).
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while the smaller neighbours perceive that they can extract the most out 
of India by creating pressures from third parties which is only possible if 
the mode of settlement is multilateral.
Though never officially defined as bilateralism, India's 
policy sought the dual and interrelated goals of first 
clearing the subcontinent of all external power influences 
and then elevating India to her rightful regional position 
by subordinating India's smaller neighbours to New Delhi 
through exclusively bilateral relations.^^
India abhors prom oting m ultilateralism  because it fears it m ight 
degenerate into an anti-Indian forum. Instead it favours bilateralism for 
it gives India the power to influence the policies of its neighbours at the 
same time as protecting its own security and freedom of action. Through 
bilateral relationships India seeks to tie the smaller states of South Asia to 
Indian authority. India has attempted to implement bilateralism in order 
to achieve regional primacy. As such it suspects all multilateral proposals 
and negotiations as aimed at reducing its stature. One Bangladeshi 
official remarks,
India is being ambivalent in its policy. It always advocates 
collective approach in international forums, particularly 
on matters of its own national interest but when dealing 
with its smaller neighbours it always insists on 
bilateralism.
32 Krol Ronald J.van de. Bilateralism in the "Old" and "New" Subcontinents: Indian  
Diplomacy and the Farakka Barrage Dispute. D. Litt thesis (Unpublished), Oxford 
University, 1981.
33 Author's interview with a Bangladeshi official.(Unpublished).
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A lthough India failed to drive ou t foreign influences from the 
subcontinent and established governments in South Asia similar to its 
own, its determination to implement bilateralism never faded. Because 
India knows that if it succeeds in doing so, Indo-centric bilateralism 
w ould give India maximum regional control at a minimal political price. 
That India continued to reject m ultilateralism  in the subcontinent is 
reflected in various disputes with its neighbours. The Farakka barrage 
dispute with Bangladesh is one such case. The Farakka bickering between 
India and Bangladesh has not been settled by strict bilateralism because 
disagreem ent over bilateralism itself lies at the heart of the Farakka 
controversy and the various proposals advanced for its solution.
Just as India reasoned that bilateralism was a necessary reaction to India's 
perilous infancy in a hostile world and region, so the smaller states of 
South Asia have always sought diversified ties to attract foreign aid and 
guarantee that their giant neighbour does not encroach upon them 
economically and militarily.
It is in fact the power perception of India that led to its highhanded 
dealings with its neighbours, specifically emphasizing diplomacy on a 
bilateral basis only, so that India might be able to exert an inevitable 
hegemonic posture w ithout the interference of a third party, and thus 
avoid an equal relationship in negotiations with neighbours.
PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY ISSUES
A nother substantive area of perceptual difference between India and its 
neighbours concerns security issues, where the states have diametrically 
opposite concerns.
31
India's perception of neighbours is framed through security optics. India 
has adopted the legacy of the British strategic view and as such perceives 
itself as an inheritor' state despite the fact that the political reality of the 
sub-continent went through dram atic changes i.e., from the political 
unity of the British period to multiple national entities. The small states 
of South Asia see India's self-image as inheritors of the legacy of the Raj 
as an historical hangover.
The doctrine of strategic unity of South Asia, a colonial 
legacy, continues to dominate the security perceptions and 
strategic planning in India. Technological developments 
in the weapons system with advances in nuclear and 
space sciences have radically changed the military strategy 
in recent times. Buffer states have ceased to be a 
meaningful shield even in a conventional warfare.^^
Indian aspiration for the strategic unity of the region have been reflected 
in official Indian policy, which "came to assert India's interest in the 
integrity and territorial inviolability of India's sm aller neighbours as a 
variant of the policy of integration with I n d i a " . I n d i a ,  therefore, does 
not see anything w rong in trying to bring all the smaller neighbours 
especially the Himalayan ones under its own security umbrella and make
34 The former foreign minister of Bangladesh Prof. Shamsul Haque during an interview 
with the author quoted this from his lecture paper on South Asia in a Changing 
W orld .w hich he delivered on the Thirty - Ninth Foundation Day Lecture of the 
Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.
35 Kodikara Shelton, Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia', Canberra 
Papers on Strategy and Defence. No. 19, Canberra, 1979, p. 17. For a detailed 
discussion on India's regional aspirations and the obstacles on her way see, Ayoob M., 
'India in South Asia: The Quest for Regional Predominance', World Policv Tournai. 
Winter 1989-90, p. 107-33. See also, Ayoob M., India as Regional Hegemon: External 
Opportunities and Internal Constraints', International loum al. Vol. 46, Summer 1991, 
p. 420-448.
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them feel like a client state. It accordingly went on to assert its own
version of big nation chauvinism  by annexing Hyderabad, Goa and
Sikkim without any hesitation. For India, it was not annexation but a 
question of boundary settlement.
In more recent years the Indian security posture, as succinctly expressed 
by the Indian elites,came to be known as Indian Doctrine'. G upta 
expounded the doctrine thus,
India has no intention of intervening in the internal 
conflicts of a South Asian country and it strongly opposes 
intervention by any country in the internal affairs of any 
other. India will not tolerate external intervention in a 
conflict situation in any South Asian country if  the 
intervention has any implicit or explicit anti-Indian 
implication. No South Asian government m ust
therefore ask for external military assistance with an anti-
Indian bias from any country. If a South Asian country 
genuinely needs external assistance to deal with a serious 
internal conflict situation or with an intolerable threat to 
a government legitimately established, it should ask help 
from a number o f neighbouring countries including 
India. The exclusion of India from such a contingency 
will be considered to be an anti-Indian move on the part 
of the government concerned.^^
36 Gupta Bhabani Sen, 'Regional Security: The India Doctrine', India Today. 31 August 
1983, p. 20
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Interestingly, the paradox is while India considers its neighbours as 
integral to the security of India, India's neighbours regard India itself as a 
source of threat to their security. To substantiate the point one can cite 
Kodikara,
One of the biggest dilemmas of South Asian politics is 
that India conceives of its neighbouring countries as lying 
within the defence perimeter and being integral to the 
security of India, while India's neighbours themselves 
regard India itself as the source of their insecurity against 
whom it is necessary to organize their own security 
interests, sometimes on an extra-regional basisA"^
While India acquires huge armed forces, with the latest in combat aircraft, 
tanks and guns, a vast industrial establishment, a nuclear capability, and 
even a nuclear powered submarine, which its defence needs can hardly 
justify; and insists on showing the world how big and strong it is, the 
sm aller countries of South Asia cannot help bu t watch it with a high 
degree of nervousness. This nervousness is heightened when India takes 
a one sided view of security and interprets it in ways which are not 
acceptable to the smaller states. This nervousness was expressed by a 
Nepali when he said.
How can we forget what India did in Goa and Sikkim.
That's why we have always had a deep distrust of Indian
37 Kodikara S. U, 'Regional Roles and Behaviour in South Asia: A Theoretical 
Framework of Regional Cooperation' in Gupta Bhabani Sen(ed.) Op.Cit.. p. 9-10.
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ambitions. We are an independent country, but the 
Indians seem to think we are just a bit more of India.^^
India's threat to its neighbours is seen as a combination of a hegemonic 
design related  to its security concept, an unw illingness to make 
accomm odations and resolve outstanding problems lest compromise is 
perceived as weakness and its readiness to in terfere and threaten 
destabilisation because of a desire to have compatible regimes all round.
The smaller states assert that if India's concern is its security sensitivity, 
theirs are their national independence and economic welfare. All of 
India's neighbours see that most of their problem of security is related 
one w ay or other to India's policy pursuits. In sum, neighbours find in 
India's behaviour a great deal of unneighbourliness. India, on the other 
hand perceives anti-Indianism  in its neighbours' behaviour. The 
assertion of Hedley Bull that "the deepest fears of the smaller units are in 
fact of their larger neighbours''^^ thus becomes true of India's neighbours.
38 Author’s interview with a Nepali academidan.(Unpublished).
39 Bull Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Orders in World Politics. London, 
1977, p. 310.
35
CHAPTER 2 
LI TERATURE SURVEY
Existing literature on the foreign policy of small states contains generalized 
observations about the problems, prospects and dynamics whereby small 
states fend off, acquire resources from or somehow manage to cope with 
their external environment.^ "Focusing on size per se, measured in terms 
of population, GNP or defence expenditure involves making arbitrary cut 
offs and yields little of great significance beyond the obvious regarding the 
characteristic behaviour of those states which happen to fall within the 
specified param eters.'2 These studies are, no doubt, helpful in many ways 
but in one im portant respect they are unsatisfying. They are more 
concerned with describing the 'what' of state behaviour. The 'why' and 
'how' remains unexplained and is consequently easily overlooked in their 
analysis. Some believe tha t 'a lthough  the "why" questions are 
fundamentally most important of all ... they cannot be answered without 
establishing before hand exactly what phenomena need to be explained'.^ 
But since we are talking about countries which are 'under developed'.
1 Some of these are: Mathisen T., The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the 
Great Powers. Oslo, 1971; Singer M., Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics 
of International Relationships. New York, 1972; Sveics V. V., Small Nation Survival: 
Political Defence in Unequal Conflicts. New York, 1969; Barston R. P., (ed.). The Other 
Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States. London, 1973, Handel M., Weak 
States in the International System. London, 1981, Calvert P. The Foreign Policy of New  
States. Dorset, 1986.
2 Sharp Paul, Irish Foreign Policv and the European Community. England, 1990, p. 22.
3 Hill C., Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries',in Clapham 
C., fed.).Foreign Policv Making in Developing States. Famborough, 1979, pp 1-2.
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'peripheries of the periphery', 'dom inated' or 'dependent', should we not 
explore how and why they behave the way they do?
Annette Baker Fox -  the 'God Mother' of small states led the way on small 
state's study. In her study of the power of small states'^ Annette Baker Fox 
analyzed the position of six small states during the second world w ar to 
explain the circumstances in which the power of small states — as measured 
by their ability to resist the demands of great powers — can be maximized. 
She argued that a situation of heavy external pressure was suited for the 
study of small states behaviour. In this way, the power of each of the small 
states at each particular moment of the crisis could be assessed and then a 
more generalized picture of the great power-sm all power confrontation 
could be attem pted. Analysis of w ar time events led Fox to suggest that 
diplomacy is the field within which small states should concentrate their 
efforts and that m uch of small states' influence was due to skilful 
diplomacy. She argued that although not all the small states had equal 
opportunities for diplom atic m anoeuvre, the small states which she 
examined (i.e. Turkey, Finland, Sweden and Spain.) did escape submission 
at the hands of the big power in some cases. Not only did Finland and 
Norway emerge from the war as totally independent entities but the others 
also survived without devastation of war with increased military strength. 
But as one of the critics^ of her work pointed out that this was possible 
because none of them was surrounded by hated or hostile neighbours. Each 
one of them possessed geographical advantages giving it some chance to 
remain non-belligerent through self-defence. Moreover, the possession of
4 Fox A. B, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II Chicago, 1959.
5 Anglin D. G , 'Review Article', International Tournai. Autumn 1960, Vol. XV, No.4, p. 
364.
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the scarce resources of critical importance to the conduct of the war- such as 
chrome (Turkey), nickel (Finland), iron ore (Sweden), wolfran (Spain) and 
sh ipp ing  (Norway) strengthened  each country 's bargaining position. 
Otherwise in a world that is characterized by the interplay of sheer interest, 
diplomacy alone has very little role to play unless a state has something in 
possession to create, enhance and sustain the interest of the other party. 
Although there is no doubt that the above work by Fox is a pioneer work of 
immense interest it does not explain why and how the small states behave 
the way they do. To Fox, small nations appeared to be but appendages of the 
spheres of great power influence, helpless fragments likely to be swallowed 
by the giants at will. And as such she had a missionary approach, revealing 
to the small states how they ought to behave (diplomatically, peacefully, 
and nicely) and encouraged them to think of themselves as morally special.
David Vital dealt generally w ith how small states could defend their 
existence and independence despite the great d isparity  between their 
strength  and that of the military giants and how they could counteract 
dangers. He described three paradigms: the classic case of Czechoslovakia in 
1938; the contemporary paradigm  of Israel; and the paradigm he took for the 
future was Finland.^ In the first case the author provided the evidence that 
this well armed power might have been able successfully to stand up to the 
threatening great power if only its leaders and friends had had the nerves to 
match, but concludes that this example of intrinsic military capacity can no 
longer be followed. In the Israeli case, he concluded that a conflict in a grey 
area like the Middle East will end either with a stalemate confirming the 
irreversible division of the minor powers between the major contenders or
6 Vital D., The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict. 
London, 1971.
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w ith the isolation of the m inor state 'alone in the ring with its great 
opponent'. He attributed Finland's relative freedom in the previous two 
decades to the internal stability of northern  Europe and to the well 
recognized strength of Russia's opponents in the general area.
In an earlier work the essence of Vital's^ analysis was that small states 
could best protect themselves and enhance their power and influence by 
maximizing strength. He therefore asserted that small isolated states that 
were threatened by a great state should maximize their intrinsic military 
potential, determ inedly and carefully use their diplomatic and military 
capabilities to show the high cost of conflict and judiciously exploit all 
contingent attributes, political as well as strategic, in order to exercise the 
greatest possible external counter pressure on the big power. He analysed 
the disabilities and possibilities of small states and generated three broad 
policies or strategies: Passive, Active and Defensive® - from the perspective 
of the am ount of strength a small state may possess. The Passive Policy is 
the policy of renunciation: ie, doing nothing and hoping for the best. The 
state gives up its effort to maintain its freedom of choice. The lack of ability 
to withstand conflict does not matter to the state any more because either it 
perceives no conflict; or it lacks confidence in its ability to create a national 
safe base (total national pool of economic and military, hum an and 
material resources); or the social and economic cost of the conflict could not 
be justified when other social ends are taken into account. This is a policy 
of total submission on the part of the small state. Under the Active strategy 
a small state strives to alter its external environment to its advantage either
7 Vital D., The Inequality of States. Oxford, 1967.
8 Ibid, p. 121.
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by minimizing the discrepancies in strength that are im portant between 
itself and the big power, or by widening the limits of freedom of political 
choice and maneuverability, or by increasing the total resources of the state 
and thereby strengthening the safe base. In other words, an Active strategy 
attem pts to exploit contingencies in the international system. Defensive 
Strategy is in effect a strategy of building up one's internal strength. 
Although Vital adm ired the active strategy, he recommended the defensive 
approach.
Vital's conceptualization of a small state in relation to a bigger one 
essentially em phasized a power-politics view of weakness and strength. 
Handel has argued that the concern should not be with small states but 
w ith the conduct of weak or weaker states in conflict with the stronger 
ones.^  One advantage as Sharp rem arks is that such a comparative 
conceptualization shifts one away from the endless debate of what 
constitutes a small state ie. whether one can bracket a host of countries 
(which are apparently small) into the category of 'small s t a t e ' . A l t h o u g h  
the present study adopts Vital's line of thinking and considers the states in 
question as small states in terms of comparative size and strength, it 
nevertheless cannot identify itself with the said w ork because of certain 
limitations of the study
The principal thrust of Vital's work is to evolve strategies that a small state 
m ight adopt. There is a significant difficulty in using strategies for the 
purpose of the study in question. Strategies are prescriptive and in Vital's 
sense they provide ways in which a particular country can strengthen its
9 Handel M., Op. Cit. 1981, p. 11.
10 Sharp, O p.Cit.. p. 22-23.
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'safe base'; thereby augm enting its pow er profile. Strategies help one 
achieve what ought to be or should be; but they do not explain why 
something is the way it is ; they have little value in trying to understand a 
particular behaviour of states.
If one accepts Vital's strategies as the only available models of small state 
behaviour one would be inclined to conclude that since most small states 
do  not possess any of the power attributes that would enable them  to 
respond  to any m ilitary-political threat, they are all to be grouped as 
countries which pursue a passive policy. The countries which pursue a 
passive policy, according to Vital are unable to respond to external threats. 
Therefore, accepting Vital's categorization would imply that the states in 
question  cannot and do not respond at all. This seems to be rather 
unrealistic. Although the problem concerns the behaviour of states who 
have little to gain from the struggle for power, because they have none of 
the attributes of power in usable form, they nonetheless have developed 
certain other modes of behaviour. Thus, there ought to be something other 
than power attributes which is worth examination.
Rothstein in his study "Alliances and Small Powers'^^ mainly contended 
w ith  the problem of defining small states and dealt extensively on the 
functions of different kind of alliances. Rothstein argued that small states 
could be analyzed in terms of certain behaviour patterns and discounted 
com parison of relative power in term s of socio-economic, military, or 
population  data. He took the traditional approach classifying all small 
states as 'nothing more than or different from Great Powers writ small'.
11 Although few small states can pursue his active' strategy.
12 Rothstein R. L, Alliances and Small Powers. New York and London ,1968.
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But in the area of small states foreign policy analysis this has not been the 
case in recent years. He therefore developed a definition with a perceptual 
dim ension arguing that there is a psychological, as well as material, 
distinction between great and small powers. Thus "a Small Power is a state 
which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own 
capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, 
institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief 
in its inability to rely on its own means m ust also be recognized by the other 
states involved in international politics". Rothstein, like Vital, aimed at 
prescription.
He examined the advantages and disadvantages of several types of alliance 
relative to small powers. Rothstein argued that from the point of view of 
Small Powers, "alliances have increasingly become instruments designed to 
achieve nonmilitary goals" In his opinion three different alliances seem 
possible for the small states. The first one is the bilateral alliance with one 
great power, the second one is the alliance with other small powers and the 
th ird  is an alliance w ith  great as well as small pow ers ie. a mixed 
multilateral alliance. The best solution for the small state in his opinion 
w as the third type. "Small Powers ought to prefer mixed, multilateral 
alliances. They provide the most benefits in terms of security and political 
influence. If unavailable, they probably should choose a small Power 
alliance in preference to an unequal, bilateral alliance, particularly if the 
Small Powers do not fear an immediate threat to their security, and if their 
goals in allying are prim arily political. An alliance with a single Great 
Pow er ought to be chosen only if all the other alternatives are proscribed, 
and  if the Small Powers fear an imminent attack— and even then only in 
hopes of improving their deterrent stance."
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Central to his analysis was the idea that both large and small powers ally for 
similar reasons but each tends to perceive relevant options in a different 
light. He discussed these differences as reflected in a dual problem of 
choosing allies as well as the kind of alliance to be created. Rothstein only 
studied the alliance behaviour of small states before the second world war. 
He regarded their alliance behaviour as nearly exclusively determined by 
the dem and for security of the small state instead of seeing the same 
behaviour as part of the foreign policy of small states.
These studies were written from a great power perspective: small state 
behaviour is treated as deviant from the norm  of pow er politics, even 
when it attem pts to be imitative. The m ain problem with these kind of 
studies lies in the fact that they are so preoccupied with explaining one 
variable, i.e., the smallness of the Small State, that they neglected the 
possibility that there was another im portant variable ie. their Behaviour. 
They were naturally interested in how the new states of the Third World 
would behave bu t they tended to believe that "small" would determine 
behaviour. To what extent was their use of the term 'small' code for less 
flattering ideas: poor, silly, a nuisance, unreliable?. Fox (being a quaker and 
a great peace and law campaigner) stressed the morality of the small powers. 
Vital (being an Israeli) was more concerned about the survival of the small 
state of Israel. He over- emphasized the weaknesses of small states largely 
by considering their worst possible situations and as such prescribed 
survival strategies. Rothstein recom m ended policy options. But 'if 
Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for them, 
they m ust be studied as carefully as the giant'.^®
13 K eohane R. O, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics', 
International Organization. 1%9, p. 310.
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Another significant study focusing on small state behaviour was conducted 
by Maurice A. East , 'Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two 
M o d e l s ' . E a s t  abstracted the conventional model of sm all states' 
behaviour in foreign affairs from the literature on foreign policy. He began 
his work with the conventional definitional characteristics of small states^® 
and observed the behavioural patterns that were traditionally attributed to 
small states. These behavioural patterns included—
a. Low levels of overall participation in world affairs.
b. High levels of activity in international organizations (IGO's).
c  High levels of support for international legal norms.
d. Avoidance to the use of force as a technique of states craft.
e. Avoidance of behaviours and policies which tend to alienate the 
more powerful state in the system.
f. A narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign 
policy activities.
g. Frequent u tiliza tion  of m oral and norm ative positions on 
international issues.
He argued that the major implicit assum ption underlying this attributed 
behavioural pattern is that the small state behaviours are the result of the 
same general processes of decision making that are found in large states. He 
observed that these patterns correspond quite closely to the outcomes of the 
application of a 'rational' model of foreign policy in which a small state's
14 East M. A, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models', World Politics. 
Vol.25, 1972-73.
15 East mentioned that small states are traditionally defined to possess one or more of the 
follow ing characteristics: small land area, small total population, small total GNP (or 
other measures of total productive capacity) a n d  a low level of military capability
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behaviour is governed by its limited resources and a limited international 
potential. Consequently, he argued tha t all behavioural expressions 
mentioned above indicated a low-profile course of action in which small 
states minimize their perceived risk and  their consum ption of scarce 
resources such as manpower, military capabilities and hard currency. The 
assum ption espoused by the conventional m odel in the literature, 
according to East is that the small states' actions "are the results of the 
decisions arrived at by a decisional unit which has been monitoring world 
affairs closely, has an adequate information base from which to operate and 
has a long range policy perspective."^® Essentially the point East 
emphasized is that the conventional model assumes that the small states, 
like their larger counterparts, evaluate all possible' alternatives and then 
make a 'rational' choice. This is precisely the point where he appears to 
disagree with the conventional model and its assumption of 'rationality'.
East accordingly developed an 'alternative model'. In his discussion of the 
alternative model East made an opposite assum ption i.e. the foreign policy 
processes of large and small states are fundamentally different. Similarly to 
the discussion of the conventional model, he began with the definitional 
characteristics of small states and constructed the said model on the premise 
that the small states are constrained in term s of resources. He maintained 
that since the small states have a smaller proportion of an already small 
resource base to devote to international affairs, the organizational size and 
capacity of a small state's foreign office is also likely to be small. He argued 
tha t th is im plied tha t there would be few er persons involved in 
monitoring international events and executing foreign policy decisions. As
16 East, Op.Cit p. 558.
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a consequence, he stated that small states are unable to deal adequately with 
the total range of international issues facing them. Small states have to be 
selective and prioritize their involvem ent in term s of functional and 
geographic areas. Another consequence of smaller capacity to monitor the 
system, he argued, is that the small states are likely to be slow in perceiving 
international event and developm ents. This inability to gather early 
signals implies that small states are likely to get fewer opportunities and 
alternatives to influence the situation. Consequently, he m aintained that 
by the time a small state receives a signal it is likely to be too late for 
negotiation or ambiguous behaviour (including softer low-risk alternatives 
such as verbal response) to be effective. Hence, contrary to the predictions 
of the conventional model the small states, a t this stage, are more likely to 
adopt a definite, unambiguous and high-risk behaviour.
East then tested the assumptions of both the models on 32 countries (large 
and small, developed and developing) generated by the Com parative 
Research on the Events of N ations (CREON) project and finds the 
assumptions of his alternative model sufficiently validated. But on a closer 
examination it appears that the assum ptions of the alternative model seem 
not only surprising but little c o n v i n c i n g . I t  appears rather simplistic to 
assume reliable linkages between size and capacity of foreign office of a 
small state and the degree of ability to perceive early signals and finally the 
m anifestation of high-risk behaviour. The author did not provide any 
empirical evidence. Perhaps the size and capacity of a small states foreign 
office is adequate for perceiving early signals in the limited and narrow 
range of areas that concern the small state. This assumption seems to be
17 For a detailed critique, See, Afroze S., 'Do Small States Behave Differently from Big 
States?A Critique of Maurice East's Alternative Model', BUSS Tournai .Vol. 2, 1993.
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convincing if we consider the aspect of rationality. It can be argued that the 
areas of interest for a small state are prioritized in such a way that more 
resources (from w hat is available) are committed to those areas that are 
most important; so that the foreign office can function best in such areas 
and is capable to perceive early signals that are needed most. Then using 
the author's argument, the small states will not be required to exhibit high- 
risk behaviour.
Accepting the definitional characteristics of small states, it may be argued 
that as a result of a narrow resource base small states have less international 
aspirations, consequently they have fewer stakes in their relations with 
other countries. This im plies that they have less need for early signals 
hence they have less risky behavioural expressions. Unlike some of the 
larger states, small states (for example) are barely concerned with 'star war' 
nor have burning  goestrategic concerns or desperate need to amass 
sophisticated military hardw are (including nuclear capabilities) nor do they 
need to maintain regional and global sphere of influence. The importance 
and need for early signals appears to be crucial in these and other similar 
areas. Such need and importance seem to be much depreciated in the area 
of small state's prim ary concern i.e., economic growth and development. 
The dim inished need for im portance of early signals in the area of 
economic grow th and developm ent implies that there will be fewer 
surprises for the small states in an evolving situation. In influencing such 
a situation the small states are not likely to exhibit high-risk behaviour. 
However, instances of high risk behaviour in such situation may be found. 
It, therefore, appears that the understanding of high-risk behaviour in 
terms of the lack of early signals does not take us far.
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Finally, a crucial contradiction may be observed in East's formulation. East 
asserted that as a result of resource constraints, the size and capacity of a 
small state's foreign office will be small; thereby such state will unable to 
perceive the early signals and this u ltim ately  would lead to the 
dem onstration of high-risk behaviour. It may be argued that the same 
resource constraint which East maintained as the premise for his argument 
of small states' high-risk behaviour is likely to prohibit such states in 
adopting such behaviour. This is because high-risk behaviour frequently 
involves commitment of resources which is significantly scarce in case of 
small states.
It also appears that the study might have been biased by the a priori 
categories and the structure of the data set upon which the study was 
wholly dependent. In a description of CREON, its own originators which 
includes East too, recognized that the validity of any findings from the 
CREON data set are dependent upon more certain knowledge of what kinds 
of bias may be inherent in the data source.^® Further, despite the 
impression of imperviousness conveyed by the use of statistics the study 
rem ained 'vulnerable' to subjectivity. Certainly the decision about which 
event will fall in which category in the data set is a matter of opinion and 
judgem ent As Am strup observed, 'the description of the data set seems to 
indicate a distortion of data on small states compared to large states, and 
having such possible, and yet not investigated, distortions in mind, results
18 East M., (ed.), Whv Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign  
Policy Studies. London, 1978.
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derived from CREON data on small states should perhaps not be taken too 
seriously.
Peterson tried to address the question in a limited sense in understanding 
the specific problem of the small states. In an attem pt to explain foreign 
policy behaviour, Peterson proposed a modeP® using the concepts of 
influence capability' and 'stress sensitivity'. This model was developed on 
Rosenau's adaptation theory and also Hansen's revision of it. According to 
Hansen, influence capability refers to a country 's ability to control and 
m anipulate its external environment and to structure it according to its 
values, w hile stress sensitivity refers to the degree to which societal 
structures and the distribution of societal values are affected by changes in 
and dem ands emanating from the external environment. Peterson posited 
that the degree of 'Influence Capability' and 'Stress Sensitivity' determines 
the foreign policy behaviour of a given country, because these two variables 
determ ine the extent to which a given state can further its interests in the 
international system and also the extent to which it has to accept external 
influences on the functioning of its essential structures eg. physical, 
political, economic and social. Depending on these two variables he 
specifies four patterns of overall foreign policy behaviour- dominance, 
balance, acquiescence and quiescence.
W hat is interesting here is that Peterson presents the two forces, influence 
capability and stress sensitivity, as varying independently of each other on
19 Amstrup N, T he Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts', 
Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. XI, 1976, p. 177.
20 Peterson Nikolaj, International Power and Foreign Policy Behaviour: The Formulation 
of Danish Security Policy in the 1870-1914 period', in Kjell Goldman and Gunnar Sjostedt 
(ed.) Power. Capabilities. Interdependence- Problems in the Studv of International 
Influence. Lcmdcxi, 1979.
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axes set across each other, rather than as different ends of the same 
dimension. So it is possible theoretically to place any state at any point in 
the circle. But there is doubt as to whether this is practicable., because of the 
difficulty of operationalizing the dimensions in the model.
Influence capability as viewed by Peterson is a function of the negative and 
positive sanctions a nation uses to influence others. And so he measured 
influence capability by size of GNP, GDP, investment, energy production 
and consumption, defence expenditures, economic aid given, ou tpu t of 
steel and cement, combat aircraft and international trade. Some of these 
factors refer directly to the ability to m anipulate the international 
environment; others seem to bear no necessary relationship to that.
Stress sensitivity is measured by developmental indicators like GDP per 
capita, GNP, contribution of agriculture to GDP, foreign trade/GDP, balance 
of payments, and energy consumption. It appears that these indicators of 
stress sensitivity are draw n from the same field as those of influence 
capability.
The essence of Peterson’s m odel is that the two qualities (Influence 
capability and Stress sensitivity) should not lie along the same dimension 
and m ust be able to vary independently of each other. But if both are 
m easured using the same information and criteria draw n from the same 
field, the model collapses : there are no axes and no circle. All we are left 
with is a monolinear banality: powerful states have more freedom of action 
than weak and small states ( which may not be true in all the cases and at all 
time). In fact the dimensions in the paradigm seems to be of very complex 
nature and hence do not lend themselves easily to operationalization as a 
single indicator. These kind of models encourage tautologous usage; the
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analyst is tempted to work back from the policy style to the attributes. This 
confirms the model but w ithout testing it. Peterson's model can best be 
described as a m iniature theory of state behaviour which takes large states 
and scales them down.
Other writers have dealt with small states simply by applying to them a 
universal theory of foreign policy behaviour.^i Rosenau for example, in 
his 'Pre-Theory'^^asserts that all foreign policy behaviour can be explained 
in terms of the relative influence of five sets of variables viz., idiosyncratic, 
role, governmental, societal and systemic. The values, talents and other 
aspects of a decision maker that distinguish him from others are subsumed 
in the idiosyncratic variable cluster; behaviour that is generated irrespective 
of the occupants of governmental position is held to be caused by role 
variables; those aspects of governmental structure that limit or enhance the 
chances of foreign policy decision makers are defined as governm ental 
variables; all other aspects of a society, ie. non governmental, that influence 
its external behaviour are classified as societal variables; and any material 
aspects of or action occurring in a society's external environm ent that 
influences its foreign policy behaviour are regarded as systemic variables. 
Rosenau tries to assess the relative influence of the variables by ranking 
them according to the following criteria: size of the country (large v.
21 To name a few other than the ones mentioned above, Menkhaus K, ]., and Kegley C. W., 
The Compliant Foreign Policy of the Dependent State Revisited: Empirical Linkages 
and Lessons from the Case of Somalia, Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 21, No. 3, 
October, 1988; Moon B.,The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State", International 
Studies Ouarterlv. Vol. 27,1983; Herman K e^ey and Rosenau (ed.), New Directions in 
the Studv of Foreign Policv. Boston, 1987; Korany B., and Dessouki A. H., The Foreign 
Policies of Arab States. (2nd ed.), Boulder, 1991.
22 Rosenau J. N, Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in R. Barry Farrell, (ed.). 
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston, 1966.
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Small), state of economy (developed v.developing) and type of political 
system (open v. closed).
Rosenau's critics contend that most of his concepts remained ambiguous 
and overlap with one another and the criteria by which the variables are 
ranked are not sufficiently p r e c i s e .A c c o r d i n g  to his pre-theory, 
idiosyncratic sources are the most im portant influence on foreign policy 
formation in an under developed country because of decreased bureaucratic 
constraints. He says nothing about where to go from there. He does not 
operationalize his own model, nor does he suggest any guidelines as to how 
others m ight do so. Another problem is posed by his assumption that all 
foreign policy behaviour can be explained in term s of his five sets of 
variables. "His choice of categories determines the nature of the ultimate 
theoretical product to a much greater extent than he is willing to admit. 
But his categories miss some im portant distinctions. For example, to say 
tha t dom estic political com petition can be subsum ed under societal 
variables is to bury it amid a host of other 'non governmental' factors, 
including historical experience, economic capability and elite attitudes. In 
other words, the distinction between third world actors where these issues 
are basic and other actors where these issues are not basic is at least 
b lu rred .25 One can suspect here that the universalist assumption that the 
model fits all actions is not fully questioned and that the model's empirical
23 Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, 'A Framework for Research on Foreign policy Behaviour', 
Tournai of Conflict Resolution. XIII ,March 1969,p. 79, and Handreider W. F, 
'International and Comparative Politics ; Toward a Synthesis?' World Politics. Vol. XX 
April, 1968, p. 487-89.
24 W einstein F. B, The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis 
of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries', World Politics. Vol. XXIV, No. 3, 
April 1972, p 360.
25 Ibid, p 360.
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relevance is centred on developed polities.^® The way in which explanatory 
variables operated m ight vary considerably in different types of nations. 
W hat might account for one kind of behaviour in one state might not do 
for another.state. As W einstein observed, Rosenau tells us nothing about 
the kind of limits each set of variables can impose, or about the manner in 
which one set may affect another. He simply chose four conditions viz size, 
level of economic development, degree of political openness and extent of 
penetration- which he proposes to correlate with his five sets of variables. 
Except to the extent that his four conditions can be subsumed under one or 
another of his sets of variables, there is no suggestion in his framework as 
to how the five sets of variables interact with each other: for example, how 
societal variables relate to idiosyncratic ones, or role to governmental.22
The fram ework for research that was proposed by Brecher and his 
associates2® focuses on foreign policy behaviour of any state in general 
rather than any specific type of behaviour (such as non-compliance) of a 
small state. Hence it is only tangentially relevant to the purpose of this 
thesis. Despite such observation, it might be possible to gain some insights 
from this study w hich m ight enhance understanding  non-com pliant 
behaviour in term s of the variables m entioned and  relationships 
emphasized.
Brecher and his associates examined different schools of foreign policy 
analysis such as power, decision making and input-output analysis and
26 Korany B., 'Fcreign-Policy M odels and their Empirical Relevance.to Third World 
Actors: A Critique and an Alternative', International Social Science Tournai. Vol. XXVI, 
No. 1,1974, p. 80-81.
27 Weinstein, Op. Cit. p.361.
28 Brecher et al. Op Cit. p. 75-101.
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observed that the former studies conducted in these traditions "do not, for 
the most part, distinguish the crucial variables of the foreign policy process 
nor do they establish relationships am ong them". The researchers 
therefore, set out to devise a new approach that would guide systematic 
inquiry into cause-effect relations, as well as the search for patterns of 
regularity in state behaviour. This led them to formulate "a framework in 
which the interplay of different pressures can be observed and measured "
Theoretically, the research framework as proposed by the authors appeared 
to be elegant. However, it failed to overcome the concerns that the authors 
had set out to overcome. They wrote, "underlying this kind of enquiry is 
the proposition that social science m odels are of little value unless they are 
subjected to the rigorous test of empirical utility". It is the contention of the 
author of this thesis that despite certain degree of conceptual success (such 
as categorizing variables, specifying their relationships and using the idea of 
feedback) some of the concepts and variables used do not seem to be 
em pirically viable if one wished to m easure them. To appreciate the 
assertion it is first necessary to highlight the research framework itself. 
Having done so, we shall return to consider this point in the subsequent 
discussion on the difficulties associated with the research framework.
In essence, one observes two crucial constructs upon which the framework 
rested . First, the dichotomous view of reality ie. "reality out there" and 
"reality as perceived". The authors asserted that while the former exists 
independently and shapes our perceptions, the latter is what one thinks the 
reality is and not w hat it really is. Second, one's decisions and actions 
follow from what one thinks the reality is and not from the reality out 
there.
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Based on these underlying constructs Brecher et. al. developed their 
fram ework from a system perspective. They asserted that a foreign policy 
system s may be viewed as a network of structures or institutions that 
receives certain inputs and transforms them to certain outputs (decisions) 
th rough  the performance of certain functions. These outputs are in turn 
fed back into the system as inputs in a continuous flow of demands on 
policy, policy process and products of policy. They argued that from a 
system s view the content and interrelations of the key variables such as 
environm ent, actors, structures and processes can be explored as demands 
on  policy or inputs and products of policy as outputs.
O perational Environment: The operational environm ent refers to the
setting in which foreign policy decisions are taken. It represents the 'reality 
ou t there' which is constituted by a set of potentially relevant factors and 
conditions that affect a state's external behaviour. The variables that were 
identified as constituting the operational environm ent were categorized 
into tw o types: external and internal. External variables referred to the 
conditions and relationships that existed beyond the territorial boundaries 
of a state. These included, global, subordinate, subordinate other, bilateral 
and  dom inan t bilateral. Conversely, the internal variables included 
m ilitary capability, economic capability, political structure, specific demands 
on  foreign policy m ade by interest groups and the general demands 
advocated by competing elites.
According to the authors, the total web of relationships among all the actors 
w ithin the international system (states, blocks, organisation) made up the 
global system. A subordinate system was referred to as the intermediate 
level of interaction between the actors within the global system. Four
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categories of subordinate system were identified. The categories were- 
geographic, with contiguous membership; geographic, with non-contiguous 
m em bership; organizational, with contiguous m em bership and finally 
organizational, with non contiguous membership. The authors used the 
term 'subordinate system' to refer to the first category i. e., a regional system 
of which a state is a member. The term 'subordinate other' referred to the 
rest of the three categories, while the term 'bilateral system' was used to 
refer to the total pattern  of interactions between any state (except for 
relations involving superpowers or preeminent powers within the global 
system). The dom inant bilateral system referred to the total pattern of 
interaction between any state and a superpower or preeminent actor in the 
global system.
The authors then defined the internal variables. Military capability was 
defined as the ability to wage war or to deter other states from attacking. 
Economic capability implied the sum total of all m aterial and hum an 
resources available to the state for external behaiour. Political structure 
referred in part to the political institutions and constitutional matrix in 
which authoritative decisions were made. It also denoted the traits of the 
political system which may influence the decision process in foreign policy. 
Examples of such traits included the type of political regime, the character of 
party system, civil military relations of contol, and the system of continuity 
and  stability of the authority structures in the system. Interest groups 
represented the different groups that convey information an d /o r exert 
pressure on the decision makers. Examples of such groups included 
m ilitary establishments, bureaucratic organizations, religious bodies, trade 
unions, business organisations, peasant associations, ethnic and civic
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groups, kinship and lineage groups, regional groups, status and class 
groups.
The final variable in the operational environment as described by the 
authors was 'competing elites': it referred to those elites that vie for 
authority to make political decisions in the system. Further as a variable it 
is closely linked to interest groups both structurally and functionally.
Having described the variables, the authors asserted that the operational 
environment existed independently of its perception by the decision maker. 
However, it is likely to influence foreign policy process to the extent that it 
is communicated to the elite. Such communication may take place in 
variety of ways which included mass media, face to face contact and direct 
observation.
Psvchological Environment: The a u th o rs  c o n te n d ed  th a t  the
psychological environment consisted of two closely related sets of data. One 
was designated by them as the 'attitudinal prism' while the other as 'elite 
image'. The attitudinal prism was referred to as the context of psychological 
predisposition w ithin which a decision maker operated. It may be 
understood as a frame of reference comprising societal factors (such as 
ideology and tradition derived from cumulative historical legacy) and 
personality factors (such as the idiosyncratic qualities of a decision maker). 
The authors argued that when the variables constituting the operational 
environm ent are viewed through the attitudinal prism, they constituted a 
reality as perceived by the decision maker. Such a perceived reality was 
term ed as 'elite image'. Borrowing the idea of cognitive behaviourism ' 
from the Sprouts they further asserted that the decision makers act in 
accordance with these perceptions of reality itself. This implied that image
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or reality could coincide or diverge. The authors argued that a decision 
made on the basis of an elite image that is divergent from what operational 
environm ent actually is, would produce unsuccessful results while 
decision based on an elite image that is convergent would produce 
successful results.
Issue Areas: In an effort to facilitate systematic analysis of state behaviour 
in foreign relations the authors classified various decisions into four issue 
areas: M ilitary-Security, Political-Diplomatic, Economic-Developmental, 
and Cultural-Status. The Military-Security issue area comprised all issues 
which focus on questions pertaining to violence, including alliances and 
weaponry and those which are perceived by the foreign policy elite as 
constituting a security threat. The Politico-diplom atic issue area is a 
residual category that contain issues which are found classified in other 
areas. All such issues may relate to foreign policy interaction at each of the 
three levels of external environment such as global, subordinate and 
bilateral. The Economic-Developmental issue area comprised all issues that 
involve the acquisition and allocation of resources such as trade, aid and 
foreign investment. Finally, the Cultural-Status issue area contained those 
foreign policy issues that concerned cultural, educational and scientific 
exchanges.
The main problem posed by this framework is that it does not appear to be 
em pirically  viable. We shall examine th is point along with other 
difficulties associated with the framework.
The difficulties that may be highlighted include the following. First, critics 
observed that although Brecher and his associates neatly integrated an array 
of relevant variables in a systemic model, they nevertheless failed to offer
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any indication about specifically relating the variables in their systems; 
instead they dem onstrated by example how one might discover discrete 
proposition from com parative case studies.29 Second, given the authors' 
desire for measurement the framework seems to suffer from an inadequate 
operational expression of the variables identified. A lthough some 
indicators w ere m entioned for the m easurem ent of military®^ and 
economic®^ capability, the authors did not spell out how they measured the 
rest of the variables. One remains uncertain as to how one can measure the 
im pact of interest groups and competing elites. Further as far as the 
external factors are concerned, m easuring the total web of relationship' 
implies m easuring both the tangible aspects (such as quantum  of trade 
between two countries, am ount of material aid given) and non-tangible 
aspects (socio-cultural legacy of conflict such as in case of India and 
Pakistan) of relationships. It is not clear how such grey areas of relationship 
could be operationalized in measurable terms. Third, it appears to be 
extremely difficult to know the operational environment (as discussed in 
the framework) as a reality that exists independent of one's perception'. 
The variables identified do not help us in such task. The knowledge of 
operational environm ent in term s of the variables m entioned (except 
m ilitary  and  econom ic capability) is a m atter of an  ind iv idua l's  
interpretation (ie. a perceptual reality). Human interpretations cannot be 
dissociated from a reality theoretically designated as 'independent' of one's
29 Herman C. F and Peacock G., 'Evolution and Future of Research in the Comparative 
Study of Foreign Policy', in Herman, Kegley and Rosenau (ed) Op. Cit.. p. 25.
30 Measured in terms of geography, level of technology, military manpower, financial 
resources available for defence and weaponry.
31 Measured in terms of demography, GNP, balance of payment, level of production and 
employment.
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perception. If that is the case the theoretical distinction between operational 
environment (an independent reality) and elite image (perceptual reality) is 
not available in practical terms. Hence, there rem ains no basis for 
comparing the operational environment and elite image for ascertaining 
which decisions are successful and which are not. Therefore the authors 
cannot achieve objectivity in the way they theorized. Further, there are 
grounds to d ispu te  their contention that the researcher will be more 
objective than the elites. If the elite's world view is a perceived reality so is 
the researcher's and for that matter anybody else's. Which view is more 
objective than the others? Also there has not been any unequivocal 
research m ethod in social science that can claim complete objectivity. 
Furthermore, the researcher as an outsider does not have the insider view 
and the crucial information needed to make a more accurate assessment of 
operational environm ent than the decision maker. Fifth, the authors 
indicated that the purpose of their study was to guide systematic inquiry 
into cause-effect relations and the prediction of behaviour through the 
search for patterns for regularity. However, no attem pt was made in the 
study to control extraneous variables. One remains uncertain as to how 
causality could be established and predictions made without the control of 
extraneous variables. Sixth, the introduction of the concepts of elite image 
and attitudinal prism  were also criticised by scholars in the field. It was 
noted that these concepts lacked the refinement to reveal how they would 
act as the in terface betw een the operational and  psychological 
environments.®^ Another critic noted that the images that are reflected in 
the public utterances of governement officials cannot be the source of policy 
decisions or the product of them. One can hardly expect the statements
32 Herman and Peacock .Op. Cit.. p. 25.
60
issued to defend a policy decision will reveal images that do not support the 
decision. The question is whether images taken from such materials really 
constitu te  a variable that can be d istinguished  from the decisions 
themselves.®® Knowing the images that exist in the decision maker's mind 
before they decide certainly will help us understand the subsequent 
decision. However, to speak of predicting outcomes based on images 
contained in official statements is no more meaningful than to say that one 
who knows in advance the argum ents that will be used to justify a given 
decision can predict that decision. Finally, the framework seems to have 
been based on the assumption of a free flow of information where one can 
get all the undistorted information about operating environment and elite 
image. This assumption does not seem to be realistic. As indicated above 
public utterances of decision makers are clearly inadequate for the purpose. 
Methodologically, one is likely to prefer some form of indepth interview 
w ith key officials as a principal means of data collection not the public 
utterances. However, because of the various stakes involved in foreign 
affairs one is not likely to get necessary access to undistorted view of elite 
image. From this perspective also the concept of elite image does not take 
us far in empirical terms.
Thus from the observation mentioned above, one is likely to conclude that 
despite the theoretical effort the framework does not offer much promise in 
empirical terms. As the constructs, variables and relationships do not seem 
to stand the empirical test, they seem not to provide encouraging insights 
for the purpose of this thesis. More importantly, as the framework did not
33 W einstein, Op. Cit. p. 362.
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concern itself with the small states' definite form of behaviour, the study 
does not seem to be of much help for this thesis.
Whatever the disappointm ent with some aspects of, or other, of the above 
discussed conceptual models, all these are no doubt impressive assemblies 
of variables and elem ents that are supposed to affect the foreign policy 
behaviour of the states in general. But again the point of departure is that 
these approaches and  models are also not very much different from the 
previous ones: sam e plethora, same open endedness. They are either 
prescriptive or banal. And unless these theories could serve practically, 
they  w ould  rem ain  only, 'elegant m onum ents to their au tho r's  
comprehension and logic.
Thus it is clear from the above discussion that although the existing and 
developing theories increase our knowledge of foreign policy behaviour, 
they give but very lim ited help in the specific problem on analyzing the 
behaviour of small states. The models are basically designed with power 
and the super powers in mind. They seem to have only minimal utility for 
those of most of the third world states. In short these kinds of theories are 
conceived from a big power perspective and hence help us to understand 
the policy of m edium  to great powers. They do not take us very far in 
understanding the behaviour of a particular type of small state vis-a-vis its 
big neighbour in a situation where both small as well as big are developing 
third world countries.
34 H ovde P. C., Explaining the Foreign Policy Behaviours of the National Leadership of 
the Small Island Democracies: An Empirical Assessment and Reconstruction of the 
Adaptive Theory. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kansas, 1980.
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CHAPTER 3 
FRAMEWORK OF INQUIRY
When small states comply w ith the wishes of big powers, we have no 
problem in understanding their behaviour. In such cases a small state's 
behaviour is more or less in accord with the preferences of the country that 
dominates it. Since the big states outweigh greatly the small states in terms 
of objective or tangible attributes of power, the small states' behavioural 
expression of compliance can usually^ be ascribed to their lack of such 
pow er capability. The problem  arises when small states exhibit non- 
compliance. We fail to understand why small states demonstrate such 
behaviour while apparently they should be complying. In this chapter we 
shall attem pt to develop a theoretical framework that would facilitate our 
understanding of non-compliant behaviour of the small states under study.
A t the core of the interaction betw een states that characterises non- 
compliance we have the interplay of power. The power connotation is 
inherent in the concept of non-compliance. As soon as we hear or read the 
term 'non-compliance' the meaning that starts ringing bells in our mind is 
'opposition'; and opposition implies the use of force or power. Therefore 
the pow er elem ent is a necessary condition for the concept non- 
compliance' to be as it is. For example state 'A' wants state 'B' to do 
som ething which state B' does not want to do or state B' does something 
not to the liking of state 'A' and state 'A' wants state B' stop doing it which
1 As w e shall see later in this chapter objective or tangible attributes do not necessarily 
guarantee power to prevail.
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State B' does not want to stop. State B' can only stop it by putting counter 
pressure on state 'A' which is making it do something that it is not inclined 
to perform. The behavioural expression of state B's resistance may be 
term ed as non-com pliant behaviour (NCB). It should  however, be 
remembered that non-compliance does not necessarily mean that a state 
has to engage in confrontations like war.
By non-compliance we mean 'not yielding to the will or pressure of the 
powerful'. Non-compliance can be conceived in term s of degrees in a 
continuum . An extreme example of non-compliance may be a situation 
w here the non-com plying state refuses to yield to the pressure of the 
external pow er saying 'No and forever no'. A lesser degree of non- 
compliant behaviour may be exhibited; in such cases the non-complying 
state says no' and after considerable pressure eventually yields to 'yes'. Yet 
in other situations, an even lesser degree of non-compliant behaviour may 
be exhibited, such that the non-complying state, although initially it says 
no', eventually yields to the external power under little pressure. Finally 
in certain other situations the non-complying state yields to the external 
pow er since no other alternative is available to it; it would avoid it if it 
were possible and it would defy the external power whenever an opportune 
m oment arrives. Corresponding to these degrees of non-compliance we 
have shades of examples— ranging from strong and explicit official defiance 
to im plicit and unofficial governmental protests. Furtherm ore, non- 
compliance may also be direct or indirect and initiative or responsive^.
2 It may be noted that it is difficult to achieve clear-cut distinction between initiative and 
responsive non-compliance. The author of this thesis shares the Sprouts view of 
arbitrariness of such distinction. The Sprouts wrote that "such a distinction [between 
action and reaction] is arbitrary and artificial in the sense that every action is in some 
degree a reaction to some earlier action by some one. However, it is necessary to cut into 
the seamless web of events somewhere. The question, Where? is determined by the way
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Given the crucial role that the idea of 'power' plays in the conceptualisation 
of non-compliance, it seems useful first to explore the concept of power in 
some detail and then examine what it implies to the conceptualisation of 
Nepali and Bangladeshi non-compliant behaviour.
C onceptualising Pow er and Non-compliance : The Policy Contingency 
Approach
Power is one of the most im portant and basic concepts in international 
relations. Although the use of the concept of power (and related concepts) 
in understanding hum an phenomena can be traced from the remote past, 
the systematic empirical study of power relations is remarkably new.3 The 
vast improvement in the clarity of power concepts was due to the fact that 
during the last several decades there were more systematic efforts to tie 
these concepts than the previous millennia of political thought.^ One 
could not agree more with the authorities such as Baldwin^, Cartwright^ or 
D ahF that conceptual sophistication, refinements, increased precision and
in which one formulates the problem to be investigated". See Sprout H, and Sprout M., 
Foundations of International Politics. New Jersey, 1962, p. 106.
3 Dahl R. A,, The Concept of Power*, Behavioural Science. Vol. 11, July 1957, p. 201-215.
4 For instance, Dahl R. A., M odem Political Analvsis. 3rd edition. New Jersey, 1976, p. 26; 
Riker W. H., 'Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power', The American Political Science 
Review. Vol. LVm, No. 2, June 1964, p. 341-349; Bachrach P. and Baratz M., Two Faces 
of Power', The American Political Science Review. Vol. 56, No. 4, December, 1962, p. 947- 
52; Nagel J. H., Some Questions About the Concept of Power', Behavioural Science. Vol. 
Xin, Mar(±i 1968; Nagel J. H., The Descriptive Analvsis of Power. New Haven, 1975; to 
name only a few.
5 Baldwin D. A., Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies', 
World Politics. Vol. XXXI, No. 2, January, 1979, p.161-194.
6 Cartwright D., Influence, Leadership, Control', in March J., (ed.) Handbook of 
Organisations. Chicago, 1%5.
7 Dahl R. A., M odem Political Analvsis. (2nd edition). New Jersey, 1970.
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'interm inable theoretical distinctions' tend to overw helm  an analyst.® 
Admittedly, there are values in achieving precision of and theoretical 
distinctions am ong such concepts as power, influence, resistance, control 
etc. However, given the task of understanding the non-compliance of 
small states it is useful to consider power in a generic sense and focus on 
the essential question: Is power some thing that can be accumulated and 
applied over w ide range of circum stances or is it context bound? In 
understanding small states' non-com pliant behaviour, it appears to be 
more convincing to consider power, as a means, w ithin a contextual 
framework, than to treat it as something capable of universal application 
and unaffected by any contextualities. Let us examine the issue. First, we 
shall explore the 'universal' view of power.
The 'realist school' of international politics maintains that the power of a 
national political community is a function primarily of its mobilizable and 
deployable m ilitary force.^ Pow er is viewed as a quantifiable and 
commensurable mass which can be measured and w e ig h e d .C h a n  in his 
study of Taiwan's trade relations with the US noted,
in general structural models of international relations are apt to 
posit the analytic or policy importance of one or more tangible 
assets, to treat these assets as proprietary properties, and to assign 
national status on the basis of these assets. The world is seen to
8 For a discussion on the distinction between Power and Influence, see. Bell D., Power, 
Influence and Authority. New York, 1975; Knorr K., The Power of Nations: The Political 
Economy of International Relations. N ew  York, 1975; Hassan S., Tndia-Bangladesh 
Political Relations During the Awami League Government, 1972-75', Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis. Australian National University, 1988.
9 See Sprout and Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, Op. Cit.. p. 137.
10 Ibid.. p. 137-138.
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have a hierarchy and countries are somehow locked into this 
structure. Attention tends to be directed to the more objective or 
quantifiable aspects of national assets, to the domestic rather than 
foreign sources for generating these assets, and to the basic 
rigidities and asymmetries of the international relation system.^^
Snider asserted that the general concern of most empirical approaches to 
the definition and measurement of power in world politics has been with 
power as a strategic resource base for a very specific purpose: to index the 
w ar fighting potential of n a tio n s .R e s e a rc h e rs  such as Singer et. al.^®, 
Choucri and North^^, Doran and Parsons^®, HandeP®, Cline^^, Wayman^® 
and StolP^ combined dimensions such as industrial, demographic and
11 Chan S.,'The M ouse that Roared: Taiwan's Management of Trade Relations with the 
United States', Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 20, No. 3, October, 1987, p. 251-292.
12 Snider L. W., 'Identifying the Elements of State Power: Where Do We Begin?', 
Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 20, No. 3, October, 1987, p. 314-356.
13 Singer J. D., Bremer,S., and Stuckey J,, Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War, 1820-1%5', in Russett B., (ed.). Peace. War and Numbers. California, 1972.
14 Choucri N., and North R. C., Nations in Conflict. San Francisco, 1974.
15 Doran C. F., and Parsons W., 'War and the Cycle of Relative Power', American Political 
Science Review. Vol. 74, No. 4,1980.
16 Handel M., Weak States in the International Svstem. London, 1981.
17 Cline R. S., World Power Trends and U. S. Foreign Policv for the 1980s. Boulder, 1981. 
Also Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. Boulder, 1975. 
Recognising Cline’s World Power Assessment as a pole opposite of contextual analysis 
advocated by the Sprouts and Lasswell and Kaplan, Baldwin commented that, if one 
wanted to promote the idea of power as monolithic, homogenous, uni dimensional and 
highly fungible, it w ould be difficult to improve on Cline's approach. See Baldwin, 
Power Analysis and World Politics', Op. Cit.. p.171-173.
18 Wayman F., Singer J. D., and Goertz G., Capabilities, Allocations and Success in 
Militarised Disputes and Wars, 1816-1976', International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 27, No. 
4,1983.
19 Stoll R., Bloc Concentration and the Balance of Power', loum al of Conflict Resolution. 
Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984.
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military (or their equivalents) in constructing capability index to assess war 
fighting potential of nations. Snider observed that all these indices held an 
underlying assum ption  that additional increm ents of resources are 
somehow converted into additional increments of power.^®
Power is being treated as a quantifiable, monolithic, hom ogeneous and 
highly fungible entity, which can be acquired, possessed, accumulated, 
measured, compared and used irrespective of time and contexts. However, 
our experiences often contradict our expectations derived from the notion 
of power based on tangible pow er assets'. In commercial negotiations, 
diplomatic disputes, even military conflicts, the weaker side is sometimes 
able to prevail over the stronger side to obtain a more favourable 
settlement than its objective assets and liabilities would suggest.^^ The 
observation of frequent failure of power predictions has led Baldwin to 
label the problem  as 'the paradox of unrealised pow er.'22 Using this 
paradox Baldwin argued the usefulness of contextual analysis and the 
inadequacy of a monolithic, homogeneous and highly fungible conception 
of power. Baldwin considered two explanations of the paradox. First, he 
explained the paradox in term s of malfunctioning conversion process. 
Using the distinction between potential power and actual power, he argued 
that a 'weaker' state may prevail over the stronger' state because of the 
latter's inability to transform  potential power into actual power. He 
maintained that variables such as 'lack of will' to use power or a lack of
20 Snider, Op. Cit. p. 317.
21 Chan, Op. Cit. A lso Keohane R. and Nye J., Power and Interdependence: World Politics 
in Transition. Boston, 1977. and Organski A. F. K., and Kugler J., 'Davids and Goliaths: 
Predicting the Outcomes of International Wars', Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 11, 
1978, p. 141-180.
22 Baldwin. Op. Cit. 1979. p. 163.
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skill' to wield it effectively could be used to account for such inability and 
help resolve the paradox. Second, he used the argument of infungibility of 
pow er resources. Power resources that are effective in one context can be 
ineffective in another.2 3
Although the phrase 'paradox of unrealised power' reflected a big-power- 
prevailing-over -a- small power perspective, this is essentially the same as 
that of a small- power-resisting-a-big-power. Both the perspectives depend 
on how power is conceptualised in order to explain the anomalies of power 
prediction (i.e., a big power failing to prevail over a small power when it is 
expected to be prevailing over the small power and a small power defying a 
b ig  pow er when it is expected to be complying with the big power.) 
However, the significance of Baldwin's arguments is that, these arguments 
underscore the importance of the two constructs (i.e., the 'will of the power 
wielder' and the relative infungibility' of power resources) in facilitating a 
contextual conceptualisation of power and thereby help to resolve the 
paradox. Hence, these two constructs will now be examined in some depth. 
Let us first consider the mediating role of 'will' in the conversion process.
One of the most im portant element of social power analysis since 1950 has 
been  the relational defin ition of power.24 Power according to this 
form ulation is perceived as a product of the relation between two or more 
actors. Such a relationship may be actual or postulated.25 The Sprouts 
wrote that.
23 Ibid.. p. 163-164.
24 Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', In tern ation a l 
Organisation. Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980, p. 4%.
25 On the relational definition of power, see, Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society. 
N ew  Haven, 1950; Simon H., Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political
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Conclusions regarding the capabilities of nation are always 
comparative. That is to say, the capabilities of a given state are 
relative to the capabilities of the other states with which it is or 
may be involved in demand-response relationships. There is no 
such thing as political capabilities in the abstract or in general- in 
a vacuum, so to speak any more than there can be any concept of 
political potential that is not comparative.^^
Similarly, in his critique of Knorr's form ulation of 'putative' power as 
inherent in the things of value^^, Baldwin wrote,
A  relational concept of power assumes that actual or potential 
power is never inherent in properties of A, but rather inheres in 
the actual or potential relationship between A 's  properties and 
B's value system.^^
W hat Baldwin disagrees with in Knorr is that power is not inherent in the 
p roperties of A; i.e., A does not possess power in an independent or 
absolute sense. However, he recognises that power can emanate from the 
p roperties  of A in his relationship w ith B's perception, values and 
propensities.29 Thus from a relational point of view, A's properties are just 
as im portant as B's value system; i.e., A's power is contingent upon himself 
just as it is contingent upon B. For example, the effectiveness or potential
Power', Tournai of Politics. 15, November, 1953; Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', Op. Cit.: 
Cartwright, Op. Cit.: and Rosenau J., 'Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent 
World', International Security. Fall 1976.
26 Sprout and Sprout, Op. Cit.. 1%2, p. 164.
27 Knorr, Op. Cit.. 1975.
28 Baldwin, Op. Cit. 1979, p. 171.
29 Ibid.. P. 171.
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effectiveness of A's threat not only depends on whether B is a coward or a 
masochist, but also w hether A has the m otivation/willingness and power 
potential to make the threat. Hence, the m otivation/ willingness of the 
power wielder can also be regarded as one significant element in the power 
relationship betw een  two actors. A lthough Baldwin preferred the
argum ent of rela tive  infungibility of power over the argum ent of
malfunctioning of conversion process,30 he elaborated (within a contextual 
frame of reference) the mediating role of motivation in another place. He 
wrote that,
The distinction between actual and potential power is essential 
Both are relational concepts in that one refers to actual social 
relations while the other refers to potential social relations; and
both vary in scope, weight and domain. The primary difference 
concerns the motivation of the actual or potential power
wielder. The distinction allows for the common phenomenon 
of unused power resources; an actor may have the ability to get 
B to do X but lack the desire to do so.3^
30 Baldwin argued that the argument of malfunctioning of conversion process encourages 
sloppy power analysis' because of the subjectivity involved in attributing such meaning 
as 'A ladced commitment'. (See Baldwin, Op. Cit. 1979. p.l69). However, the element of 
subjectivity is inescapable in social science research in general and international relation 
in particular. For example, the Sprouts wrote, 'At best the analyst's inferences regarding 
his subjects' image of milieu and his orientation to it rest invariably and inescapably on 
more or less arbitrary decisions as to the relevance and weight to be given to various 
kinds of evidence perceived and filtered through the analyst's own (and usually several 
intermediaries') culture-biased spectacles.' Sprout H., and Sprout M., 'Environmental 
Factors in the Study of International Politics', Tournai of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 1,1957, 
p. 320. When subjectivity is a condition of research, no one alternative is better than the 
other.
31 Baldwin, Op. Cit.. 1980, p. 498. (emphasis added).
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Other examples of similar formulation can also be found in the literature. 
For exam ple, S tarr,32 Most and Starr33, and Papadakis and Starr34 
considered the logical connections between variables such as willingness of 
the decision makers to pursue certain policies, the opportunities offered by 
the environm ent etc., to construct the basis of their environmental model. 
'Willingness' (which deals with psychological goals and motivations) was 
conceptualised as a m ediating variable between the environm ent and 
'outcomes' of foreign policy.®® Papadakis and Starr wrote,
The environment defines the context within which a state may 
act, but how the state actually acts or deals with its environment 
depends upon number of factors: the. sets of opportunities that 
the characteristics of the sub-environments 'objectivity' provide 
the state, how the state perceives its environment, its w illin g n ess  
to take a particular course of action, and so on?^
One can see a close parallel between this formulation and the relationships 
between 'actual power', 'potential power' along with the mediating role of 
motivation of the power wielder. The crucial suggestion which emerges
32 Starr H., " 'Opportunity' and 'Willingness' as Ordering Concepts in the Study of War", 
International Interactions. Vol. 4,1978, p. 363-87.
33 Most A., and Starr H., Case Selection and. Conceptualisation and Basic Logic in the 
Study of War', American Tournai of Political Science. Vol. 26, 1982, p. 834-56; Most, A., 
and Starr, H., Conceptualising War: Consequences for Theory and Research, Tournai of 
Conflict Resolution. Vol. 27, 1983, p. 137-59; Most, A., and Starr, H., International 
Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitability, and Nice Laws', World Politics. Vol. 36, 
1984, p. 383-406.
34 Papadakis M., and Starr H., 'Opportunity, W illingness, and Small States: The 
Relationship between Environment and Foreign Policy', in Herman C., Kegley C., and 
Rosenau J., (ed.). New Directions in the Studv of Foreign Policv. Boston, 1987.
35 Ibid.. p. 415-419.
36 Ibid.. p. 416. (emphasis added).
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from the foregoing discussion is that m otivation of the power wielder 
(viewed within a contextual frame of reference) may be treated as a 
plausible element of the theoretical framework necessary to understand 
non-com pliant behaviour of the small states under study. Having 
considered the motivation of the power wielder, let us now return to the 
argum ent of infungibility of power resources in understanding the paradox 
of unrealised power.
The failure of the power predictions may also result from the mistaken 
belief that power resources are highly fungible, i.e., those power resources 
that are useful in one policy-contingency framework will be equally useful 
in other policy-contingency frameworks. The Sprouts insisted that a 
discussion of capabilities should always take place within some framework 
of policies and operational contingencies, actual or postulated.32
The policy-contingency frame of reference is im portant because data (for 
example, of physical geography, demographic condition, technological state, 
economic affairs etc.) have no intrinsic political significance whatsoever. 
Such data acquire political significance only when related to some frame of 
assumption as to what is to be attempted, by whom, when and where, and 
vis-a-vis what adversaries, associates and neutral bystanders.3®
32 Sprout H., and Sprout M., Op.Cit. 1962, p.l64. 
38 Ibid. p. 164.
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The need for contextual specification of pow er relations was also 
highlighted by Lasswell and Kaplan®^, DahH®, B aldw in^\ N a g e l ^ 2  and 
Lam born^® . While Baldwin offered a com plete list of contextual 
specifications, he suggested that there is a general agreem ent in the social 
pow er literature that a m inim um  specification of a pow er relation must 
include both  scope and domain^^. Emphasising the im portance of 
specifying scope and domain Dahl wrote.
A ny statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the 
domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless. 
When one hears that A  is highly influential, the proper 
question is: Influential over what actor with respect to what
matters? The failure to insist on this simple question often 
leads political observers astray.^^
A sim ilar emphasis can also be observed in the Sprouts' work.^6 xhe 
underlying rational for such em phasis is that the situational diversities 
render a particular power-resource useless across context. B a l d w i n ^ ^  cited
39 Lasswell and Kaplan, Op . Cit.. 1950, p. 75-76.
40 Dahl, Op. Cit.. 1976, p. 29-33.
41 Baldwin, Op. Cit.. 1979 and 1980.
42 Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power, Op. Cit.. p. 14.
43 Lambom A. C., The Price Of Power. Boston, 1991.
44 Baldwin, Op. Cit.. 1980. The complete descripticMi of a power relation would include who 
is trying to get whom to do what, by what means, where, when, how, at what cost, with 
what degree of success and so cm.
45 Dahl, Op. Cit.. 1976.
46 Sprout H., and Sprout M., Op. Cit.. 1%2.
47 Baldwin, Op. Cit.. 1979.
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Schelling, who stressed that even slight changes in the context of an 
influence attem pt can convert a power asset into a power liability; that 
threatening voters w ith nuclear attack is not merely one of the less effective 
ways to win a mayoral election in New Haven, it is a guarantee of defeat; 
that possession of nuclear weapons is not just irrelevant to securing the 
election of a US citizen as UN Secretary-General; it is a hindrance; that 'first 
strike weapons' m ay not only decline in effectiveness in deterrent 
situations, they may actually impair one's ability to deter.^®
This is because political pow er resources are relatively low in fungibility. 
However, this does not im ply that some power resources are not more 
fungible than others. Power resources such as money, time, information 
etc., are most likely to be effective in most situations with regard to most 
people over most scopes^^ than perhaps power resources such as ethnic 
homogeneity of one's own constituency or elite consensus. However, as 
Baldwin noted, there are tendencies to exaggerate the effectiveness of 
m ilitary power resources and  to treat m ilitary pow er as the ultim ate 
measuring rod to which other forms of power should be compared. These 
tendencies are considered to be counter-productive in theorising about 
in ternational politics.®® A lthough Lasswell and Kaplan gave 'special 
consideration to the role of violence', they repeatedly asserted that power 
does not rest 'always, or even generally, on violence'; that 'power may rest 
on various bases'; that 'none of the forms of power is basic to all the others'; 
an d  th a t p o litica l p h en o m en a  a re  on ly  ob scu red  by the
48 Schelling T. C., The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, 1976, d ted  in Baldwin, Op. Cit.. 
1979, p. 166.
49 Baldwin, Ibid.. p. 167.
50 Ibid. p. 180.
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pseudosim plification attained with any unitary conception of pow er as 
being always and everywhere the same'.®^ Hence, if power is treated as 
situation  specific rather than generalised, idea of an 'ultimate' form of 
pow er does not make much sense.®2 Finally, Baldwin asserted.
The proposition that military force is more effective than other 
power resources is both ambiguous and debatable. In the 
absence of clearly specified or implied policy-contingency 
frameworks, the proposition that force is more effective than 
other power bases has little, if any, meaning.53
A s required by the contextual perspective, we shall now focus on the 
situation  specifics and attem pt to form ulate a contextual framework for 
understanding  Nepali and Bangladeshi Non-Compliant Behaviour.
A C ontextual Fram ework for A nalysing N on-com pliant Behaviour of 
Sm all States
The insistence of contextual analysis of pow er relations might convey an 
im p ress io n  of atheoretical em piricism . A dm ittedly, a contextual 
perspective discourages the development of general theories, however, it is 
no t devoid of theoretical significance. Baldwin stressed the theoretical 
im port of a contextual analysis and mentioned that.
51 Lasswell and Kaplan, Op. Cit.. p. ix, 76, 85, 92, 94.
52 Baldwin, Op. Cit.. 1979.
53 Ibid.. p. 181.
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Emphasis on policy-contingency frameworks could improve 
theorizing about international politics by encouraging the 
development o f middle-level theories and by forcing the 
acknowledgement o f assum ptions that are often left 
implicit
A s  'm iddle-level theories', the m odels that follow shortly are context 
bound. Yet they are, at the same time, plausible conceptual organisers that 
are likely to facilitate the understanding of the specific incidents of NCB of 
Nepal and Bangladesh. Figure 3.1 present a schematic diagram of the 
contextual fram ew ork used to facilitate understanding of Nepali and 
Bangladeshi NCB s.
Figure 3.1 A Schematic Diagram of the Contextual Framework 
for Understanding NCB of Nepal and Bangladesh
State B [Small State- The Defiant Actor]
The Conditions of Motivation to Defy
2
►
Condition 1: Vital-ness of Issues
Condition 2: Ambition of the Ruler 
Condition 3: Political Tilt of the Ruling
State A 1 Party
[Big State- 
The Target o f Defiance]
Capability to Resist
4 (based on Non-tangible Power Resources)
Popular Pressure and Popular Support 
Leadership Strength 
External Political Support 
Geo-political Leverage
Î
Demonstration of NCB 
(The Extent of NCB ]
54 Ibid.. p. 168.
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In this framework the small state is engaged in a relationship with the big 
state which is characterised by non-compliance. However, as arrow  1 in 
figure 3.1 suggests, this relationship is contingent on both the states 
involved in the interaction. According to this fram ework, certain  
conditions are likely to generate a small state's motivation to defy a big 
state. The motivation to defy is generated because under these conditions 
the small state perceives certain moves of the big state as threats to its goals, 
aspirations and interests. Arrow 2 in figure 3.1 indicates such perception of 
real or imagined threats. Vitalness of issues, ambition of the ruler and the 
political tilt of the ruling party emerged from data®® as conditions that 
constitu te  m otivation  of Nepal and Bangladesh to defy India. The 
conditions that generated the motivation to defy, ascribe m eaning to the 
power resources as means to demonstrate non-compliance. To illustrate 
the point, let us consider an extreme situation. What could geo-political 
leverage, a power resource as a means to defy India, signify to a dead (hence, 
devoid of motivation to defy) Nepali decision maker? Perhaps nothing at 
all! Arrow 3 in figure 3. 1 indicates an ascription of meaning (to the power 
resources) by the motivational conditions. The power resources which 
constitute capability to resist, are also contingent on the big state (i.e., the 
target of small state's defiance) for their effectiveness. For example, given 
the geographical location, geopolitical leverage for Nepal acquires its 
usefulness as a result of Indian security concerns. Arrow 4 in figure 3.1 
reveals such a contingent relationship of the power resources. Popular 
pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political
55 Obtained through field study and review of literature and documents
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support and geo-political leverage em erged from the data as power 
resources that may constitute a small state's Capability to Resist.
Finally, according to the framework, the conditions of motivation to defy 
offer the answer to the why  of non-com pliance while, given these 
conditions, the power resources offer the answ er to the how  of non- 
com pliance of Nepal and Bangladesh. In o ther words, Nepal and 
Bangladesh dem onstrated NCB because conditions such as vitalness of 
issues, am bition of the ruler and the political tilt of the ruling party 
generated the motivation for them to defy. Given the contextualities, these 
states demonstrated NCB with the help of power resources such as popular 
p ressure  and popular support, leadership strength, external political 
support and geo-political leverage.
1. The Conditions Generating Motivation To Defy:
From the foregoing discussion of Power, the m otivation of the power 
wielder emerged as a significant intermediary variable. The motivation for 
an  outcome or goal is the need, aspiration or desire for acquiring something 
of value or for avoiding something of anti-value (e.g., avoidance of pain). 
W hen acquisition of valued outcome or the avoidance of anti-valued 
outcome are threatened by coercion or deprivation (actual or perceived) the 
m otivation to defy may be generated in order to eliminate the threat and 
enable the seeking of outcomes valued or avoidance of outcomes anti-
56 It may be noted that the conditions and resources are considered in a specific context, 
with specific states (i.e., Nepal, Bangladesh and India) with specific direction of 
resistance to demands (Nepal and Bangladesh resisting Indian demands), in a certain 
time-frame (specified in the analysis chapters), and over certain issues (specified in the 
analysis chapters).
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valued. The crucial role of motivation in non-compliance was succinctly 
put by Puchala's respondent, who was quoted to have m entioned that, 
'N othing will move a national governm ent that does not want to be
moved'®2.
The contextual analysis of pow er dem ands exploring the contextual 
conditions that generate the motivation of the decision maker to act (or to 
defy). As mentioned earlier, vital ness of issues, ambition of the ruler and 
the political tilt of the ruling party emerged from the data as plausible 
conditions that generated m otivation in the Nepali and Bangladeshi 
decision makers to defy India. These conditions bestow m eaning and 
significance to the power resources.
1 a. Condition 1: Vital-ness of Issues
Non-compliance is not an end in itself; i.e., states which do not comply, do 
so not just for the sake of it, bu t for other compelling reasons. Non- 
compliance can be best viewed as a product of their pursuit of survival. 
According to condition 1, as the observations from the field study suggest, a 
perception of vital-ness of issues, as a condition for motivation to defy, may 
lead a small state to demonstrate NCB. Motivation to defy, however, does 
not follow when such issues are not viewed as vital.
An issue is vital if it is necessary (actually or potentially) to survival of 
people®®, state or regime— physically, economically, and politically. To be
57 Puchala D., 'Dom estic Politics and Regional H arm onization in the European  
Communities’, World Politics. Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1975, p. 510. (emphasis added)
58 Here the consideration of peoples' survival' does not constitute a problem of level of 
analysis. Such a consideration dos not imply focusing on the behaviour of both the states'
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more specific, survival is at stake when a people face death (physical); a 
country's trade, industry and agriculture face ruin (economic); rulers face 
loss of rule (political); decision-makers face loss of independence of decision 
making (political) or the state faces actual or potential threats to territorial 
independence (physical). In all such cases the issues involved are vital. On 
the other hand, a non-vital issue is that which is not necessary to survival. 
For example, as the data from this study suggest, Bangladesh has been more 
vocal and defiant in the case of the water issue which is considered vital for 
the survival of her population as compared to the 'Tin Bigha Corridor'. 
Also, Nepal has been more defiant over issues like Trade and Transit as 
compared to the ethnic balance in the Tarai Region. It appears from the 
foregoing that the vital issues can be spread over a range. On one side we 
may have something that is 'absolutely' necessary to survive, i.e., without 
which existence will be at stake, for example, people will face acute crisis 
immediately or in future. On the other side we may have something that is 
necessary because, although w ithout which existence will not be at stake, 
but survival will mean encountering considerable difficulty.
The demonstration of non-compliance on the issues perceived as vital, can 
be observed in Puchala®^. He examined some cases in his study of the role 
of domestic politics in regional harmonisation in the EEC. These were the 
Belgian subsidies case, the German pharm aceuticals case, the French 
investm ent case and the Italian VAT case. In all these cases, the EC 
directives threatened some issues that were considered to be necessary for 
political or econom ic survival of either people or groups or even
behaviour as influenced by peoples' affairs. A similar treatment can be found in Puchala, 
Ibid.
59 Ib i^  p. 4%-520.
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governm ents. Puchala's analysis suppo rt vitalness as a condition of 
motivation to defy. For example Puchala mentioned that,
They w ill balk, delay, circumvent, or ignore Community 
regulations when they perceive compliance as being contrary to  
th e ir  in te rests , even when they are formally committed to 
compliance.
Similarly he further added.
When a government chooses to circumvent EEC regulations, 
there are usually good political reasons, and no am ount o f  
pushing from  Brussels is likely  to bring compliance un til 
national political difficulties have been overcome..^^
The EC directives, in some instances, pu t existence' at stake; while in 
others m eant encountering considerable difficulty. For example, in the 
Belgian subsidies and the Italian VAT cases EC directives threatened the 
existence of the regimes concerned. Puchala asserted,
... no Belgian regime could remain viable if it insisted upon 
allocating regional subsidies in any other way than in accordance 
with the size of linguistic communities in Belgium.^^
Similarly, in the Italian case he wrote that, 'But it [non-compliance] had a 
great deal to do with fears about yet another crisis fo r  the faltering Rome
60 Ibid, p.510. (emphasis added)
61 Ibid. p. 514. (emphasis added)
62 lb i4 p .  511.
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regim e’ Additionally, in the Italian VAT case, various sections of the 
Italian population perceived that the implementation of the EC directives 
would mean encountering considerable difficulty.
1 b. Condition 2: Am bition of the Ruler.
Another plausible condition that appears to generate motivation to defy is 
the ambition of the ruler. Irrespective of ability an individual nourishes 
the desire to become whatever one hopes to become. Since ambition 
creates an urge to fulfil whatever is left unfulfilled it influences behaviours 
and actions. In our particular situation the ruler's dreams, aspirations to 
become a strong and effective ruler and to rule a strong and prosperous 
country are also likely to influence his decisions, actions and behaviours. It 
is very natural that some of these decisions, actions and behaviour will be 
non-com pliant. Examples of such decisions, actions and behaviour in 
Nepal are not that rare. Hence, according to condition 2, the presence of a 
ru ler's am bition to become strong and effective is likely to generate 
m otivation to defy, while the absence of such ambition is not likely to 
generate m otivation to defy and thereby enable us to understand non- 
compliant and compliant behaviour respectively.
63 Ibid. p. 511. (emphasis added).
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1 c  Condition 3: The Political Tilt of a Ruling Party
The previous conditions offered two possible ways of understanding the 
motivation to defy. Here we explore another possible condition that give 
rise to the m otivation to defy. This focuses on the Political tilt of the 
Ruling Party in explaining such motivation of small states. According to 
this condition, the motivation to defy of a small state is contingent upon 
the political tilt of the party in power. The presence of this condition is 
likely to generate behaviour that could either be compliant or non- 
compliant. Political tilt could be a natural one or a tilt as a result of political 
rivalry between the political parties gaining power at successive stages. In 
both the  cases the tilt of the ruling parties could be in the form of 
inclination or disinclination toward the dom inant power. Let us first 
consider natural tilt.
Political attitudes, ideas, views and socio-cultural linkages of individuals or 
groups involved in the management of a country tend to influence the 
policies they formulate, behaviours they demonstrate and actions they take. 
Subscription to a political idea, attitude or view along with the kind of 
socio-cultural linkage (across border) that is congenial to the dom inant 
power, sets a friendly environm ent (between the ruling parties of the 
interacting states) in which the small state might develop a tendency to 
accept whatever is wished by this power. This condition may be labelled as 
political inclination of the ruling party tow ards the dominant power. On 
the other hand, a subscription to a political idea, attitude or view along with 
the kind of socio-cultural linkage (across border) that is not congenial to the
64. The term 'ruling party' is used as a broad category to denote an individual, group or party 
that is in the helm of power.
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dom inant power, sets a different environm ent in which the small state 
might develop a tendency to reject wishes of the big power. This condition 
may be labelled as political disinclination of the ruling party toward the 
dom inant power. The ruling party 's profound adherence to certain 
political attitude, ideas, views or socio-cultural linkages set a predominant 
bias in its policy formulation. In Nepal, as well as in Bangladesh one is 
likely to find both tilts i.e., political inclination and disinclination towards 
India. A tilt towards China (as in case of Nepal) or a tilt towards the Islamic 
countries (as in case of Bangladesh) may be considered as a disinclination 
tow ards India. A num ber of com pliant/non-com pliant behaviours (of 
small states under this study) may also be explained by taking into account 
the political inclination/disinclination of the ruling parties. Examples of 
such behaviour in Nepali and Bangladeshi external relations that can be 
a ttributed to the inclination/disinclination (toward India) of the ruling 
party are not rare. The data suggest that, in case of both Nepal and 
B angladesh, 'p a rtie s ' w hich have an inclination tow ards India 
dem onstra ted  com pliant behaviour w hile 'parties ' w hich have a 
disinclination towards India demonstrated non-compliant behaviour.
So far we have considered the natural dispositions of the ruling parties. 
These tilts are natural consequences of subscribing to certain types of ideas, 
views and attitudes. However, tilts may evolve not only from believing 
and subscribing to any set of ideas, views or attitudes but also from other 
sources. For instance, political rivalries among various groups often play a 
very strong role in deciding w hat sort of tilt a particular political party 
m ight adopt. The very alliance of a political party (which was in power) 
with the external power is a sufficient cause for a competing political party
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(which later came to power) to assume an antithetical posture.^® Thus, if 
the former party in power enjoyed a cordial relationship with an external 
power and was inclined to it then its successor would distance itself from 
such external power and would be disinclined to it. The successor would 
take up such a posture in an attempt to discredit the policy options adopted 
by its political rival. To sum up, this tilt is specific to conditions in which
(a) two political parties or two leaders are in adversarial relationship and
(b) one is inclined towards the big power and consequently the other has to 
be disinclined or vice versa.
Interestingly, a close parallel can be drawn between these conditions and the 
motivational needs postulated by Maslow in his Need Hierarchy Theory of 
Motivation.®® Figure 3. 2 presents the 'conditions' and their tentatively 
equivalent 'needs'.
'Vital-ness of issues' (expressed in terms of som ething that is 'absolutely' 
necessary because w ithout which existence will be at stake) appears to be 
equivalent to the 'physiological' need (i.e., the needs for food, water, air, 
sleep etc.). 'Vital-ness of issues' (expressed in term s of something that is 
actually or potentially necessary because w ithout which survival will mean 
encountering considerable difficulty) appears to be equivalent to the 'safety' 
need (i.e., the necessity to ensure that the actual or potential needs for food, 
water, air, sleep etc. are met not only for today bu t also for the future). 
'Political tilt' appears to be equivalent to 'relationship' need because tilt as a 
condition of motivation emanates from a certain type of relationship with
65. Rizvi Gowher, 'The Role of the Smaller States in the South Asian Complex', in Barry 
Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, (ed.) South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers. London, 
1986, pp. 128.
66 Maslow A., Motivation and Personality (2nd. edition), 1970, N ew  York.
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Figure 3.2 The Conditions of Motivation to Defy and 
M aslow's Need Hierarchy Theory
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the dom inant power. 'Ambition' appears to equate with 'esteem' and 'self 
actualisation'. This is because, one's self esteem may be satisfied if one is 
able to realise ambition. Furthermore, ambition also mean becoming-what- 
one-can-become, i.e., actualisation of self.
2. Capability To Resist: The Non-Tangible Power Resources (NtPR)
In the previous section, w e considered the conditions tha t generate 
m otivation to defy. We mentioned that policy contingency fram eworks 
characterised  by the m otivational conditions bestow m eaning and 
significance to the power resources. In this section we shall focus on the 
'capability to resist' in understanding non-compliant behaviour. W ith 
this focus we are essentially concentrating on the power resources that 
tend to influence non-compliant behaviours. Readers will recall from the
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preceding discussion that power may evolve from a variety of resources; 
both tangible and non-tangible. Hence, the 'capability to resist', which is a 
form of pow er capability, may also evolve from both types of power 
resources, i.e., tangible and non-tangible. Examples of tangible power 
resources (TPRs) include territorial size, economic wealth, productive 
population, advanced technology, m ilitary hardw are etc., while non­
tangible power resources (NTPRs) include people's support, leadership 
strength, external political support, geo-political lev e rag e ,in fo rm a tio n - 
p rocessing capabilities, elite consensus, governm ental au thority , 
bureaucratic co-ordination, negotiation skills,^® confidence and flexibility 
em anating from internal political stability, dom estic intellectual and 
cultural resources, m arket access, historical ties^^-etc. As mentioned 
earlier, policy contingency frameworks bestow meaning and significance to 
power resources. In other words, the usefulness of a power resource (both 
tangible and non-tangible) for constituting 'capability to resist' and thereby 
in dem onstrating NCB, depends on a prevailing policy contingency 
framework. The implication of the contextual characteristics of power 
resources is that, the non-tangible power resources show no less prospects 
than their tangible counterparts in a iding our understanding of the 
phenom enon of non-compliance. In the absence of significant tangible 
power resources, the non-tangible power resources appear to offer plausible 
clues for understanding non-compliance of Nepal and Bangladesh. Given 
policy contingency fram ew orks characterised  by the m otivational 
conditions, the non-tangible power resources (NTPRs) that appear to
67 non-tangible power resources reported in this study
68 non-tangible power resources reported in Chan, Op.Cit. 1987, p.255.
69 non-tangible power resources reported in Papadakis and Starr Op.Cit. 1987, p. 426.
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constitute Nepal and Bangladesh's 'capability to resist' include popular 
pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political 
support and geo-political leverage.
2 a. Popular Pressure and Popular Support
Popular pressure and popular support appear to be im portant power 
resources that mould the behavioural expression of small states. Popular 
pressure and popular support are essentially similar. Pressure works 
'against' something while support works 'in favour' of something. In the 
context of this study 'pressure' is used to indicate people's resistance to the 
dom inant state, and 'support' is used to imply people's endorsem ent of 
government's opposition to such state.
Popular pressure and support are regarded as non-tangible power resources 
because they evolve from public attitudes, feelings, and sentiments that are 
essentially non-material and non-physical things. The tendency to resist 
the preponderance of an external power is often deeply embedded in the 
psyche of the mass. As a result of the historical experiences of social, 
cultural, political or economic dom ination by the dom inant power, the 
common people feel threatened and attem pt to resist it. The sources of 
such resistance are not tangible nevertheless these non-tangible resources 
constitu te  pow er capability. This is because under certain policy 
contingency frameworks popular pressure and popular support are capable 
of influencing behavioural expressions of the defiant actor and the target of 
defiance.
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The possibilities of popular pressure and popular support influencing non- 
compliant behaviour of an actor, can be observed in Puchala^®. Puchala 
cited some cases^^ and stressed that domestic resistance to the EC directives 
led the national governm ents to demonstrate non-compliance. Various 
sections of dom estic populations, such as the linguistic groups (in the 
Belgian subsid ies case), the  G erm an health  fra te rn ity ' (in the 
pharmaceuticals case), the Right and Left wing political groups, the business 
communities, the elite factions, the general public, the revenue officials, the 
municipalities etc. (in the Italian VAT case) exerted pressures on their 
respective governm ent. Often a government wishing to remain in office 
cannot do so without showing due regard to popular sentiments. Puchala's 
observation also supports this. The compulsions imposed by the public, for 
example, on the Belgian and the Italian regimes bear the point just made.^^ 
Similar examples of governm ent actions influenced by popular pressure 
may be found in the countries under study. Recent instances of such 
influence include King Birendra's and General Ershad's stepping down 
from pow er as a result of severe public pressure against their respective 
governments. A part from pressure, popular support may also enable a 
governm ent to dem onstrate defiance. The French Left and the French 
public lent their support to the government's stand on the investment case. 
On the French defiance, Puchala wrote that.
Pressures which were present in the French investment episode,
rather than prompting the de Gaulle government to resist the
70 Puchala, Op.Cit.. p. 507.
71 Ibid.. mentioned earlier p. 508-510.
72 Ibid.. p. 507-509.
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EEC, simply reinforced official resolve already pointed in that 
direction
Examples of popular support, enabling decision makers to adopt a non- 
com pliant stance, can also be observed in Nepali and Bangladeshi 
behaviours.
In certain policy contingency frameworks, popular pressure and popular 
support, as non-tangible power resources, may also have impact on the 
target of defiance (i.e., the big state). Public resentments and movements 
w ithin a small state have the potential of attracting attention of the world 
community to the detriment of the prestige and image of the big state. Data 
from  this study suggest that strong popular pressure or popular support 
m ay have contributed to the dem onstration of non-compliant behaviours 
by Nepal and Bangladesh in their relations with India.
2 b . Leadership Strength
Developing countries are often characterised by the presence of charismatic 
revolutionary leaders described by Henry Kissinger as the 'Prophet'.^^ 
Kissinger's characterisation bears the implicit recognition that leadership 
s treng th  has profound influence on the m anagem ent of a country. 
Leadership strength can be regarded as a power resource because, under 
certa in  policy contingency fram eworks, it is capable of influencing 
behavioural expressions of the defiant actor and the target of defiance.
73 Ibid.,p. 511.
74 Kissinger Henry, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy', in Wolfran A. Handreider 
(Ed), Comparative Foreign Policies: Theoretic Essays. New York, 1971, p. 47.
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Leadership strength is considered to evolve from non-material and non­
physical things such as leader's personal attributes and style , hence, it may 
be said to be a non-tangible power resource.
The observations m ade by Snider^^ offer some support that leadership 
strength may be considered as a power resource and that it is potentially 
capable of influencing the behaviour of an actor. He observed that in many 
developing countries, 'personalised power' operate  in an inform ally 
in s titu tio n a lise d  po litica l system . C om paring  the n a tu re  of 
institutionalisation of a political systems in developed and developing 
countries he m entioned that, 'in many developing countries, political 
power does not reside in the institutions where it is formally declared to 
rest. It is often concentrated in the hands of the chief executive based on 
personal attributes and, more often than not, his relations w ith the 
m ilitary and other politically relevant (and mobilised) groups in the 
s o c i e t y . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  his observations also indicate that personal 
attributes and personal relationships (based on family, tribal, ethnic and 
professional linkages) may enable a leader to implement political decisions. 
Snider wrote that.
The extent to which these governments [U.A.E., Qatar and 
Bahrain] have penetrated their societies is attained more 
through the person of the ruler via interpersonal tribal links 
than through state's infrastructure, which is independent of the 
person of the ruler. These informal patron-client networks 
represent a form of infrastructural power to the extent that they
75 Snider, Op. Cit.. p. 322.
76 Ibid.. p. 323.
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enhance the government's capacity to penetrate society and 
logistically implement its political decisionsJ^
If one accepts this, it is not difficult to see that, under certain policy 
contingency frameworks, various personality attributes and types might 
also influence the behavioural expressions of a government in its external 
relations. However, by that it is not to suggest that foreign policy is solely 
the function of leader’s im pulses and idiosyncrasies. Considering the 
leader as one of the actors in the foreign policy process, we cannot rule out 
the likelihood of personality attributes shaping behavioural expressions of 
small and developing states in their external affairs.
D ifferent leadersh ip  styles may influence behavioural expressions 
differently. Leadership styles, such as the assertive and the acquiescent, 
seem particularly relevant to this study. When leadership style is assertive, 
the leader acts independently and imposes his 'self by moving things his 
ow n way. In other words, the locus of control over his own affairs is within 
his own self. On the other hand, when the leadership style is acquiescent 
the leader's actions are dependent, the leader lacks the ability to impose his 
ow n 'self in getting things moving his way and yields to whatever he is 
told. In other words, the locus of control over his own affairs is not within 
his ow n self. When the style is assertive the capability to resist is strong and 
w hen the style is acquiescent the capability is weak.
Leadership strength has not only a potential for influencing the actions of 
an actor, but also it has a potential of having some effect on the target of 
defiance (i.e., the big state). Leader's assertiveness has the potential of
77 Ibid.. p. 324.
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divesting a big state of its control over an acquiescent leader and thereby 
make it difficult for the big state to pursue its intention. Besides, in certain 
policy contingency frameworks, leader's assertiveness may lead to a loss of 
prestige of the big state. Leader's assertion, at least, will mean registration of 
his position and this might, in turn, draw  international opinion contrary to 
the big state's image and international standing. The data suggests that 
leader's assertive style may have contributed to the non-com pliant 
behaviours by Nepal and Bangladesh in their relations with India.
2 c  External Political Support
Another non-tangible power element found to be relevant to this study is 
the External Political Support (EPS). Under certain policy contingency 
frameworks, EPS appears to influence behavioural expressions of the 
defiant actor and the target of defiance. Hence, it can be regarded as a power 
resources. EPS may also be treated as a non-tangible power resource, 
because it does not involve any physical (military a n d /o r  economic) 
support.
A particular state may enhance its pow er position by seeking external 
political support. Membership in international organisations, political 
alliances, international lobbying etc., are likely to enhance the non-tangible 
power capability of a small state. Papadakis and Starr noted that.
From a systemic perspective small states have the ability to 
appeal to world opinion, and in contemporary international 
system there are substantial constraints on the larger powers
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themselves, for example, norms against the use of force, 
imperialism and interventionism^^
The distinction between political tilt of the ruling party  and external 
political support may, however, be noted. While a particular ruling party 
may be tilted to an external power (that is a rival to the dominant power 
tow ard which the small state dem onstrates non-compliance), it will not 
constitute a source of power unless the external power extends its support 
to that ruling party. Capability is enhanced only when external support is 
extended and not merely when a particular ruling party is tilted to the rival 
external power. As will be observed in the analysis chapter, data from the 
field suggest that strong external political support may have enabled 
Bangladesh and Nepal to demonstrate non-compliant behaviours in their 
relations with India.
2 d. Geopolitical Leverage
A state's geopolitical leverage is another im portant determ inant of non­
tangible power capability. Geopolitical leverage can be regarded as a power 
resources because, under certain policy contingency frameworks, it is 
capable of influencing behavioural expressions of the defiant actor and the 
target of defiance. Geopolitical leverage may be said to be a non-tangible 
pow er resource, because it em anates from the target's (big power's) 
perception of strategic importance of the small state.
The physical location of a country does not, by itself, provide any 
opportunity  to acquire strength. A small state acquires importance only
78 Papadakis and Starr, Op. Cit.. p. 425.
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when it is located at a place that is strategically im portant to big states. 
However, a small state cannot be strategically im portant unless there are 
big states with adversarial relations with other big states. Hence, small 
states gain leverage w hen there is a conflict of interest between big states. It 
is this conflict situation that generates a feeling of vulnerability in each big 
power making it suspicious about each other's intentions and actions. It 
becomes a matter of necessity for a big power to woo the small state so that 
the small state does not become an instrument for its adversary in various 
designs against it. It is a situation that provides the small state with a 
certain degree of freedom to choose one or the other to its advantage and to 
m anipulate the weakness of each by playing off one against the other to 
further its goals. The small state acquires political strength as a result of the 
big state's need for its goodwill. The observation by Papadakis and Starr^^ 
also support the point that strategic location offers a small states certain 
leverage over the big state. The big power's need and the exploitation of it 
by the small state makes geopolitical leverage different from and also more 
effective than external political support in certain policy contingency 
frameworks. Data from the field study suggest that geopolitical leverage 
enabled Nepal to dem onstrate non-compliance towards India.
A strong non-tangible pow er capability (i.e., popular pressure and popular 
support, leadership strength, external political support or geopolitical 
leverage are strong) m ay enable a small state to non-compliant behaviour 
while weak non-tangible power capability may not. It may be stated that, 
depending on a policy contingency framework, a particular non-tangible 
pow er resource on its ow n or power resources in various combinations
79 Ibid.. p. 425427.
96
may lead to a specific behavioural expression. However, it may be stressed 
that it is difficult to pin down which particular element (or set of elements) 
is responsible for a particular behavioural expression. What is offered here, 
is a num ber of possibilities that seem to provide equally plausible grounds 
for understanding the behavioural expressions.
Having considered the contextual framework, it is necessary to examine the 
issue of operationalization. The usefulness of any theoretical framework 
tends to be diminished if the concepts used to formulate the framework are 
not operationally workable. Therefore, it becomes necessary to show that 
the concepts used in this fram ework are operationally workable. The 
abstract concepts used in this study include—'vital/non-vital issues', 
'am bition' (of the ruler) and political inclination/disinclination' (of the 
ruling party); popular pressure and popular support', 'leadership strength', 
'external political support' and geo-political leverage'.
The purpose of operationalization is to find indicators which measure or 
define a concept empirically. It is the means by which a concept is actually 
linked to the phenomenon in the real world.®® A concept formulated at an 
abstract level can be seen in concrete events, actions, behaviours and  
responses. Looking into these empirical referents (i.e., the events, actions, 
behaviours and responses) it is possible to extract patterns which illustrate 
the meaning, or can be summarised by the concept. The crucial point is that 
one does not look into a single, isolated instance of such events, actions, 
behaviours or responses to extract their meaning; rather a series of similar 
expressions has to be considered before it can plausibly be recognised that
80. Phillipson Michael, Theory, Methodology and Conceptualisation', in Filmer et.al. N ew  
Directions in Sociological Theory. London, 1972.p. 77-116,
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the expressions adequately reflect the concepts. For example, concrete 
incidents such as formation of Nepali Congress Party in India, participation 
of the Nepali Congress leaders in India's nationalist movement against the 
British Raj, Prime Minister Nehru's personal intervention to free the jailed 
Nepali Congress leader B. P. Koirala and so on demonstrate the pro-Indian 
inclination of Nepali Congress party. It is possible to identify other 
em pirical referents to show that the concepts used in this study are 
operationally workable.
The actual task of operationalising will be undertaken in the analysis 
chapter. This is because the empirical referents are contextually embedded 
and m uch of their meaning will be lost if they are extracted and listed in 
this chapter without paying attention to the contextual aspects. Meaningful 
interpretation of specific empirical referents within the context of the states 
under study makes it possible to operationalize the abstract concepts. Once 
the concepts are operationalized by interpreting the empirical referents we 
can then interpret the relationships hypothesised in the models.
W hat appears from the foregoing discussion is that the entire issue of 
operationalization and for that matter model testing revolves round the 
'meanings' ascribed by the researcher. It might then be asked — How far can 
the readers tru st such 'meanings'? In response, we w ould like to 
acknowledge that in social science research it is rather impossible to evolve 
'objective' meaning in the sense of natural-science ideal. Since, in social 
science, the very data  them selves contain m ultiple m eanings, it is 
extremely difficult to specify any particular meaning unequivocally. This 
m akes the problem  of operationalization very acute in social science 
research. Phillipson emphasises that operationalization and hypothesis
98
testing cannot be seen as independent of the researcher's interpretations. 
He writes—
Operationalization is literally the meaning of the empirical 
concept because it involves the observer's reasoning as an 
unexplicated resource at every stage. The indicators and 
empirical referents of a concept, which are then used in the 
research process of hypothesis verification, are the products of 
the observer's commonsense reasoning, so that the manifest 
"public" hypothesis he claims to be empirically investigating 
cannot be seen as independent of the "private" practical 
theories he has used in operationalizing his concepts.^^
The question still remains what can be done to gain readers' confidence. 
Phillipson goes on—
A methodological prerequisite ... therefore, is that the 
researcher develop ways of making his practical reasoning 
accountable and observable to the reader of his research 
reports; only in this way can the researcher show the links 
between his concepts and the social phenomena he claims to 
be investigating.
In this thesis we have attempted to follow Phillipson's advise by making 
our reasoning (employed in operationalization and model verification) as 
explicit and accountable as possible.
81. Ibid. p.llO.
82. Ibid. p. 110.
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The M otivation To Defy, C apability To Resist And The Extent Of Non- 
Compliance:
In the preceding discussion we have considered 'motivation to defy' and 
'capability to resist' (expressed in terms of non-tangible power resources) to 
understand non-compliant behaviour. We considered the non-tangible 
power resources because the small states under study lack traditional power 
and still demonstrate some non-compliant behaviour. Although they have 
dem onstrated non-compliant behaviour, nevertheless the extent of such 
demonstrations was limited.
In this section we shall consider the extent of NCB demonstrated by a small 
state, within a policy contingency, framework using the NTPRs. In other 
words, given a policy contingency framework, the question is, to w hat 
extent a small state can match the capability of the big state and thereby 
demonstrate NCB; and what are the eventual behavioural responses. The 
relationship between NCB and CR (based on NTPR) is graphically shown in 
figure 3.3.®®
A range of possible behavioural responses may be observed in figure 3.3. 
First, given a certain policy contingency framework, as aw areness of 
'capability to resist' increases, non-compliance may be expected to increase. 
This stage may be called the build-up stage. With the increase in non- 
compliance the small state is likely to experience increasing counter 
resistance from the big power. The small state has constantly to compare its 
awareness of its power to resist with its awareness of the big state's power
83 This graphical presentation should not be interpreted as a formal mathematical 
expression'. This form of presentation is used merely as an illustration for the sake of 
simplicity of expression and ease of conceptualisation.
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Figure 3.3 : The Relationship betw een Capability to Resist
(CR) and Non-compliance
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to coerce. That comparison comes into sharp focus at a point designated as 
X. Second, as the capability to resist (based on NTPR) of the small state 
increases beyond that of the build up stage, it would either have no further 
changes in the NCB or would lead to a dramatic tilt towards compliance. 
In this stage we may have three possible behavioural expression— State of 
Stalemate, Sullen Retreat and Compulsive Subjugation as a result of the 
changes in policy contingency framework. The behavioural expressions of 
state of stalemate and sullen retreat exhibit the limitations of capability, 
based on NTPRs, to produce non-compliant behaviour. Most small states 
tend not to defy beyond point X.
The Build up Stage: As mentioned above, with the increase of small state's 
capability to resist (based on NTPR), its non-compliance is likely to
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increase. However, non-compliance increases up to the point referred to as 
X. Point 'X' may be defined as the point at which the small state becomes 
aware that its capability to resist just balances with the coercive capability so 
far used by the big state. The small state is also aware that if it crosses this 
point it is likely to evoke significant counter pressure from the Greater 
Power which it would find difficult to contain. The degree of non- 
compliant behaviour that most small states can demonstrate is decided at 
this point.
The line in the build up stage is likely to be non-linear. The hypothesis is 
that as capability to resist (based on NTPR) increases, leading to 
corresponding increases in non-compliance, every incremental change in 
the capability is likely to lead to increasingly smaller changes in non- 
compliance. This happens because the small state is aware of Point 'X', and 
as the curve approaches it, it is probable that most small states will likely to 
be increasingly concerned not to pass it.
The Second Stage: All the three possibilities, i.e., state of stalemate, sullen 
retreat and compulsive subjugation, generate from the point described as 
'X'. We shall now consider these possibilities in relation to capability to 
resist (based on NTPR). For example, if the small state does not submit to 
the counter pressures then the increases in capability to resist (based on 
NTPR) beyond the level of point 'X' is likely to lead to marginal or no 
increases in non-compliance due to its inability to w ithstand further 
counter pressures with the help of NTPRs. However, non-compliance is 
not likely to decrease significantly because as just mentioned, the small 
state is not subm itting to the existing level of counter-pressure. This 
implies that irrespective of further increases in capability to resist (based on
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NTPR), the level of non-compliance rem ains unchanged, hence the curve 
tends to rise vertically as show n by the line A in figure 3.3. Line A 
represents a sta te  o f  s ta lem  ate. This is because on one hand the small 
state decided not to comply, i.e., stay at a level of defiance it can maintain 
with the help of NTPRs; on the other hand, it cannot defy further, i.e., go 
beyond point X, for the fear of retribution which it cannot contain with the 
help of NTPRs. The big state refrains from exerting increasing counter 
pressure (and end stalemate) perhaps because the level of defiance, 
although annoying, is not damaging for the big state; or perhaps the big 
state is more interested to see that the small state does not defy further and 
that it can contain small states' level of defiance with the existing level of 
counter pressure; or perhaps the big state might consider that the existing 
level of counter pressure is distressing enough for the small state to defy 
further. A t this stage the small state is likely to be under considerable 
difficulty in coping with the counter pressures as it chooses not to submit 
and seeks to maintain the level of non-compliance. Maintenance of a non- 
compliant posture at this stage is likely to result in build up of tension 
betw een the states involved. The increase in tension makes the 
relationship volatile. The volatility is likely to continue until a new 
equilibrium is restored. The volatile state is shown by the shaded area in 
figure 3.3.
Now for example, if the small state, finding it unbearable to contain the 
counter pressure, chooses to yield to it, the line, passing through a short 
period of volatile state, is likely to change its direction sharply and move 
towards compliance. In such circumstances we may have two possible 
behavioural expression. These are 's u lle n  re tre a t' and 'c o m p u ls iv e  
s u b ju g a tio n  ' represented by line B and line C respectively in figure 3.3.
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In case of 'sullen retreat' the small state is likely to fall back to obeying the 
big state as a result of the pressures exerted on it by the big state. If the 
increased capability to resist (based on NTPR) of the small state that led to 
non-compliance is not perceived by the big state as a source of potential 
threat then the big state might just make the small state comply by putting 
on 'arrestive' counter pressure. In this situation the counter pressure 
exerted by the big state is not directed towards curtailing the small state's 
level of capability but just to rem inding it of the possible consequences of 
being defiant. By complying the small state escapes the possibility of 
further loss and severe retribution.
If, however, the big state perceives the increased level of capability as a 
source of potential threat it is not only likely to compel compliance but also 
seek to reduce the level of capability to resist (based on NTPR) of the small 
state by exerting reductive' pressure. The capability of the small state may 
be curtailed by the big power, for example, by toppling the leader or 
crush ing  his strength, or by pacifying popular pressure th rough  
m anipulating the small states' politics etc. This may, usually be done by 
adopting covert means. In such circumstances, we are likely to have line C 
which depicts the progressive reduction of capability with corresponding 
increase in compliance.
Conclusion
The conditions of motivation to defy and the non-tangible power resources 
constituting capability to resist offer a conceptual framework to understand 
non-compliance within the contexts of Nepal and Bangladesh's relations 
w ith India. The conditions are, 'vital-ness of issues', 'ambition of the ruler'
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and 'tilt of the ru lin g  party '. They offer various possibilities in 
understanding why Nepal and Bangladesh non-comply. In the absence of 
any significant tangible power resources, the non-tangible power resources, 
such as 'popular p ressu re  and popular support', leadership strength', 
'external political su p p o rt ' and  geopolitical leverage' constitu te the 
capability of the small states under study. Under certain policy contingency 
frameworks, these non-tangible power resources also offer some plausible 
explanations for understand ing  how Nepal and Bangladesh non-comply. 
The framework also sets out a hypothesis regarding the dynamics of the 
relationship betw een capability  to resist (based on NTPR) and non- 
compliant behaviour and the limits to NCB. In the subsequent chapters we 
shall analyse data using  this contextual framework. Not all the non- 
compliant behaviour of Nepal and Bangladesh is likely to be explained 
using a single condition of motivation to defy and a single power resource. 
We shall try to ascertain which condition of m otivation to defy and non­
tangible power resources best explain the non-compliant behaviours of the 
said states. Finally, w e shall attem pt to understand the extent of non- 
compliant behaviour that the small states have demonstrated in the past.
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C h a p te r 4
FO R E I G N  POLICY BEHAVIOUR OF NEPAL WITH IN D IA
W ith the exit of the British from the sub-continent in 1947, the rulers of 
independent India tried to build a security community of the Himalayan 
states by bringing the southern Himalayan states into their security orbit. 
A lthough India's power in the region was far less absolute than that of 
British India, independent India believed and still believes that it is the 
rightful scion to British India. Nehru often described the Himalayas as not 
only Indian territory but also ....................................
a part of our hearts and minds. (They have) been associated with 
the thinking of our race___ for thousands ofyears^
To be more precise, India's security policy is based on the assumption that 
Com m unist China is an aggressive country and the Himalayas are the 
natural barrier for both India and Nepal. For this reason, India assumes t t  
has de facto responsibility for defending the natural barrier which includes 
Nepal. India considers cts national security is intricately linked with that of 
Nepal's security and thus I t  seeks to coordinate Nepal's defense policy 
with . With this framework in the Indian mind one is not surprised to see 
Nehru making statements in Parliament such as.
Apart from any kind of alliance the fact remains that we cannot 
tolerate any foreign invasions from foreign countries in any part of
1 Quoted in Chatterjee, R. K., India's Land Borders: Problems and Challenges. New  
Delhi, 1978, p. 17.
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the Indian sub-continent. Any possible inmsion of Nepal would 
inevitably involve the security of India. ^
At the time of independence when the British were packing up to quit the 
sub-continent, some policy makers suggested continuing the old relationship 
with regard to the Himalayan states that had existed previously between 
India and those states. There were others who desired the complete 
accession of those states or to maintain them as client states. The most 
influential view came from Sir Olaf Caroe in a 1946 memorandum entitled. 
The Mongolian Fringe’^  where he urged that all the Himalayan states be 
included within the frontier of India, while at the same time they would be 
tied to India irrevocably through economic means. Sardar Patel, the then 
Deputy Premier of India, was in favour of complete accession of all 'native 
states' of India. But Jawaharlal Nehru wanted to have dependable allies in 
the form of puppet kings in those states. Nehru believed that it was not 
practical yet for the accession of those states in the Himalayas but maintained 
that India did have a special interest in that region.^ As has been observed by 
Srikant Dutt,
Nehru was guided by his sentiments in dealing with the 
Himalayan states, regarding them paternally as unblemished 
idyllic retreats from the world, and this led to many of the 
inconsistencies in his policies during the 1950's. Nehru vacillated 
between statements of 'big brother to little brother' relations and
2 Nehru, Jawaharlal, India. Parliamentary Debates. Part 11 New Delhi, Government of 
India Publication, Mardi 17,1950.
3 India Office Records. P&S Dept. Coll. 8/4364, p. 6-14.
4 Menon, V. P, The Integraticm of the Indian States. London, 1956.
108
respect for independence and his insistence that India had the right 
to defend the Himalayan states'.^
India thus pursued the idea of concluding separate bilateral treaties with 
each of the Himalayan states. These treaties are all patterned after the 
treaties which British India had concluded with each of the Himalayan 
Kingdoms before the independence of India. Treaties of Peace and 
Friendship between India and Nepal, and of Trade and Commerce, were 
subsequently signed by the representatives of both the governments in 
Kathmandu on 31 July 1950.^ The secret 'letters of exchange' attached to the 
treaty which was made public only in 1959 during the high time of Sino- 
Indian hostilities carried the process of consultation further by asserting that.
Neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the 
other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with such a threat the two 
governments shall consult with each other and discuss effective 
counter measures'."^
To quote a Nepali scholar.
In so doing the leaders of independent India were only stepping 
into the Anglo-American shoes to rid themselves from China
5 Dutt, Srikant, ’India and the Himalayan States', Asian Affairs. 1979. p. 74.
6 For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the 1950 treaty, see, Subedi, S. B., India- 
Nepal Security Relations and the 1950 Treaty: Time for N ew  Perspectives', Asian 
Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, March 1994, p. 273-284.
7 Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches. September 1946-April 
1%1. New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1%1, p. 374.
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phobia; or to put it in other words India was suffering from a 
strong colonial hangover'^
The key clauses in the treaty of peace and friendship are articles 2, 5,6 and 7. 
Article 2 of the treaty obliges both the Governments
to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding 
with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the 
friendly relations subsisting between the two governments'.
Article 5 stated that any arms, am m unition or warlike material and 
equipment necessary for the security of Nepal that the Government of Nepal 
may im port through the territory of India shall be so imported with the 
assistance and agreement of the Government of India. The treaty while 
recognizing Nepal's independence included a mutual defence article and an 
article regulating arms imports.
Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty obliges each of the states to extend reciprocal 
rights to citizens of the other with respect to participation in industrial and 
economic development, trade and commerce, residence, and ownership of 
property in each other's territory. Although this clause has been fully 
applied to Indian residents in Nepal, who enjoy virtually equal rights with 
Nepali citizens in these respects, the reverse has not been the case for Nepali 
resident in India.
Article 5 of the trade treaty stipulated that Nepal had to "agree to levy at 
rates not lower than those leviable for the time being in India customs duties 
on imports from and exports to countries outside India." This hindered the
8 Uprety, P. R., A Small Nation in South Asian Politics: The Nepali Case Study', a paper 
presented in a Seminar in the University of Colombo, p. 7.
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possibility of an independent trade policy for Nepal. The treaty also 
compelled the government of Nepal to agree to levy on goods produced or 
manufactured in Nepal which were exported to India, export duty at rates 
sufficient to prevent their sale in India at prices more favourable than those 
of goods produced or manufactured in India which was subject to central 
excise duty. Again as a result of India's exporting goods directly to Tibet 
(previously it was through Nepal), economic stimulus from Tibet was 
lacking and the villages and towns along the traditional trade route suffered 
greatly. Nepalis traders claimed that about 80 percent of their trade with 
Lhasa has been lost to India^. The Treaty of 1950, thus, arrested Nepalis 
industrial development for a decade.^® The control and the handling of 
Nepal's foreign exchange accounts by Reserve Bank of India was another 
significant element in the treaty. This also meant that the necessary foreign 
exchange for Nepal's imports were to be issued by the government of India.
The cumbersome procedures established for the transit of goods through 
India under the trade treaty were detrimental to Nepal's economic survival. 
As soon as goods imported from third countries entered Nepal, the amount 
deposited with the Indian customs office equal to Indian customs tariff was 
allowed to be withdrawn provided a certificate regarding the physical entry 
of goods was presented to the same office. The existence of such a procedure 
locked up Nepali liquid capital which could have been utilised in a 
productive channel.
The treaties came under severe criticism from the very beginning and 
dem ands for the revision of the treaties were voiced almost immediately
9 Wemer, L., 'Nepal inWorld Politics' Pacific Affairs. Vol.XXX, No.3, September 1957.
10 Rana, Pashupati Shumshere J. B, 'India and Nepal: The Political Economy of a 
Relationship', Asian Survey. Vol. II, No.7, July 1970, p. 648.
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after their ratification. Anti-Indian feelings were expressed in various public 
statements by the political leaders, party resolutions, press, demonstrations 
and processions. The Nepalis looked upon the treaty as dictated and 
i m p o s e d . N o t e w o r t h y  among the various demonstrations and protests 
was a black flag demonstrations which was staged against Nehru when he 
came to visit Kathmandu in June 1951. The controversy over the treaties 
continues till now. A survey done in Kathmandu in 1989 showed that 
roughly one half of the random sample of 300 people surveyed said that they 
knew about the treaties that were signed in 1950 and almost two fifths of 
them were clearly in favour of its abrogation. Today as many as seven 
articles of the treaty of peace and friendship serve little or no purpose or are 
self-defeating and help to breed animus rather than amity. Article 2 remains 
defunct. Article 5 is almost redundant and is a major cause of conflict. 
Article 6 and 7 are explicitly discriminatory against China. Article 8 is 
hardly relevant and Articles 9 and 10 deal with procedures to implement the 
diplomatic p r o v i s i o n s . ^ ^  Little remains except the first article that professes 
peace and friendship and acknowledges respect for the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and independence of each other. The Nepalis feel that if 
the treaties are not abrogated, it will influence other treaties and agreements 
and at the same time will keep adversely influencing both the programming 
and implementation of an independent and internal policy.
At the time of signing the treaties, Nepal was ruled by the Rana prime 
ministers. The King was only a figure-head. The Ranas traditionally
11 For comments on the trade treaty see, Shrestha, B. P., 'An Introduction to the Nepal 
Economy'. Kathmandu, 1962; and Pathak, G. D., 'Nepal's Trade with Her Neighbour- 
The Trade Pact of 1950'. Nepal Review, Vol. 1, No. 6, September 3 0 ,1%3.
12 Aditya, A. and Dahal, D. R., 'Crisis : Hallmark of Nepal-India Relations', The Rising 
Nepal. June 24, Saturday 1989.
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enjoyed British support and with the departure of the British from the sub­
continent they were left with no choice but to look for support from the 
Indian authorities. Even before the conclusion of the treaty and the 
exchange of the secret letters', the Ranas had cooperated with the Indian 
government by sending 10 battalions during the Hyderabad and Kashmir 
crisis of 1948. The main motive behind this act was to appease the Nehru 
government in India. The signing of treaties that were directed against the 
new Communist government in China was not disturbing to those who held 
identical views of the Communist threat. Furthermore, most of the wealth 
they amassed was kept in the banks in India and they were afraid that if they 
pursued a policy not palatable to New Delhi, the Indian government might 
freeze their accounts.
KING TRIBHUVAN REGIME (1951-1955)
In November 1950 there was a revolt in Nepal against the ruling Ranas with 
the active support of India. The King w ith his entire family with the 
exception of his 4 year old grandson Jhanendra, fled to the Indian embassy 
in Kathmandu on the 6th of November and asked for political asylum which 
was granted r e a d i l y ^ ^  As a consequence of this revolution of 1950-51 the 
rule of the hereditary Rana Prime Ministers was abolished. King Tribhuvan 
returned to Nepal on 18th February 1951 and a British style parliamentary
13 The whole affair of giving asylum to the King was preplanned between the palace and 
the embassy. Erika leuctag who was employed in the Palace between 1949 and 1950, 
gives a clear account of secret contacts made between the King and Indian ambassador 
S. S. Majitha and later his successor C. P. N. Singh in her book Erika and the King (New  
York, 1958). She also claimed that she herself established these initial contacts on  
behalf of the palace. She mentioned about King Tribhuvan's intention to overthrow the 
Rana Oligarchy and his soliciting Indian help for this purpose. She also mentioned in 
detailed the secret exchange of letters between the King and Nehru. This is dted  in 
Sharma, laedish.Prasad..Nepal’s Foreign Policv.l947-1962..an unpublished Ph.D  
dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1968.
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monarchy was adopted in Nepal under the advice of New Delhi. India 
played a significant role in restoring the royal authority in Nepal by bringing 
together the Ranas, the King and the Nepali Congress under the Delhi 
compromise in January 1951. The Delhi Compromise which was master 
minded by Nehru reshuffled the power pattern in Nepal which brought 
fresh vigour to Indian tutelage over Nepal. To quote Rose and Dial,
The terms of the settlement, the so-called Delhi Compromise 
reflected the objectives of the Indian government much more than 
it did those of the revolutionary leaders}^
The political instability which followed the 1951 political change favoured 
the King who became even more dependent on the government of India. 
The Indian government in return took full advantage of the situation and 
sided with the King and his party men under the disguise of peace and 
stability, and the immense financial assistance from India to Nepal left King 
Tribhuvan with no other alternative but to coordinate his country's foreign 
policy with that of his big neighbour. 'When the Indian government beats the 
drum, the Nepal government dances '^ 5 was the common expression in those 
days.
Nepal's foreign policy between 1951-55 was thus conducted within the 
general framework of special relationship which im plied that Nepal's 
relations with other countries had to be contingent upon her relations with 
India. Nehru stated.
14 Rose,Leo E, and Dial Roger, Can a Mini State Find True H appiness in a World 
Dominated by Protagonist Powers? The Nepal Case', The Annals of the American 
Academy. 1969. p. 91.
15 Tiwari, Krishna, J.,'Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy in South Asia; The Case 
of Nepal.' in Tournai of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. X, No.3, Spring 
1987,.p. 68.
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What became the fundamental principle of India 's frontier policy, 
namely, that, as far as defense is concerned, India unilaterally assumes 
responsibility for the security of the entire Himalayan border, even in 
areas where the territory of independent and autonomous states (Nepal, 
Sikkim, and Bhutan) intrudes
"Nehru was so concerned about his country's security that he linked Nepal's 
independence and sovereignty with that of India", remarks a Nepali former 
diplomat. Despite Nepal's grumbling, most statesmen as well as policy 
makers in India take for granted Nepal's security, stability and economic 
prosperity as intricately linked with those of India, because of their 
extensive social, cultural, historical, geographical and economic ties.
D uring this 'special relation' phase the form ulation of an independent 
foreign policy on the part of Nepal was almost impossible and at the same 
time superfluous. The Himalayan Kingdom was looked upon as an Indian 
sphere of influence. Almost all matters of importance including matters of 
domestic politics were communicated to New Delhi and the King's regime 
attached considerable value to the Indian advice. Rose wrote: On a number 
of occasions, the Nepali government not only tamely followed New Delhi's guidance 
but actually took the initiative in seeking itA^ One Indian Ambassador, 
Chandra Prasad Narayan Singh even insisted upon his being seated in the 
cabinet meetings despite the objection some Nepali Cabinet Ministers made 
about his presence.^^ He is also believed to have arranged M. P. Koirala's
16 Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches. September 1946-April, 
1% 1.
17 Author's interyiew with the respondent. (Unpublished).
18 Rose, Leo E, Nepal: Strategy for Survival. Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 195
19 Interview with a Nepali official.
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appointm ent as Prime Minister in November 1951, instead of his half 
brother B. P. Koirala^o who was supposed to head the first non-Rana 
governm ent. He was the man who arranged for Tribhuvan's political 
asylum and had been influential in negotiating the settlement of the political 
crisis in 1950- He often intervened personally in the process of government, 
on one occasion even dominating the proceedings of a conference of district 
level officials. is said openly in Kathmandu that the real ruler in Nepal today 
is the Indian ambassador, Mr. C. P. N. Singh'.^
Indian advisory teams were sent to Kathmandu many times in order to 
advice the Nepali government on administrative reorganization. Charges 
were m ade that these teams were working tow ards m odelling the 
governm ental processes to suit Indian interests. Indian officials were 
brought directly into top positions in the Nepal Secretariat in administrative 
rather than advisory roles. To cite some examples, the first attorney-general 
of Nepal was an Indian. It was an Indian police officer who was once 
entrusted with the task of reorganizing the Nepali police force.^^ This kind 
of practice gave the impression in Nepali government circles that all the 
im portant posts in the government might soon be monopolized by the 
Indians. Moreover, Indian aid was channelled through the Planning 
Commission rather than the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi.^^ This 
was viewed a slur on Nepal's national self image, because it seemed to place 
Nepal on the same footing as an Indian state.
20 Rose, Strategy for Survival, Op.Cit. p. 1%,
21 Ibid. p. 1%.
22 Quoted in Patterson, George N, Peking Versus Delhi. London, 1963, p. 142.
23 Rose, Strategy for Survival, Op. Cit.. p. 198.
24 Ibid., p. 199.
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There was also a tendency among the Nepali high Government officials 
including King Tribhuvan and the Ministers to go to India for Indian advice 
whenever there was a crisis of any sort. Prime Minister M. P. Koirala was 
quite famous for making these kind of trips to New Delhi for which one 
Nepali politician remarked, 'When Nehru caught a cold, M. P. Koirala 
sneezed' , I n  other words, the governm ent of India was intimately 
associated with practically every major political incident that occurred on 
the Nepali scene between 1951-55 under the pretext of special relationship.
Also with regard to the representations by the Indian missions abroad, the 
government of India was asked at one time to handle Nepal's relations with 
New Zealand and Australia. "Such a relationship with India ran counter to 
Nepali nationalism, the major goal of which has been to achieve a status of 
equality in N epal's interaction with India. W ithout realizing Nepal's 
delicate position sandwiched between the two mighty states, India wanted 
to maintain special relations without fulfilling its special responsibilities 
towards Nepal which needed special facilities for trade, whether with India 
or with third countries".26
The principal objects of harsh public criticisms were the various Indian 
advisory missions to Nepal, particularly the Indian military mission that 
came to Kathmandu in 1952 in order to reorganize and train the Nepali 
army. Probably no other act of the two governments could have struck more 
directly at popular sensitivity than this.^^ Following the Raksha Dal revolt in 
January 1952, an Indian team arrived in Kathmandu to discuss the future of
25 Ibid.. p. 199.
26 Baral, L. S., 'Nepal's Foreign Policy 1960-72: Some Basic Ingredients', Pacific  
Community. 1973-74, p. 140.
27 Author's interview with a Nepali scholar.
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the Nepali army. Agreements were reached with the Indian team and on 
29th February 1952, a 150 man Indian military mission, led by a major- 
general arrived in Kathmandu to reorganize as well as modernize the Nepali 
army.^® At the peak of its strength, the mission consisted of about 250 
officers which was gradually reduced to 43 by 1964.^9 The check post 
personnel were to train Nepali nationals and to operate wireless sets at the 
Sino-Nepalis border posts. They were stationed in 17 checkpoints in the 
northern border of Nepal and their total strength remained about 75 all the 
time. It was reported that the Indian military mission came to Kathmandu at 
Nepal's request. It is, however, not out of place to mention that India was 
more than willing to consider Nepal's request as i t  provided India an 
additional advantage of keeping a better watch on Chinese activities on the 
Nepalis border. But at a later stage the difference of perception between 
India and Nepal regarding the Chinese threat and India's lack of recognition 
of Nepal as a separate entity in relation to its security structure became the 
source of conflict. The conflict was further aggravated by India's insistence 
on maintaining its mission in Nepal.
The Indian military mission came to Nepal for a specific purpose and on 
completion was supposed to return to India. Originally, it was scheduled to 
complete its task within a year. Barely a month had passed after their arrival 
when Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha that the mission was to stay in Nepal 
for at least a period of two years. However, actually it stayed on indefinitely. 
India's real intention, which was the management of its security needs and 
not the training of Nepali forces, became apparent when with the growing
28 Rose, Strategy for Survival, Op. Cit. p. 197.
29 Mihaly, E. B. , Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal. Oxford University Press, London,
p. 26.
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Sino-Indian hostility India did not want to lose the opportunity of her 
military presence in Nepal and tried to interlink their presence with her 
security interests in Nepal. Indian military presence was regarded as a 
factor that jeopardized Nepal's security interests and political independence 
because rather than serving Nepal's interests it served Indian interests. 
Second, as mentioned earlier one of the stated task of the mission was the 
reorganization programme which involved the reduction of the army from 
25,000 to 6,000 men.^^ "Such a drastic reduction of army personnel could 
hardly be reckoned as something in the best interest of Nepal's defence", 
remarks a Nepali scholar.^^ Third, the control of Radio communication 
between the northern border and Kathmandu were assigned to the Indian 
technicians, because as was argued, the Nepali army lacked both the trained 
personnel and equipm ent to carry out that function efficiently. All the 
com m unications were reported directly to the Indian embassy in 
Kathmandu rather than to the government of Nepal, thus giving India a sort 
of private intelligence system within N e p a l . T h e  above facts demonstrate 
that the Indian military acted contrary to the Nepali security interests. As 
time passed on, the Indian military mission thus, came to be regarded as an 
occupation force and anti Indian feelings were expressed in public speeches.
A number of such protests were made. For example, in a public speech on 
21st April 1952, Rishikesh Shaha demanded to know why the Nepalis 
themselves who had earned their names in history as the best soldiers in the 
world were not good enough to train their own army. He also took the issue 
with the governmental contention that there was a need for protecting the
30 Rose, Strategy for Survival, Op. Cit. p. 197.
31 Author's interview with the respondent. (Unpublished).
32 The Econcxnist. London, 27 August, 1960.
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'newly bom democracy from internal and external dangers', and maintained 
that Nepal needed a democracy that could operate on its own rather than the 
one that had to be managed by foreign troops.^^ Tanka Prasad Acharya 
commented that he would not have been opposed to the idea of an Indian 
military mission in Nepal had it been headed by a Gurkha officer in the 
Indian A rm y.^
In the 1950's India decided to control the rivers of Nepal which had 
constantly caused destruction through floods in Northern India. Nepal also 
suffered because of the floods but to a lesser extent. On 25 April 1954, the 
pro Indian Nepalis administration, headed by M. P. Koirala, agreed to India's 
proposal to build a power house and a barrage in the Kosi river near the 
Nepal-Bihar border by which India achieved flood protection and irrigation 
facilities for vast areas of its own territory. Nepal received only a minute 
proportion of the total irrigated land. India benefited more from the power 
resources developed than Nepal. Sriman Narayan wrote,
10 million acres of India's land will be irrigated while only a few 
thousand acres in Nepal will be. Working on the Nepalis portion was 
also ignored or delayed.^^
A s  a result of the project Nepal lost acres of fertile land and some 
administrative control on the projects without proper compensations. The 
water storage facilities ruined some of Nepal's richest agricultural lands in 
the eastern Tarai because of the accumulation of silt. For all practical
33 Gorkha Patra. Kathmandu, 22 April, 1952.
34 Ibid.
35 Narayan Sriman, India and Nepal: An Exercise in Open Diplomacy. Bombay, 1970, 
p. 57.
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purposes, the land covered by the project came under the administration of 
the project which was controlled by India. Further, the Kosi agreement had 
no time limit. As Mihaly observed, '
What India needed was flood protection and irrigation water.
Nepal had neither the capital nor the skill to take an active role in 
harnessing the rivers. So, India, in the Indian view, did the 
sensible and honourable thing in agreeing to take full responsibility 
and give Nepal both water and power at virtually no cost at all.
No consideration appears to have been given to the fact that it was 
taking from a sovereign state the water on which its future 
depended.^
The agreement aroused intense bitterness in N e p a l . N e p a l i s  perceived the 
agreement a threat to their vital agricultural interests. The agriculture of 
Nepal mainly rested on irrigation. Nepal have only three rivers capable of 
yielding sufficient water for a year-round irrigation. The other smaller rivers 
could not provide enough water for an additional crop. But the Kosi river 
project yielded greater benefits to India compared to Nepal at the cost of 
adverse im plications to Nepal's agriculture. Opponents accused the 
governm ent of bartering away Nepal's future. The project was also 
characterized as an economic exploitation of Nepal. As Sharma noted,
A  river inside the country is a national wealth. It is both deception and 
dishonesty on India's part to take over the river and its hydro-electric
36 Mihaly, Op. Cit. p . 149.
37 Rose, Op. Cit. p. 199.
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potential by just giving a little royalty as an imperialist country would 
in a similar situation.^
Indian influence in Nepal became so pervasive that Indian politicians did 
not hesitate to make unnecessary, legalistic statements without paying the 
slightest attention to Nepali nationalist sentiments. A. S. Ayangar, the 
Speaker of the Lok Sabha, for instance, declared in 1954 that democracy in 
Asia w ould be strengthened only when the Himalayan states including 
Nepal were amalgamated into the Indian Union and that Nepal's border 
should be treated as India's border in the north.
Anti-Indian agitation in Nepal reached new dimensions when in May 1954 
there was a massive demonstration on the arrival of the Indian parliamentary 
delegation in Kathmandu.^^ As reported, the delegation was physically 
attacked and serious clashes took place in Kathmandu between Nepali and 
Indian workers. The Nepali government a t that time tried to blame the 
demonstrations on the opposition parties, but this could not disguise the fact 
that these organisations could use anti-Indian slogans to arouse substantial 
popular backing. This became even more apparent when a pro-communist 
front successfully organised an "Anti-India Interference Day" in Kathmandu, 
despite not having the open support of most of the major political parties.
38 Sharma, Op. Cit. p. 153.
39 Ibid, p. 122.
40 Rose, Strategy for Survival, Op. Cit.. p. 201.
41 Ibid.. p. 201.
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ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAVIOUR : KIN G TR IBHUVAN
REGIME (1950-1955)
From the above observation of Nepali behaviour from 1950-55, we see that 
the government of Nepal complied with the wishes of its big neighbour, 
India. How does the motivation to defy and the capability to resist help 
understand the governm ents' compliant behaviour? The answer to this 
question seem to be found partly in condition 1 and partly in condition 3 , 
and in the lack of capability to resist in this phase.
The readers will recall from chapter 3 that according to condition 1 an issue 
considered as non-vital is not likely to generate motivation to defy and 
consequently will lead to compliance. Similarly, condition 3 states that an 
inclination to the dom inant power is also not likely to generate motivation to 
defy and consequently will lead to compliance. Let us now examine the 
partners in the coalition in this phase in turn and explore the conditions, 
assumptions and contextualities (ie., policy contingencies) that led to the 
demonstrations of compliance.
King Tribhuvan held a very positive view of India's role as a personal friend 
and a close ally. It appeared nothing unnatural to him to accept Indian 
influence since he regained his crown with the help of India. The King 
reciprocated such Indian favour by aligning himself with the Indian lines. 
At the same time he was too dependent on India for advice on all matters of 
concern including how to manage the Ranas and the party politicians as he 
was not very much interested in politics itself. It was King Tribhuvan's 
appreciation of India for reinstating him at the helm of power, which kept 
the foreign policy of Nepal non-deviant and, therefore, subordinate to India's
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foreign p o l i c y For Tribhuvan consciousness of the help given and his 
sense of obligation for emancipation from the clutches of the Rana autocracy, 
were too heavy to override Indian interests in Nepal. To King Tribhuvan, 
the issues relating to the treaty of 1950, the presence of Indian military 
mission and Indian advisors and the Kosi agreement were not vital because 
far from threatening his regime, the Indian influence as a whole supported i t  
The considerations of issues as non-vital (ie,, condition 1) failed to generate 
m otivation to defy. The logical behavioural expression under the 
circumstances was therefore compliant.
King Tribhuvan's compliant behaviour may also be interpreted by his 
disposition of natural' inclination toward India. King Tribhuvan had close 
personal and family ties with India and with several Indian leaders. He was 
politically inert and avoided the complexity of politics. As such he aligned 
himself with India and relying on Indian advice he accepted whatever was 
offered to him by India. For example. King Tribhuvan's private secretary, 
Covinda Narayan, was an Indian civil servant who was seconded to Nepal 
to advise the King. He exerted a substantial influence over the King. In 
being subservient to India, Tribhuvan saw no threat to N epal's 
independence. Rather he was very much content to get back his crown 
because he wanted to reign and not to rule. During his reign, both 
Kathmandu and New Delhi accepted the 'special relations' between the two 
countries as an inescapable fact. The lack of motivation of defy generated 
from a disposition of inclination (ie., condition 3) offer plausible explanation 
of King Tribhuvan's compliance.
42 Sharma, Op. Cit.. p. 141.
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The compliant disp>osition of the Ranas may be understood with the help of 
condition 1 only. Like Tribhuvan, the Ranas did not see the issues damaging 
N epal's vital in terests, or as threatening their regim e interests. 
Consequently, their behavioural expression logically was not defiant. 
Historically, the Rana cooperated with the British who in turn helped them 
to remain in power. With the departure of the British Raj, they continued the 
same policy with the Indian authority. The signing of the 1950 treaty may be 
viewed as a Rana effort to appease India to gain their support to remain in 
power.
After the revolution of 1950-51, the Ranas found themselves as a partner in 
the coalition government formed as a result of the active Indian negotiation 
and mediation. Although India was instrumental in putting an end to the 
Rana oligarchy through the revolution, the Ranas remained dependent on 
Indian support to maintain whatever power they still had as a partner in the 
coalition. Furthermore, they could not just do without India because they 
also needed Indian advice and guidance on how to function in the new 
political system totally alien to their whole understanding of politics.^^ For 
the Ranas, just as for Tribhuvan, compliance to the big power seem logical as 
they regarded non compliant behaviour as virtually biting the hand that was 
feeding them.
The Nepali National Congress had always been tilted towards India. This 
can be inferred from the following facts. The Nepali National Congress itself 
was bom  and brought up in India with the guidance and support of Indian 
socialist leaders. The Nepali Congress leaders were socialized into politics 
through involvement in the Indian nationalist movement and was very
43 Rose, Leo E, and Scholz John T, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom. Colorado, 
USA, 1980, p. 44.
125
much interested in retaining close working relationships with their Indian 
mentors. The Nepali Congress secretary-general, Surya Prasad Upadhaya 
had shared a prison cell with the Indian Congress leader, Rafi Ahmed 
Kidwai, during the second world war. W ell-known Nepali Congress 
leaders, like B. P. Koirala and D. R. Regmi were even imprisoned by the 
British for their active involvement in the Indian freedom struggle. B. P. 
Koirala had once provided asylum to the Indian socialist leader, Jaya 
Prakash in Nepal during the second world war. Before the revolution of 
1950, B. P. Koirala was arrested by the Rana government. In jail, he went on 
a hunger strike for twenty seven days and the rum our of his death created a 
sensation both in Nepal as well as in India. The Socialist Party of India 
observed a Nepal day all over India and staged a protest demonstration 
before the Nepali Embassy in Delhi. Ultimately, Nehru intervened in the 
release of Koirala. It is recorded that Nehru sent a telegram to Mohan 
Shamsher which read something like this: "Should anything happen to B.P. in 
your prison, it would surely do much harm to Indo-Nepalis relations
Apart from the personal connections of Nepali Congress Leaders with their 
Indian counterparts, more importantly the Nepali Congress Party subscribed 
to the Indian notion of security. It genuinely believed that Nepal's security 
could be secured only by India as Nepal lacked ability to withstand any 
aggression from outside. Further, economically they did not find anything 
awkward to see Nepal's economy as an appendage of Indian economy. They 
believed that Nepal's economy could only prosper by being integrated with 
the Indian economy. To them the issues relating to the treaty, the presence 
of military mission and the advisers, and the Kosi project did not constitute 
any threat to Nepal's interest. Therefore, a lack of motivation to defy.
44 Chatterjee, Bhola, A Study of Recent Nepalese Politics. Calcutta, 1967, p. 39.
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emanated from condition 1 (i.e., perception of issues as non-vital) and 
condition 3 (inclination tow ards India), provide plausible clues for 
understanding the compliant stance of Nepali Congress.
According to our contextual framework, given the motivation to defy, 
NTPRs such as leadership strength, people's power, geo-political leverage 
and external political support may enable a small state to demonstrate NCB. 
Given the contextualities, not only that Nepal, at this phase, lacked the 
motivation to defy, it also did not possess the necessary potential NTPRs that 
might have constituted capability to resist.
King Tribhuvan was an easygoing man of frail health with excessive 
gratitude towards India. He was caught in the middle of the power struggle 
between the Ranas and the Nepali Congress. He was very reluctant to assert 
himself fully. Added to this was the personal disliking on the part of King 
Tribhuvan to participate in politics. The 'Economist' commented:
... Pandit Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, has also had his way 
in securing the return of King Tribhuvan to the Nepalis throne. This 
was not what the King had originally wanted. He had long schemed 
and endeavoured to live outside Nepal, and there is little probability 
even now that of his own accord he desires to go back.^^
His indifferent health held him away from the Kingdom quite often and for 
long intervals. All this had given rise to an aversion towards politics in him 
as he adm itted himself. While appointing M. P. Koirala as the Prime 
Minister second time, in the Royal Proclamation of 15 June, 1953, he said.
45 The Economist. 6 January 1951, pp. 27-28.
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This problem (of choosing a Prime Minister) could have been solved a 
long back, and our burden, which has to be carried against our liking 
and health, lightened, only if the politicians had given up their 
individual and partisan outlook and adopted a national one instead.^
Hence King Tribhuvan's personal gratitude coupled with lack of interest in 
politics, ill health, and lack of assertiveness indicate an absence of leadership 
strength as a potential NTPR.
A part from King Tribhuvan, the Ranas and the Congress leader M. P. 
Koirala also lacked the kind of assertiveness and strength to defy. Besides, 
leadership strength, one also notices the absence of other non-tangible power 
resources. For example, Nepal in this phase was totally Indo-centric having 
alm ost no political linkages with any outside power (with the exception of 
Britain). Consequently gaining external political support was out of 
question. Indo-Chinese rivalry was also not so acute in this phase compared 
to that of the post 1960 period. Consequently, for Nepal to tap such rivalry 
and gain a leverage was not so feasible as it was in the post 1960 period. 
Hence, the absence of these potential NTPRs also help us understand Nepal's 
compliant posture at this phase. However, anti-Indian public pressure as a 
potential NTPR was present. But such public pressure did not contribute to 
regime defiance because the regime lacked the motivation to defy.
46 Quoted in Muni, S. D,.’Role of Personality in the Context of Nepal's Foreign Policy,' in 
Varma, S. P, and Misra, K. P, (eds.). Foreign Policies in South Asia. New Delhi, 1%9, 
p. 142.
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K I N G  M A H E N D R A  REGIME (1955-1959)
With the death of King Tribhuvan, Mahendra succeeded the throne on 13th 
March 1955. His accession to the throne was destined to alter the foreign 
policy of Nepal in such a significant way as to constitute a watershed in 
Nepal's international relations. The question before King Mahendra was 
how Nepal, sandwiched as it is between India and China, could maintain its 
independence and  advance tow ards m odernization and economic 
development. His determination to assert Nepal's separate national identity 
disposed him to follow an independent path of his own choice without 
caring to consult the Indian government as his father had done before him. 
His foreign policy of having equal friendship with all countries was in sharp 
contrast to the Indian objective of keeping the strategic Himalayan kingdom 
aloof from foreign influences.
On 14th April he announced the formation of a five-man Council of advisors 
and accepted the resignation of M. P. Koirala. As one Indian scholar noted.
The way King Mahendra ignored the demands of the various political 
parties to form a cabinet without seeking Indian advice made it clear 
that unlike his predecessor he would not let New Delhi guide Nepal's 
future political development.^^
After coming to pow er the first step he took was to discard the existing 
policy of 'special relationship' with India. As Muni states,
King Mahendra's rise to power in March 1955 marked a 
breakthrough in Nepal's foreign policy. Nepal moved away from
47 Jha, R. K., The Himalayan Kingdoms in Indian Foreign Policy. N ew  D elh i, 1986 p. 151.
129
the poliqf of 'special relations ' with India and evolved a certain 
balance of power in relations to its neighbours"^
On 26th July 1955, a six member Chinese delegation arrived in Kathmandu 
for negotiation on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. After five days of continued negotiations it was announced on 1st 
A ugust that an agreem ent had been reached on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was agreed that the 
exchange of relation was to take place at an ambassadorial level^^. On the 
immediate effect of the treaty, the Eastern World wrote,
Nepal grew in stature as an independent state- because of its 
being so treated by a great Asian Power.^
These developments were watched by India with considerable indignation. 
There were much resentm ent and annoyance in Delhi at Nepal's blunt 
defiance of India's established position there. India could not just let Nepal 
wander from its (India's) sphere of influence. Nehru, who had all along been 
opposed to the extension of foreign influences in Nepal, was placed in a 
delicate position although apparently he praised the panch shila (five 
principles) declaration. The Hindu wrote:-
The recent decision of Nepal and the People's Republic of China to 
normalize their relations and exchange diplomatic representations 
seems to have provided another cause for concern among a section 
of members of Parliament. There is speculation whether this new
48 Muni, S. D., Foreign Policy of Nepal. New Delhi, 1973, p. 98.
49 The Statesman. 15 October, 1955.
50 Eastern World. London, October 1956, p. 12.
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friendship may not result in infiltration of the Chinese into Nepal 
and upset the balance in the northern border on IndiaP^
On 14th December 1955, Nepal was admitted to the United Nations. Nepal 
had first applied for admission into the United Nations in 1949 but was 
vetoed by the USSR. Its objection had been that Nepal was not an 
independent country but a satellite of India and that other similarly qualified 
countries were not granted membership. The admission to the United 
Nations was thus the realization of seven years' effort and the fulfillment of a 
nationalist aspiration to participate in the international forum as an equal 
and  bonafide member of the world community; it was celebrated in Nepal 
w ith a two day jubilation. Art official statement characterized the event as a 
'g reat success' in Nepal's efforts to gain 'universal recognition of her
s o v e r e i g n t y ’^ ^
On January 27,1956, Mahendra appointed T. P. Acharya as Prime Minister. 
In his first Press Conference after taking office, Acharya announced that his 
governm ent would pursue a policy of 'equal friendship' with all in its 
foreign relations and accept aid from any quarter if such aid was 
unconditional.^^ He also declared that he would seek to amend the 1950 
Indo-Nepali trade treaty in order to establish direct trade relations with 
third countries. This announcement implied that the 'special relationship' 
w ith India was now at an end.
The Nepali public as well as the Chinese government responded quite 
enthusiastically. Nepal acquired new trade and aid agreements with China
51 The Hindu. 3 August, 1955.
52 Sharma, Op. Cit. p. 68.
53 Rose, Op. Cit. p. 209.
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for the first time bringing in this new factor in Himalayan politics as a 
potential counter-balance to India. Both Nepal and China emphasized 
equality of status between the two countries, thus hitting hard at the special 
position enjoyed by India in its dealings with Nepal. A week later, it was 
announced in Kathmandu that the government would soon take up the 
Tibetan question with C h ina .^  The objective was to regularize Sino-Nepali 
relation in view of the changed Tibetan status. T. P. Acharya, the Prime 
Minister of Nepal, while addressing a news conference on 29th May 1956, 
said that Nepal had made an informal approach to the Government of India 
suggesting a revision of the 1950 treaty.
On 20 September 1956 China and Nepal signed a treaty which abrogated all 
past agreements and treaties between the two countries and remained in 
force for a period of eight years. The Prime Minister of Nepal described it as 
a 'historic event in trans-Himalayan relations'^^ and left for China on a state 
visit the same day the treaty was signed. The visit was particularly 
significant in the sense that it publicly underscored the independent nature 
of Nepal's foreign policy and gave notice to New Delhi that the so-called 
special relationship was not acceptable to Kathmandu any longer.
In the same year, Nepal participated as one of the 29 countries at the Afro- 
Asian Conference held at Bandung. Representation at Bandung gave a 
greater non-aligned flavour to Nepal's foreign policy and set the stage for a 
more active participation in the international arena. Nepal was also granted 
membership in the Universal Postal Union in 1956. Until then, Nepal's
54 Asian Recorder. Vol.I.No.59,11-17 February 1956, p. 678.
55 Ibid. p. 187.
56 The Hindu. 22.September, 1956.
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postal communication with the world was conducted by India. Now that the 
Himalayan kingdom was officially admitted into the Universal Postal Union, 
Nepali postal stamps gained international recognition and from then onward 
Nepal conducted its own postal communication.
Nepal also sought to define its position in such bodies as the United Nations 
in something other than a follow-the-leader role to India. In the 1956 vote in 
the UN General assembly on the Hungarian question Nepal voted with the 
West against the Soviet bloc. This was the first major issue in the UN in 
which Nepal had not voted with India, thus establishing Nepal's credentials 
as an independent state in an international forum.
This kind of defiant behaviour in Nepali foreign policy was not a pleasant 
development for India. With respect to Nepal's relations with China, Nehru 
informed the Chinese Government that the 'signing by them of a treaty of 
friendship with Nepal would, from India's viewpoint, be inopportune. 
That India was much distressed and annoyed can be discerned from the 
views expressed in Indian press. Almost all leading dailies expressed this 
concern in their editorial sections. One such comment is given below.
Legally China has nothing more to do with Tibet than we have to
do with Nepal. That being so New Delhi erred grievously in
letting Peking have a locus-standi in Nepal-Tibet affairs. How
would Pricing relish New Delhi's direct negotiations with Lhasa?
58
57 Sarvepalli, Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. 1956-1964. Vol.3, Delhi, 1984 p. 35.
58 Oreaniser. 15 October, 1956.
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This gives the reflection of overall Indian thinking which equates the status 
of Nepal with that of Tibet which was certainly detrim ental to the 
independent status of Nepal.
Despite India's annoyance, Nepal continued to deal with Peking as 
intimately as before. On 25th January 1957, Chou-En-Lai paid a visit to 
Kathmandu on Nepal's invitation. But before he could visit Nepal, India 
announced her President's visit to Kathmandu. As one Nepali analyst 
observed, it was obvious that his visit right between Nepali Prime Minister’s 
return from China and Chou's forthcoming trip to Kathmandu was a part of 
Indian response to growing intimacy in Sino-Nepali relations.^^ The Indian 
President Rajendra Prasad upon his visit to Kathmandu tried to remind the 
Nepalis of their social and cultural affinity with India, and declared that, 7 
am your kin' and stated that relation between India and Nepal was not of 
body but of soul.^
On 13 July, 1957, Tanka Prasad Acharya resigned. The reason behind his 
resignation was the differences that had developed between him and the 
King over the appointment of several ministers who were either relations or 
favourites of the King. When the influence of the party members was seen 
shrinking by these appointments, Acharya forwarded his resignation.^^
K. I. Singh, a vocally pro-Indian man was appointed as the prime minister of 
Nepal on 26 July 1957.
59 Sharma, Op Cit. p. 68.
60 Ibid. p. 69.
61 Patterson, Op.Cit.. p. 145.
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In appointing pro-Chinese and pro-Indian ministers, King 
Mahendra, of course, was not motivated by either sentiment but 
rather by a determination to gain for Nepal a greater degree of 
flexibility and independence in dealing with both of his dangerous 
neighbours.
After coming to power he announced his intention to re-establish the 
special relationship' with India and to keep Nepal's contacts with other 
powers to a minimum. It can be noted here that the concept of 'special 
relation' was not contested by the Nepali government whenever it was 
headed by a pro-Indian ruling party or a party leaned to India. K. I. Singh 
also stated that Russia ahcT China would not be permitted to establish 
embassies in Kathmandu. Nepal would continue to conduct its business 
with overseas powers through its embassies in New Delhi and London. In 
August 1957, he declared:
We shall support India over the Kashmir issue. There is no doubt 
about this. Kashmir was and is a part of India and the people of 
kashmir desire to live with the Indian union. We respect their 
wishes.^^
He denied that Nepal had ever ratified the 1956 treaty with China on the 
Tibet question. On the issues of Gandak river project, which the Nepalis 
look upon as a symbol of resistance to Indian domination, K. I. Singh 
accepted the draft agreement submitted by India and appointed a special 
committee to evaluate the proposal as the first step in the direction of an 
agreement.
62 Rose, Op.Cit. p. 214
63 Hindustan Times. 4 August, 1957.
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But K. 1. Singh lasted less than four months. He took office on 26th July 
1957, and was dismissed on 14th November 1957. His dismissal was so 
sudden that everyone in Kathmandu, including the Cabinet Ministers, was 
taken by surprise. Unaware of his downfall, K. I. Singh himself contacted 
the Radio Station to get the text of the royal proclamation.^ K. I. Singh was 
picked on the assumption that he would cooperate with the king. But when 
he refused to do so he was sacked. He even tried to cross the limits of his 
real power. For instance, he announced a com plete reform  of 
administration in the country starting with the Palace itself by removing 
two of the King's principal private secretaries.^
From m id November 1957 to end May 1959, King Mahendra initiated a 
period of direct rule. His policy of diversification was pushed once again 
with fresh vigour. The m ost significant aspect of this period was the 
relatively little attention paid to New Delhi. Nepal reached agreement with 
the United States in January 1958 under which both government established 
resident embassies in each other's respective capitals. This was followed by 
the opening of further embassies by a number of other states including 
China and the Soviet Union in the face of New Delhi's annoyance. In 1958, 
Nepal established its own airline. The new airline, operated under Nepali 
governmental control, replaced the Indian Airlines Corporation which had 
until then been running air services in and out of Nepal.
From subservience to India in 1950 Nepal had come to a new independence. 
Previously, Nepal had direct diplomatic relations with only five countries-
64 Gupta, A., Politics in Nepal: A Study of Post-Rana Political Developments and Party 
Politics. Bombay, 1964, p. 119.
65 Mihaly, Op. Cit.. p. 157.
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all established before 1951; by 1959, Nepal had exchanged instruments of 
recognition with twenty four governments. As Leo Rose observed,
'Sleepy little Kathmandu, in which foreigners had been 
once a rarity, had now become a busy center with a 
substantial diplomatic community
ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAVIOUR : KIN G MA HE NDR A
REGIME (1955-1959)
Non-Compliance in the foreign policy behaviour of Nepal during the phase 
1955-59, may be understood in terms of motivation to defy that appear to 
have emanated partly by condition 1, partly by condition 2 and partly by 
condition 3. According to condition 1, a small state is likely to acquire 
motivation to defy and demonstrate NCB if it considers the issues involved 
as vital i.e., if the issues are perceived as necessary for physical, economic or 
political survival of the people, state or regime. Such necessity may be 
'absolute' i.e., without which existence will be at stake; or it may not be 
'absolute i.e., without which existence will not be at stake but survival would 
mean encountering considerable difficulty. If an issue is not considered vital 
then a small state is not likely to have motivation to defy and consequently 
non-compliance is not likely to follow. According to condition 2, a ruler's 
ambition to become strong and effective and to transform his country to a 
prosperous, independent and respectable m ember of the international 
com m unity might generate the motivation to defy and lead to NCB. 
According to condition 3, a ruling party 's disinclination towards the 
dom inant power might generate the motivation to defy and lead to NCB
66 Rose, Op. Git, p. 268.
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while an inclination towards the dominant power might not generate the 
motivation to defy and fail to lead NCB. A subscription to a political idea, 
attitude or view along with the sociocultural linkages (across border) of the 
ruling party that is not congenial to the dominant power, sets an antagonistic 
environm ent in which the ruling party might develop a tendency to reject 
the wishes of the dom inant power. This condition was defined as political 
disinclination of the ruling party towards the dominant power. Conversely, 
a subscription to political idea, attitude or view along with the kind of socio­
cultural linkages (across border) of the ruling party that is congenial to the 
dom inant power sets a friendly environment in which the ruling party might 
develop a tendency to accept whatever is wished by the dominant power. 
This condition was labelled as political inclination of the ruling party 
tow ards the dom inant power. The point is that both inclination and 
disinclination sets a predom inant bias in the formulation of policy by a 
ruling party.
Table 4.1 sum m arizes the non-compliant behaviours, their nature (i.e., 
initiative/responsive) along with the conditions of motivation to defy and 
the NTPRs used to understand these behaviours. Table 4.1 suggests that in 
all the instances Nepal took the initiative to defy. It also shows that out of 17 
instances, 4 instances can be best understood by condition 1, 6 instances by 
condition 2 and the remaining 7 instances by condition 3. In 3 out of the 4 
instances of NCB (that can be understood by condition 1) economic survival 
was at stake, while in 1 instance the issue involved were vital from the point 
of view of both economic and political survival. Furthermore, table 4.1 
reveals that leadership strength, an NTPR constituting capability to resist, 
explains all the instances of NCB. In 3 instances, people's power and 2 
instances, external political support, (both in addition to leadership strength)
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T ab le  4.1 A S u m m ary  o f th e  In s ta n ce s  o f NCB d u rin g  K ing 
M a h e n d ra 's  R eg im e  (1955-1959) a lo n g  w ith  th e  
C o n d itio n s  o f M o tiv a tio n  to  D efy  an d  the  N TPRs 
u se d  to  E xp la in  T hem .
INSTANCES OF NCB NATURE 
OF NCB
MOTIVATION 
TO DEFY 
CThe Conditions)
CAPABILITY TO 
RESIST 
(The NTPRs)
1. Discard Special Relaticwis. Initiative Condition 3 
(Disinclination)
LS
2. E stab lish m en t o f d ip lom atic  
relation with China.
Initiative Conditions
(Disinclination)
LS
3. Admission to United Nations Initiative Condition 2 
(Ambition)
LS, EPS
4. Announcement by Acharya of the 
policy of equal frienddiip.
Initiative Condition 3 
(Disinclination)
LS
5. Acharya's announcement of the 
policy of accepting aid from third 
party.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, PP
6. Acharya declared h is desire to 
am end  1950 trade treaty to  
establish direct trade relation with  
third country.
Initiative CondiÜŒi 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, PP
7. Trade and aid agreement w ith  
China.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS
8. Announcement of Nepal's intaition  
to d iscuss the Tibetan question  
w ith  China to regularize Sino- 
Nepali relations.
Initiative Condition 3 
(Disinclination)
LS
9. Acharya mentioned, Government 
of Nepal informally approached to 
India for the revision of the 1950 
Treaty
Initiative Conditionl 
(Survival of 
economic and 
political 
independence)
LS, PP
10. Nepal and China signed treaty Initiative Conditio»! 3 
(Disinclination)
LS
Table 4.1 Contd
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Table 4.1 Contd ...
INSTANCES OF NCB NATURE 
OF NCB
MOTIVATION 
TO DEFY
The ConditicMis
CAPABILITY TO 
RESIST 
(The NTPRs)
11. Membership in Universal Postal 
Union
Initiative Condition 2 
(Ambition)
LS
12. Voted with the West on Hungarian 
Question against India and Soviet 
bloc
Initiative Condition 2 
(Ambition)
LS, EPS
13. S tr e n g th e n in g  S in o -N e p a li  
relations Chou-en-Lai's v isit to 
Nepal.
Initiative CondiÜŒ! 3 
(Disinclination)
LS
14. Diplomatic relations with the US Initiative Condition 2 
(Ambition)
LS
15. Opening of embassy in China Initiative Condition 3 
(Disinclination)
LS
16. O pening of em bassies in other 
states including USSR
Initiative Condition 2 
(Ambition)
LS
17. Establishment of Airline. Initiative
Condition 2 
(Ambition) LS
The letters LS, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, people's power and 
external political support.
also enable us to understand NCB. Let us now examine the instances closely 
and explore the conditions, assumptions, contextualities etc (i.e., policy 
contingencies) within which these NCBs are demonstrated.
The instances of non-compliant behaviour which condition 1 best explains 
include announcement of the policy of accepting aid from third countries, 
declaration of Nepali government's intention to amend 1950 trade treaty to 
establish direct trade relations with third country, trade and aid agreement 
with China and Nepali government's informal approach to India for the 
revision of the 1950 treaty. Explaining these instances of NCB in terms of 
motivation to defy based on the ambition of the ruler (condition 2) or 
disinclination of the ruling party  (condition 3) rather appears to be
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unsatisfactory. However, for the moment we will postpone addressing the 
question as to w hy these conditions are unsatisfactory in understanding 
these NCB. Instead we will concentrate on condition 1 i.e., vitalness of 
issues. It may be recalled from the foregoing phase that the treaty obligation 
with India in m atters of trade threatened Nepal's vital economic interests 
and jeopardized Nepal's survival as a viable economy. Hence the issue of 
favourable terms of treaty with India to ensure diversification of economic 
relation with other countries was perceived to be a necessary element for 
Nepal's economic existence. These instances of NCB highlighting Nepal's 
quest for diversifying economic relations, may thus be explained in terms of 
a motivation to defy characterized by vitalness of issue (condition 1) because 
the issue involved was viewed as necessary to Nepal's survival as viable 
economy. Now let us return to the question as to why condition 2 and 
condition 3 do not offer satisfactory explanations. As far as condition 2 is 
concerned, am bition of the ruler may be best viewed as a disposition 
characterized by an urge of becoming', growing' or developing' to the full 
potential, an actualization of a dream to become a strong and effective ruler 
of a strong country. Surely the question here is not of an actualization of a 
dream. It is rather a question of bare survival of economic existence.
Condition 3, on the other hand, does offer an explanation to these non­
complaint behaviours. It will be observed from the subsequent analysis that 
both King M ahendra and his prime m inister A charya had strong 
disinclination tow ards India. From this point of view it appears logical for 
this regime to be non-compliant. However, economic survival is too 
fundam ental to be interpreted in terms of their subscription of certain 
political views or attitudes. Hence Condition 1 (i.e. vitalness) rather than 
Condition 3 (i.e. disinclination) offer better explanation in these instances.
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Let us now examine the instance of NCB which may be explained best by 
condition 2 i.e .,ambition of the ruler. These instances include admission to 
the United Nations, membership in the universal postal union, voting in the 
United Nations on Hungarian question against Indian stand, establishment 
of diplomatic relations with the US, opening of embassies in various states 
including USSR and finally establishm ent of airline. Condition 1 and 
condition 3 do not appear to be persuasive in explaining these instances. 
Condition 1 does not facilitate our understanding satisfactorily because the 
issues involved are not necessary for physical, economic or political survival 
of the people, state or regime. It seems difficult to interpret the non­
admission to the international bodies (the United Nations, the Universal 
Postal Union), or non-diversification of political relations with other states or 
the non-establishment of a national airline as threatening the existence of 
people, state or regime either physically, economically or even politically. 
Since the issues involved are not vital, condition 1 does not help us 
understand the motivation to defy and thereby the demonstration of these 
NCBs. Similarly, condition 3 is also deficient. Except the Hungarian issue, 
disinclination towards India, does not appear to play any role in these 
instances of NCB. Nepal's disposition of disinclination or inclination 
towards India does not imply that it can or cannot seek membership in the 
UN or in the Universal Postal Union or establish its own national airline. 
Further, the diversification of political relation, in these instances, suggest 
that Nepal had a political affinity towards these states. Logically it may be 
argued that political affinity tow ards other states does not necessarily 
connote Nepal's disinclination towards India. This is because it is possible to 
imagine that while maintaining close affinity towards other states, Nepal can 
still maintain an equally close affinity towards India. Hence, an affinity 
towards other states does not help us to understand the motivation to defy
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and consequently the dem onstration of these NCBs w ith the help of 
condition 3.(i.e., disinclination towards India). However, Nepal's political 
relations with China and Pakistan seems to be exceptions to this. As we 
shall see later in the analysis, King Mahendra's disinclination towards India 
had been as a result of Indian preponderance. For M ahendra then it was 
crucial to counter balance Indian influence. China and to some extent 
Pakistan (both adversaries of India) were the potent forces within the 
geographical proximity that Nepal could utilize to counter balance Indian 
influence. Nepal's political relations with China and Pakistan may be 
understood in terms of disinclination towards India (Condition 3). To the 
Nepalis, no other states or international organizations represent such a force. 
Hence, manifesting an inclination towards those states (other than China and 
Pakistan) or organizations cannot be understood with the help of condition 
3.
However, condition 2 helps us understand these behaviours. It can be said 
that these behaviours emanated from King M ahendra's ambition to see 
Nepal as a respectable partner in the conduct of international affairs. It will 
be recalled from the earlier discussion that initially the USSR vetoed Nepal's 
admission to the UN on the ground that Nepal lacked the status of an 
independent state. Certainly Nepal's subsequent admission to the UN is a 
recognition to its independent status and a realization of Mahendra's dream 
to see Nepal as an equal and bonafide member in the international 
community. The diversification of political relations with other states may 
also be interpreted in terms of M ahendra's ambition to enhance Nepal's 
image as an independent state. Rather than being an appendage to the 
Indian m achinery of external affairs, these m easures dem onstrated 
Mahendra's desire to enable Nepal to enter into political relationships with
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other states in its own right and to conduct its business directly with those 
states. Voting against the Indian stand on the Hungarian question might be 
interpreted in terms of disinclination towards India (condition 3). However, 
in essence it revealed Nepal's assertion of an independent entity rather than 
a bias or an a ttitude towards India. This is because the UN (being an 
international forum) offers a great opportunity to a state for self-assertion. In 
this case, Nepal's availing of such an opportunity to assist itself overshadows 
the explanation of its disinclination towards India. Hence, Mahendra's 
ambition (to secure an independent status for Nepal) offers a better 
understanding of his motivation to defy and consequently the demonstration 
of NCB than his disinclination towards India.
The NCBs that condition 3 help us understand include discarding special 
relations w ith  India, establishing diplom atic relations with China, 
announcement of the policy of equal friendship, efforts to regularize Sino- 
Nepali relations on Tibetan issue, signing of treaty with China, strengthening 
of Sino-Nepali relations marked by Chou-en-lai's visit to Nepal and opening 
of embassy in China. Apart from condition 3, condition 1 also offers an 
explanation for these behaviours. However, condition 2 does not offer any 
satisfactory explanation. We shall focus on condition 3 first and 
subsequently return to condition 1 and condition 2 respectively.
Essentially the behaviours dted above relate to Nepal's diplomatic relations 
w ith China. The establishm ent of diplom atic relations with China 
dem onstrated Nepal's non-compliance to Indian wishes. India wanted 
Nepal to see China through the prism of New Delhi's strategic thinking. To 
this end, it naturally desired to block any type of relations developing 
between China and Nepal which the Indian policy makers thought adverse 
to their interest. Nepal refused to accept the Indian version' of Nepal's
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foreign relations. Nepal not only established relations with China but also 
intensified it with great zeal.
Taking condition 3 into consideration, Nepal behaved this way because the 
ruling power at that time was disinclined towards India. King Mahendra 
had an anti-Indian attitude and subscribed to a political view contrary to 
India's predom inant political view. Chatterjee wrote, "King Mahendra 
started his Royal career w ith three sharply defined attitudes: (1) contempt 
for democratic politics; (2) animosity toward the Nepali Congress; and (3) 
dislike of I n d i a W h i l e  Crown Prince, Mahendra had witnessed the post­
revolutionary political developm ents in Nepal and had developed an 
aversion for the role India had played in the internal as well as external 
affairs of Nepal.
This disinclination disposed him to follow an independent path of his own 
choice without caring to consult the Indian government as his father had 
done before him. He also did not inherit the disposition of his father and did 
not share the attitude and feeling of commitment towards India that his 
father had had. On the contrary, he considered India a hindrance in the way 
of Nepal's self-assertion and real independence. As such his foreign policy 
of having equal friendship with China was in sharp contrast to the Indian 
objective of keeping the strategic Himalayan kingdom aloof from foreign 
influences. Tanka Prasad Acharya, who was appointed as a prime minister 
in January 1956 by King Mahendra, had a reputation as a 'Leftist' with 
know n anti-Indian leaning. In June 1951, he publicly led the anti-Nehru 
demonstration when the Prime Minister of India was on a state visit to 
Nepal. He had all along been opposed to India's special position in Nepal
67 Chatterjee, Bhola, Op. Cit. p. 65.
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and questioned the very usefulness of the policy of 'special relationship'. 
Instead he advocated Nepal's equally good relations with China. Acharya 
believed that there was no immediate threat to Nepal from China and 
argued as has been reported by one of the Indian dailies,
We fear no attack from China because China knows that to do so 
will antagonize India .^
He agitated for the end of the special relationship with India and suggested a 
neutralist posture in Nepal's relation with other countries including India. 
He contended that Nepali neutrality should be made effective by procuring a 
guarantee from both India and China.
Thus both Mahendra and his preferred prime minister looked north toward 
their neighbour across the Himalayas m uch more than toward their 
neighbour in the south.
The high points of non-compliant behaviour in the foreign policy of Nepal 
can be observed during the periods when the Nepali Congress Party was not 
in power. When they were in power they did not see any harm in tilting 
towards the dominant power in their various policies and pronouncements 
with whom they had political as well as psychological pedigree.
As m entioned earlier, condition 1 also offer an explanation for the 
motivation to defy and thereby the demonstration of these NCBs. Nepal's 
establishm ent of diplomatic relations with China may be viewed as a 
m easure to counter-balance Indian preponderance. India's pervasive 
political influence on Nepal in the form of special relations, meant 
curtailm ent of political freedom of the Nepali decision makers. Hence,
68 Hindustan Times. 5 June 1952.
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counter-balandng Indian preponderance was viewed as a necessary measure 
for the political survival of the decision makers. However, the explanation 
offered by condition 1 appears to be less satisfactory when compared to the 
explanation offered by condition 3. This is because perception of political 
freedom is contingent upon the values, attitudes or views held. Hence, 
disinclination as an orientation takes precedence over the perception of 
political freedom.
Let us now  return to condition 2, i.e., ambition of the ruler. It was 
mentioned earlier that this condition does not offer satisfactory explanation 
for the motivation to defy and consequently the demonstration of the NCBs 
under consideration. Although the establishment of diplomatic relation 
contributed towards Nepal's self-assertion, the counter-balancing of Indian 
preponderance is more a fundamental concern than actualization of 
Mahendra's ambition (to secure for Nepal an independent and respectable 
place in the world ). Counter balancing was a necessary measure for the 
survival of Nepal's political independence. Therefore the crucial point is not 
becoming the fullest potential' but 'survival of existence'. Further more, 
given a disinclination characterized by an attitude of aversion towards India 
and an ambition, it may be argued that an attitude of aversion takes 
precedence over ambition. This is because it seems natural first to alleviate 
pain and then seek gratification. From this perspective redressing an 
attitude of disliking (through the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
China) appears to be more convincing than an actualization of an ambition.
During this phase Nepal's non-compliant behaviour may be attributed to 
leadership strength of King Mahendra, to some extent external political 
support and people's power. Geo-political leverage did not play any 
significant part in these instances. This is because Sino-Indian rivalry was
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not so acute (as it will be observed in the subsequent phase of Mahendra's 
reign) to enable Nepal to capitalize it. In every instance in this phase 
leadership strength as a factor of capability may be interpreted to have 
contributed to Nepal's non-compliance.
Unlike King Tribhuvan, King Mahendra demonstrated the strength of 
leadership. He was determined and sought power by whatever means were 
available. The strength of his personality as a leader and as a power seeker, 
can be said to have led him to defy India. In his effort to break away from 
India he used all possible sources of power. By diversifying Nepal's relations 
with other countries Nepal gained political support in its defiance to India. 
For example, in supporting the West in the Hungarian question Nepal 
obtained their support to defy the Soviet bloc including India. The presence 
of leadership strength and external political support during this phase 
explain how Nepali government was non-compliant during this phase and 
not in King Tribhuvan's reign. In addition to this, public pressure against 
India may also be said to have strengthened Mahendra's efforts to defy India.
Given these NTPRs, it may be asked how do we explain M ahendra's 
dismissal of Prime Minister Acharya, his appointment of prime ministers K. 
I. Singh and his subsequent four months compliance with the Indian wishes 
and finally reverting back to his pattern of defiance in November 1957. 
These incidents show that despite the presence of the speded motivational 
conditions, Nepal dem onstrated compliant stance. This suggests the 
presence of other contextual condition(s) not explicitly specified in the 
contextual framework,^^ that might render the NTPRs inadequate or might
69 The inadequacy of handling these deviations reflect a weakness of the contextual 
framework used in this study. It is possible that similar inadequacies may prevail in 
som e instances that might have remained beyond the researcher's awareness. The 
point of emphasis is that a focus on policy contingency framework enables us to
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just lead to a temporary 'retreat' e tc  A further detailed contextual analysis 
might enable us to understand these behavioural expressions. However, 
setting aside these deviations, the contextual framework adopted here appear 
to enable us to understand Nepal's predominant behavioural expressions 
(i.e., non-compliance) during this phase.
CO N G RESS REG IM E (1959-1960)
In 1959 the King granted a general election while he remained a 
constitutional monarch. This election was long overdue. In the settlement 
that ended the 1950 revolution, a general election was promised sometime in 
1952-53. But because of various technical and political reasons it could not 
be held.^o The elections ran from February to May and 43 percent of the 
voters (universal adult suffrage had been granted) voted. The election was 
held on the basis of single constituency majority vote. The Nepali Congress 
won the elections taking 74 out of 109 seats in the lower house. Gorkha 
Parishad won 19 seats while the Communist party got only 4 seats.^^ It may 
be stressed here that the Nepali Congress Party has an unpopular pro-Indian 
image, even though its appeal for democracy has wide influence in the 
country.
India, who had backed the Nepali Congress, was delighted after its victory 
in the 1959 general elections. Nehru wrote to B. P, Koirala:
reœgnize the impossibility of formulating a universal framework capable of explaining 
all instances. Hence, this contextual framework does not claim of being capable of 
explaining all possible instances of NCB of both Nepal and Bangladesh.
70 Rose, Op. Cit.. p. 219.
71 Mihaly, Op. Cit. p. 184.
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The results of the election recently held in Nepal has naturally 
gladdened all those who believe in democracy and are friends and 
good wishers of Nepal.
In May 1959, Nehru came to Nepal as a gesture of goodwill to the new 
government. The communiqué issued before his departure, the first ever 
m ade jointly by a Nepali and a foreign prime minister, stated that there is no 
conflict of interests between the two countries, and they face similar problems and 
have common a p p r o a c h e s .In other words, it affirmed that there was an 
identity of interest between the two countries which led them to follow 
similar policies.
After winning the election, B. P. Koirala rejected Chou-en-Lai's proposal of a 
road connecting Katmandu with Tibet.^^ None of the Chinese aided 
economic development projects provided in the 1956 agreement ever got 
under way during this period. The Nepali Congress, unlike previous Nepali 
governm ents (which had tended to dismiss any suggestions that China 
m ight be a potential threat to Nepal), attempted to underline the seriousness 
of the potential threat. They also attempted to counter the tendency among 
some Nepalis to assume that India constituted the only threat to Nepal's 
independence.
The Nepali congress also subscribed to the Indian version of the idea of non- 
alignment'. While there was no intention of abandoning the policy, which in 
Nepal was interpreted to mean primarily non alignment in the Sino-Indian 
dispute, the implication of some Nepali congress statements and actions
72 Gorkhapatra. 1 June, 1959.
73 Asian Recorder. V: 27 July 4-10,1959, pp. 2748-49.
74 Asian Recorder. December 3-9,1961, p. 4298.
150
indicated that, if a choice had to be made, Nepal could only align itself with 
India. Without taking into consideration the intensely emotional anti-Indian 
sentiments prevalent in the country, the Congress government operated with 
a conviction that smooth relations with India alone were in the best interests 
of Nepal.
In early November 1959, the Himalayas, a significant portion of which lies 
north of Nepal, were claimed as India's northern boundary. This claim was 
followed shortly afterw ards by Nehru's unilateral declaration on India's 
responsibility over Nepal's security. During a debate in Indian Parliament in 
Novem ber 1959, N ehru reiterated his government's position that 'any 
aggression against Bhutan and Nepal would be regarded as aggression 
against India . T h i s  enunciation of the Nehru doctrine disregarding 
Nepal's independent existence evoked a nationalist uproar of such intensity 
in Nepal that even B. P. Koirala was constrained to explain that the Indian 
prime minister had merely meant "that in case of aggression against Nepal, 
India would send help if such help is ever asked for. It could never be taken 
as suggesting that India could take unilateral action"^^. Nehru affirmed that 
B. P. Koirala's elaboration was 'perfectly correct' but also revealed for the 
first time the terms of the "letters of Exchange" that had accompanied the 
1950 treaty. This outraged Nepali sentiment even further, and added 
substantially to the outcry against India's alleged interference in Nepal 
w hich subsequently trem bled the Congress governm ent to its very 
foundations.
75 Statesman. November 28,1959.
76 Asian Recorder.V: 51. December 19-25.1959. p. 3060-61.
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On 4th December 1959, Nepal signed the agreement on Gandak Project and 
agreed to give the necessary facilities within its territory for its execution. 
This agreem ent was signed in the face of massive demonstrations and 
protests in N epal7^ The project was characterized by Nepali critics as an 
economic exploitation of Nepal. But the pro-Indian government of B. P. 
Koirala said "India would have constructed dam in her own territory if 
Nepal had not given the permission. Nepal would ... thereby have been 
deprived of much b e n e f i t . I n  other words, Nepal had to take what it 
could get.
On 11 September 1960, the Nepali Congress government and India agreed to 
conclude a new treaty which was signed at Kathmandu by Nepal's Industry 
and Commerce Minister and India's am bassador to Nepal. The treaty 
comprised of three parts: (1) bilateral trade (2) transit and (3) general 
provisions. It ran to a total of fourteen articles which was supplemented by 
(l)a Protocol (II)Letters of Exchange at the Ministerial level and (III) a 
Memorandum.
India granted certain rights and privileges to Nepal in the Treaty of 1960. It 
ended India's unilateral control over Nepal's tariff structure thereby enabling 
Nepal to evolve an independent trade policy. She could on a non reciprocal 
basis, impose protective duties or qualitative restrictions on imports from 
India in order to overcome the initial handicaps of newly established 
industries in the countries.
77 The Nepal Press Digest. June 8-14,1960. p. 134.
78 Nepal. Publidtv Dept. Release. 11 June 1960.
79 Rawat, P. C., IndoN epal Economic Relations. New Delhi, 1974, p. 172.
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In transit Nepal was accorded freedom through India to and from third 
countries. Article 9 stipulated that 'traffic in transit shall be exempted from 
customs duties and from all transit duties or other charges for transportation 
and such other charges as are commensurate with the costs of services 
rendered for supervision of such transit'.
But India in her efforts to discourage Nepal's trade diversification imposed 
restrictions stating that there was a difference of view between India and 
Nepal on the question of service charges to be levied for supervision and 
handling of transit traffic at Radhikapur. The Indian Minister for trade 
explained that while it was true that India did not collect any charges for 
providing services and facilities Tor Nepal's transit trade through Calcutta 
port, small charges were collected for certain special types of services'. 
Nepal's reaction was natural. The Nepalis Minister for Commerce and 
Industry while talking to newsmen in an informal meeting said that,
India's refusal of transit facilities to starting trade with Pakistan 
via Radhikapur did really touch the sentiments of the Nepalis 
people. We never imagined that India could ever go beyond the 
treaty of 1960 and demand from Nepal such a charge when even 
Pakistan was not charging from her for Indo-Afghan trade through 
Pakistan ... The Indian delegation put forward one demand after 
another.^
The Indian stand on transit facilities was detrimental to the Nepali goals of 
trade diversification. The signing of the Gandak agreement and Koirala's 
alignment of Nepal's interests with that of India led to an intense nationalist 
agitation against the Congress regime.
80 Muni. Op. Cit. p. 136.
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ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAVIOUR : CO N G RESS REGIM E
(1959-1960)
The observations of Nepali behaviour during 1959-60 reveal that like King 
Tribhuvan 's phase, the Governm ent led by Nepali Congress was 
predominantly compliant. One might point out that the Trade and Transit 
Treaty signed by the government in 1960 as an example of their non- 
compliance. However, this is not so. Non-compliance by definition assumes 
the presence of confrontation or discord between the interacting states. No 
instance of Nepali Congress' defiance, protests or unhappiness with the 
provisions of the previous treaties was found. It may be emphasized here 
that the Congress government of B. P. Koirala was tilted towards India. 
India was contented because of their ideological and political compatibilities. 
Furthermore, after nearly a decade, Nepal appeared to be heading toward a 
stable democratic system much like that of Nehru's India. In a strategically 
located country like Nepal, such a stable and ideologically compatible 
government was im portant to Indian interests. With growing Sino-Indian 
hostility, a friendly Nepal, firmly standing by the spirit and provision of the 
1950 treaty of peace and freindship would undoubtedly further Indian 
security interests. Taking these points into consideration, it appears more 
convincing to treat the provisions of 1960 Trade and Transit Treaty as short 
term Indian concessions (in order to gain long term goal of a common market 
and identical security interests) rather than Nepali defiance.
The compliant posture of the Nepali congress party may be attributed to its 
lack of both motivation to defy and capability to resist. Condition 1 and 
condition 3 offer plausible explanations for the lack of motivation to defy. 
According to condition 1, an issue considered as non-vital is not likely to 
generate motivation to defy and thereby lead to compliance. Similarly,
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condition 3 states that an inclination to the dominant power is also not likely 
to generate motivation to defy and thereby lead to compliance. Let us now 
explore the conditions, assum ptions, contextualities (i.e., the policy 
contingencies) in order to understand the behavioural expression of the 
Nepali Congress party.
Nepali Congress believed that Nepali economy could prosper only if it is tied 
to Indian economy and Nepal's security could be ensured if India took the 
responsibility. In governmental perception Indian security posture and 
Gandak river project did not threaten Nepal's survival politically or 
economically. They were non-vital issues to the government. Therefore, 
according to condition 1 Nepali Congress government lacked the motivation 
to defy. So their behaviour were compliant. Further as was observed in the 
analysis of King Tribhuvan's phase, Nepali Congress party had a political 
inclination towards India. Hence, according to condition 3 also, Nepali 
Congress lacked the motivaion to defy and their behaviour was compliant. 
In addition to the lack of motivation to defy, Nepali Congress also lacked the 
capability to resist. Unlike King Mahendra, Koirala lacked assertiveness and 
strength to defy India. Besides, Koirala's Indo-centric foreign policy implied 
the lack of political linkages with any outside power. Consequently, external 
political support was absent. Nepal's geo-political leverage at this period 
was very weak or almost non-existent. This was because Sino-Indian rivalry 
was not as acute in this phase as was in the post 1960 period. Finally, 
although people's power was strong, it did not contribute to governmental 
defiance as the regime lacked motivation to defy.
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K IN G  M A H EN D RA  REG IM E (1960-1972)
The above phase of Nepali foreign policy was reversed following the sudden 
dismissal of the Nepali Congress governm ent King Mahendra had great 
reservations about the role of India in Nepal's politics, and considered the 
prevailing Nepali multi-party political system as an appendage of the Indian 
political system. In December 15, 1960, he dism issed the government, 
banned the multi-party system, jailing most party leaders including B. P. 
Koirala and took the reins of power in his own hands. The King charged the 
ousted governm ent w ith irresponsibility in its discharge of duties and 
insinuated that it had acted against the national interests of the country.
... in the name of the democratic system, interests of the people 
and the nation were ignored and power was used for the fulfillment 
of personal and party needs ... anti national elements received 
encouragement in a large degree and it is no secret that this created 
an atmosphere detrimental to national unity ... as it is our 
ultimate responsibility to safeguard nationalism and sovereignty 
we hereby dissolve the cabinet as well as both houses of 
Parliament.
Mahendra maintained that it was the dependence of Nepal's political parties 
on foreign powers, particularly India, which necessitated the change. He 
also argued that as Nepal had never been a colony, it could not simply 
imitate W estern democratic institutions but had to devise a system of its 
own. In interviews with the press. King Mahendra at one time even accused 
Koirala of being on the verge of merging Nepal with India.
81 Dainik Nepal. 15 December, 1960.
82 Cited in Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, Op. Cit. p. 232.
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Nehru called it a "set-back to democracy" and on 20 December, he made the 
following comments in the Rajya Sabha on the King's action.
This is a complete reversal of the democratic process and it is not 
clear to me that there can be a going bade to the democratic process 
in the foreseeable future naturally one views such a development 
with considerable regret.
It was not clear whether this was a real expression of concern for genuine 
democracy or political rhetoric to discredit Nepali authority because, one 
suspects India's role which it historically maintained to suit its own needs 
rather than upholding principles and ideals. Mihaly observed, Ndiru had 
attacked the new government before it had begun to function and show its xvorth.^
On the contrary, China maintained a discreet silence on the king's action, 
simply reporting the event w ithout editorial comment. The Nepal-China 
Joint Boundary Commission was in session at the time of the coup, and both 
the teams were touring the border areas and preparing reports based on 
their investigation. The dismissal of the Koirala ministry did not interfere 
w ith these proceedings, which concluded on schedule in mid January 
1961.85
The royal take over was indeed a set-back for India. The basis for 
maintaining strong influence was cut off and India was unprepared for the 
new development in Nepal. Nepal went on asserting with greater emphasis 
that like any other independent state Nepal was free to adopt any convenient
83 Nehru. India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, p. 443.
84 Mihaly, Op_at p. 109.
85 Rose, Op. Cit p. 235.
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political system for its governance that would fulfill its aspirations and 
interests for the attainment of progress and prosperity.
In 1961, a State trading corporation was established to encourage trade with 
other countries other than India and provide better organisation in Nepal's 
foreign trade. The importance of diversification of Nepal's foreign trade was 
emphasized and trade relations were established with countries other than 
India both formally and informally.
A part from that, Nepal took a num ber of other steps to prom ote 
diversification of trade in the 1960s. One such step was the introduction of 
the 'bonus voucher' or the import entitlement scheme. The rationale behind 
this kind of incentive was to make Nepalis products more attractive as well 
as cheaper in the international market. This scheme provided a significant 
source of foreign exchange needed for national development, plus an 
im portant source of revenue from custom s duties. International 
organizations such as IMF concurred on the effectiveness of the scheme. ^
The scheme was very much contended by India on the ground that it 
stimulated deflection of goods across the border. India's main concern was 
the loss of foreign exchange and custom revenue and therefore India wanted 
Nepal to abolish the bonus voucher scheme. Abolishing the scheme was 
considered detrimental to Nepal's economic interests.
Although India could not oppose Nepal's diversification policy in principle, 
in practice it gave rise to numerous conflicts. One such conflict was due to 
India's drive for and Nepal's opposition to, harmonization of their economic
86 Shrestha, S. B, Chinese and Indian Policies Toward Nepal: An analysis of Political. 
Economic and Security Issues. 1960-75. Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Uniyersity of 
Kansas 1980, p. 139.
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policies. India wanted to wed Nepal to the idea of a common market. India 
contended that harmonization is the only answer to check border smuggling. 
But Nepal believed that such a policy would be even more detrimental to 
Nepalis economic interests against the backdrop of India's relatively large 
and industrialized economy which might well stand as an obstacle to 
Nepalis' aspiration for greater self-identity and independence. Nepal argued 
that sm uggling was not a problem only w ith Nepal and India; it was 
common also between East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and Burma and India. 
If India was not exerting any pressure on them to harmonize their economy 
with her why was she so much bothered about Nepal when she knew that 
Nepal was totally against such a policy. To them it appeared that India was 
demanding too special a price for Nepal's landlockedness. Nepal viewed her 
economy and trade policy as being formulated in consonance with her 
national interests and economic realities.
In September 1961, King Mahendra personally represented the Himalayan 
Kingdom at the conference of the non-aligned countries at Belgrade. 
Emphasis was made on non-intervention and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of countries. In an attempt to break away from its relationship with 
India, Nepal also intensified relations with Pakistan. Although diplomatic 
relations were established formally during the Koirala ministry on 19 March 
1960, no further steps were taken at that time. The King paid a seven day 
official visit to Pakistan in September 1961. The significance of this visit was 
that it gave an indication of strong unwillingness on King Mahendra's part 
to defer to Indian sentiments in the conduct of Nepal's foreign policy. A 
Pakistani em bassy was set up in K athm andu and both the countries
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concluded trade and transit agreements. Also arrangements were made for 
an air link between Dacca and Kathmandu.^^
On September 25,1961, the King went on a seventeen day state visit to China 
and Outer Mongolia. The main purpose behind his visit to Peking was the 
signing of a boundary agreement which came on the 5th of October. They 
reached agreement on their boundary in a manner favourable to Nepali 
interests; a protocol to the 1%1 treaty, signed as an annexe to it in January 
1%3, laid down the alignment of the boundary in concrete terms established 
by the exact position of permanent boundary makers set up in 1962.^^ The 
Nepalis claimed that they gained a few thousand square miles as a result of 
the agreement. They also pointed out the application of the mountain crest 
principle in draw ing the alignm ent of the border, an arrangements the 
Chinese have denied the Indians. Upon his return to Nepal, the King 
declared at a dvic reception at Kathmandu on 27 October 1961,
The Boundary Treaty with China had delimited the boundary 
between the two countries in a definite manner, thus bringing to a 
happy conclusion the exchange of views and controversies which 
had been going on for eighteen months. ... This too has helped 
consolidate the friendly good relations existing between the two 
countries. ... By the northern boundary treaty, the Kingdom of 
Nepal has gained three hundred square miles, and I  feel that all the 
Nepalis experience a sense of glory when I state that Sagarmatha, 
on which the eyes of the world seem to be focused, continues to be 
as it has been ours and within our territory. It may also be
87 Rose and Dial, Op.Cit..p. 94.
88 Asian Recorder. Vol. VII. No. 49, 3-9 December 1961, p. 4296-4297.
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mentioned in connection with the border area and Sagarmatha that 
the northern boundary area dispute, which had been going on since 
the time of Bhimsen Thapa's premiership, has been solved in such 
a manner as to benefit Nepal
Another significant development was Nepal's acceptance of the Chinese 
offer to build a road from Kathmandu to Lhasa. Mahendra signed the 
Katmandu-Kodari road agreem ent on 15th October 1961 to the great 
annoyance of India. The signing of this agreement, which had been refused 
earlier by the pro-Indian Prime Minister, B. P. Koirala, was also an 
expression of the reassurance of his independence in decision making. He 
not only cracked at domestic critics and India but also ridiculed those who 
interpreted the road as a conduit for prospective Chinese activities in Nepal 
saying "communism does not travel in taxi cabs" Tulsi Giri, the foreign minister 
of Nepal who had accompanied King Mahendra on his China trip declared,
Indian newspaper have not liked the idea of constructing 
the Kathmandu-Lhasa road. But if China does not like our 
road to the south, just as India does not like a road to the 
north, should Nepal not build any roads at allT^
Kathmandu-Lhasa road thus became the first to breach the Himalayan 
barrier. China later followed up  by building another strategic road 
connecting Kathmandu with Pokhara, where it met an Indian built road 
connecting it to the important rail centre in Gorakpara. Road building, in 
fact, became soon a matter of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal. Hitherto, India 
had been the main road builder in Nepal. The Tribhuvan Rajpath, linking
89 Shaha, Rishikesh, Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect. New Delhi, 1978, p. 123.
90 Nepal Bhasa Patrika. 27 January, 1%2.
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Kathmandu with the Indian border was an Indian enterprise in the early 
fifties. The East-West Mahendra Rajpath too was a collaborative venture in 
which India was associated with the US, UK, USSR, and the United Nations. 
But the Chinese advent as road builders gave the Nepalis a counter weight 
which increased their bargaining position with India.
On 26th January 1962, the Indian Republic Day, a massive demonstration 
was held in front of Indian embassy in Kathmandu and a memorandum of 
protest was handed over to the embassy officials. The memorandum, as it 
is reported, contained demands for restrictions on Congress activities and 
non-interference in Nepal's internal affairs.
On April 1962, a Pakistani trade delegation came to Kathmandu to discuss 
trade relations between the two states and an air-link between the eastern 
wing of Pakistan and Kathmandu.
On April 18,1962, Mahendra made an official trip to New Delhi. The main 
motive behind his trip was to persuade India to restrict the Congress 
activities in India. When political parties were banned in 1960, leaders and 
workers of the deposed ruling and other parties took shelter in India. 
Thereafter, they organised regular armed raids and sabotage across the 
border in Nepal. As the press reported, there were sharp exchanges of 
words in the meeting between Nehru and M a h e n d r a . ^ ^  Mahendra insisted 
that Nepal's internal disturbances were the handiwork of the rebels taking 
refuge in India while Nehru argued that fundamental economic and political 
factors in Nepal were at the root of the disturbances. He asked Mahendra to 
come to a settlem ent with the Nepali congress which was totally
91 Rose, Op. G it, p. 244.
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unacceptable to the King. Nehru also could not make any progress in his 
efforts to discuss Nepal's relations with China and the recently concluded 
agreement on Kathmandu- Kodari road.
On 29th September 1962, India imposed an economic blockade on Nepal 
commonly known as the 'Raxual Blockade'. The commercial traffic between 
the two countries came to a stand still which resulted in a sudden rise in 
price and panic in Kathmandu. The motive behind the Indian pressure was 
not economic; rather a mixture of politico-strategic concerns which India 
had expressed publicly and had tried to deter Nepal effectively from 
deviating to a course which India felt was not in consonance with its 
interests. It was in fact a consequence of the defiant position Nepal had 
taken in its foreign policy by cultivating relationship with India's staunch 
enemies China and Pakistan and in its domestic policy by dismissing the 
Koirala ministry.
In the latter half of October 1%2, a large-scale border war broke out between 
China and India when the Chinese forces moved across the Indian border in 
the N orth East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh. The Chinese 
dem onstrated military superiority over the Indian. India was severely 
defeated and the Chinese seized a large portion of Indian territory (about 
14,000 sq.miles). In this war Nepal refused to take sides. Mahendra said that 
Nehru had greyed his hair working for peace and he knew of the Chinese 
Premier Chou-en-Lai's faith in the Five Principles of Co-Existence.
On October 1962, Nepal signed a trade treaty with Pakistan-first in the series 
of Pakistan-Nepal trade agreement. The agreement provided for the grant of 
'most favoured nation' treatment by one country to the other in matters of 
trade and commerce.
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On December 16,1%2, King Mahendra introduced Panchayat system (a non 
political form of governm ent w here the members of the body were 
appointed by the king) despite ominous Indian threats. He inferred the 
Panchayat system as a transitional political system suited to the soil and 
climate' of the country and defended it as necessary to preserve the Nepali 
identity as a nation thereby saving the country from the distinct possibility 
of 'having always to play second fiddle to foreign power'.^^ B. P. Koirala's 
government had been under the influence of India which urged Nepal to 
adopt a political structure analogous to that of India, so that the Nepali 
government would be a Royal ally and uphold the 1950 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship. The Party-less Panchayat system of government on the other 
hand was characterized by a higher degree of nationalism, a vigorous 
m ovem ent toward self-identity and independence that weakened Indian 
political influence in Nepal.
On 26 January 1963, Nepal signed a transit agreement with Pakistan which 
provided, on a reciprocal basis, for freedom of transit of goods intended for 
im port into or export from the territories of either country from or to a third 
country. The agreement also provided for exemption from customs and 
transit duties for traffic in transit On 24 March 1963, air services between 
Dhaka and Katmandu was established.
In the same year, Nepal sought and obtained from the British and the 
Americans, limited quantities of military assistance— provision of which was 
previously an Indian monopoly. In 1965, Nepal used non-cooperation as an 
approach to obtain from India a revision in the Kosi river agreement for 
accommodating Nepal's major grievances. Although the revised agreement
93 Nava Samai. 22 September, 1%2.
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was not totally satisfying for the Nepalis, it was nevertheless more in line 
with Nepali interests. In 1%5, Nepal signed a trade agreement with the 
Soviet Union. In the same year Nepal and Yugoslavia agreed to trade with 
each other on a barter basis. By the end of 1967, Nepal had established trade 
linkages with the UK, Poland and China.
On 25 June 1969, India reluctantly acceded to Nepal's demand that the 
Indian military mission in Kathmandu and the Indian manned security posts 
on Nepal's border with China be withdrawn.
In 1969, the Nepali Prime Minister, K. N. Bista, challenged the mutual 
obligations of the two countries in each other's defence under the 1950 
Treaty and termed the 'theory of special relationship' with India as out of 
step with modern developments' in Nepal's external relations.
Nepal was determine to eliminate, or at least minimize the kinds of problems 
it had experienced for the last decade. India wanted Nepal to abandon its 
liberal trade incentives and to cooperate with India in harmonizing economic 
policies. Failing to conclude a new treaty before the I960 treaty, which 
expired in September, 1970, Nepal proposed extending the existing 
agreement until a new one was concluded. India agreed to extend only until 
the end of 1970. Because of the divergence of views, further attempts to 
reach an agreement before the end of 1970 failed too. Public protests and 
demonstrations took place in front of the Indian embassy at Kathmandu and 
in other Nepalis towns near the border.^^Behind the breakdown in the 
negotiations, there are resentments which are not strictly related. It was
94 Muni. Op. Git, p. 167.
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Nepal's tightrope act between India, China and Pakistan that irritated New 
Delhi.95.
During negotiations for the new treaty to replace the 1960 treaty, Nepal 
persisted in demands for two separate agreements; one concerning Indo- 
Nepalis bilateral trade and the other concerning transit facilities. Nepal's 
demand was based on the reality that trade with India would be subject to 
revision every few years while its transit requirements were of a permanent 
nature and that the freedom of transit for a land locked country should be 
removed from every day politics. India argued that transit facility was a 
question to be negotiated between the land locked and transit states and it 
could never be assumed as an undeniable right of a land locked state. Nepal, 
persisting that free transit was its right, took the issue to UNCTAD and the 
law of the Sea Conference.
The King's trip to Afghanistan in 1971, brought the establishment of an air 
link between Kathmandu and Kabul- the first of its kind on the subcontinent. 
During his meeting with Afghanistan's Zahir Shah, Mahendra emphasized 
"the Kabul Declaration of December 1970, particularly the implementation of 
the provision related to the transit rights of landlocked-countries, and those 
pertaining to the least developed and developing c o u n t r i e s I n  securing 
Afghanistan's support for overland transit routes for landlocked states, 
M ahendra was aiming for extra backing for his demand that New Delhi 
concede to Nepal surface transit routes to other countries.^^
95 Far Eastern Economic Review. 21 November, 1970,p. 18.
96 Far Eastern Economic Review. 10 July, 1971, p. 15.
97 Far Eastern Economic Review. 17 July, 1971, p. 17.
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Finally, in 1971, after months of prolonged preliminary discussions and 
repeated negotiations both the governm ents reached an agreement for a 
trade and transit treaty to end their economic uncertainties which had taken 
place because of an absence of any treaty. Nepal had to sign a single treaty 
covering both trade and transit. Nepal was given the status of 'most 
favoured nation' while India abandoned its harmonization scheme.
ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEH A V IO U R: K IN G MAHENDRA
REGIME (1960-1972)
In this phase Nepal's non-compliant behaviour can be understood in terms 
of motivation to defy that em anated mainly by Condition 1. Besides 
condition 1, in few other instances the motivation to defy appear to have 
emanated fom condition 2 and condition 3. The Table 4. 2 summarizes the 
non-compliant behaviours demonstrated during this period, their nature i.e., 
initiative/responsive, along with the conditions of motivation to defy and 
the NTPRs used to understand these non-compliant behaviour. Table 4.2 
suggests that in 11 out of 17 instances of non-compliant behaviours Nepal 
took initiative to defy. In the remaining 6 instances its defiance was in 
response to Indian action, demands etc. Table 4. 2 also suggests that 13 
instances of non-compliant behaviours can be explained by vitalness of 
issues (condition 1), 2 instances by King Mahendra's ambition (condition 2) 
and the remaining 2 instances his disinclination towards India (condition 3). 
Out of 13 instances, in 9 instances economic survival, in 2 regime survival, in 
1 instance survival of political independence and in 1 instance physical 
survival were at stake. Furthermore, Table 4. 2 shows that given the 
conditions of motivation to defy, in all the instances leadership strength, in 4
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T ab le  4.2 A Su m m a r y  of  the  In s ta n ce s  o f NCB du r ing  
M a h en d ra  Reg ime  (1960-1972) a l ong  w i th  the 
C o n d i t i o n s  of  M o t i v a t i o n  to De fy  an d  the  NTPRs 
Used to Expla in  Them.
INSTANCES OF NCB NATURE OF 
NCB
MOTIVATION 
,  TO DEFY , 
(The Conditions)
CAPABILITY TO 
/  RESIST \  
(The NTPRs)
1. D ism issal of N epali Congress 
Government.
Initiative Conditicm 1 
(Regime 
Survival)
LS
2. Introduction of Bonus Voucher and 
the refusal to abandon it.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS
3. Rejection of Indian demand for 
harmonization
Responsive Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS
4. Road build ing- 
Kodari-Kathmandu Road 
Kathmandu-Pokhara Road
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, CL, PP.
5. Refusal o f Indian suggestion of 
settlement with the rebels.
Responsive Condition 1 
(Regime 
survival)
LS
6. Refusal to concede to the Indian 
req u est to abandon Kodari- 
Kathmandu road.
Responsive ConditicMi 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, CL
7. Revision of Kosi agreement Responsive Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, PP
8. Trade agreement with the USSR, 
Yugoslavia, the UK, Poland and 
China
Initiative Conditicm 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS
9. W ithdraw al o f Indian military 
mission
Responsive Condition 1 
(Survival of 
political 
independence)
LS, PP
10. T ak in g  th e issu es  o f land­
lockedness to UNCTAD and the 
Law of the sea Conference
Initiative ConditicHi 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS
Table 4.2 Contd
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Table 4.2 Contd ...
INSTANCES OF NCB NATURE OF 
NCB
MOTIVATION 
TO DEFY 
The Conditions
CAPABILITY TO 
RESIST 
The NTPRs
11. Trade and Transit Agreement with 
Pakistan
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS, CL
12. Bista renounces special Relations 
and the 1950 treaty of Peace and 
Friendship
Responsive Condition 3 
(disinclination)
LS, PP
13. E s ta b lish m e n t o f tra d in g  
corporation
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival))
LS
14. D iversifica tion  of d ip lom atic  
relations with Pakistan, China
Initiative Condition 3 
(disinclination)
LS, EPS, CL
15. Participation in the Non-Aligned  
conference at Belgrade.
Initiative Condition 2 
(Ambition)
LS, EPS,
16. Introduction of Panchayat Initiative Condition 2 
(Ambition)
LS, EPS, CL
17. Military assistance from the UK 
and the USA
Initiative Condition 1 
(Physical 
survival)
LS
The letters LS, CL, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, geopolitical 
leverage, peoples' power and finally external political support.
instances people's power in 5 instances geo-political leverage and finally in 5 
instances external political support (all as NTPRs constituting capability to 
resist) explain the non-compliant behaviour. Finally, in 10 instances more 
than one NTPR explain non-compliant behaviours. Let us now explore the 
conditions, assumptions, contextualities etc. (ie., policy contingencies) in 
order to understand the instances of non-compliance demonstrated in this 
phase.
The non-compliant behaviours that condition 1 best explains include the 
ones which relate to trade and transit, Kosi river project, road building, 
Nepali Congress party, Indian military mission and military assistance. The
169
ambition of the ruler (condition 2) or disinclination of the ruling party 
(condition 3) do not offer satisfactory explanations. This point will be 
addressed later. First, let us consider condition 1. According to condition 1, 
the consideration of an issue as vital is likely to generate motivation to defy 
and thereby lead to non-compliant behaviour, while consideration of an 
issue as non-vital is not likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby fail 
to lead to NCB. An issue is considered vital if it is necessary for the survival 
of people, state or regime- physically, economically or politically. It may be 
recalled that vital issues can be spread over a range. In one extreme we may 
have something that is 'absolutely' necessary for survival i.e., without which 
very existence will be at stake. On the other extreme, we may have 
something that is necessary but without which existence will not be at stake, 
however survival would mean encountering considerable difficulty.
Having recapitulated condition 1, we shall now consider the issues involving 
economic survival. Nepal being a landlocked and a small country had 
experienced the reality of economic and trade dependence on India. More 
than 84 percent of Nepal's foreign trade was carried out with India; the 
rem ainder via India. India could easily throw Nepal's economy into 
disarray. In the 1960s, this economic claustrophobia became increasingly 
insufferable for Nepal. More specially after the Raxual blockade in 1962, 
Nepal came to know that some kind of trade diversification was necessary in 
order to survive. That is why Nepal sought to minimize her dependence on 
India through establishment and expansion of trade with countries other 
than India.
Another compelling reason for trade diversification was Nepal's need for 
goods that India could not supply, plus a market for produced goods India 
could not use. Nepal w anted the options of buying goods on the
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competitive international market and selling products outside India. As an 
exporter of primary products and importer of manufactured goods, Nepal 
had always been facing a growing trade deficit with India. With the growth 
of population, per capita income and development works, Nepal's demand 
for m anufactured goods outstripped its export of prim ary products. 
Although it is true that this trade imbalance was reduced by foreign aid to 
Nepal, it could not count on foreign aid forever. It was necessary for Nepal 
to arrest this erosion in its economy.
From this perspective, the initiative non-compliant behaviours such as the 
trade agreements (with the USSR, Yugoslavia, the UK, Poland, China), the 
trade and transit agreem ent with Pakistan, establishm ent of Trading 
Corporation, the taking of the issue of landlockedness to UNCTAD and law 
of the sea conference may be said to have been a result of the threats to 
Nepal's vital economic interests. In addition to these, the initiative non- 
compliant behaviours such as introduction of bonus voucher scheme and the 
Nepali government's refusal to abandon it and the responsive non-compliant 
behaviours such as the governments' refusal of the Indian proposal of 
harm onization may also be viewed as vital from the point of view of 
protecting the commercial interests of Nepali traders and increasing their 
competitiveness. Therefore, we may assert that diversification of trade, 
protection of Nepali traders and increasing their competitiveness are vital 
necessities for Nepal to survive as a viable economy and thus explains 
Nepal's motivation to defy and consequently its defiant stance against India.
Besides, the revision of the Kosi river agreement constitute another example 
of responsive non-com pliant behaviour which may be explained by 
vitalness. Reader will recall from the discussion of the 1950-55 period that 
Indian control over Kosi River Project constituted threats to Nepal's
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agriculture and irrigation. Hence for Nepal, gaining authority and control 
over the project may be considered as vital to her agricultural needs.
The various road building projects are other examples of the non-compliant 
behaviour of Nepal. Associated with this was the responsive non-compliant 
behaviour of the refusal of Indian proposal to abandon the Kathmandu- 
Kodari road, which connects Kathmandu to Tibet and was considered vital 
because it was supposed to be the back bone of Nepali economy. Nepal had 
long been seeking ways in which to break the strong hold India had over its 
economy as the necessary prerequisite for its political independence. It was 
hoped that it would provide Nepal with an alternative to Calcutta for her 
transit trade, in the process reducing the economic and political liabilities 
associated with Nepal's status as a landlocked country. This proved to be 
particularly true after the Raxual Blockade and 1989 Blockade during which 
people's economic sufferings were extremely severe. Nepal's decision to get 
on w ith the project with Chinese assistance, despite Indian pressure to 
abandon it, may thus be explained in terms of vitalness because it was 
viewed necessary to Nepal's survival as a viable economy.
So far we have considered the non-compliant behaviours in terms of issues 
that were economically vital. We will now focus on the exhibited non- 
compliant behaviours in terms of issues that were vital from the stand point 
of regime survival. Such examples include the initiative non-compliant 
behaviour of dismissal of Nepali Congress government by M ahendra and 
the responsive non-compliant behaviour of his refusal of India's suggestion 
that he should compromise with the Nepali Congress rebels who were 
attempting to destabilize his regime by means of armed raids launched from 
Indian soil. Let us examine them.
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As a result of the 1959 general election, when the Congress government came 
to power it began to treat the King as only a nominal head of state. The King 
feared that the socialist programmes and approaches of the Nepali congress 
party and the growing popularity of the prime minister might lead to the 
eventual abolition of the monarchy. He became increasingly dissatisfied, 
among other things, with the depletion of his power. Resisting this threat to 
the monarchy was vital to the survival of Mahendra's regime. This seems to 
be a plausible explanation of the dismissal of the Pro-Indian government led 
by B. P. Koirala. We can similarly explain Mahendra refusal of the Indian 
suggestion that he should strike a political settlement with the Congress 
rebels, who were allegedly supported by India.
Now we will consider the withdrawal of the Indian military mission, a 
responsive non-compliant behaviours in terms of the issues that were vital 
for the survival of political independence. To the Nepalis the presence of the 
m ilitary m ission underm ined  their cultural iden tity  and political 
independence. The Nepalis have always remained proud of the reputation 
of the Gurkhas as fighters and had looked upon themselves as superior to 
their big neighbour India in this regard. The image of a superior race of 
fighters form the core of cultural identity for the Gurkhas and the Nepalis at 
large. They take pride in the fact that from the mid 19th century the British 
actively recruited the Nepalis into their imperial army. The Nepalis, as 
soldiers, are so valued that the Sultan of Brunei pays over £1 million a year 
for the upkeep of Gurkha brigades in his country. That the Indian military 
mission came to teach the Gurkhas how to fight was an insult to Nepali self 
respect.
98 Ibid. p. 34.
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It is plausible to infer that Indian influences and interferences severely 
restricted the independent political m aneuverability of Nepali decision 
makers. Redressing such restriction of political maneuverability may be 
seen as vital to political independence and survival of Nepal.
The initiative non-compliant behaviour of securing military assistance from 
the UK and the USA may also be explained by condition 1. The issue 
involved in this behaviour was vital for Nepal's physical survival. Despite 
the fact that the quantum of assistance received did not enhance Nepal's 
m ilitary capability substantially, it may be said that Nepal's seeking of 
assistance was prompted by its security concern. This is because irrespective 
of the nature of existing relationshipys between a country and its neighbours, 
actual or potential threats to its territorial integrity is ever present in the 
m inds of the decision-makers. Any measure, however small, towards the 
preservation of territorial sovereignty is a necessity for its physical survival. 
Nepal is no exception. Therefore, the military assistance may be considered 
as vital to Nepal's survival.
Having discussed condition 1 let us return  to the question as to why 
condition 2 and condition 3 do not offer plausible explanations. According 
to condition  2, ambition of the ruler w as defined as a disposition 
characterized by an urge of becoming, growing or developing to the full 
potential; an actualization of a dream to become a strong and effective ruler 
of a strong country. Condition 2 maintained that the presence of ruler's 
ambition might lead to NCB while its absence might not lead to defiance.
As highlighted in the foregoing analysis, Nepal's behaviour in this phase 
relating to trade and transit, Kosi river project, road building, dismissal of 
Nepali Congress, withdrawal of Indian m ilitary mission and military
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assistance suggest Nepal's concern for bare survival. However, our general 
experience suggests that we endeavour to actualize our potential to the 
fullest extent only when our survival is ensured. Given Nepal's quest for 
survival, as demonstrated by these instances, an explanation with the help of 
condition 2 i.e., ambition of the ruler (to actualize dream  to become an 
effective ruler of a strong country) remains rather unsatisfactory.
Let us now consider condition 3 i.e., the political tilt of the ruling party with 
respect to these NCBs. According to condition 3, a specific tilt (i.e. 
disinclination of ruling party towards the dominant power) leads to NCB 
while a reverse tilt (i.e,. inclination of a ruling party towards the dominant 
fHDwer) does not lead to NCB. Disinclination was defined as a disposition in 
which the ruling party subscribes to a political idea, attitude or view that is 
not congenial to the dom inant power. This disposition sets an antagonistic 
environm ent in which the ruling party develops a tendency to reject the 
wishes of the dom inant power. Inclination was defined as an opposite 
disposition. The ruling party subscribe to a political idea, attitude or view 
that is congenial to the dom inant power and does not see any harm in 
accepting the wishes of the dom inant power. It will be recalled from the 
analysis of M ahendra's first phase (i.e., 1955-59) that he had a strong 
disinclination tow ards India. Despite such an observation explaining 
Nepal's behaviours (relating to trade and transit, Kosi river project, road 
building, dismissal of Nepali Congress, withdrawal of Indian military 
mission and military assistance) in terms of disinclination do not appear to 
be appropriate. This is because physical, economic or political survival of 
people, state or regime is far too fundamental to be interpreted in terms of a 
ruling party's subscription to a political idea, attitude or view. Hence,
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Mahendra's disinclination do not appear to be as convincing as is vitalness of 
the issues.
The non-compliant behaviours that condition 2 i.e., ambition of the ruler, 
offer plausible explanation include Nepal's participation in non-aligned 
conference at Belgrade, Mahendra's visit to Mongolia and introduction of 
Panchayat. According to condition 2, a rulers ambition to become strong 
and effective and to transform his country to a respectable and independent 
member of international community might lead to NCB. An absence of 
ambition might not lead to NCB. Condition 1 and condition 3 do not offer 
persuasive explanations. Condition 1 which m aintains that NCB is 
demonstrated when the issues involved are vital, does not work. This is 
because the issues underlying these instances cannot be interpreted as 
necessary  for physical, econom ic or political survival of the 
peop le /s ta te /reg im e. For example, it is difficult to visualize non­
participation in the non-aligned conference etc, as threatening to the 
existence of people/state/regim e either physically, economically or even 
politically. Furthermore, it does not appear to be satisfactory to explain the 
introduction of Panchayat as a measure adopted by King Mahendra to 
ensure the survival of his regime. The introduction of Panchayat is 
something m ore than mere survival. King Mahendra appears to have 
already secured the survival of his regime by dismissing the Congress 
government and consolidating power in his own hands. As we shall see 
later, through the introduction of Panchayat, Mahendra institutionalized his 
system of government. This institutionalization can be described more as a 
process of becoming of a goal or a dream (of firmly establishing a form of 
government) to enhance his power than his efforts to merely survive.
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Like condition 1, condition 3 (political disinclination of ruling party) is also 
deficient. It will be recalled from the foregoing discussion that according to 
condition 3 political disinclination of the ruling party is likely to generate 
motivation to defy and thereby lead to NCB while an inclination is not likely 
to generate motivation to defy and fail to lead to NCB. Using similar logic as 
before (Mahendra's first phase), it may be stated that Nepal's disposition of 
inclination or disinclination towards India does not imply that it can or 
cannot participate in international forum s such as the non-aligned 
conference. Further the diplomatic relation with Mongolia only suggests a 
political affinity towards it. As mentioned earlier, with the exception of 
China and Pakistan, a political affinity towards other states do not help us 
understand this NCB in terms of condition 3. It might be possible to explain 
introduction of panchayat in terms of condition 3. However, such an 
explanation will be less satisfactory. In this instance as we shall see later. 
King M ahendra's self-assertion was very conspicuous. Hence, Mahendra's 
ambition to see himself as a strong and effective ruler overshadows an 
explanation of mere subscription of certain political idea, attitude or view 
(i.e., disinclination towards India).
Let us return  to condition 2 and examine M ahendra's ambition. It was 
indicated in the analysis of Nepali behaviour during the period 1955-59, that 
M ahendra was a man of high political ambitions. He wanted to have a free 
hand in shaping the political destiny of his nation. Even as Crown Prince 
Mahendra had demonstrated a self-assertive character and a proclivity for 
experimentation on different occasions. He had a passion for power and he 
realized that domestic affairs were closely linked with foreign affairs. He 
wanted to develop a new kind of relationship with India because he felt that 
India's extensive presence was an obstacle in his way and resented Nehru's
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patronizing attitude. He was very much resentful of seeing Nepal as an 
Indian backwater. His ambition was to take Nepal out of the isolation and 
subservience and seek her place in the world on the basis of equality. 
Therefore, the continuing pattern of relationship with India was not in 
keeping with his political framework. The alacrity with which he cultivated 
relations with China in political and economic fields revealed both his 
ambition and determination to balance the Indian position by the Chinese 
presence in Nepal. His ambition to assert Nepal's separate national identity 
disposed him to follow an independent path of his own choice without 
caring to consult the Indian government as his father had done before him. 
As such his foreign policy of having equal friendship with all countries was 
in sharp contrast to the Indian objective of keeping the strategic Himalayan 
kingdom aloof from foreign influences.
The foregoing discussion seems to support the idea that the initiative non- 
compliant behaviours such as the participation in international forums were 
prom oted by King Mahendra's ambition to see Nepal as an independent 
state in the world community. The introduction of Panchayat may also be 
considered as a realization of his dream of becoming a strong and effective 
King in Nepal.
M ahendra was one of the world's last absolute monarchs, an astute but 
sometimes heavy handed politician who disliked parliamentary democracy. 
He was totally against the idea of sharing power with anyone as is evident 
from the actions he took when he dismissed the government of B. P. Koirala. 
His ambition was to go down in history as the great m odernizing King 
capable of dealing effectively with the country's problems in the course of its 
modernization. As such he introduced a new system called Panchayat 
democracy. His ambition zvas to rule like an absolute monarch of the type common
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in medieval times, and he made no secret of his desire to rule like them xvith powers 
completely centralized in his own h a n d s ^  The King was more in favour of an 
alternative system that could be accepted by the people and at the same time 
w ould provide no organisation or political leader any opportunity to 
challenge the King's absolute power. It was therefore, understandable that 
the neutrality the King so enthusiastically described as constituting the 
cornerstone of his foreign policy became as much a necessary part of his 
ambition to become an effective King as of the reorganization of the political 
life of the nation under the Panchayat system- a system claimed to have been 
devised not only to accord with Nepal's genius but also assumed to be viable 
enough to steer clear of Indian parliam entary democracy and Chinese 
communism and reinforce Nepal's foreign policy posture of equi-distance 
between the tw o .^^  However, Mahendra was also apprehensive that New 
Delhi might intend to repeat the role it had played in the 1950-51 revolution. 
Introduction of Panchayat may be viewed as a realization of his dream of 
becoming an effective and independent King. Therefore, it may be held that 
the introduction of Panchayat was prompted by King Mahendra's ambition.
The remaining NCBs demonstrated by Nepal during this phase include 
renunciation of special relations with India and diversification of diplomatic 
relation with China and Pakistan. Except Nepal's relation with Pakistan 
these NCBs were considered in some details in the analysis of Nepali 
behaviour during 1955-1959. However, in terms of explanation of non- 
compliance, Nepal's relation with Pakistan is identical with the relation with 
China. It may be recalled from the analysis of Mahendra's former phase that
99 Baral, L. S, 'The New Order in Nepal Under King Mahendra, 1960-62: An Assessment', 
International Studies Vol.l3 N o.l, Jan-March 1974.
100 Baral, L. S., Pacific Community, Op. Cit. p. 129.
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condition 3 (i.e., M ahendra's disinclination towards India) best explains 
these NCBs, although condition 1 (i.e., survival of political independence) 
offer an explanation, it is not entirely satisfactory and finally condition 2, 
(i.e., M ahendra's ambition) does not offer satisfactory explanation. A 
separate treatment of the NCBs mentioned above will mean repetition of the 
reasoning set forth in the analysis of the previous phase. Hence they are not 
elaborated further.
It may be recalled from chapter 3 that m otivation to defy enables us to 
understand the why of non-compliance. In addition to such motivation, a 
state m ust also possess the capability to resist in order to be non-compliant. 
In case of the small states under study the non-tangible power resources 
such as leadership strength, external political support, geopolitical leverage 
and people's power constitute the capability to resist. According to our 
contextual framework given the motivation to defy, the presence of these 
non-tangible power resources enable a small state to non-comply while their 
absence does not enable it to non-comply.
The non-compliant behaviour demonstrated by Nepal in this phase may be 
explained by leadership strength of King M ahendra. In addition to 
leadership strength, external political support and people's power also help 
understand some NCBs. Unlike the earlier phases, geopolitical leverage also 
help us understand some of the NCB in this phase. Let us examine the 
power resources.
As shown in Table 4. 2 leadership strength of King Mahendra seems to be 
working in every instance of non-com pliant behaviour. M ahendra's 
leadership strength, which was discussed earlier became more conspicuous 
during this phase. As such it demands greater degree of elaboration. As
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indicated earlier, Mahendra was a different man from his father, Tribhuvan, 
both temperam entally and with regard to his views of Nepal's role in 
international affairs. He was a resolved man with no such personal 
emotions or inhibitions.^^^. Unlike his father, he was more politically 
assertive and manipulative. Mahendra came to the scene with great energy 
at his command. The most significant of Mahendra's personality trait was 
that he was dynamic. He exploited his constitutional position and the 
traditional and modern sources of power through active involvement in 
politics. Unlike his father he invited political and social groups to discuss 
the politics of the realm with him. He exercised a leverage on the cabinets, 
whose birth and survivals were entirely at his disposal. The assertiveness 
and independence of his decisions were evident from the installations and 
dismissals of government led by Tanka Prasad Acharya, K. I. Singh, B. P. 
Koirala and Tulsi Giri. Furthermore, he engineered the royal coup of 1960 
w ithout any difficulty and his act was endorsed without any protest. These 
qualities made him a national political force and gave him a reliable and 
independent source of strength. As a proud and determined personality, he 
seemed resolve to use all the means available to him to restore order to 
Nepal's political life. He worked up foreign policy to resolve the crises of 
legitimacy, identification and stability of his government with considerable 
success during the years immediately following the establishm ent of 
Panchayat democracy established by him. It was also him with whom rest 
the credence of instilling in his people a strong sense of national pride. 
T hrough his leadership  strength, he not only raised his country 's 
international status, but also got the most out of its big and dominating 
neighbour, India. He preserved and expanded his country's independence.
101 Krishnamurty, Y. G, Rebel. King and the Statesman: King Mahendra of Nepal. Calcutta, 
1967.
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The foregoing discussion of Mahendra's leadership strength reveals an 
important point; the relationship between leadership strength and NCBs. A 
com parison of M ahendra's strong leadership and Tribhuvan's weak 
leadership (the analysis of Nepali behaviour under Tribhuvan's regime) 
explains why Mahendra was non-compliant and Tribhuvan was not.
Apart from leadership strength, geopolitical leverage seems to have played 
its part in a number of instances. Nepal's location between India and China, 
and the "cold war" situation between these two countries at about this time, 
provided King M ahendra with some diplom atic strength, and this 
geopolitical advantage helped to create a favourable atm osphere for 
defiance. It appears that geopolitical leverage has contributed in Nepal's non 
compliant behaviours such as road building, diversification of diplomatic 
relations, introduction of Panchayat, and trade and transit agreement with 
Pakistan. It may be observed that Sino-Indian rivalry was not so acute in 
Tribhuvan's reign. This explains why Nepali government was not compliant 
during King Tribhuvan's reign.
Unlike King Tribhuvan's reign, Nepal during King Mahendra's reign came 
out of diplomatic isolation and gained external political support and 
friendship from a number of countries. External political support seems to 
have been contributed tow ards dem onstrating such non compliance 
behaviours as the issues of landlockedness (in UNCTAD and law of the sea 
conference), diversification of diplomatic relationships, introduction of 
panchayat, participation in the non-aligned conference at Belgrade, and 
trade and transit agreement with Pakistan. Nepal's gaining external political 
support during this phase also explain why Nepal was able to demonstrate 
NCB during Mahendra's reign and not during Tribhuvan's reign.
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Finally, it appears that popular support and popular pressure contributed in 
the cases of non-compliant behaviour such as revision of the Kosi agreement, 
w ithdrawal of military mission, and Bista's renouncing of special relation 
and the treaty of peace and friendship treaty.
The foregoing analysis suggest that given the motivation to defy, all the non­
tangible power resources (as identified in the framework) led to Nepal's 
defiance during this phase.
K I N G BIRENDRA R E G JM E4iaZ2-1990)
N epal's efforts at demonstrating non-compliant behaviour reached new 
heights when King Birendra came to power. He significantly extended the 
repertoire of policies and strategies in intensifying Nepal's efforts at self- 
assertion. King Birendra, who succeeded his father in January 31,1972, had 
been gradually inducted into the processes of government by his father over 
the last few years and thus had been reasonably well socialized into the 
political system and policies of Mahendra regnum. He was exposed to 
international intellectual cross currents, having had various educational 
experiences in Great Britain, United States and Japan. He had also 
developed personal relations with highly educated and talented Nepalis, 
some of whom  were Ph.ds from Universities abroad. From the beginning of 
his reign, Birendra was surrounded by very different types of advisers and 
consultants from the group of older, mostly high-level government servants 
who had served in this capacity in the latter years of Mahendra's reign. He 
reinvigorated his father's efforts to establish Nepal's identity independent of 
India.
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Soon after assum ing the throne, King Birendra refused to consider his 
country as part of the Indian subcontinent. He declared that,
the concept like Nepal as a buffer-state has been outmoded. Nepal 
is not part of the South Asian Sub Continent, it is really that part 
of Asia which touches both China and India.
This indicated a clear attempt on the part of Birendra to further dissociate his 
country from India.
He actively sought international recognition that his country no longer lived 
under India’s economic or defence umbrella and asserted that Nepal would 
pay any price to assert its independence. In international conferences, Nepal 
continued to lobby for international guarantees of unrestricted transit rights 
to and from the sea for landlocked states. When India refused to add a more 
specific "freedom of transit" clause to the new Trade and Transit Treaty and 
insisted that transit was strictly a bilateral matter, Nepal refused to sign the 
Indian draft even after the 1971 treaty expired. Subsequently, Nepal's efforts 
at lobbying at the international conferences became even more vociferous.
On 7 September 1973, while addressing the Algiers Conference of non- 
aligned countries, Birendra raised the trade and transit problem by 
elaborating.
Being a landlocked country Nepal is painfully aware of the difficulties 
and frustrations the landlocked countries had to face while preparing 
the infrastructure for development inside and diversifying trade outside 
the country. ^ 3^
102 Newsweek. September 10,1973.
103 Muni, S. D., Nepal as a Zone of Peace', Strategic Analysis. January 1984, p. 780.
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He also urged the coastal countries to make specific provisions 
guaranteering the right of the landlocked countries to free and unrestricted 
access to and from the sea.^^^ At the United Nations, Nepal assumed the 
leadership of the landlocked countries for advancing their claims for 
unrestricted transit facilities through the coastal states.
In October 1973, Birendra along with his foreign minister and other officials 
visited India. Birendra talked of remodelling India-Nepal relations on a 
more "mature and sober basis". During the same visit he publicly raised the 
transit difficulties of the landlocked states.
On 25th February 1975 King Birendra for the first time forwarded the 
proposal of making Nepal the zone of peace , while addressing the royal 
guests in his coronation ceremony:
And if today, peace is a overriding concern with us, it is only 
because our people genuinely desire peace in our country, in our 
region and everywhere in the world. It is with this earnest desire to 
institutionalize peace that I propose that my country Nepal be 
declared a zone of peace. Only under condition of peace will we be 
able to create a politically stable Nepal with a sound economy, 
which will in no way be detrimental to any other country. "^06
In his opinion such a proposal was necessary for security, independence and 
development. Birendra said.
104 Rising Nepal. 9 September 1973.
105 The Statesman. 14 October 1973.
106 Quoted in Shaha, R., ‘Nepal as a Zxyne of Peace', in Politics in Nepal 1980-1990. 
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As a country that had never been colonized, we wish to see that our 
freedom and independence were not thwarted by the changing flux of 
time when understanding is replaced by belligerency and war.
At the same time he was careful to emphasize that Nepal harboured no ill 
will towards either India or China and that the proposal was 'not prompted 
out of fear or threat from any q u a r t e r ' ,  ^ 8^ implying that there was no crisis 
situation and that peace would be more enduring and independent of 
changes in leadership if it is institutionalized. Nevertheless, it is interpreted 
by some analysts that the developm ents in Nepal's neighbourhood 
prom pted the King to come out with this kind of proposal. The creation of 
Bangladesh as an independent state in the face of China's strong opposition 
dem onstrated China's inability to contain the growing influence of India 
backed by the Soviet Union. Added to this was the annexation of Sikkim by 
India in April 1975 which became a matter of grave concern to Nepal.
In recent years the peace zone proposal has become the top priority in 
Nepal's foreign policy initiatives. Nepal has been reiterating the importance 
of the proposal whenever an opportune moment arrived. As one Nepali 
scholar observed.
The most important merit of the proposal lies in creating an 
environment that could resolve constraints of tight rope-walking 
in Nepal's foreign policy, contain external influence and 
intervention outside Nepal's boundary, bring about a planned 
change in traditional relationships and action patterns between 
Nepal and her neighbours, keep pozver politics out of Nepal and
107 The Times. 26 February, 1975.
108 Ibid.
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help eliminate any military and non-military threats to and from 
and through Nepal to China and India. '
Through the peace zone proposal, Nepal expresses that it would be fatal for 
the country to establish ties in pursuance of alignment with anti-Indian 
posture. Nor would it be beneficial to Nepal to be closely associated with 
India, with all the manifest disadvantages that excessive reliance would 
bring to its relations with countries beyond the region. In February 1982, the 
then Nepali Prime minister Surya Bahadur Thapa, outlined seven points as 
modus operandi of Nepal's peace zone proposal. They are:
1. Nepal will adhere to the policy of peace, non alignment and — 
peaceful coexistence and will constantly endeavour to develop 
friendly relations with all countries of the world, regardless of 
their social and political systems, and particularly with its 
neighbours, on the basis of equality and respect for each other's 
independence and sovereignty;
2. Nepal will not resort to the use of threat and force in any way 
which might endanger the peace and security of other countries;
3. Nepal will seek peaceful settlement of all disputes between it 
and other state or states;
4. Nepal will not interfere in the internal affairs of other states;
5. Nepal will not permit any activities on its soil that are hostile to 
other states supporting this proposal and in reciprocity states
109 Dhruba Kumar. Op. Cit. p. 45.
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supporting this proposal will not permit any activities hostile to 
Nepal;
6. Nepal will continue to honour the obligations of all the existing 
treaties which it has concluded with other countries so long as 
they remain;
7. In conformity with its policy of peace and non alignment, Nepal 
will not enter into any military alliance nor will it allow the 
establishm ent of any foreign military base on its soil. In 
reciprocity, other countries supporting this proposal will not 
enter into military alliance nor will they allow establishment of 
military bases on their soil directed against Nepal.
In fact, Nepal's security strategy initiated through the zone of peace is 
analogous to the pilot fish behaviour which keeps 'close to the shark to avoid 
being eaten'.
The Peace Zone proposal can be described as a product of a Nepali 
perception of national security which stands apart from the traditional 
perception of security viewed through the Indian prism. India, evaded 
discussion of peace zone idea because it perceived that its interests were 
likely to be hampered by any change in Nepal's traditional relations with it 
on military, political and economic affairs. The Indian foreign office 
maintains that India is "committed to perpetual peace and friendship" with 
Nepal, through the pre-existent treaty of 1950 and that since India poses no 
threat to peace and stability of that country, the need to endorse the Nepali
110 Bjol, Erling, The Small States in International Politics,' in Scholu and Olav, (eds.). Small 
States in International Relations. Stockholm, 1971, p. 33.
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proposal does not arise.^^^ Secondly, as the traditional open border and 
affinity between the people of two countries remain, it would be difficult for 
India to undertake the kind of obligation Nepal is trying to impose on it 
through the zone of peace proposal. The point that India has taken in this 
context is clause 5 of the clarification under which Nepal proposes to restrict 
people indulging in untoward activities from any country recognizing the 
zone of peace. India feels the open border along with the traditional free 
press' in the country makes it almost impossible for India to be guaranteed 
against the activities of the Nepalis citizens residing in the Indian soil. 
Finally, India is also skeptical about the zone of peace which has been 
incorporated as a guiding principle in the Nepali Constitution. K. 
Subramanyam state the classic Indian view,
It must be made clear to our neighbours what kind of concessions 
they can legitimately expect from their big neighbour and what 
they cannot. Any proposal which jeopardizes India's security 
should be clearly ruled out and Nepal's zone of peace and 
neutrality is one such proposal^
It is not, however, clear how the Zone of Peace proposal can pose threat to 
Indian security. It is almost axiomatic that Nepal, by itself, does not ever 
pose any threat to India. The sheer size of India's military might is enough 
to deter Nepal irrespective of the status of the proposal. Therefore, this 
possibility is rather insignificant. A more significant possibility of threat to 
Indian security is Nepal's alignment with its enemies. Once the proposal is 
endorsed and institutionalized Nepal cannot be draw n into the conflict
111 Shaha, Op. Cit. p. 56.
112 Subramanyam, K, 'Subcontinental Security' in Stratepc Analysis. Vol. V., August- 
September,1981, p. 253.
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between any states. Therefore, Nepal cannot ally itself with China or with 
any other India's adversaries in the event of a conflict. The Zone of Peace 
proposal honours India's security concerns and also that of other countries. 
As China has already endorsed the Nepal's proposal, it is keen to have an 
endorsement of the proposal by India as well, in order to ensure that both 
countries keep their hands off Nepal. If Nepal can persuade both its big 
neighbours to act as international guarantors of peace in the country, it 
would further mean the elimination of dissent of whatever form in national 
political life in the name of peace.
India's reluctance is a reflection of its apprehensions that, once endorsed, the 
proposal might render the Indo-Nepalis Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 
1950 automatically superfluous and thereby encourage Nepal to demand 
that it should be abrogated. India is evasive about the proposal because it 
does not relish the possibility of its having to surrender the political and 
economic leverage it enjoys in Nepal on the basis of the Indo-Nepalis Treaty 
of 1950. For instance, the letter exchanged between the two countries after 
the signing of that treaty obliges the government of Nepal to seek advance 
assistance and concurrence of the government of India for importing any 
arms, ammunition, or warlike equipm ent from third countries for its 
security. It obliges Nepal to give first preference to the governm ent or 
nationals of India, as the case may be, when indenting for assistance for the 
development of the natural resources of Nepal or for the establishment of 
any industrial project in Nepal.
The expressed Indian sensitivities towards the peace zone proposal and the 
irritants it has developed against Nepal's formulation of its own security 
perceptions in the Himalayas clearly indicate that New Delhi's resolve is not 
concerned with transforming Nepal into a conflict free zone but rather with
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keeping Nepal as an exclusive area falling within its security perimeter. It 
suspects the proposal as being motivated by external powers to undercut 
New Delhi's strategic supremacy in the region. It has also dismissed the 
proposal as Nepal's deceitful move to equate India with China. What piqued 
Indian thinking in this regard is that Nepal's intention to establish equal 
relations with all its neighbours (as mentioned in the first clause of the 
proposal) is a breach of the understanding Nepal has with India under the 
1950 treaty. Hence Kathmandu's proposal is viewed in New Delhi as an 
attem pt by its smaller neighbour to completely de-link itself from the 
relationships framed under the treaty, thereby threatening the Indian 
concept of strategic stability in the region.
It is believed by the Nepalis that institutionalizing Nepal's neutral stand can 
further her economic development and m aintain political freedom by 
ensuring her security. The Zone of Peace is, therefore, considered to be a 
necessary tool for the survival of her territorial, political and economic 
identity. Any impediment towards the implementation of the proposal can 
be regarded as a threat to her territorial, political and economic identity. As 
seen in the foregoing discussion, India's strong opposition to the proposal is 
one of such impediment that the implementation of it remains uncertain.
India at first thought that the proposal would die of neglect. But Nepal stuck 
to its guns. Each success in securing endorsem ent of the proposal by the 
international community testifies to non-compliant stance adopted by Nepal. 
By 1986, about 75 countries including the USSR, the USA, the UK, China and 
France as well as Nepal's neighbours, excluding India and Bhutan, had 
readily endorsed the King's proposal that Nepal be declared a zone of peace
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maintaining that it goes along well with the non-aligned foreign policy of the 
Himalayan Kingdom.
In March 1976, Nepal signed separate trade and transit agreements with 
Bangladesh. India protested that it should have been consulted before the 
signing of the treaty because trade and transit was to be carried out through 
Indian territory. Dr. Tulsi Giri, the prime minister of Nepal replied that 
Nepal's relations with other countries were of no concern to India.
In June, the same year, Birendra became the first foreign head of the state to 
fly over the Himalayas when he undertook a state visit to Szechenan and 
Tibet. It was the first direct air passage between China and Nepal marking, 
as Chinese prem ier Hua Kua Feng said, 'the building of an air bridge of 
China-Nepal friendship over the roof of the world for the first time in 
history'.i '^^
In March 1978, Nepal secured a de-linking of trade from transit. Under 
Nepali criticism and pressure India conceded to sign separate treaties. It may 
be noted here that the continued delay in the signing of a new trade and 
transit treaty after the old one has expired in 1976 despite several rounds of 
talks at both official and diplomatic levels showed India's reluctance to 
concede to N epal's dem and for unfettered transit facilities. India 
apprehended that such a concession, once granted, would set a precedent 
and encourage Nepal to demand corridors through Indian territories for 
alternative outlets to the sea. But Nepal stuck to her determination and 
criticized India by stating that by denying Nepal such a right, India was in
113 Shaha, Nepali Politics. Op. Cit. p. 165.
114 Afroze, Shaheen, 'Dilemmas in Nepalese Foreign Policy', BUSS Journal. Vol. 8, No. 4, 
1987.
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fact impeding Nepal's national economic development and prosperity. After 
discussions held at the Prime Minister level in December 1977, both the 
countries agreed in a joint communique that separate trade and transit 
treaties should be concluded expeditiously. Finally, as a result of long 
negotiations, separate trade and transit treaties and a memorandum of 
understanding on Industrial and Economic Cooperation were signed 
between the two countries in March 1978. The trade treaty was signed for 
five years while the transit treaty was for seven years. In order to conduct 
trade between the two countries twenty one routes were made available, out 
which thirteen routes were meant for transit traffic. The most important 
achievement of the treaty was that India was made to agree to provide an 
overland route for Nepal's trade with Bangladesh as well as with third 
countries through Bangladesh.
In the same year India urged King Birendra to release B. P. Koirala from 
prison and initiate the process of democratization in Nepal. Nepal sharply 
reacted to what they termed was an interference in their internal affairs. 
King Birendra himself asked New Delhi to desist from sermonizing to Nepal 
on matters of purely domestic concern of Nepal.
On 21 March 1983 the trade treaty which was signed in 1978 was 
subsequently renewed for another period of five years, through exchange of 
letters.
In April 1987, Nepal announced that establishment of work permits' would 
be required for Indian and other foreign skilled and unskilled labourers. 
India regarded the introduction of the work permit system as a violation of 
the special treaty of peace and friendship signed between the two countries 
in 1950. Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty provided for an open border and
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reciprocal treatment of each other's citizens with respect to participation in 
industrial and economic development, trade, commerce, residence and 
ownership of property in each other's territory. It may be pointed out here 
that this clause was supposed to promote m utual participation in each 
other's economic and industrial development, but in fact it gave India an 
opportunity to strengthen its hold on Nepal. Clause 4 of the letters of 
Exchange that accompanied the treaty made it incumbent upon Nepal to 
give first preference to the Indian government or national if it decides to seek 
foreign assistance for the development of natural resources or for any 
industrial projects. As a result there were about 1. 5 lakh Indians working in 
Nepal. India felt that the work permit scheme was aimed at removing these 
workers. Nepal said it was only a precautionary measure to check the entry 
of illegal immigrants into Nepal and no Indian worker has been removed or 
denied a job as a consequence. It further argued that the scheme would be 
used for the planning process in order to get a rough estimate of skilled and 
semi skilled workers in the country.
The trade treaty which was renewed in 1983 lapsed in 1988, but was 
extended twice, each time for a period of six months. The transit treaty had 
expired in March 1985 and been extended, ad hoc, till the end of the year and 
then for a period of four years till March 1989, though, according to the 
original provision, it could have been extended for seven years. But India 
unilaterally scrapped the treaty following the failure of Nepal and India to 
reach common ground. The Government of Nepal officially requested India 
to continue with the existing arrangements as interim measures until fresh 
treaties were signed and proposed imm ediate negotiations.^ India 
publicly announced termination of the treaties and turned down Nepal's
115 Far Eastern Economic Review. 12 May 1989, p. 8.
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request for continuation of existing arrangements by saying that provisions 
of the treaties that had been terminated could not be allowed to remain in 
force.
India was of the opinion that the trade and transit issues were inseparable 
and insisted on a single unified treaty for both transit and trade - a marked 
departure from a position in practice for over a decade. Nepal, on the other 
hand, said its landlocked status involved principles quite separate from 
trade. In an interview with the Independent, the foreign minister of Nepal, 
Shailendra Kumar Upadhya said.
We have told India that trade is a bilateral matter subject to 
fluctuations. You get a lot of changes in a trade relationship, but 
transit is more or less of a permanent relationship. You cannot trade 
unless you have transit rights.
As mentioned earlier behind the issue of a single or two treaties lies the 
Indian desire to retain her invaluable leverage over Nepal in the matter of 
Transit thereby creating obstacles in Nepal's policy of diversification. On the 
contrary Nepal alw ays wants to remind India that it is not just a thin 
vulnerable line in the map of the world but an independent country having, 
unlike India, an unbroken glorious tradition of independence, and 
determined not to be subdued or to compromise its independent stance.
India wants a comprehensive trade and transit treaty, in which Nepal will 
restore concessions to Indian trade, in return for open access to third 
countries. Nepal on the other hand says that transit rights are so vital to a 
land locked country, that they must be guaranteed separately.
116 Independent. June 1989.
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Another example of non-com pliant behaviour in this period was King 
Birendra's purchase of several anti-air craft guns and a batch of AK-47 rifles 
from China. India used to be the sole supplier of weapons to Nepal. Nepal 
argued that they were needed for internal security, to deter possible terrorist 
a t t a c k . I t  further said that it had tendered a request to New Delhi in this 
connection and only subsequently turned to China's basement bargain.
But India viewed these purchases as an unfriendly act on the part of Nepal 
even though they did not constitute a threat to India. India protested that 
the procurement broke the 1950 treaty of friendship and peace which does 
not appear to be so on a reading of the documents. The point of reference 
here is that while India is concerned over Nepal's acquisition of arms from 
China, it fails to take into account the misgivings which Nepal has over air 
space violations and military incursions by India. India twice violated the 
airspace of Nepal, once when it dropped relief supplies to northern Tamil 
areas in Sri Lanka and for the second time to test the Chinese capabilities 
along the Indo-Nepal b o r d e r . ^ O n  various other occasions, the Indian 
police have intruded into the Nepali villages on the pretext of chasing 
Gurkha m i l i t a n t s . ^^0 During the recent India-Nepal crisis over the buying of 
arm s from China the Indian m inister of state for external affairs came to 
Kathm andu as an special envoy of Rajiv Gandhi carrying a letter from 
Gandhi asking for King Birendra's assurances that Nepal would not 
purchase arms again from China and that the weapons already purchased
117 The Statesman. (New Delhi), 11 April 1989.
118 India Today. May 31,1989.
119 Far Eastern Economic Review. 4 May 1989.
120 The New Nation. 25 April, 1989.
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w ould not be used against I n d i a . B i r e n d r a  refused to give any such 
assurances, insisting that it was Nepal's right to buy weapons it considered 
necessary for its defence and insisting that the weapons were intended for 
internal security and anti-terrorism had constituted no threat to India. When 
the minister argued that the Himalayas were India's vital defense barrier, 
which it could not allow China to breech, Birendra counter argued that such 
thinking was out of date. According to some reports, Birendra also told the 
minister that Nepal planned to add two divisions to its army over the next 
decade, roughly doubling the size of its m i l i t a r y .^22
ANALYSIS OF NEPALI BEHAV IOUR : KIN G BIRENDRA
REGIME (1972-1990)
The non-compliant behaviour manifested during Birendra's rule may be 
understood in terms of motivation to defy that emanated from condition 1, 
i. e., vitalness of issues. Table 4. 3 sum m arizes the instances of non- 
com pliant behaviours demonstrated in this period, their nature, i. e., 
responsive and initiative, along with the conditions of motivation to defy 
and the NTPRs. It may be observed from Table 4. 3 that of the 10 instances, 
Nepal took initiative in 7 instances: in the remaining 3 instances Nepal's 
behaviours were in response to Indian actions, demands etc. Table 4. 3 also 
suggests that in 6 instances the underlying issues were related to economic 
survival, in 2 instances they were related to physical survival, in 1 instance 
they were related to regime survival and in another 1 instance they were 
related to physical, economic and political survival. Furthermore, given the
121 Hindustan Times. 29 July, 1988.
122 Organizer.. 21 August, 1988, and the Hindu. 24 September 1988.
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T ab le  4.3 A S u m m a r y  of  th e  In s ta n c e s  o f NCB d u r i n g  King 
B i r en d r a ' s  R e g i m e  (1972-1990) a l o ng  w i t h  the  
C o n d i t i o n s  of  M o t i v a t i o n  to De fy  a n d  t he  NTPRs  
used  to  Expla in  Them.
INSTANCES OF NCB NATURE OF 
NCB
MOTIVATION 
,  TO DEFY . 
(The Conditions)
CAPABILITY TO 
,  RESIST  ^
(The NTPRs)
1. Raised the issue of land-lockedness 
in N on-aligned  Conference in 
Algiers.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS
2. Assumed leadership of land-locked 
countries, advocated their rights at 
the UN
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS
3. Birendra publicly raised the transit 
difficulties of land-locked states 
during his visit to India
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS
4. Forwarded the Zone of Peace 
proposal
Initiative ConditicMi 1 
(Physical, 
economic, 
political 
survival)
LS, EPS
5 Signed separate treaties for trade 
and transit with India
Responsive Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, PP
6. Trade and transit treaty with  
Bangladesh
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS
7. Rejected the Indian suggestion to 
release B. P. Koirala from prison 
and initiate democratic process
Responsive Condition 1 
(Regime 
survival)
LS
8. Purchased arms frcwn China Initiative Condition 1 
(Physical 
survival)
LS
9. Establishment of work permit Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, PP
10. B iren d ra re fu sed  G andhi's  
suggestion to give assurances that 
Nepal w ould not purchase arms 
any further from China and use 
them against India.
Responsive Condition 1 
(Physical 
survival)
LS
The letters LS, CL, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, geopolitical 
leverage, peoples' power and finally external political support.
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motivation to defy, in all the instances leadership strength, in 5 instances 
external political support, in 2 instances people's power explain non- 
compliance. Geo-political leverage was absent as a pow er resource 
constituting capability to resist. Finally, in 6 instances more than one factor 
were responsible for non-compliance. Let us now explore the conditions, 
assumptions, contextualities (i.e., the policy contingencies) in order to 
understand the instances of NCB demonstrated in this phase.
The instances of non-compliance that condition 1 best explains include those 
related to Nepal's land lockedness, trade and transit treaties, work permit, 
zone of peace proposal and purchase of arms. As far as these instances are 
concerned condition 2 (ambition of the ruler) and condition 3 (disinclination 
of the ruling party) do not offer plausible explanation. According to 
condition 2 as mentioned before, the presence of the ruler's ambition is likely 
to generate the motivation to defy and thereby lead to non-compliance while 
its absence does not. Ruler's ambition was defined as a disposition 
characterized by an urge for actualization of a dream to become a strong and 
effective ruler of a strong country. However, as mentioned before, our 
general experience suggests that we strive to actualize our potentials (or 
dreams for that matter) when our survival is secured. The specific NCBs 
exhibit Nepal's concern for survival. Hence when survival is not secured an 
explanation with the help of ru ler's am bition is rather weak and 
unsatisfactory.
According to condition 3, it will be recalled that the ruling party 's 
disinclination towards the dom inant power is likely to generate motivation 
to defy and thereby lead to non-compliant behaviour while its inclination to 
the dominant power will lead it to be compliant. Although King Birendra, 
like his father Mahendra was also disinclined towards India, the aspect of
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physical, economic and political survival of the people/state/regim e is too 
fundamental to be interpreted in terms of his adherence to a political idea, 
view, attitude or belief. Hence, Birendra's disinclination does not appear to 
be as convincing as is the vitalness of the issues involved.
As stated before, condition 1 maintains that consideration of an issue as vital, 
(i.e., it is necessary for physical, economic or political survival of the people/ 
sta te / regime) is likely to generate motivation to defy and thereby lead a 
small state to demonstrate NCB. Such necessity may be 'absolute' i.e., 
w ithout which existence will be at stake; or it may not be 'absolute' i.e., 
w ithout which existence will not be at stake but survival would mean 
encountering considerable difficulty. The following analysis of the specific 
instances is geared to show how condition 1 explains Nepal's non- 
compliance during this phase. Readers will recall from the analysis carried 
out in the period 1960-72 (i.e., Mahendra's direct rule) that the issue of land 
lockedness was considered as a vital necessity for Nepal to survive as a 
viable economy. Adopting similar line of argum ents, the instances of 
initiative NCBs in this period such as raising the issues of land lockedness 
and unrestricted right of access to sea in the non-aligned conference, 
providing leadership in the UN on such matters, and also raising the issue 
during Birendra's visit to India may be considered as vital to Nepal's 
economic survival.
Related to the issue of land lockedness is the Nepali demand for separate 
trade and transit treaty. The signing of the separate treaties in March 1978 
marked the realization of a persistently defiant Nepali stance. The necessity 
of having separate treaties (one for short term trade arrangements and the 
other long term and permanent transit arrangements) is vital for Nepal for 
its economic survival. This is because such separation of treaties and long
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term transit arrangements would provide considerable protection to Nepal 
in terms of its vulnerability as a result of landlockedness. This would deny 
India its invaluable leverage over Nepal in matters of transit which literally 
devastated Nepali economy during Raxual Blockade (and subsequently in 
1989 with far greater intensity). One can therefore strongly maintain that a 
separation of treaties seem to be first step towards protecting Nepal from 
threats to its economic survival. The signing of separate treaties which 
constitutes a responsive NCB, may therefore be understood in terms of 
vitalness which is suggested by condition 1.
It will also be recalled from the analysis of Nepali behaviour during 1960-72 
that the issue of trade diversification was considered vital for Nepal's 
economic survival. Hence, the non-compliant behaviour (demonstrated 
during 1960-72) such as the trade agreements with the USSR, Yugoslavia, the 
UK, Poland, China and the trade and transit agreement with Pakistan were 
all explained in terms of condition 1. Adopting similar line of arguments the 
initiative non-compliant behaviour of signing trade and transit treaty with 
Bangladesh may also be explained in terms of condition 1.
The establishm ent of work perm it, an initiative NCB, may also be 
understood in terms of vitalness. Basically, the Nepali trade, industries and 
jobs (eg. teaching) etc. are dom inated by Indian immigrants where the 
Nepalis find difficult to sustain themselves. The work permit as a measure 
to control illegal im m igrants provide some protection to the Nepali 
population in terms of employment. Therefore, the introduction of work 
permit may be seen as vital to the economic survival of the Nepalis. Hence, 
condition 1 provide a possible explanation to such NCB.
201
The peace zone proposal was vital for Nepal's physical, economic and 
political survival. It will be recalled from the earlier discussions that Nepal 
through the peace zone proposal sought guarantees from other states to treat 
it as a conflict free zone. It will also be recalled from earlier discussion that 
special relations with India and other treaty obligation produced an 
enormous Indian preponderance in Nepal's conduct of her affairs. Indian 
preponderance as mentioned before acted to the detrim ent of Nepal's 
physical, economic and political survival. To secure her survival as an 
independent state, it was necessary for Nepal to cast her Indian satellite 
status. Nepal attempted to do so by developing relations with China. Given 
the Sino-Indian rivalry and the physical, economic and political vulnerability 
of Nepal, thus meant a tight rope walking and becoming a victim of Indian 
wrath. Nepal needed a more positive measure so that she could at the same 
time free herself from Indian preponderance and steer clear of the Sino- 
Indian rivalry thereby securing her survival as an independent state 
physically, economically and politically. The Peace Zone proposal was one 
such measure, through the endorsement of which by China and India, Nepal 
could secure her survival. Hence, condition 1 (vitalness of issue) offers a 
plausible explanation for Nepal's behaviour of forwarding the zone of peace 
proposal.
Condition 1 ( vitalness of issue) also explains Nepal's NCBs related to the 
purchase of arms from China. As a result of the acquisition of anti-aircraft 
guns and AK 47 rifles, the enhancement of Nepal's capability to deter 
external aggression was very insignificant. Despite that, the acquisition of 
arms may be said to have been prompted by its security concerns. Far from 
being secured, the threats to territorial sovereignty were persistent in the 
minds of the Nepali decision-makers. This is reflected in Birendra's desire to
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double its military size by adding two divisions of army over the next 
decade. Apart from the external threats, the purchase of rifles may also be 
explained in terms of Nepal's internal security concerns. As mentioned 
earlier, the Nepali government emphasized that the purchase was necessary 
to deter possible terrorist attacks. This underscores a concern regarding the 
threats posed by the terrorist against the regime of King Birendra. Hence, 
from the perspective of survival of territorial independence and that of the 
survival of regime condition 1 (vitalness of issues) offers a plausible 
explanation to Nepal's NCB of purchasing arms.
Finally, King Birendra's refusal of the Indian suggestion to free the former 
Nepali Prime Minister, B. P. Koirala, from  prison ^ d  initiate democratic 
process may be considered as a responsive NCB that is guided by his regime 
interest. In view of the popularity of B. P. Koirala, and the threat posed by 
democratic movement to the royal regime, it is a vital necessity for Birendra 
to keep B. P. Koirala immobilized by putting him in jail. Viewed as a vital 
issue in term s of regime survival, condition 1 seems to offer a plausible 
explanation for this NCB too.
In our efforts to understand Nepal's non-compliance during this phase, we 
have so far examined her motivation to defy. But as mentioned in Chapter 3, 
for a state to be non-compliant, it m ust also have the capability to resist. 
Hence, the following analysis is geared to examine Nepal's capability to 
resist in order to understand the NCBs demonstrated during this phase. 
According to our contextual framework, the non-tangible power resources 
that constitute capability to resist include leadership strength, external 
political support, geopolitical leverage and people's power. Given a 
motivation to defy, the presence of these non-tangible power resources lead 
to non-compliance while their absence does n o t
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Nepal's non-compliance in this phase may be explained by King Birendra's 
leadership strength. In addition to this, in some instances of NCB external 
political support and people's power seems to have played their part. 
However, unlike Mahendra's direct rule, geopolitical leverage in this phase 
did not contribute to Nepal's capability to resist. Let us examine the power 
resources.
As mentioned earlier. King Mahendra personally groomed Birendra to take 
up the leadership of his country. Birendra was gradually socialized into 
Mahendra's political system. He received his academic training abroad and 
was exposed to international intellectual cross-currents. Having studied 
politics under Henry Kissinger at Harvard, he is the first Nepali King to have 
had any prolonged exposure to the world outside India and his country's 
isolated valleys. This is in contrast to his father who said that his only 
experience of the outside world was the watering places of Nice, Cannes and 
Monte Carlo.
It was doubted that King Birendra would prove to be equally strong and 
would have the political acumen and insights like his father to maintain his 
country's internal and external position. In fact he was a step forward than 
King Mahendra. He was no less assertive than his father in his relation to 
China as an expression of non-compliance to India. At the same time he was 
meticulously cautious throughout to see that its growing amity with New 
Delhi did not revert back to the subservient position of the early fifties or 
lead to any deviation from its set policy of equidistance between its two 
neighbours.
Toeing his father's line, Birendra with great zeal and strong leadership re 
energized Nepal's efforts to establish an identity independent of India. The
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vigorous pursuance of his ingenious peace zone proposal bears the 
testimony of his leadership strength. His leadership strength explains 
Nepal's assertive role in the international forums on the issue of transit right 
for the landlocked countries. Nepal led the landlocked countries in the UN 
and advocated for their right to the access to the sea. Birendra's 
assertiveness may be noticed in his refusal to concede to the suggestion 
made by Rajiv Gandhi's special envoy to provide assurances to stop 
purchasing arms from China. Another example is the rejection of Indian 
suggestion to release B. P. Koirala from prison and initiate democratic 
process. Following similar arguments as before the difference in leadership 
strength between Birendra and Tribhuvan explains why Nepal was non- 
compliant during this phase and failed to be non-com pliant during 
Tribhuvan's phase.
In addition to leadership strength, external political support also contributed 
towards Nepal's capability to resist relating to Nepal's land lockedness and 
peace zone proposal. Nepal's assumption of the role of spokesperson in the 
UN for the landlocked countries testify that Nepal was successful in 
mustering political support from those countries. The political support and 
solidarity offered by other states on the issue provided Nepal the strength to 
defy. The operation of external political support is also evident in Nepal's 
pursuit of peace zone proposal. In essence, the key actors in materializing 
the ZOP are India and China. The rationale behind Nepal's attem pts to 
secure wider recognition for the proposal is that, through the endorsement of 
international community Nepal could secure their commitment and support. 
It is reasonable to gain commitment and support because an endorsement 
politically binds a state as a party to the proposal. As China spontaneously 
accepted the proposal, the only stumbling block was India. The wide
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recognition enabled Nepal to amass the political strength required to put 
pressure on India to accept the proposal. As mentioned before, by 1986, 75 
countries including the USSR,the USA, the UK, France, China, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh endorsed the proposal. The wider international endorsement for 
the proposal shows the operation of external political support in Nepal's 
behaviour of non-compliance.
It may be inferred from the foregoing that King Birendra's Nepal was 
characterized by a foreign policy of dynamism which sought interaction and 
involvement with the rest of the world. In contrast, Tribhuvan's Nepal was 
characterized by isolationist foreign policy. A comparison of the two 
provides the evidence which partly supports the proposition that the 
presence of external political support leads to NCB while its absence does 
not.
Besides, leadership strength and external political support, people's power 
also help us understand Nepal's NCB in this phase. Popular pressure 
against India was evident in various demonstrations and protests that were 
made to effect the signing of separate trade and transit. The annexation of 
Sikkim by India became a matter of concern in Nepal. Several newspaper 
openly expressed their apprehension that India might use her dominant 
position to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring country- a 
suspicion buttressed by India's annexation of Sikkim. These developments 
were viewed with alarm in Kathmandu, where the elite felt a serious 
challenge to N epal's independence and  security . Anti Indian 
demonstrations in Nepal in 1974, protesting the Indian actions in Sikkim, 
were allegedly encouraged by officials of the Nepal government. Unlike 
Tribhuvan's government (which lacked the disposition to defy) Birendra's
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government utilized people's power to enhance its capabilities to be non- 
compliant
However, geopolitical leverage as a factor of capability to resist did not play 
any significant role in this phase. The emergence of Bangladesh proved that 
the effectiveness of Chinese influence in the region was considerably 
diminished. As against the Indian involvement, China could not do much to 
help her close ally Pakistan in preventing the creation of Bangladesh. 
Nepal's geopolitical leverage was thereby reduced to some extent. A further 
reduction of this leverage took place when India subsequently amassed huge 
military capabilities including nuclear power which was absent in 1960s. An 
Indian political scientist wrote,
India's military muscle acquired a punch which was tragically 
lacking in 1962. India also emerged as the world's fourth 
strongest military power, with a million plus strong armed force 
and significant armoured and air striking capabilities. With all 
its nuclear armour, China's conventional punch is probably less 
forceful today than it was in 1962. 2^3
Sino-phobia was no longer a significant element in the Indian security 
calculation. Thus Nepal's geopolitical leverage, gained from India's sino- 
phobia, became proportionately insignificant Nepal's geopolitical leverage 
whatever may have been left, was finally stripped off during the late 80s 
when long-standing tensions between India and China were eased through 
Sino-India rapprochement Hence, given the erosion of geopolitical leverage, 
it cannot be said to have contributed towards Nepal's non-compliance 
during this phase. From the foregoing analysis we may therefore conclude
123 Gupta, Bhabani Sen, 'China as a Threat', World Focus Nov-Dee. 1989.
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that given the motivation to defy (emanated from condition 1) the presence 
of leadership strength, external political support and people's power led 
Nepal to be defiant.
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CHAPTER 5
FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR OF BANGLADESH WITH INDIA
W ith the surrender of the Pakistani Army to the Joint Indo-Bangla 
Command on the 16th December, 1971, Bangladesh's emergence as a 
sovereign country in the map of the world was complete. Until 1947, the 
area comprising Bangladesh used to be a part of British India. Between 1947 
to 1971, it was a part of Pakistan. On 25th March 1971, the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh was declared which gained its independence on the 16th 
December 1971.
Although there is no denying the fact that India played an important role in 
the emergence of Bangladesh it must be remembered here that India came to 
Bangladesh's assistance not entirely for selfless reasons. The Director of the 
Indian Institute for Strategic Studies and Defence Analysis at a seminar on 2 
April 1971 pointed out that.
What India must realize is the fact that the break-up of Pakistan is in 
our interest, an opportunity the like of which will never come again. It 
is the opportunity of a century (to destroy the nation's inveterate and 
principal enemy) L
He further concluded in a newspaper article, "the speedy emergence of a 
Bangladesh government headed by Awami league leadership is very much
1. Quoted in Peiris, Denzil, 'Opening a Raw Wound', Far Eastern Economic Review. 7 
May, 1976, p. 10.
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in our in te rest"2 Even Mrs. Indira Gandhi herself, during her visit to 
Bangladesh (after its independence), on several occasions and more than 
once in the same public meeting explained why India helped the liberation 
movement of Bangladesh. In a public meeting she outlined how a free and 
independent Bangladesh added to India's strength. In terms of the regional 
balance of power, to free Bangladesh would be to free India from its regional 
constraints. Not only that but she also calculated whether the Bangladesh 
liberation struggle had the chance to succeed. Once she was convinced that 
the movement would not peter out, she plunged into political and military 
commitments. 3
MUJIB REGIME (1972-1975)
Nevertheless, the moral and material support which India extended to 
Bangladesh was never lost on the sentiments of the decision m akers of 
Bangladesh. During the euphoric stage, bonds of friendship were forged 
between the two countries. To none occurred that foreign policy is devoid of 
any kind of sentimentality and that an overweight sense of gratitude is 
irksome and can sometimes become unbearable. Consequently on March 19, 
1972 upon Mrs. Indira Gandhi's first visit to Bangladesh, (from 16 to 19 
March) both the countries signed a treaty which was titled "Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Peace." It may be noted here that while the 12 
article treaty was on the cards for the past three months, the signing of it was 
kept a closely guarded secret till Mrs. Gandhi herself announced about it at a
2. Subramanyam, K,.'India's Security Linked with Bangladesh's Struggle', Assam Tribune. 
12 April, 1971.
3. Hindu. 23 March. 1972.
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news conference in Dhaka. "Both Mrs. Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
played things close to their chest to the extent that even some of their closest 
aides who were deeply involved in the dialogue, were kept in the dark until 
the leaders chose to tell them of their decisions."^ "If the officials of India 
and Soviet Union had two years to prepare for a similar treaty between their 
countries, the Sheikh might have given us at least two months to work on 
our treaty", complained one of the close aides from the Bangladesh side.^
The treaty which was valid for 25 years, declared that India and Bangladesh 
w ould respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Both sides would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of 
the other. The clauses relating to defence were couched exactly in the 
phraseology of the Indo-Soviet treaty of A ugust 1971. Both countries 
declared that they would not enter into any military alliance that might be 
directed against the other party. They would not allow their territories to be 
used in any manner that would constitute a threat to their neighbour's 
security. The treaty stipulated that "in case either party is attacked or 
threatened with attack, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter 
into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to 
elim inate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their 
countries." It may be recalled that India invoked an identical clause in the 
Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 to deter China from coming to Pakistan's 
assistance. This security understanding was further sealed with the 
declaration that neither party should "undertake any commitment, secret or
4. Ibid.
5. All, S. M, After the Dark Night: Problems of Shiekh Muiibur Rahman. New Delhi, 1973, 
p. 144.
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open, toward one or more states which may be incompatible with the 
present treaty".
The two countries also agreed under article 6 of the treaty to cooperate in 
flood control, river development, irrigation and communication. It was 
agreed that joint studies and actions would be undertaken in the fields of 
flood control, river basin development and the developm ent of hydro­
electric power and irrigation.
After signing the treaty, Mrs. Gandhi told a press conference:
Bangladesh needs no guarantee for its sovereignty. But if its 
sovereignty or security should ever be threatened India will 
defend it. ^
Bangladeshi President Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, in his address to the 
assembly, commended India's role in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh 
and described the treaty as "the practical expression" of the friendship 
between the two states.^ Likewise, Mrs. Gandhi in her statement in Indian 
Parliament on 20 March 1972 declared that,
the Treaty embodies the Will of the two Governments to pursue 
common policies in matters of interest to both countries and 
solemnizes the close ties of friendship between our two countries 
and peoples cemented through blood and sacrifice. The Treaty ...
6. Times of India. 19 March, 1972.
7. Jatiyo Sangsad Official Proceedings, 1st Session, 1st Sitting, 9 April, 1973, p. 45.
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will guide us in our journey into the future in quest of peace, 
good neighbourliness and the well-being of our two peoples.^
The Hindu wrote:
The Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Peace 
is a natural evolution and is an effective step forward in many ways 
from the Indo-Soviet treaty. The geographical neighbourliness of the 
two countries makes the treaty a more rational commitment than 
the arrangement between Delhi and Moscow. There is more in 
common between the people of India and the people of Bangladesh in 
matters of political, ideological, cultural background and racial 
affinity.^
But the opposition parties in Bangladesh unanimously demanded the treaty 
be repudiated. It is im portant to note that none of the political parties in 
Bangladesh supported the Government in its stand on the friendship treaty^^ 
because they saw in it the abridgment of Bangladesh's in d e p e n d e n c e .T h e  
treaty increased people's fear rather than support and strength. Some saw it 
as severely undermining Bangladesh's political and security options, and also 
as a means to stifle nationalist sentiments, while others saw it as a 
commitment by Mujib to accept Indian claims to predom inance in the
8. Government of India, M inistry of Information and Broadcasting, B an g lad esh  
Documents. Vol.II, 1972, p. 648.
9. Hindu. 19 March 1972.
10. Hassan, Shaukat, India-Bangladesh Political Relations During the Awami League 
Government. 1972-75. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Australian National University, 1988, 
p. 110.
11. Tativo Sangsad Official Proceedings. 1st Session, 1st Sitting, 9 and 13 April; also 2nd 
Session, 29th Sitting, 7 July 1973.
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subcontinent, especially as its principal rival, Pakistan, had been d i v i d e d .
In all, the opposition interpreted the treaty as an infringem ent of 
Bangladesh's sovereignty and appealed to the Assembly to reject it right 
away. One member of Parliament commented that the wording of the 
friendship treaty provided no scope to repudiate it, thereby binding 
Bangladesh to the Indian security arrangement in the subcontinent. He even 
demanded to know why Bangladesh, being an independent country, should 
not be given the right to negotiate for her own interests.
Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, leader of the National Awami Party 
addressing a public meeting in observance of Anti-Repression Day at Pal tan 
Maidan described the treaty as one of bondage and asserted that the people 
of Bangladesh would never accept Indian domination.^^ In December 1972, 
he formed a 7 Party action committee whose aim was to free the country of 
this treaty because the treaty guaranteed India's domination and influence 
over the future course of Bangladesh and thereby extend and establish its 
own sphere of influence over the subcontinent According to the Committee, 
the treaty could not serve Bangladesh's interests as claimed by the 
Governments^
Apart from that. Holiday, a Bangladeshi English language weekly claimed 
that India was playing the Big Brother role, and argued that Articles 9 and 10 
'clearly give enough leeway to the Indian Government to infringe upon the
12. Baxter, Craig, Bangladesh: A New Nation In An Old Setting. Boulder and London, 
1984, p. 99.
13. Tativo Sangsad Official Proceedings. 2nd Session, 29th Sitting, 7 July 1973, pp. 1817, 
1820.
14. The Times of India. 10 October, 1972.
15. Ahmed, Moudud, Bangladesh: Era of Shiekh Muiibur Rahman. Dhaka: The University 
Press Ltd., 1983, p. 190.
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sovereign right of the Bangladesh people' and that in fact 'Indian defence and 
foreign policies have now become Bangladesh's policies as well'.s^
On the contrary, Indian reaction to the treaty was totally different because, as 
far as Indian self-interest was concerned, India w ould not be in a 
disadvantaged position for signing a friendship treaty with Bangladesh.
The treaty allowed India to realize three important regional objectives: first, 
India was able to convince Bangladesh that it neither require any defence 
arrangem ent with external powers, nor a strong army since India would 
assume the responsibility for Bangladesh's defence; second, India's influence 
and 'guidance' in Bangladesh's affairs were guaranteed by several treaty 
provisions, particularly article 4; and finally, the economic 'salvation' of 
eastern India was assured by the economic understanding across the border 
of peace and friendship'.
The security arrangement in the treaty implied, as mentioned before, that 
Bangladesh's defence forces remain weak and dependent on India. The 
treaty also constrained Bangladesh to enter into defence arrangement with 
any country without Indian approval. Regional and world politics is far 
from being static. Bangladeshi people felt that there was no guarantee that in 
future India will honour its commitment for safeguarding Bangladesh's 
sovereignty or it will not take military measures against Bangladesh. In the 
face of regional, extra regional and global political changes and instabilities, 
the people of Bangladesh perceived the treaty as threatening the nation's 
physical survival and sovereignty, as it meant that the national defence forces 
will be permanently weak and dependent on India. A part from this, the
16. Holiday. 26 March 1972.
17. Hassan, S., Op. Cit. p. 134,
216
people of Bangladesh also perceived the treaty as an instrum ent that 
curtailed the nations right to survive politically as an independent entity. As 
mentioned before, the treaty required Bangladesh to develop security 
relationship with only those states that India approves. By all implications 
Bangladesh was tied to the Indo-Soviet axis on a long term basis. Thereby, 
Bangladesh's political independence to establish any form of relationship 
with any state, regionally, extra-regionally or globally was jeopardized by the 
treaty. In addition to the circumscription of political freedom as just 
mentioned, the treaty also imposed inflexibility in terms of Bangladesh's 
position on world politics. As a developing nation with a war torn economy 
and faced with chronic difficulties, it was an imperative for Bangladesh to 
have some political flexibility in order to be able to tap support from both 
Sino-American and Indo-Soviet axes. The long tenure of the treaty made 
Bangladesh's political alignment rigid thereby impossible to alter political 
position or remain neutral. It may not be out of place to mention here that 
although India is regarded as a forerunner in the non-aligned movement, the 
post independence events suggest that India was then more aligned with the 
Soviet Union than remain non-aligned. Consequently, through the treaty 
Bangladesh acquired alliance with the Indo-Soviet axis. Further, to the 
Bangladeshis, the treaty accentuated Indian influence in Bangladesh. It may 
be recalled from the discussion of the treaty in the preceding section that 
several provisions of the treaty, particularly Article 4, guaranteed India's 
influence and guidance in Bangladesh's affairs. The people perceived it as 
Indian domination and a threat to Bangladesh's survival as an independent 
political entity.
The treaty was also viewed by the people as a threat to Bangladesh's vital 
economic interests. The 'Indo-Soviet' label was seen as putting obstacle on
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the way of Bangladesh's chances for getting recognition from the oil rich 
m iddle eastern countries and China. Given the precarious state of its 
economy, it was indispensable for Bangladesh to infuse large amount of 
capital for its developmental efforts. W ithout their recognition it was 
impossible for Bangladesh to secure funds from those countries. All the 
above points suggest that the treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace of 
1972 was perceived by the people of Bangladesh as a threat to physical, 
political and economic survival of Bangladesh.
The political parties of Bangladesh seeing a dismantling of Bangladesh's 
political, economic and security options, feared encapsulation' by India. 
They not only opposed the treaty provisions but also rejected the idea of a 
treaty with India because they were well aware of the precedents that in all 
such treaty arrangements between a big and powerful on the one hand and 
small and weak on the other, the latter implicitly surrenders part of its 
independence in exchange for security, which is directly guaranteed by the 
stronger power'.^^
In the economic front, the most significant feature was the trade agreement 
w ith India which was concluded on 28 March, 1972. The trade agreement 
accorded each other the status of most-favoured nation treatment. In 
addition, the agreement provided that trade in perishable commodities and 
articles of daily use among people living within 16 kilometers of the border 
w ould be free of customs and currency regulations. Since the 16 kilometer 
zone could not be distinguished, many saw this as an attempt on the part of 
India to achieve an economic integration of Bangladesh and India. It may be 
noted here that before the partition of India in 1947, Bangladesh was the
18. Sethi, J.D, 'Indo-Soviet Treaty and Non-Alignment', India Quarterly. Vol. 27, No. 4, 
October-December 1971, p. 330.
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agricultural hinterland for the port of Calcutta. It sent jute, fish and fresh 
vegetables to Calcutta and got manufactured goods in exchange. After the 
emergence of Bangladesh, India wanted to see the old arrangement revived 
if not totally, at least partially. During her election campaign speeches in 
West Bengal and Assam, Indira Gandhi had repeatedly emphasized the 
benefits that free commerce would bring to these states bordering 
Bangladesh.
The trade agreement also revealed some interesting features. Against Rs. 7.5 
crore^o worth of jute and Rs. 9 crore worth of fish from Bangladesh the major 
Indian item was tobacco. But the most remarkable feature of this trade 
agreement between Dhaka and New Delhi was the provision for border 
trade. As mentioned earlier, this provision enabled trade to flow free of 
customs and currency regulations within 16 kilometers along the 1300 mile 
Indo-Bangladesh border. It was the result of an Indian initiative and proved 
very disastrous for Bangladesh. The 16 kilometer zone made currency and 
customs regulations altogether impractical and m eaningless. It was 
impossible to ascertain whether goods were carried across the border or 
w ithin the sam e country. Some smuggling of prim ary goods from 
Bangladesh to India was already taking place, but the loop hole in the border 
trade agreem ent provided the leeway and encouraged it on a large scale 
basis. Jute, fish, poultry, eggs, newsprint, food grains and even relief 
materials found their way across the border to India resulting in an 
astronomical rise of prices of daily necessities in Bangladesh. The drainage 
was so gigantic that foreign donors began saying that 'some day ... India is
19. Hindu. 17 March 1972.
20. One crore=10 million.
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going to give a big yawn over Bangladesh's problem and when it closes its 
mouth Bangladesh will be inside.
The Indian businessmen took advantage of Bangladesh's shattered economy 
to get a foothold that had been denied since 1947, when an unfriendly 
Pakistan was established in East Bengal. Even the coins of Pakistan days 
found their way to India as they reportedly contained better metal than the 
India ones and were used to make fountain pen nibs in India. The consumer 
goods that India sent were mostly of a very poor quality. In a dispatch from 
Dhaka, The Times of India correspondent Kirit Bhaumik wrote, "one of the 
political jokes current here (Dhaka) is that what India has given with one 
hand, it has allowed to  be taken aw ay with the other through smuggling.‘"22
In fact, the smuggling hurt Bangladesh more than India. Loss of the jute hit 
its mills, while loss of fish further drove up the local prices. Calcutta sources 
estimated that between 12 lakh and 14 lakh bales of jute came across the 
border in the year 1972. The enormity of this illegal traffic can be judged by 
comparing these figures with the provision of three lakh bales in the 
agreement reached in March.
Bangladesh wanted mutually beneficial trading relations with India with 
necessary checks and balances; and that there would be no going back to the 
trade pattern which existed in the pre-partition days when East Bengal 
served as the hinterland of Calcutta. But without serious considerations of 
how Bangladesh's already war-torn economy would be affected, India 
argued for the integration of the economy of Bangladesh with the economy 
of the eastern part of India.
21. Quoted in Dawn. 30 November, 1975.
22, Times of India. 28 June, 1972.
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It was also argued that not only would India remain Bangladesh's 'chief and 
dominant trading partner', but that India is about the only country whose 
aid Bangladesh can require with little cost to itself and in fact at much 
benefit, and with whom by the same means it can balance its trade'.23 Thus, 
the theme of mutual benefit through economic cooperation between the two 
countries was constantly invoked in certain vested quarters in India.
Furthermore, India and the Awami League Leaders persisted that the 
economies of Bangladesh and the neighbouring states of India were 
complementary when in reality they were not. Jute for instance is an item in 
which India and Bangladesh compete for markets. Export of jute to India 
meant in the first place boosting Indian jute manufacture which would again 
compete with similar Bangladesh products for markets abroad. Secondly, it 
increased India's and correspondingly decreased Bangladesh's ability to sell 
raw jute to international markets for hard currency. Finally, Indian rupees 
thus earned could be used only to buy Indian goods. The Dhaka Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries, an association of the traders and manufacturers, 
opposed the free border trade clause and condemned it as harmful for the 
country. Commenting on the agreement, the Vice-President of the chamber 
said, "our economy dictates that only those commodities which do not find 
ready market should be included in barter agreement. But jute the main 
foreign exchange earner of the country is being bartered against 
commodities which have very limited export market in terms of quality and 
foreign exchange earning capacity."24 The official exports of jute to India 
were criticized in Dhaka for bringing into the country only Indian rupees
23. Chopra, Pran, Bangladesh in Search of a Role, India Quarterly. Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, 
April-June, 1972, p. 124.
24. The Bangladesh Observer. 23 May, 1972,
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instead of Teal' foreign exchange, as Sheikh Mujib had so often promised 
they would do. What made matter worse was the Indian answer that coal 
and cement from India, sold for takas, balanced this out. Can so valuable an 
exchange earner as jute (the golden fibre and the lifeline of Bangladesh) be 
equated with coal and cement?^^ xhe devaluation to bring the Bangladesh 
currency at par with that of India immediately after independence was also 
done at the dictate of India. The expected benefits from this devaluation 
were dissipitated and put Bangladesh at great loss
The insistence on the complementary nature of their economies meant Indian 
intake of Bangladesh's primary commodities in return for its manufactured 
products. If perpetuated it meant that even as independent state, Bangladesh 
will be perm anently geared to the economic needs of its big neighbour. 
Industrial growth in Bangladesh will stop and instead it will become a 
preserved market for Indian goods. This was certainly not the goal for which 
the Bangladesh people had demanded partition of the subcontinent and 
broken away from Pakistan.
M oham med Toaha, leader of the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), 
protested that Bangladesh has become protectorate of India. He further said 
that the penetration of Indian money was having an adverse impact on the 
economy of Bangladesh, resulting in an adverse balance of trade. The 
m iddle class shuddered at the thought of having to use inferior Indian 
products on prohibitive prices. 6^
The weekly "Haq Katha", in its editorial said that through the so called 
border trade, India is virtually robbing Bangladesh. It further said that
25. Guardian. 4 September, 1972.
26. The Times of India. 10 October, 1972.
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though Bangladesh is a free and sovereign country, the politics of jute has 
not yet been removed from the country. The Indian jute mills on the Hoogly 
river have again been started in full swing with the raw jute of Bangladesh. 
The jute of Bangladesh is being black-marketed into India, and it is the 
Indian businessmen and the Indian Marwaris who are making the profits.22
A commentator in the Political and Economic Weekly of Bombay noted: "For 
how long are we going to maintain the fiction that the rising tide of ill-will in 
Bangladesh towards India and Indians is exclusively the consequence of 
Moulana Bhashani and the handful of residual pro-Pakistani elements? Why 
not admit that the problem has deeper roots?".28
Bangladesh also inherited after its independence the problem of sharing the 
waters of the Ganges- an international river that traverses through India and 
Bangladesh and empties into the Bay of Bengal. The dispute originated in 
the early 1950s and continued after Bangladesh's independence. The Ganges 
is one of the largest rivers in the world. Its headwaters originate from the 
Gangotri glaciers som e 23,000 feet high in the southern slopes of the 
Himalayas, in the northwesterly direction from New Delhi. It changes over 
to a southeasterly direction over half its course and then flows in an easterly 
direction across northern India until it reaches the border with Bangladesh.
It is fed by a number of tributaries originating in the Himalayan slopes of 
Tibet, Nepal and India. Of the major tributaries, the Kamali, the Gandak and 
the Kosi originating in Nepal together contribute 71% of the dry season flow 
of the Ganges and 41% of its annual flow.
27. Hag Katha. 15 August, 1972.
28. Quoted in The Times of India. 29 September, 1972.
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As the Ganges approaches the Indian state of West Bengal, the river swings 
southward towards the delta. A short distance before it enters Bangladesh, it 
splits into two channels. The smaller, known as the Bhagirathi, continues 
southward becoming in its lower reaches the Hoogly on which is situated the 
port of Calcutta. The main channel enters Bangladesh and forms the 
boundary between India and Bangladesh for about 130 kilometers. Then 
taking the name Padma, it flows southeasterly for another 110 kilometers 
before joining the Brahmaputra-Jamuna. Further downstream the Padma 
joins the Meghna and continues as the lower Meghna until it empties its 
waters into the Bay of Bengal.
The Farakka Barrage, which cost India' about US $ 190 million, was built 
ostensibly to save' the Calcutta port from extinction. By placing the barrage 
across the Ganges before it proceeds into Bangladesh, water can be diverted 
into the Hoogly River to flush the silt from Calcutta's port so that it can 
receive big ships. According to experts in Bangladesh, "Farakka was not 
planned as a purely economic project by India, but as a political lever. It is 
essentially a scheme which benefits India alone and which cannot do 
anything but harm to B angladesh."29 The diversion of water to the Hoogly 
decreases the normal flow through the Ganges in south western Bangladesh, 
depriving that area of sufficient water to prevent sea water intrusion and the 
salinations that results. It has had adverse effects on Bangladesh's 
agriculture during the dry months. Pamphlets circulated in Bangladesh 
called the barrage "a death knell to Bangladesh".30
29. Author's interview with some Bangladeshi officials.
30. Begum, Khurshida, Tension over the Farakka Barrage: A Techno Political Tangle in 
South Asia. University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1988, p. 129.
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Most of the Ganges water consists of monsoonal flows that run out to sea. 
D uring the lean period of March to May, the discharge at Farakka is 
insufficient, less than 55,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs) in the last ten days 
of April. India claimed that the purpose of flushing the Calcutta port 
required a diversion of at least 40,000 cusecs of water, thereby leaving only a 
small balance for Bangladesh. The Bangladesh case was that if India 
extracted the above quantum, the result would spell disaster for Bangladesh.
After independence of Bangladesh, Farakka issue was taken up for 
discussion between the two countries. Under article 6 of the Peace and 
Friendship Treaty of 1972 signed between the two countries, it was agreed 
that the two countries would cooperate in flood control, river development, 
irrigation and communication. It was further agreed that joint studies and 
actions would be undertaken in the fields of flood control, river-basin 
development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation. 
At the same time decision was also taken to establish the Indo-Bangladesh 
Joint Rivers Commission "so that the water resources of the region can be 
utilized on an equitable basis for the mutual benefits of the people of the two 
c o u n tr ie s " .B u t there was no particular reference to the question of sharing 
the Ganga water and other points relating to the dispute.
Between April 1972 (i.e., after signing the peace and friendship treaty) and 
May 1974 (i.e., before the Prime M inister's summit meeting) several 
ministerial level meetings were held but nothing significant came out except
31. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Bangladesh Documents. Vol. II, 
1971, p. 644.
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that India made a commitment that "a mutually acceptable solution will be 
arrived at before operating the Farakka Barrage". 2^
In May 1974, the two Prime Ministers, Indira Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman 
met in Delhi but the meeting was not the success it might have been. 
However, para 17 and 18 of the Indira-Mujib declaration stated.
The two Prime Ministers took note of the fact that the Farakka 
Barrage Project would be commissioned before the end of 1974.
They recognized that during the period of minimum flow in the 
Ganga, there might not be enough water to meet the needs of the 
Calcutta Port and the full requirements of Bangladesh, therefore, 
the fair weather flow of the Ganga in the lean months would have 
to be augmented to meet the requirements of the two countries. It 
was accordingly, decided that the best means of such 
augmentation... should be studied by the jo in t Rivers 
Commission.33
As one authority observed.
This joint declaration of the Prime Ministers of the two countries 
clearly indicated that instead of proceeding step by step for finding out a 
solution, the dispute was thrown into further discrepancies and 
contingencies.^
32. The Ganga Water and Bangladesh, an Unpublished Paper, p. 7, Cited in Begum, 
Khurshida, Op.Cit. p. 109.
33. Record of Discussions of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, Dhaka, May 
1985, pp. 56.
34. Begum, K., Op. C it.p. 110.
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After this sum m it meeting two more ministerial level meetings were held. 
The first one was held in February 1975. But the meeting as usual made no 
headway in edging closer to a solution because of the divergence of views of 
the two sides on the question of the commissioning of the Farakka barrage. 
The second meeting was held in April 1975 in Dhaka between Bangladesh 
and India. On the third day of the meeting a joint press statement was issued 
which read: The Indian side pointed out that while discussions regarding 
allocations of water are continuing, it is essential to run the feeder canal of the 
barrage during the current lean period. Accordingly on 18 April, an interim 
agreement was signed allowing India to test the feeder canal for the period 
between 21 April and 31 May with discharges varying from 11,000 to 16,000 
cusecs (see Table 5.1). This was a concession to the policy of 'appeasement' 
that Mujib governm ent was following tow ards India. The agreement 
concerned only the test run of the feeder canal and not the commissioning of 
the barrage. But India continued withdrawing water even beyond the period 
specified in the Interim agreement of May 1975. The Indian authority did not 
inform Bangladesh about the continuation of the diversion of the water after 
the specified period. One Bangladesh official closely involved with the issue 
commented: The Farakka dispute has unmistakably demonstrated that the Indian 
Government, in its relation with Bangladesh- as with other neighbours- is incapable 
of keeping good faith.^^
Bangladesh, being an agrarian country, is the worst sufferer of the water 
dispute. Agriculture in Bangladesh constitutes 60% of GNP and provides 
70% of labour force with employment. In 1971-72, the food production of the 
country, apart from the adversities of the war of liberation, suffered a setback 
by d rough t The drought condition in 1972-73 was even more severe. The
35. Far Eastern Economic Review. 23 April, 1976.
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year 1974-75 brought extensive damage to agricultural production by a flood 
of unusual magnitude.
Added to these miseries was the withdrawal of a large quantity of water by 
India through the Farakka Barrage in violation of the ad hoc Agreement, 
1975, for "test running the feeder canal". This produced harmful effects on 
Bangladesh. The most sensitive aspect of the diversion was its impact on the 
agricultural sector in Bangladesh. Insufficient flow of water on one hand 
made irrigation impossible and on the other hand failed to prevent the 
intrusion of sea water thereby increasing salinity of the soil. With the 
increase of salinity, soil fertility decreased proportionately. This resulted in 
colossal loss of agricultural crops. Besides, agriculture, inland navigability, 
fisheries and livestock suffered greatly due to inadequate flow in the 
Padma.36 In sum, withdrawal of water brought ecological disaster for the 
people of Bangladesh. The diversion threatened an intolerable weakening of 
the already anaemic Bangladesh economy.
Before the independence of Bangladesh, the Awami League in their election 
manifesto of 1970 promised that, every instrument of foreign policy must be 
immediately utilized to secure a just solution of Farakka problem. After 
independence, people felt the Awami League government got an unusual 
opportunity to fulfill its promise. Not only was the atmosphere conducive 
for a settlement but actually a forum was also created so that the problem 
could be solved. When the two prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Mujibur 
Rahman met in 1974 to discuss among various things the water issue, people 
naturally expected that substantial progress will be made. But despite a 
num ber of concessions made to India, the Mujib government could not get
36. The Bangladesh Times. 11 April, 1976; also The Bangladesh Observer. 25 September, 
1976.
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what the people considered a fair share of water from the Ganges river 
system except for a face saving interim agreem ent^
Table 5.1 : Agreement To Share The Ganges As Per The Ad Hoc
Agreement, 1975.
Date of Withdrawal Withdrawal by India Balance left for 
Bangladesh
April 21-30 11,000 cusecs 44,000 cusecs
May 1-10 12,000 cusecs 44,500 cusecs
May 11-20 15,000 cusecs 44,250 cusecs
May 21-30 16,000 cusecs 40,500 cusecs
Source: Bangladesh Observer, April 19,1975.
Another serious problem faced by Bangladesh in its relation with India was 
the Indian stand on the basis of delimitation of maritime boundaries and the 
latter's claim over the territories that Bangladesh believes belong to it. 
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III), a coastal state is entitled to extend its territorial sea 12 
nautical miles (n.m) (Article 3), its contiguous zone 24 n.m (Article 33(2}), its 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 200 n.m (Article 57), and the continental 
shelf38 upto 200 n.m (Article 76), or up to the natural prolongation measured 
from an appropriate baseline. The territorial sea sets the limit of the sea zone 
over which a coastal state may exercise its sovereignty. The EEZ and the 
continental shelf set the sea zones over which a coastal state may exercise
37. Manimzzaman, 'Bangladesh in 1976; Struggle for Survival as an Independent State', 
Asian Survev. Vol XVII, No. 2, February 1977, p. 121.
36. The Continental Shelf of a coastal state is the sea bed and sub soil of the sub marine 
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its 
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.
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exclusive economic rights. According to international convention a state is 
entitled to prescribe the conventionally accepted sea zones to their entirety. 
Under the Law of Sea (LOS) Convention, unilateral apportioning of sea 
zones is not possible if, as a result of geographical constraints, prescribing 
the sea zones by one coastal state m eans encroachment of other coastal 
states' sea zones. This applies when two coastal states are adjacent or 
opposite to each other and available breadth of the sea zone is narrow. In 
such cases the convention suggests that the sea zones be delimited through 
bilateral agreement. Every sea zone of Bay of Bengal requires to be 
delimited by the coastal states. To the North of the Bay lies Bangladesh and 
adjacent to Bangladesh are India and Burma. Indian coast lies to the west 
and northw est while Burmese coast to the east. Again, opposite to 
Bangladesh, i.e. to its south in the bay are the Indian islands of Andaman 
and Nicobar. The location of the neighbouring states pose considerable 
difficulty for Bangladesh to prescribe its sea zones. In addition to the 
geographic constraints, as mentioned earlier, the delimitation of Bangladesh- 
India borders was further complicated by the Indian stand on the principle 
to be adopted for the settlement of the dispute. Bangladesh inherited 
unresolved maritime borders from Pakistan. Although border delimitation 
was incomplete when Bangladesh got its independence, the Awami League 
government did not consider it to be important enough to initiate discussion 
immediately. This was reflected in the high level governmental interaction 
between the two states. For examples, the joint communiqués issued at the 
end of Mujib's visit to Calcutta in February, 1972, or Mrs. Gandhi's visit to 
Dhaka in March 1972 or at the end of several foreign ministerial visits in 1972 
and 1973 did not mention anything about the border issues. The Awami 
League government perceived that Bangladesh's territorial sovereignty was 
secured because it was surrounded by 'friendly' India. The issues of
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maritime boundary delimitation did not receive attention until 1974 when 
Bangladesh took the initiative to explore petroleum resources in the Bay of 
Bengal. Based on a report of cabinet sub committee in late 1973, Bangladesh 
decided to go ahead with oil exploration in its territorial waters. It then 
became necessary first to enact maritime legislation. On February 1974, the 
territorial waters and maritime zone act was enacted. This act was 
promulgated before the second session of the UNCLOS III. As authorized by 
this act, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on April 15,1974 that the 
country would exercise the 12 n.m limit for the territorial sea and 200 n.m for 
the EEZ measuring from the b a s e lin e s .39 The baseline was determined by 
using depth method at 10 fathom line on the admiralty chart. Meanwhile, in 
April same year, Bangladesh approached India for talks. However, 
Bangladesh did not receive any response from the Indian side. On the basis 
of its own definition of the maritime boundaries, Bangladesh decided to 
proceed with the task of drawing up contracts with foreign oil companies for 
offshore drilling. Six Oil Companies (three American companies-Union Oil, 
Atlantic Richfield and Ashland; a Canadian subsidiary of an American 
company, Canadian superior; a Japanese Consortium, Japan Petroleum 
Development Corporation and a Yugoslav company) were granted contracts 
to explore oil on behalf of Bangladesh.40 In November 1974, India sent a 
protest note against Bangladesh's enactment of legislation on territorial 
waters stating that Bangladesh's claim of jurisdiction over territorial waters 
cut into twenty-one miles of Indian territory.^i Around the same time, upon 
discovering that Bangladesh had already finalized contracts with the oil
39. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Circular No. LT-1/3/74, p. 1.
40. Hassan, Op. Cit.. p. 222.
41. Financial Times. 22 November 1974.
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companies, India agreed to discuss the boundary issue with Bangladesh. As 
a result five rounds of negotiations took place between November 1974 to 
May 1975 and the parties failed to reach an agreement. It may be noted here 
that the Awami League governm ent was removed from power through a 
military coup on August 1975 and could not continue further negotiations. 
While these negotiations were in progress the exploration work of an 
American company (Ashland Oil) was stopped by forceful intervention of an 
Indian naval ship in the area. Franda wrote,
Even while the so-called fifth round of talks looked promising, optimism 
evaporated when the Indian navy physically prevented an American oil 
company vessel from exploring on bdialf of Bangladesh, a disputed 
area. 42
The maritime boundary dispute basically involved three aspects. The first 
two relate to the basis of delimitation while the third involved the newly 
emerging island i.e. South Talpatty, in the estuary of the Haribhanga river on 
the border between the two countries. Bangladesh favoured equitable' 
principle while India insisted on 'equidistance' principle as a basis for 
delimitation of the maritime zones, i.e. Territorial Sea, EEZ and Continental 
Shelf. According to the equidistance formula any point on the line 
delimiting boundaries m ust be at same distance from the nearest points of 
the appropriate baseline on the coast. The concave nature of Bangladeshi 
coast implied that the equidistant line dividing the sea zones moved towards 
the south easterly direction from the edge of the land boundary. As the 
equidistance formula denied Bangladesh thousands of square miles of the 
sea that it might expect, it held that a line was to be drawn toward the south
42. Franda, Marcus, Bangladesh: The First Decade. New Delhi, 1982, p. 132.
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from the edge of the land boundary. Thus the disputed sea zone lay within 
the angle formed by the south bound line (as prescribed by Bangladesh) and 
south east bound line (as prescribed by India). Bangladesh argued its case 
on the ground that the 'equidistant' formula did not take into account the 
specific geographic features of the bay and thereby cannot ensure equity.
The application of equidistance method under the UNCLOS III convention is 
far from satisfactory. One expert in the area wrote,
The 1958 Geneva Conventions are of very limited help to the 
parties confronting the delimitation issue (Article 12 of the 
convention on the Territorial sea and the Contiguous Zone 43 and 
Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf ^ ) . During 
the Geneva Conference, delimitation was discussed in the context 
of narrow belt of territorial sea or of a continental shelf of 200 
meters. It was from this perspective that the equidistance method 
zvas applied. But this method is not even remotely applicable to all 
situations, in particular when greater distances such as the 200 
n.m, EEZ or Continental Shelf up to the outer edge of the 
continental margin are involved. The shortcomings are 
insignificant near the coast but can become monumental far 
offshore.^^
43. UN DOC. A/CO NF. 13/L.52.
44. UN DOC. A /C O N F 13/L.55.
45. Rahman, Habibur, 'Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries', Asian Survev.Vol. XXIV, 
No.l2, December 1984, p. 1305.
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Bangladesh ci ted the 1969 judgment of the International Court of Justice in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf (NSCS) cases^^ involving West Germany, 
the N etherlands and Denmark. W hen the North Sea delim itation 
agreements between the UK and the Netherlands in 1%5, between the UK 
and Denmark in 1966 and, in particular, between the Netherlands and 
Denmark in 1966 were completed. West Germany emerged with a small 
share of the continental shelf in relation to its size, economic importance and 
the length of its coast line. As opposite states, the parties to each 
delimitation agreement apportioned the continental shelf on the basis of 
equidistance principle. The differences of view between the parties arose 
when the Netherlands and Denmark, w ithout Germany's participation, 
agreed to achieve lateral delimitation of the outer area of the shelf up to the 
median line with UK on the basis of equidistance. The lateral delimitation 
as agreed by the Netherlands and Denmark was rejected by Germany. 
Although Germany was a signatory to the Geneva Convention, it did not 
ratify it. Therefore, it protested that boundaries based on equidistance 
principle, as prescribed by the convention could not be forced on it. 
Germany claimed that it was entitled to a 'just and equitable share' of the 
continental shelf, in proportion to the length of its coast line or sea frontage. 
The geographical factor, i.e., Germany's concave coast line and the flanking 
of the German coast by the Dutch and the Danish coasts, made the results of 
the equidistant rule inequitable.^^ Mason wrote.
46. Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Netherlands, ICJ, General List, Nos. 51 and 52, February 20,1969.
47. Mason, C.M, and Bimie P.W., Oil and Gas: The International Regime’, in Mason, 
C.M.,(ed.), The Effective Management of Resources: The International Politics of the 
North Sea. Frances Pinter Ltd. London, 1979, p. 35.
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The root of the problem was the concave configuration of the long 
German coast line, which describes an angle of approximately 100^ 
in the Elbe estuary area; this would mean, if equidistance was 
applied between each pair of the three neighbouring states, that 
Germany would be hemmed in (by the intersection of the 
equidistance lines between Germany and Denmark to the north, 
and Germany and the Netherlands to the south) to a sector of the 
North Sea shelf disproportionately small in comparison with the 
length of her coastline and those of her neighbours.^
The parties failed to agree upon a common principle for the delimitation. 
The matter was then referred through a special agreement in February 1967 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) so that it can decide on a principle 
that might be adopted by the disputants as a basis for negotiating the 
boundaries between them. The court held that the use of equidistant method 
was not obligatory. This was because West Germany had not ratified the 
convention or otherwise accepted it and equidistance had not become a 
customary rule of international law. The court further held that in reaching 
an agreement the concerned parties were obliged to 'meaningfully' negotiate 
(i.e., in conformity to the general principles of international law) and that the 
agreement thus reached should conform 'equitable principles' taking into 
account all the circumstances of the case.
To achieve equity, the court suggested that, among other things, the 
geographic configuration of the coast, its special or unusual features and the 
geological features could be taken into consideration.^^ The negotiations that
48. Ibid. p. 37.
49, Ibid. p. 37.
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followed the court's decisions enabled West Germany to secure 11900 square 
kilometers (about 5000 square kilometers from the former Dutch claim and 
7000 square kilometers from Denmark) of the continental shelf in the North 
Sea.
The West German case bears considerable similarity with Bangladesh's 
circumstances both in terms of the configuration of the coast line i.e. concave 
and the legal standing i.e. although Bangladesh was a signatory to the 
UNCLOS III it did not ratify it. Hence, to the Bangladeshi government, the 
NSCS cases offered strong support for their claiming in the Bay of Bengal.
The second aspect of disagreement between India and Bangladesh concerned 
the principle for the determination of base line. The base line delineation is a 
fundamental starting point for the delimitation of maritime zones. It forms 
the line of reference on the coast (or adjacent to it) from which the outer 
limits of all the sea zones i.e. Territorial Sea, EEZ and Continental Shelf are 
measured. According to the 1958 convention on the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone, a 'normal' base line is normally the coast itself; more 
specifically, the low water line along the coast.
Bangladesh rejected the concept of a baseline developed in terms of low- 
w ater m ark on the ground that the geographical, geological and 
geomorphological characteristics of the Bangladeshi coast ( and its adjacent 
bay) do not permit the adoption of such a line. Instead, it subscribed to the 
logic of the judgment of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case of 1951.50 
case provided the basis for the formulation of 'straight' base line^^ which was
50. United Kingdom v. Norway, ICT. General List. N o .5 ,18 December, 1951.
51. Independent of low- water marks, a straight base-line is drawn (by joining the 
appropriate points on the coast) where the coast is deeply indented or cut into or 
fringed with islands in its immediate vicinity.
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later adopted by the 1958 Geneva Convention. In this case the International 
Court of Justice underscored that geographic realities and the local 
conditions were to be taken into account in determining base lines. The court 
gave effect to Norway's claim that the adoption of straight line method was 
based on considerations related to geographic conditions prevailing on the 
Norwegian coast and the safeguarding of the vital interests of the inhabitants 
of the northern most parts of the country.52 Most of Bangladesh constitute 
one integrated river basin with an area of plains. The mighty rivers, that 
flow from the Himalayas carry down to the Bay of Bengal a colossal 
discharge of silt. Heavy monsoon rainfall, cyclonic storms, and tidal surges, 
together with the silt, have contributed to a continuous process of erosion 
and shoaling both on land and in the river estuary.53
Bangladesh's coast line is concave, unstable, broken and irregular. Added to 
these is the presence of numerous river deltas and islands in the bay. The 
coastline shifts constantly as a result of ongoing formations in the river 
estuary. As Rahman stated: The effects of erosion and shoaling have been 
monumental:
1. The estuary of Bangladesh is such that no stable water 
line or landward or seaward demarcation exists,
2. The continual process of alluvion and sedim entation 
forms mudbanks, and the area is so shallow only small 
boats can navigate it,
52. Rahman, Habibur, Op.Cit.. p. 1304.
53. Ibid.. p. 1306.
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3. The navigable channels through the aforesaid banks 
continually change course and require soundings to 
establish these demarcations.54
In the absence of identifiable fixed land points Bangladesh found the low 
tide mark as inappropriate. Taking into account the peculiar geographical, 
geological and geomorphological characteristics of its coastal region and the 
aspects of economic dependency of coastal inhabitants, Bangladesh 
perceived the depth method (of determining base point) as right and fitting 
to its local requirements. 55
Thus, Bangladesh drew  its base line at ten fathoms that extended 16 to 30 
miles from the coast l in e .56 Table 5.2 shows the base points, fixed by 
Bangladesh, that were successively joint in straight lines to obtain the base 
line.
T ab le  5.2 D e p th -m e th o d  B ase lin es  D ra w n  by  B an g lad esh
Baseline Points Geographical Latitude Coordinate Longitude
No. 1 21° 12' 00" N 89° 06' 45" E
No. 2 21° 15’ 00" N 89° 16' 00" E
No. 3 21° 29' 00" N 89° 36' 00" E
No. 4 21° 21' 00" N 89° 55' 00" E
N o.5 21° IT 00" N 89° 33' 00" E
No. 6 21° 07' 30" N 91° 06' 00" E
No. 7 21° 10' 00" N 91° 56' 00" E
No. 8 20° 21' 45" N 92° 17' 30" E
Source : Ministry of Foreign Affairs Circular No. LT-1/3/74.
54. Ibid.. p. 1310.
55. Ibid., p. 1307
56. The Bangladesh Observer, (ed.), 9 May, 1977.
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Disregarding Bangladesh's peculiar coastal features, India rejected the 
Bangladeshi formulation of the base points. Franda wrote,
By early April 1975, Dacca (Dhaka) seemed to have accepted the 
'equidistant line', but talks broke down later over identification of 
'base points'. International precedents on demarcation of 'base 
points ' vary so widely that they offer little help. ^
The third aspect of the dispute on the maritime boundary issue between 
Bangladesh and India relate to the ownership of a new born island in the 
river estuaries. The Haribhanga river, as it empties into the bay, splits in 
several channels. The boundary between the two countries is the mid stream 
of the main channel of Haribhanga river. The disputed island is in the 
estuary of the border river Haribhanga and the Bangladesh's internal river 
Raimangal. Most probably the island was formed after the cyclone and tidal 
bore of 1970 and initially rising as a low-tide elevation.^s In 1978, its 
approximate area at low tide was two square miles. Although the island was 
then uninhabited, fishermen from Bangladeshi mainland were seen during 
the dry season. The controversy regarding the actual flow of the main stream 
of Haribhanga river led to overlapping claims of ownership of the island by 
the two countries. The stream, which Bangladesh claimed to be main 
channel of the river, passed southward flowing through the west of the 
island, thus suggesting that the island was Bangladesh's territory. On the 
contrary, India claimed that the main channel flowed through the east of the
57. Franda, Op. Cit.. p. 132.
58. Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 18 September, 1981, p. 31090.
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island suggesting that the island was Indian territory^^. Although the 
dispute was concerned with matters of fact (which could have been 
ascertained by a joint survey^ of the area) rather than of a principle, the 
negotiations that took place did not yield a settlement. There were wide 
spread public demonstrations, protests and all out strikes led by opposition 
parties all over the country against Indian claim of territorial waters, its 
display of naval power and its rejection of the plan for equitable sharing of 
the Bay of Bengal.
Bangladesh perceived its stand as vital to its physical and economic survival. 
As far as physical survival is concerned Bangladesh considered Indian claim 
as an infringement of Bangladesh's territorial integrity. This is because a 
realization of the Indian claim would deny Bangladesh its rights over the 
territories which it considered as belonging to it if equity in delimitation was 
ensured. The economic significance of the Bay of Bengal to Bangladesh can 
hardly be overemphasized. The bay and the river estuaries are important 
sources of various kind of fish. There are extensive fishing grounds in the 
northern zone of the bay. Fish such as 'Hilsa', a major food of the 
Bangladeshi people, migrate from the coastal bay to the river estuaries and 
the inland rivers for breeding. The people in the coastal belt sustain their 
lives and earn living through fishing. The country depends on its fishery 
resources for foreign exchange.^^ The bay is the only sea approach through 
which Bangladesh can have access to the rest of the world. Bangladesh's
59. Rahman, Habibur, 'Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries: Some Pertinent Issues for 
Bangladesh*, in Hassan and Kabir (ed.) Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh 
Foreign Policy. Bangladesh Society for International Studies, 1987, p. 115.
60. Later in 1979, Bangladesh proposed a joint survey and India agreed. However, India 
subsequently began to frustrate it by adopting delaying tactics. (See Rahman).
61. FAQ Trade Yearbook. 1980, p. 331.
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international trade and commerce is entirely depended on the sea routes 
through this channel. The Bay of Bengal is also very rich in seaweed and 
minerals. The resource potential of the continental shelf in terms of oil and 
gas deposits is also very high. According to J. Morgan, 'the Bay of Bengal 
should be ideal places for oil reservoirs if such deposits have been preserved 
in ancient rocks.' Commenting on the delimitation dispute between 
Bangladesh and India Franda noted: "... the disputed area could potentially 
have a 10 mile oil bearing belt and is likely to be rich in minerals from 
centuries old Bengal delta sedimentation (10-16 miles in depth) the
absence of any oil and mineral deposits in the Bangladesh's mainland, the 
Bay of Bengal with its resource potential is extremely im portant to its. 
Under the circumstances Bangladesh has to explore and exploit both its 
mineral and food resources in order to save its millions from starvation and 
possible extinction.
To sum up in the words of an eminent Bangladeshi political scientist,
the romantic visions of solidarity created in the Bangladesh liberation 
struggle of 1971 were soon replaced by the widespread fear of 
domination of Bangladesh by an "expansionist" India. ^
On August 15 1975, suddenly and w ithout prior warning, a section of 
Bangladesh army attacked the home of Mujib and killed him as well as all 
his family, with the exception of his two daughters who were out of the 
country at that time.
62. Cited in Shepard, Francis P. Submarine Geology. 3rd edition. New York, 1973,p. 168.
63. Franda, Op.Cit.. p.l33.
64. Maniruzzaman, Talukdar, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath. Bangladesh 
Books International Limited, Dhaka, 1980,p. 163.
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ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESHI BEHAVIOUR : MUJIB REGIME
(1972-1975)
The observation of Bangladeshi behaviour 1972-1975 show that the 
government led by Awami League was, in some instances compliant and in 
others non-compliant The compliant behaviour of Bangladesh during this 
period may be understood in terms of its lack of motivation to defy which 
emanated from condition 2 and condition 3. Further, condition 1 also 
explains why the government was compliant in some instances while non- 
com pliant in others. A summary of the instances of non-complaint 
behaviours their nature (ie., initiative/responsive) along with the condition 
of motivation to defy (i.e. condition 1) and the NTPRs constituting capability 
to resist is provided in Table 5.3. Of the two instances, as shown in Table 5,3 
Bangladesh took the initiative to defy in one and in the other Bangladesh's 
non-compliance was in response to some Indian actions, demands etc. Both 
the instances may be best explained in terms of motivation to defy that
T ab le  5.3 A S u m m ary  of the  In s ta n ce s  o f NCB d u rin g  M ujib  
R eg im e  (1972-1975) a lo n g  w ith  th e  C o n d itio n s  of 
M o tiv a tio n  to  D efy  an d  th e  N T PR s u sed  to  E xplain
th e m .
INSTANCES OF NCB NATURE OF 
NCB
MOTIVATION 
TO DEFY (The 
Conditions )
CAPABIUTY TO 
RESIST 
(The NTPRs)
1. Awami League’s stand on equitable 
distribution of Ganges Water,
Responsive Condition 1 
(Physical and 
Economic 
survival)
People's power.
2 Awami League's stand on its daim  
over maritime boundaries.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Physical and 
Economic 
survival)
People's pxDwer
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sprung from condition 1, i.e., issues perceived vital for survival. The 
underlying issues in these instances were vital for physical and economic 
survival. Furthermore, given the motivation to defy, people's power as a 
constituent power resource of capability to resist offers the explanation of 
Bangladesh's non-compliant behaviours.
Let us explore the conditions, assumptions, contextualities etc. (i.e., policy 
contingencies) in order to understand the behavioural expressions of Awami 
League. A closer examination of the data presented in the foregoing section 
will reveal that during the period from 197%to 1975, the government in 
power did not perceive its relations with India as harmful although it 
disturbed the people of Bangladesh. Mujib's government was largely 
compliant towards India and maintained close relations with it till the very 
end of his (Mujib's) regime. However, it is important to note that while the 
government maintained close relations with India and was largely compliant 
towards it, the element of euphoria in which it was initially immersed into 
was subsequently weaned out by its confrontation with the stark realities of 
survival. Although it remained largely compliant in its relations with India, 
some of its behavioural expressions did not fit into its usual compliant 
pattern. The data will show that the instances of League government's non- 
compliant behaviours tended to cluster towards the end of its regime. 
Awami League's usual lack of motivation to defy explain its overall 
compliant stance. However, at a later stage its motivation vacillated. This 
explains the instances of its governmental non-compliance at this phase 
relating to the sharing of the Ganges Water and Maritime Boundaries. The 
motivation to defy emanated from condition 1 offers best explanation for 
these instances of non-compliance.
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Let us first examine Awami League's dispositions that led to its compliant 
behaviours. The predominant condition that failed to generate motivation to 
defy and thereby led to Awami League's compliance was its political tilt 
towards India. According to Condition 3, the nature of political tilt 
determines whether a ruling party is likely to be motivated to defy. A tilt 
characterized by a political inclination towards the dominant power is not 
likely to generate m otivation to defy and as such lead to compliance. 
Conversely, a tilt characterized by a political disinclination towards the 
dominant power is likely to generate motivation to defy and as such lead to 
non-compliance. Political inclination was defined as a disposition in which a 
ruling party subscribe to a political idea, attitude or view that is congenial to 
dominant power. It sets a friendly environment between the two. Political 
disinclination, on the other hand, was defined as a disposition in which the 
subscribed political idea, attitude or view is not congenial to the dominant 
power. It sets an antagonistic environment between the ruling party of the 
small state and the dom inant power. The following analysis will reveal 
Awami League's political inclination towards India thereby suggesting a 
plausible explanation for its compliant stance.
India was the first country to recognize Bangladesh. It may be mentioned 
here that between April and December 1971, the primary concern of the 
Indira Government and the Provisional Government of Bangladesh was how 
to return the Awami League to power in an independent Bangladesh so that 
both the governments could benefit mutually.
Even before its independence, the Provisional Government of Bangladesh 
which had existed in Calcutta functioned totally at the pleasure of the Indira 
Government and was obliged to be guided by Indian advice. In the absence
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of Sheikh Mu j i b , t h e  Awami League Leadership was weak and submissive 
which helped India in establishing a complete control over the government 
in exile. In the course of the nine-month struggle the bond between the 
Awami League and the Indian government grew further and they developed 
a deeper understanding. The provisional government's dependence on India 
at the time was so complete that it had no bargaining position whatsoever. 
Its only value to India was the promise of a pro-Indian leadership in the 
future Bangladesh in return for India’s favours.
The Awami League government, after independence, set up a parliamentary 
form of government under a document which was modelled largely on that 
of India. Mujib clearly admired the Indian constitution which found its 
expression when in 1972 he declared that Bangladesh would be built on the 
pillars of nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism. Mujib 
resembled India in all government matters. As a western observer wrote in 
fact Bangladesh was less a reflection of India than a caricature o fit.^
Despite the existence of the professional soldiers, Mujib created a new armed 
organization, called the Rakkhi Bahini, which served as a parallel and rival 
group pledged to Mujib rather than to the nation at large. The strength of 
this force was estimated at about 25,000 in January 1975. It is widely 
believed that Mujib created this force at the advice of India who later trained 
the Rakkhi Bahini. It was also dressed in the olive green battle dress of the 
Indian army.
65. On 25 March 1971, Mujib was arrested from his residence by the Pakistan Army and 
was subsequently flown to Pakistan (West Pakistan). He was detained in Pakistani jail 
for the entire period of the liberaticx» war of Bangladesh.
66. Oren, Stephen, After the Bangladesh Coups', The World Today. January, 1976, p. 18.
246
All these bear a clear indication that the Awami League leadership 
subscribed to the political ideology of their Indian mentors. It not only 
adopted the broader political ideology held by their Indian gurus, they also 
subscribed to various Indian policies in the conduct of state affairs. It 
aligned itself with the Indo-Soviet bloc and India's friends became 
Bangladesh's friends as well. In addition the Awami League subscribed to 
the Indian view that Bangladesh did not require strong defence forces and 
that the Bangladeshi economy and the economies of the Indian states 
adjacent to Bangladesh were complementary.
Apart from inclination in terms of political ideology and views, the Awami 
League had a congenial attitudinal tilt towards India. Since India was 
instrum ental in the creation of Bangladesh, Mujib's Awami League 
governm ent had to content itself with an Indian presence. After its 
independence the attitude of the decision makers of Bangladesh towards 
India was one of profound gratitude. They owed a personal debt to the 
Indian Government for sustenance during the nine months of liberation war. 
They felt that the minimum Bangladesh could do in return for Indian moral 
and material support in the liberation war was to offer the continued and 
whole hearted friendship of Bangladesh. These sentiments were also present 
in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. While on his way back from Pakistani prison 
via London India offered its Air India Jet to carry him home to Bangladesh. 
But Mujib refused. As has been reported, Mujib said that he owed too much 
to India and therefore it was advisable to strive for some balance. He took a 
British Air Force Comet.^^
67. Far Eastern Economic Review. 22 January, 1972.
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Mujib also enjoyed a personal rapport with Indira Gandhi. Their personal 
relations with each other may be described as most cordial and encouraging. 
While coming back home from the Pakistani prison, he had a brief stop over 
at Delhi to thank Indira Gandhi personally. There Mujib described the 
'people of India' as the hest friend of his country' and Mrs. Gandhi, as 'not 
only a leader of men, but also of m ankind '.^  Also during his first official 
visit to India in February 1972, Mujib described 'the friendship between 
India and Bangladesh as everlasting' and that no power on earth will be able 
to make any crack in this friendship'^^. He could not overcome his personal 
dilemma over India. According to one of his Private Secretaries:
Sheikh Sahib was acutely aware of Mrs. Gandhi's all-out help for 
Bangladesh in those dark days. He would often recall how Mrs.
Gandhi had requested many world leaders to intercede on his 
behalf to save him from being hanged by Yahya Khan [when 
Mujib was a prisoner] in Pakistan.'^^
The news of Mujib's assassination was received in the Indian political system 
with great shock and dismay. His tragic fall from power was indeed a 
political loss for India not only in the sphere of its foreign relation in Asia but 
also because India knew very well that in the prevailing state of affairs in 
Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujib was the last resort for India to retain its hold, to 
whatever extent, on Bangladesh. At a memorial meeting in New Delhi, after 
Mujib's assassination on 25 August, Mrs. Gandhi described him, "as a great
68. Bangladesh Documents. Vol.l, No.l, Dhaka; External Publicity Division, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1972, p. 2.
69. Bangabandhu Speaks: A Collection of Speeches and Statements made bv Shiekh 
Muiibur Rahman. Dhaka: External Publicity Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,p. 33.
70. Quoted from Hassan, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Australian National University, Op. 
Cit. p. 261.
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national leader and statesman whom  people in India held in deep respect 
and affection."71
Thus to the Awami League governm ent the Treaty of Friendship 
Cooperation and Peace, did not constitute a threat to Bangladesh's survival 
physically, economically or politically. Similarly, the trade treaty was also 
not regarded as a threat to Bangladesh's economy because it believed that 
Bangladesh and its adjacent Indian economies were complimentary therefore 
Bangladesh could benefit from the treaty. These issues were not perceived 
by the Awami league as vital and as such was not regarded to be threatening 
to the survival of Bangladesh.
Mujib also lacked ambition, a condition that is likely to generate the 
motivation to defy. It appears that all his dreams and aspirations were 
realized with the creation of Bangladesh. His life long struggle was to set 
Bangladesh free from the exploitation of the Pakistani regime. This struggle 
culminated in the liberation w ar and the dream was realized on the 
achievement of independence. The post independence period of his life was 
as if a time for him to dwell in his 'dream come true' world. Mujib was no 
longer an ordinary party worker of his early career nor was he a political 
agitator of the mid sixties. To millions of Bangladeshis (including of course 
his party followers) he transcended the limits of his ordinariness and became 
one of those great leaders that time had ever produced. The nation called 
him 'Banga Bandhu' (Friend of Bengal) and made him the Father of the 
Nation. Immediately after independence, he achieved the stature of a 
mythical figure and a legendary character. Although his image was stained 
by the end of his regime, his actions and words were initially regarded as
71. Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 1975,p. 27383.
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somewhat 'divine*. People obeyed him because it was him who said or did 
something. At this state of saturation there was nothing for him to seek; his 
ambition was realized; Bangladesh was freed from the exploitation of 
Pakistan. He became what he wanted to become-a leader of a nation free 
from the clutches of the Pakistani rulers. Actually his past image carried him 
through but not for long. In the new circumstances i.e., after independence 
he lacked direction. This was reflected in the policies he adopted. For 
example, socialism was incorporated as a state principle in the constitution 
of Bangladesh but the measures taken to implem ent socialism was half 
hearted. The industries which were abandoned by the Pakistani owners 
were to be taken care of. So the government took the charge by nationalizing 
them. Nationalization was labeled as a socialistic measure, while in fact, all 
social, political and economic structures of pre-independence Bangladeshi 
society (which operated within a framework of capitalism) were retained. 
Market m echanism operated and land reforms in line with socialistic 
principles did not take place. The lack of direction also indicate Mujib’s lack 
of ambition.
The foregoing analysis point out that Awami League was politically inclined 
tow ards India and hence, did not perceive the issues as jeopardizing 
Bangladesh’s survival. The leadership also lacked ambition. These 
conditions failed to generate motivation to defy help explain Awami League 
Governments' usual compliant stand towards India.
Having said that, the logical question that surfaces in mind is that how can 
the failure to reach agreement in matters of water sharing and maritime 
boundary delim itation be explained. If Bangladesh Government was 
com pliant it would have swallowed whatever India had placed on the 
negotiating table and the agreements could have been concluded. But as far
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as the data suggest that was not the case. It may be recalled here from the 
preceding section that these negotiations took place between 1974-1975. The 
agreements had not been reached because the Awami League government 
was not entirely compliant at these phase. By this time there were certain 
changes in the policy contingencies. The post independence euphoria 
evaporated considerably. The earlier agreements (particularly trade) with 
India just after independence began taking their tolls on the economy of 
Bangladesh increasing the magnitude of people's suffering. The government 
came under intense public pressure increasingly due to anti-Indian feeling. 
The governm ent started to take on board some perceptions that people 
considered vital for Bangladesh's survival. Once commenting on the North 
Sea Continental Shelf case, Mason wrote,
There is said to have been a strong undercurrent of anti-German 
public opinion in Denmark and the Netherlands which made it 
impossible for the Danish and Dutch governments to do anything 
which could have been construed as an unjustified concession to 
Germany 7^
Similarly, the Awami League Government was obliged not to ignore 
people's perception entirely in its handling of issues such as water sharing 
and m aritim e boundary delimitation. For Awami League this was a 
dilemma. On the one hand it was inclined towards its ally, and on the other 
it began to realize the issues as vital for survival. As a m atter of fact, its 
motivation to defy vacillated between political inclination and perception of 
vitalness making it at times compliant and at others non-compliant.
72. Bimie and Mason, Op. Cit.. p. 24
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Mujib's behavioural expressions bear an interesting similarity with those of 
the European governments behaviours demonstrated in their relations with 
the EEC 73 These European governments were formally committed to 
comply to EEC regulations just as Mujib was inclined towards India. 
European governments' non-compliance emanated from their population's 
perceptions of violation of vital interests just as Mujib's non-compliance 
generated from people's perception of violation of their vital interests. First 
let us consider the issue of water sharing.
The help and assistance extended by India in the Liberation struggle of 
Bangladesh, notwithstanding in pursuance of its own political interests, 
became a liability for the decision-makers of Bangladesh in their handling of 
the Ganges issue. The Awami League government's political inclination 
towards India is clearly evident in its handling of the water problem with 
India. The Ad hoc Agreement on the Ganges in 1975 is an example. Without 
settling the more urgent question of how to share the existing dry season 
flow of the river, the League government conceded to the operation of the 
barrage. Bangladesh Observer stated:
The agreement will not disturb the discussions regarding the 
allocation of fair weather flows of the Ganges during the lean 
months as was envisaged in the Prime Minister's declaration of 
May 1974..74
But as one authority pointed out "in that agreement, Bangladesh lost what it 
had gained in previous agreements, that India should not take a unilateral
73. Puchala, D., 'Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonization in the European 
Communities', World Politics. Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1975, p. 496-520.
74. Bangladesh Observer. 19 April, 1975.
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decision to commission the Barrage. The new Agreement apparently 
ensured the lion's share for Bangladesh, but it was only for 41 days. After 
that India withdrew water from the river to the fullest capacity of the feeder 
canal for as many days as it needed. It was not at all a solution rather a stage 
was set for further complications to develop. "75
Bangladesh Awami League was long blamed for making such a flawed 
contract with India. It surrendered to India's pressure without exploiting its 
good terms with India to make it agree to some kind of sharing arrangement 
before commissioning the barrage. As Ben Crow in his unpublished 
dissertation observes. There was a long window in Indo-Bangladesh relations 
between 1972 and 1974175; but there was little progress in the disputeJ^ A 
spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Bangladesh raised a resentful 
voice against Dr. Kamal Hossain's (who was then the foreign minister of 
Bangladesh) claim of credit for winning 44,000 cusecs of the Canga and said,
" it has been necessary to put the records straight that
on the 18th April 1975, for the first time, Bangladesh 
surrendered institutionally its legal and inalienable to the 
entire flows of the lower reaches of the Ganga. This has 
bound the hands of the subsequent negotiators in 
effectively negotiating the sharing of water of the 
Ganga. "77
75. Khurshida Begum, Op. Cit. p. 112.
76. Crow, B., 'Politics and Technology of Sharing the Ganges', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis 
Universitiy of Edinburgh, 1980.
77. The Bangladesh Observer. 23 August, 1984.
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Despite the W orld Bank's readiness to assist the tw o countries in 
augmentation of the Ganges water in whatever manner possible, Mujib 
acquiesced in the Indian desire to keep third parties uninvolved in bilateral 
problems.
However, Mujib's government also perceived the water issue as vital as it 
threatened Bangladesh's survival physically and economically. His 
government was aware of the dangers to Bangladesh's agriculture from the 
decrease in water supply during the dry season although it stated that it was 
a Technical' problem. It may be said that despite having an inclination 
towards India, the awareness of vitalness led it to send protest note to New 
Delhi for its breach of the contract India unilaterally withdrew water from 
the river after the interim agreement had expired. On the question of 
augmentation, although Bangladesh acceded to India to keep third parties 
uninvolved, it did turn down Indian proposal for building link canal. 
Because the link canal proposal (which will be discussed in detail in the 
subsequent phase) was considered detrimental to Bangladesh's interests. 
Besides, Awami League also displayed a low level of enthusiasm at the 
inauguration of the Farakka project on the 21 May 1975 by cancelling the 
visit of Mujib's Water Resources Minister, Abdur Rab Semeabat who was 
invited to be present on that occasion.78 Finally, the failure to reach long 
term agreement was indicative of Bangladesh's insistence of an equitable 
share of water which Bangladesh perceived as vital to its survival.
A similar dilemma may also be observed in the negotiations regarding the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries. In this case too the Awami League 
maintained its disposition of inclination, at the same time it also considered
78. Franda, M., 'Indo-Bangladesh Relations', American Universities Field Staff Reports. 
South Asia Series, XIX, 16 September, 1975.
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the issues as vital. Its insistence of equitable principle and the 10 fathom 
base-line indicate the perception of vitalness. However, at a later stage, it 
acceded the Indian demand for delimitation on the basis of equidistance 
principle. It may be inferred that such acceptance resulted from its 
disposition of inclination.
The foregoing analysis illustrate that in the absence of conditions of 
motivation to defy such as disinclination of the ruling party or ambition on 
the part of the leadership, the perception of vitalness offers the best 
explanation for w hatever non-com pliant behaviour Awami League 
government demonstrated.
It will be recalled from the earlier discussions that for a state to be non- 
compliant, in addition to the motivation to defy, it must have the capability 
to resist. According to our contextual framework, non-tangible power 
resources such as leadership strength, external political support, geopolitical 
leverage and people's power constitute the capability to resist. According to 
the framework, capability to resist is strong non-compliance is likely to 
follow but when this capability is weak or non-existent non-compliance is 
not likely to follow. In these instances NTPRs such as leadership strength, 
external political support and geo political leverage did not appear to have 
contributed towards Awami League's non-compliance. Sheikh Mujib was 
immersed with profound gratitude towards India for its help in the 
liberation struggle of Bangladesh and also for her efforts to free him from the 
Pakistani jail. His mystique as a great leader certainly suffered by his 
subordination to India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. It was Mujib's 
dependence on India that prevented him from capitalising on his extensive 
popularity. Therefore, the elements of assertiveness in his personality was 
missing when it involved India. Bangladesh during Mujib's period, was also
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entirely Indo-centric, hence, Awami League failed to secure political support 
from the world at large. Finally, unlike Nepal, Bangladesh does not possess 
any leverage arising out of its geographic location. The only plausible source 
of non-tangible power was its people's pressure. It was mentioned before 
that there were strong anti-Indian feeling among the members of public on 
the sharing of the Ganges Water and Maritime Boundary issues. It may be 
interpreted that Awami League's defiance on these issues have been backed 
by public pressure. Hence, people's power (constituting capability to resist) 
seems to have worked with the perception of vitalness of issues ( a condition 
generating motivatio to defy) to yield the governmental non-compliance in 
this phase.
ZIA REGIME (1975-1981)
The period from 15 August to 7 November 1975 was one of political 
instability and uncertainty in Bangladesh. After Mujib's assassination 
Martial law was declared and the new governm ent was formed under 
Mushtaque Ahmed. On 3 November 1975, an abortive counter coup was 
staged by Brigadier Khaled Mushharaf, who was believed to be an Indian 
protégé. He was killed in the ensuing battle which was followed by a 
revolutionary mutiny. After a series of rebellions, power passed to Major 
General Ziaur Rahman ?9on 7 November 1975. Bangladesh's parliament
79. Ziaur Rahman was a major in the East Bengal Regiment. On March 27,1971, Zia made 
the announcement of the independence of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong. During 
the Liberartion War he fonned the Z forces. After independence he was supposed to 
be the army Chief of Staff, but Mujibur Rahman appointed Major General K. Shafiullah 
who was junior to Zia instead to that post. Marcus Franda points out that the main 
reason for not appointing Zia to the post was that on March 27 1971, Zia declared 
himself the President of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong. Zia's ambitious nature 
was not liked by Mujib
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was abolished and no political parties were permitted to operate in the 
immediate aftermath of the countercoup. It was not until Zia established his 
authority did Bangladesh get any scope to interact with the outside world.
The change was definitely not pleasant for India, who looked on all these 
events in Bangladesh with great uneasiness. As Times of India quoted an 
Indian foreign ministry spokesman,
India had been watching with considerable anxiety the complicated 
situation which has developed in Bangladesh ... the developments in 
Bangladesh are its domestic affairs but India cannot remain indifferent 
and unconcerned about developments taking place there.^
Colin Legum of The Observer (London) reported that since the coup that 
killed Mujib there were Indian military movements along the Bangladesh 
border.3i
In general, relations with India took a turn for the worse with Mujib's death, 
bu t genuine tensions did not emerge until the Zia regim e began to 
consolidate its power. India started providing asylum to the supporters of 
Sheikh Mujib including Kader Siddiqui who fled to India immediately after 
the August coup of 1975. India also opened camps along the border and 
trained and arm ed the Bangladeshi dissidents for guerilla warfare and 
subversion. These dissidents with Indian training began to launch armed 
raids on border post with the support of the Indian Border Security Force.®^
80. Times of India. 8 November 1975.
81. Cited in Qiowdhurv. Iftekhar Ahmed. Bangladesh's External Relations: The Strategy of 
a Small Power in a Subsystem. Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Australian National 
University, 1980.
82. Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, Op.Cit. p. 2Ô1.
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There were reports of skirmishes between Indian and Bangladeshi forces on 
their mutual frontier.
In the meantime, in order to further bolster his authority, Zia announced an 
amendment to the Bangladesh constitution, which shifted the country from 
its status as a secular nation to that describing it as an Islamic state. He 
declared, Bangladesh is keen to strengthen relations with the Muslim countries of 
the world with which it has religious, historical and cultural ties. The 
deterioration in Indo-Bangladesh relation was also advanced by the speed 
with which Pakistan moved to recognize the Zia government Pakistan not 
only recognized the new governm ent but also urged the other Muslim 
countries to do so. Islam was raised as a force drawing Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and the Muslim countries together. There were exchange of ambassadors 
between Bangladesh and Pakistan and emphasis was placed on maximizing 
economic cooperation without minimizing political independence. In May 
1976, they signed a three year trade agreement. Zia then moved to develop 
close ties with the Arab Muslim world and received recognition and 
substantial economic assistance. Several economic and goodwill delegations 
were exchanged with the Muslim countries and a number of agreements 
were signed.
The new opening to Pakistan also brought the Chinese into Bangladesh. On 
31 August, 1975 China recognized Bangladesh. A Chinese diplomatic 
mission was opened in Dhaka on 23 January 1976 and the Bangladeshi 
mission in Beijing operated on 19 January the same year well in advance of 
the restoration of Sino-Indian diplomatic relations. India was disturbed by 
the thought of a hostile Bangladesh, which in league with China and 
Pakistan, might exploit conditions in India's turbulent northeast quadrant. 
China and Bangladesh also signed a two year trade and payment agreement
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envisaging a greater volume of imports and exports between the countries. 
China also sent a technical delegation to Bangladesh to assist it with small 
irrigation projects.
India was clearly unhappy with the developments in Bangladesh. In April 
1976, there were renewed hostilities on the Indo-Bangladesh border. One of 
these incidents was on April 19, in Meghalaya in which the Director General 
of the Indian Border Security Force was seriously injured®^.
At the same time Bangladesh reopened the Farakka Barrage problem. Mujib 
and Indira Gandhi had arrived at a tentative agreement over the question of 
how to manage the distribution of the Ganges waters in 1974, but India 
violated it, thus further antagonizing Bangladesh. With Mujib gone and the 
anti-Indian sentiment rising, the issue was not only revived but it became a 
cause celehre. After 1975, the Farakka Barrage dispute became more than 
simply a test of Indo-Bangladeshi relations.
In November 1975, Bangladesh charged that India was again diverting water 
a t Farakka and that, because of abnorm ally low water levels in 1975, 
Bangladesh faced serious drought, navigation and salinity problems. Far 
Eastern Economic Review commented that India's water diversion, coupled 
w ith unusually dry conditions in 1975, created enormous difficulties for 
parts of Bangladesh fed by the Ganges.®^ With the dry season approaching, 
decision was taken in December 1975 by the new government to send a 'note 
of protest' to India. And actually a series of strong protests were sent to 
India; one on January 15, 1976 and the second on 18 February 1976.^5 The
83. Far Eastern Economic Review. 7 May, 1976,p. 9.
84. Far Eastern Economic Review. 23 April, 1976, p. 35.
85. Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 15 October, 1976.
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letter written by B. M. Abbas, President's adviser on flood control, irrigation 
and power stated that 'the low water levels of the Ganges in Bangladesh has 
been affecting river condition and causing adverse consequences in
Bangladesh'.36
But India outrightly denied the charge of unilateral withdrawal from the 
river after the scheduled period and said, "The April 1975 agreement was 
limited to the lean season of the same year ... . There was, therefore, no 
question of agreeing on the withdrawal of water after the lean months which 
is a period of plenty and floods "
Bangladesh pointed out that "India continued with unabated unilateral 
withdrawal during March, April, May- a period considered by itself as 'lean' 
and requiring equitable apportionm ent ... w ithout the consent of 
Bangladesh in complete disregard of its rights on the waters of the Ganges 
and without disclosing the quantum  of such w ithdraw al" . a  Delhi 
spokesman expressed "astonishment at the extraordinary and wholly 
unjustified demand that any withdrawal during any part of the year at 
Farakka or even further upstream, should be subject to prior approval of the 
Government of Bangladesh."®^
Rear Admiral M. H. Khan, Chief of the Bangladesh Navy and principal 
spokesman on the Ganges issue said,
if India did not take an intransigent attitude the question could be 
settled amicably. If almost one-third of Europe had no problem with the
86. Abbas, Op. Cit. p. 47.
87. Deadlodc on the Ganges, Government of Bangladesh, p. 3.
88. The Times. 19 February, 1976.
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Danube, why should friendly countries like India and Bangladesh have 
any with the water of the Ganges? It was accepted international 
practice that an upper riparian should consult the lower riparian on 
intended action to interfere with the flow of water in the river7^
The impact of withdrawal of Ganges water in the different sectors of public 
economy compelled people of Bangladesh in almost all walks of life and 
from all professions to protest against India for its high-handed dealing with 
the water issue. It remained no longer confined to concerned bureaucrats' 
files or records or in the reports of the newspapers. Complaints and protests 
were lodged. Various seminars were held in the country and Farakka protest 
committee was formed. Ttie Bangladesh Supreme Court Bar Association 
followed by protests from different association of lawyers at divisional and 
district level all over the country expressed their concern at India's unilateral 
and arbitrary withdrawal of water from the Ganges.^ Teachers of Rajshahi 
University, Mymensingh agricultural University, Jahangir Nagar University 
and various other teacher's association expressed their anxiety and concern 
over the issue.^^ and the students of Dhaka University as well as other 
Universities abstained from their classes in p r o t e s t . ^ ^  Dhaka University 
Teacher's Association called upon the government to raise the issue in the 
international forums including the UN.^® Leaders of various political parties 
also called upon the Government to take up the issue at the UN and before 
the Third World Forum to mobilize world opinion against India's violation of
89. Far Eastern Economic Review, Op. Cit.. p . 35.
90. The Bangladesh Observer. 28 February, 1976.
91. The Bangladesh Observer. 28 March, 1976.
92. The Bangladesh Observer. 11 April, 1976.
93. The Bangladesh Observer. 13 March, 1976.
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international norms and bilateral agreements.^ The operation of the Farakka 
Barrage was termed as "an act of aggression on the economic sovereignty of 
Bangladesh".^®
One such agitation was initiated by the veteran politician of Bangladesh, 
Maulana Bhashani on May 16, 1976. He organised what has been described 
as the longest procession in living memory in the sub continent. The 
procession was 8 km long and comprised nearly 500,000 people.^® It was a 
silent non-violent march to demonstrate people's demand for the rightful 
share of the Ganges. The long march halted at the border, approximately 25 
miles from where the Ganges divide itself. According to Maulana, his 
intention was not to demolish the million dollar project of India but to launch 
public agitation for Bangladesh's rightful share.^7
When this agitation was building up, Indian premier Indira Gandhi wrote a 
letter to the Maulana hinting that the long march would be provocative. 
Bhashani in his reply pointed out that it was very much a question of 
survival for about 35 million people in the northern districts of the state and 
also reminded her that the tactic he was using was one he had learned from 
her forefathers and Mahatma Gandhi. He also invited her to visit 
Bangladesh and to see for herself the effects of diversion. Maulana Bhashani 
also sent telegrams to Gerald Ford, Kurt Waldheim, Mao and Kosygin stating 
Bangladesh's grievances against India.
94. The Bangladesh Observer. 8 March, 1976.
95. New York Times. 6 October, 1976.
%. New  York Times. 17 May, 1976; Financial Times 18 May, 1976.
97. Holiday. 16 May, 1976.
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Finding the attitude of India uncompromising, the Zia regime took the vital 
Farakka issue before multilateral forums such as the Islamic conference, the 
Commonwealth summit and, the United Nations to intervene diplomatically 
on Bangladesh's behalf. In the 7th Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference 
which took place in Istanbul, Turkey expressed its deep concern over the 
problem. A t the end of the meeting on the 15th of May 1976, the Joint 
Communiqué referred to the economic suffering and hardship of Bangladesh 
caused by the withdrawal of water by India.^®
Before raising the issue to the United Nations, one final round of talks was 
held. Rear admiral M. H. Khan, led the Bangladesh delegation to New Delhi 
in September but failed to reach any agreement because of divergence of 
opinion. Bangladesh wanted augmentation to take place within the Ganges 
basin. India rejected the idea and also refused to accept that Bangladesh had 
a right to veto upstream withdrawals. Besides, they also differed over the 
length of the dry season.^ Finding it hard to negotiate bilaterally with India, 
Bangladesh put the question of India's unauthorized water diversion before 
the September 1976 session of the UN General Assembly. "India cannot 
unilaterally w ithdraw waters from common rivers without due regard to the 
consequences d o w n s t r e a m ' , Bangladesh declared in the United Nations 
General Assembly. Over the protests of India and Soviet Union, Bangladesh 
did manage to add the dispute to the Special Political Committee's agenda. 
However, Bangladesh's efforts failed because of not getting sufficient 
support for its resolution calling on the IBRD and the Secretary General to 
associate themselves with the negotiations and reluctantly adhered to a
98. Khan, Z. A, (ed.) Basic Documents on the Farakka Conspiracy. Dacca, 1976.p. 158.
99. Holiday. 12 September, 1976.
100. New York Times. Op. Cit.
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consensus statem ent announcing the two parties' decision to meet 
"urgently" in Dhaka because of the approach of another dry season.
After returning from the United Nations, talks were resumed between the 
two countries. The first round of talk took place in December 1976 in Dhaka 
with Jagjivan Ram leading the Indian team and Admiral Khan leading 
Bangladesh team. This m eeting was adjourned because India merely 
repeated its earlier position that it would divert water at least 40,000 cusecs 
of the total Ganges water flow of 52,000-55,000 cusecs available during the 
dry season. The talk was resum ed in January 1977 in Dhaka. Ram 
suggested that 50% of the total dry-season flow of the Ganges at Farakka 
was the most India could part with for Bangladesh. Indian proposal was not 
acceptable to Bangladesh because in April alone -one of the driest months- 
Bangladesh needs 49,000 cusecs of Ganges water just for irrigation purpose. 
Indian proposal "was just an attem pt to hoodwink the people by rewording 
the old argument." Upon this Jagjivan Ram adjourned the meeting and 
suggested that the next meeting be held in Delhi so that it would be easier 
for him to talk to the Prime Minister. A month later i.e. in February, M. H. 
Khan led a 12-member delegation to Delhi. Yet no agreement could be 
reached. As Far Eastern Economic Review reports.
Before the Bangladesh delegation arrived in New Delhi for talks 
on sharing the Ganges water, India Premier Indira Gandhi had 
announced a general election. As the Bangladeshis reached Delhi 
she was heading for the Kumbha Mela (fair) about 500 miles 
away. On arrival, the delegation's leader. Navy Chief Rear 
Admiral M. H. Khan, met the then Agriculture Minister Jagjivan 
Ram in what was described as the opening of formal talks. He 
was told that the Indians had nothing new to offer. Khan was
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flabbergasted. "What was the sense of asking us to come to Delhi 
then?" he asked Ram. The veteran Indian politician said he xvas 
sorry he could not reconsider the Indian position as the Premier 
was away from Delhi. The Bangladesh delegation had little left to 
do except sight seeing.
Another meeting was scheduled for the following morning, but it 
was cancelled unceremoniously 10 minutes before the Bangladesh 
delegation was due to leave the hotel for the talks. An assistant 
protocol officer of India's External Affairs Ministry was considered 
sufficiently competent to inform Khan of the cancellation. Before 
the Bangladesh team left for home, Ram and the head of India's 
Policy Planning Division, G. Parthasarathy, called on Admiral 
Khan to tell him 'off the record' that the Indian government could 
not initiate any new move on its own, and could not consider any 
proposal presented by Bangladesh because "such a move may have 
serious adverse effects on the Congress Party's election chances, " 
especially in West Bengal.
Before returning home, Khan said at Calcutta's Dum Dum airport that,
the talks had finally foundered on the rocks of Indian intransigence. It 
failed because of India's failure to keep pace with Bangladesh and her 
consistent refusal to appreciate Bangladesh's immediate problems of 
lack of water during the dry season.
101. Far Eastern Economic Review. 4 March, 1977.
102. Ibid.
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In the meantime Zia paid an official visit to Peking in January 1977 where he 
received renewed declarations of Chinese support for Bangladesh and for 
the Bangladesh government's stand on Farakka. This was the first high level 
contact between Bangladesh and China since Bangladesh gained its 
independence in 1971. Bangladesh and China signed a technical cooperation 
agreement and an agreement to increase trade.
But India-Bangladesh relations continued to deteriorate. Deliberations on 
the Farakka Barrage dispute were also at an impasse. In March 1977, the 
internal power structure in India underwent some changes because of the 
election in which the Congress government was ousted. The Janata Party of 
India won the election.
Jagjivan Ram with the new portfolio (he became the defence minister of the 
Janata Covernment rather than the Agriculture minister of the Congress 
government) led the Indian delegation to Dhaka on 15 April 1977.^03 On 18 
April 1977, it was declared.
An understanding has been reached (on Farakka), details of which 
will be worked out at a meeting of the officials of the two 
governments to be held in New Delhi as soon as possible.
In May 1977, a Bangladesh delegation led by B. M. Abbas went to Delhi. The 
issue of dry season flow of the Canges was raised by Bangladesh in the 
discussion with the Indian team led by Jagat Mehta. The meeting was not 
fruitful because of the insistence of each party on its proposal of increasing 
the flow.
103. Hindu. 15 April. 1977.
104. The Banglade^ Times. 19 April, 1977.
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In June 1977, Morarji Desai, the new Indian Prime Minister and Ziaur 
Rahman met for the first time at the Commonwealth Conference in London. 
On June 10,1977 both leaders announced that progress had been made on all 
their outstanding differences. India promised to police its border and 
prevent Indian territory from being used as a sanctuary for guerrillas 
operating against the Bangladesh g o v e rn m e n t.P re v io u s ly , when the 
Bangladesh delegation led by Admiral M. H. Khan had raised the issue of 
border problem with Indira Candhi in a discussion, instead of taking a 
positive attitude she answered that she did not believe this. She said 
problems could be solved if there was desire on the part of Bangladesh. She 
pointed out Bangladesh's attempt to raise the water issue in the UN agenda 
as an unfriendly ac t The Admiral asked. What is a friendly act? And after a 
short while the Bangladesh delegation took leave.
More discussions were held during the months of August and September 
1977. Jagat Mehta w ent to Bangladesh and held talks with B. M. Abbas. 
According to the official statement, differences between the two sides were 
narrowed down.' In September, Desai sent a letter to Zia stressing the need 
for better understanding to settle the Farakka dispute. Finally, in the early 
morning of 30 September 1977, an agreement was initialled between the two 
countries which was signed on November 5, 1977, by M. H. Khan and S. S. 
Bamala, the new Indian Minister of A g r i c u l t u r e .
The agreement was initially for a period of five year which could be extended 
by mutual understanding until a new arrangement was developed. Under
105. Hindu. 11 June, 1977.
106. Hindu. 22 September, 1977.
107. Financial Times. 7 & 8 November, 1977 and Economist (London), 8 November, 1977.
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the provisions of the agreement Bangladesh was guaranteed an even flow of 
Ganges water during the dry months. Article II of the agreement defined the 
dry season from 1st January to 31st May every year when the sharing would 
be "based on 75 percent availability calculated from the recorded flows of the 
Ganga at Farakka from 1948 to 1973." Article II also guaranteed,
Provided further that if during a particular 10-day period, the 
Ganga flows at Farakka come down to such a level that the share of 
Bangladesh is lower than 10% of the value shown in column 4, the 
release of waters to Bangladesh during that 10-day period shall not 
fall below 80 percent of the value shown in column 4.
In Bangladesh there was quiet jubilation. Although the Ganges issue is never 
of such significance at the public level in India as it is in Bangladesh, the 
Desai government faced criticism from the Indian press as well as from some 
sections of the public in West B e n g a l .T h e  members of the Congress Party 
(then an opposition party in the Indian political system) described the 
agreement in the Rajya Sabha as "sell out" of Indian interest.
In January 1978, the fourteenth meeting of the Joint River Commission 
decided that the two parties should exchange their proposals for the long 
term solution for the augmentation of the dry season flows of the Canges. 
Earlier, India had proposed building a canal to link the Brahmaputra River 
with the Canges. But the canal would have both its headworks and its tail in 
India, while the route of the canal would take some 60 miles of Bangladeshi 
territory. With the barrages at both ends of the link canal lying in India, 
Bangladesh would have relatively little control over the canal's use. Should
108. Amrita Bazar Patrika. 8 October, 1977.
109. The Statesman. 27 July, 1977.
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India decide to divert increasingly more water from the Brahmaputra to the 
Ganges to meet its own demands, northern and central Bangladesh, which 
mostly depend on the Brahmaputra waters, would face the same problems 
as the southwest areas of Bangladesh were now facing because of Farakka 
Barrage. Once again Bangladesh would be in the mercy of India. The 
construction of the canal across northwest Bangladesh would also mean the 
loss of thousands of hectares of valuable agricultural land. With problems of 
over population and insufficient food grains already at crisis points, 
Bangladesh could not afford to lose any irrigable lands. Also Bangladesh 
maintains that it cannot resettle the population that would be displaced.
Related to the storage dam problem is the danger Bangladesh faces from 
annual flooding. So it has countered with a plan that includes Nepal and 
provides for storage dams in Nepal to regulate the flow of the northern 
tributaries of the Ganges. Bangladesh has refused to examine the link canal 
proposal until the alternative of storage reservoirs has been exhausted, and 
refuses to consider the second alternative exhausted until Nepal has been 
formally admitted to the Joint River Commission (JRC). Since, Nepal is 
situated within the Ganges Basin and its rivers also contribute most of the 
Ganges' dry season flow, Bangladesh insists that Nepal must also be made a 
party to the negotiation of augmentation. As far as Nepal is concerned it is 
also inclined to cooperate in the water resource development of the region. 
King Birendra of Nepal in an interview with the Far Fastem Fconomic Review 
said,
Nepal has made its stand clear, it is prepared to examine the 
development of its water-resource potential in a way which would 
benefit both India and Bangladesh. If both the countries make a 
joint proposal, my government would look into such a proposal, it
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goes without saying, from the prime consideration of Nepal's 
overall national interestA"^^
As reported by the Rising Nepal, Nepal also favours the proposal of 
Bangladesh and disapproves the Ganga-Brahmaputra link canal proposal 
which goes against its interests too.
... it is conceivable that the Bangla option may be preferred, if 
its ecological and other costs are not unaffordably high. Related 
also could be the future of the ambitious Kamali project, if the 
Brahmaputra-Ganga link canal idea is accepted, Nepal's 
negotiation position vis-a-vis India could weaken. Similarly, her 
prospect for navigational facilities could also possibly be 
affected.^ '^^
But India resists drawing Nepal into the discussions for fear that Dhaka and 
Kathm andu will join hands as an alliance against it and undercut the 
freedom that it enjoys in separate bilateral relations with its neighbours. 
Verghese states that India apprehends that multilateralism will slow down 
progress and Bangladesh and Nepal will be encouraged to raise their 
demands at India's cost by international forces.^^^ Bangladesh wants to have 
a sort of 1960s programme that provided a solution to the waters issue in the 
Indus basin between India and Pakistan in the western side of the sub­
continent.
110. Far Eastern Economic Review. 24 March, 1983.
111. Rising Nepal. 6 Tanuarv. 1983.
112. B.G.Verghese, Waters of Hope. Oxford University Press, 1990.
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Zia also tried to broaden relations with other œ u n tries in the area. Zia was 
the only South Asian head of states to visit each of the other countries 
completing his journeys in 1977 with visits to Nepal, India and Pakistan. 
Earlier he had been to Sri Lanka also. Under Zia, Bangladesh developed 
close ties with the Arab Muslim world and received recognition and 
substantial economic assistance as a result. Bangladesh an active and 
respected participant in international forum, has been a member of the 
Security Council and was present at the Cancun summit in Mexico. Another 
prop in Bangladesh's pursuit to chart greater independence is its active role 
in international organisations and its enthusiastic support for South Asian 
Regional Cooperation of which it was the original proponent.
Zia was assassinated in Chittagong on May 30, 1981, by a group of 
disgruntled army officers. After his assassination. Vice President Abdus 
Sattar became Acting President until an election was held. He served less 
than a year. On March 24, 1982, General Ershad led a bloodless coup that 
displaced President Sattar and began a new period of martial law with 
Ershad as the chief martial law administrator. He later assumed presidency 
on December 11,1983.
ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESHI BEHAVIOUR : ZIA REGIME (1975-1981)
During Zia regim e (between 1975 and 1981} one gets a picture that 
Bangladesh increasingly tried to project a separate identity from India. His 
government did not blindly follow his predecessors' footsteps and hence 
pursued a foreign policy which was not overall characterised by compliance 
to India. Zia himself is reported to have claimed that the most significant 
development in the field of foreign policy of Bangladesh was that Bangladesh was
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now in a position to make its own decisions and formulate its own independent 
policy to serve its national interests
Although condition 3 (i.e. disinclination of the ruling party) provides clues in 
some instances as to why Bangladesh was defiant, condition 1 ( i.e. vitalness 
of issues) offers better explanation for motivation to defy in the instances of 
NCBs demonstrated by Bangladesh during Zia regime (1975-1981).
Table 5.4 summarizes the instances of NCBs demonstrated during this phase, 
their nature, along with the condition of motivation to defy and the NTPRs. 
Table 5.4 suggests that in 6 out of 8 instances Bangladesh took the initiative 
to be defiant while in the remaining 2 instances its defiance was in response 
to some measures taken or dem ands made by India. It may be observed 
from the table 5.4 that except one instance, ( in case where condition 2 offers 
better explanation) all the instances of NCBs may best be understood with 
the help of condition 1. Table 5.4 further reveals that in all the instances 
(which condition 1 explains) economic survival was at stake and in 6 
instances physical survival was at stake. Furthermore, as a power resource 
constituting capability to resist, leadership strength explains all the 
instances, people's power explains 4 instances and external political support 
explains 2 instances. In 5 instances more than one factor of capability were 
involved in demonstrating NCB.
The non-compliant behaviour which condition 1 best explains include the 
ones related to sharing of Ganges Water, amendment of the constitution and 
the establishment of relations with Pakistan and China. Condition 2 i.e..
113. Quoted in Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, Op. Cit.. p. 
208.
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T ab le  5.4 A S u m m ary  o f th e  In s ta n ce s  o f NCB d u rin g  Zia 
R e g im e  (1975-1981) a lo n g  w ith  th e  C o n d itio n s  o f 
M o tiv a t io n  to  D efy  and  th e  N T P R s u se d  to Explain
them .
INSTANCES OF NCB NATURE OF 
NCB
MOTIVATION 
TO DEFY (The 
Conditicms )
CAPABILITY TO 
RESIST 
(The NTPRs)
1. A m en d m en t o f B angladesh i 
Constitution.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS
2. Establishment of relations with  
Pakistan.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS
3. Establishment of relations with  
China.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS
4. G overnm ent's protests against 
unilateral w ith d raw al o f the  
Ganges Water by India.
Responsive. Condition 1 
(Physical and 
Economic 
survival)
LS. PP
5. Government's internationalizing of 
the water issue.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Physical and 
Economic 
survival)
LS, PP&EPS
6. Rejection of India's Link Canal 
Proposal.
Responsive Condition 1 
(Physical and 
Economic 
survival)
LS, PP
7 Insistence to include Nepal in the 
JRC
Initiative Condition 1 
(Physical and 
Economic 
survival)
LS, PP
8. Creation of SAARC Initiative Condition 2 
(Ambition) LS, EPS.
The letters LS, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, peoples' power, anc 
finally external political support.
ambition of the ruler does not offer satisfactory explanation. Although 
condition 3 (disinclination of the ruling party) offer some clue in 
understanding these instances of NCB , it does not appear to be as 
convincing as condition 1. We shall turn to examine these conditions later. 
First, we shall examine these instances with condition 1. According to 
condition 1, if the issues involved are regarded as vital (i.e., they are
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necessary for the survival of peop le /s ta te /reg im e  either physically, 
economically or politically) motivation to defy is likely to be generated and 
thereby lead to non-compliance. Further a necessity may be 'absolute' 
w ithout which existence will be at stake, or it may not be 'absolute' i.e. 
w ithout which existence will not be at stake but survival would mean 
enduring substantial difficulty. The following discussion will reveal the 
vitalness of the issues in explaining Bangladesh's non-compliance during Zia 
regime.
Water is supposed to be the life. "People pray not to water but to the life 
w ithin the w a t e r " . E v e r  since 1951, Bangladesh ( at that time East 
Pakistan) objected to the Indian plan of diverting water apprehending 
adverse affects on its economy. All these years the people of Bangladesh had 
been experiencing what they had apprehended. After its independence in 
1971, the people of Bangladesh desired in their new political system not only 
the political freedom but the also relief from their daily miseries and freedom 
from internal and external exploitation. But their hopes and aspirations 
rem ained unfulfilled because of the League governm ent's acquiescent 
posture towards the dominant country.
After Zia came to power, there was a growing awareness of the situation on 
the part of the people. Mass demonstration and bitter resentments against 
India for disregarding the vital issue of life and death of the people was 
ram pant in all section in Bangladesh. These responses were only instinctive; 
they were in defence of their rightful claims and survival.
114. Darian, G. Steven, The Ganges in Myth and History. The University Press of Hawaii, 
1978, p. 17.
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The effects of water withdrawal was highlighted in the preceding section. 
By this time those effect were further magnified. About 38% of the country's 
cultivable land dried up and crippled due to the lack of sufficient water. A 
therm al power station was shut down, busy steamer services were 
suspended, newsprint mills and other industries were halted and thousands 
of acres of vital land turned into desert. Agriculture, fishing, forestry, and 
ecology were devastated over 20,000 sq. miles on which 25 million people 
live. One study showed salinity in the Khulna area was up by 4,000%- 
closing down industries that were dependent on fresh water- and together 
w ith the falling water table threatened vegetation and fish, the biggest 
source of protein.^^^ The White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute, 
published by Government of Bangladesh in September 1976, read:
A grave crisis has arisen for Bangladesh on account of India's 
unilateral action in diverting the waters of the Ganges at 
Farakka. ... These withdrawals amount to as much as three- 
fourths of the dry season flow of the river Ganges. It is difficult 
to find a precedent in the world where such heavy amount of 
waters of an international river are appropriated unilaterally by a 
country at the cost of the vital interests of a neighbouring 
country.
For Bangladesh, as a lower riparian country, such large quantities of 
withdrawal of water by India clearly implied threats to its survival. Hence, 
the vitalness of the issue explains why its people demonstrated and the 
government protested. It also explains why contrary to India's wishes.
115. For a detailed discussion on the effects of water withdrawal, see Crow, B., Op. Cit.
116. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh:White paper on the Ganges Water 
Dispute, September 1976, p. 4.
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Bangladesh went on internationalizing the water problem. The main 
purpose of this action was to gain wider diplomatic support against India. 
The unilateral withdrawal of water by India spelled disaster for Bangladesh. 
The difficulties for Bangladesh were extremely grave. It needed all the 
international support it could possibly get. "Bangladesh has gone to the 
United Nations and other world forums only out of utter desperation arising 
out of acute human suffering. Its rejection of India's Link canal proposal 
and its insistence to include Nepal in the water talks were also prompted by 
the question of vitalness. It will be recalled from the earlier discussion that 
the proposal would have aggravated the already deteriorated state. This 
was because the head and the tail of water works of the canal would be 
under Indian control thereby increasing Bangladesh's vulnerabilities. It 
would also mean further loss of agricultural land and displacement of 
inhabitants. Nepal's inclusion in the water talks, for Bangladesh, meant 
opportunities for a satisfactory resolution of the dispute.
In addition to the issue of sharing the Ganges water, vitalness of issues also 
offer plausible explanation for the amendments of the constitution and the 
establishment of relationship with Pakistan and China. It may be recalled 
here that prior to these changes i.e., during Mujib's period, Bangladesh was 
Indo-centric, aligning itself only with the Soviet bloc. But Bangladesh was in 
dire need of funds. Its social and economic development needed infusion of 
large am ount of funds. India and the socialist countries, with whom 
Bangladesh allied itself were no very forthcoming in terms of providing the 
necessary financial support. The Western developed countries capable of 
providing such assistances were reluctant to come forward because of 
Bangladesh's avowed socialistic principles. By amending the constitution.
117. Author's interview with a Bangladeshi official.
278
Zia changed Bangladesh's pro-socialist, pro-Soviet and pro- Indian image. 
Socialism, a fundamental state principle during Mujib's period was dropped 
from the constitution. He also adopted policies to privatize nationalized 
industries to win the hearts of the western donors and secure funds so much 
necessary for economic survival.
He also pledged to establish links with states "who had not been friends 
before", referring to Pakistan and China who hurriedly recognized the new 
government. Pakistan was, in fact, the first state to recognize the post-Mujib 
regime. China's recognition of the new Bangladesh Government at the end 
of A ugust and the latter's warm response to China's gesture towards 
renewed and wider trade relations, set nerves.in New Delhi's South Block 
(Foreign Office) a bit on edge. He also developed close ties with Arab 
Muslim World. Saudi Arabia, who had previously refused to deal with 
Mujib, did recognize Zia. This move of Zia was considered by India as an 
attempt at creating a distance from her. Elsewhere in the international field, 
Zia changed what under Mujib had been a very close relationship with India 
and Soviet Union to one of correct and less cordial.
Like the constitutional amendments, establishment of relationship with 
Pakistan and China may also be interpreted in terms of vitalness. Pakistan 
acted as 'gate-keeper' in the establishment of relations between Bangladesh 
and China and Bangladesh and Middle Eastern countries. An absence of 
relation with Pakistan implied that the approaches to China and the middle 
east as vital sources of economic assistance were sh u t Zia's establishment of 
relationship with Pakistan opened up channels through which Bangladesh 
could seek vital assistance necessary for economic survival from the middle 
eastern countries.
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The islamization of the œ un try  helped open up those channels. Zia declared 
Bangladesh an Islamic Republic. Although he did not change Bangladesh's 
name, Zia did eventually drop secularism from the constitution and 
emphasized Islam at the mass level. The constitution was given a definite 
Islamic orientation with the insertion of 'Bismillah-hir-Rahmanir Rahim (In 
the name of Allah the beneficial and the merciful). He introduced the 
recitation from Holy Quran' in place of recitation from other holy books. 
Under him, Islamic parties which were outlawed under Mujib were 
legalized.
All these measures including abolishing secularism from the constitution 
may be said to have been taken to woo the oil rich middle eastern countries 
which are capable of providing Bangladesh the necessary assistance for its 
economic survival. Bangladeshi citizens were employed in the Middle east 
and their remittances generated much needed foreign exchange. From the 
Islamic forum, Bangladesh not only secured aid but also support in its 
disputes with India. At the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Istanbul 
in 1976, Bangladesh received all out support of the Muslim countries over its 
Ganges water dispute with India. The Islamic group of states in the United 
Nations expressed com plete solidarity w ith Bangladesh regarding  
presentation of its problems in the Law of the Sea Conference that took place 
in New York in 1976. Having said so, we shall now consider why condition 
2 and condition 3 are not as satisfactory as the one given by condition 1.
As far as condition 2 is concerned, ambition of the ruler may be best viewed 
as a disposition characterized by an urge of becoming, 'growing' or 
'developing' to the full potential, an actualization of a dream to become a 
strong and effective ruler of a strong country. Surely, the question here is
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not of an actualization of a dream. It is more fundamental than that. It is 
rather a question of bare survival of physical and economic existence.
Conversely, condition 3 appears to offer some answer as to why Bangladesh 
was defiant in its relation with India with regard to amending the 
constitution and establishing relationship with Pakistan and China. This 
condition attem pts to understand non-compliant behaviour in terms of 
m otivation to defy generated from a disposition of disinclination of the 
ruling party towards the dominant power. Disinclination and Inclination are 
two opp>osite dispositions; in case of the former, the ruling party subscribes 
to a political idea, attitude or view that is not congenial to the dominant 
power, while in the later case the subscribed political idea, attitude or view is 
congenial to the dom inant power. Disinclination sets an antagonistic 
environment while inclination sets a friendly environment between the two. 
The ruling party's disinclination towards the dominant power could either 
be a natural one or as a result of political rivalry with the previous 
governm ent in power. In case of Zia's regime the disposition of 
disinclination towards India may be understood in terms of its rivalry with 
Awami league.
It m ay be stated that Awami league governm ent system atically 
d isem pow ered  the Bangladesh Army while consistently rem aining 
acquiescent and loyal to India. The army had never forgotten that they had 
fought for Bangladesh's independence while Sheikh Mujib was in a Pakistani 
jail and the other Awami League Leaders resided in Calcutta hotel suites. 
After independence, the army felt neglected and duped, the more so because 
the Indians had been careful to remove all heavy equipment of the former 
Pakistan army before leaving Bangladesh. The army chafed under the close 
bilateral ties insisted upon by Delhi. Their main grievance was that the
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Indian arm y reaped the glory of victory, although the Mukti Bahini 
(Bangladesh liberation force constituted of Bengali armed personnel, and 
civilians) had fought bravely for nine months on their own. General Zia, 
who assum ed power in 1975, felt outraged that Bangladeshis had not 
participated in the surrender ceremony in December 1971. Zia is said to 
have charged that,
[after] the ceremony was turned into an all-India show, ... your 
intellectual and political leaders came and gave unsolicited advice 
and even attempted to formulate our policy. They created the 
impression that Bangladesh had no separate identity.
Ever since independence, Bangladesh army had been an institution without 
function. Mujib preferred to rely on various militias tied to the Awami 
League rather than on the army. India's training and backing of the Rakkhi 
Bahini, Mujib's paramilitary force, aroused resentment within the army, as 
did the failure of India to return fully the four divisions of Pakistani 
weapons captured in the 1971 war. As a result of Awami league's pro-Indian 
policies which diminished the importance of army in Bangladesh, it can be 
said that the army in general became disinclined towards India. As an Army 
General, Zia shared this orientation. Such orientation was further 
strengthened when Zia assumed power. After Awami league, the significant 
governm ent that ruled Bangladesh was the governm ent formed by Zia. 
Quite logically, Awami League blamed the army (consequently Gen. Zia) for 
the killings of Sheikh Mujib and his family. General Zia on the other hand 
blam ed Awami league for mismanagement, inefficiency, corruption, 
lawlessness and all round sellout of Bangladesh to India. Hence, both
118. Manash Ghosh, 'Bangladesh Sheds Suspicions', Statesman. New Delhi, 15 June, 1978.
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Awami league and Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party became arch rivals to 
each other. In the process, Zia had to abandon the path trodden by Awami 
League. Since Awami league was inclined towards India Zia was 
disinclined towards India.
It is possible to infer that wearied by Mujib's undue dependence on and 
identification with India, Zia inevitably tried to distance the country from 
India. Zia abandoned Awami league's policy of socialism in favour of 
privatisation, he abandoned the popular slogan 'Joy B a n g l a ' ^ , which bore 
the connotation of Tndianism' in favour of 'Bangladesh Zindabad ' (long live 
Bangladesh).
From this perspective, it seems logical for this regime to be non-compliant. 
However, survival (economic and physical) is too fundamental to be 
interpreted in terms of Zia's political orientation. Hence, condition 1 
(i.e.,vitalness) rather than condition 3 (disinclination) offers better 
explanations for these instances.
Let us now focus on the remaining instance from Table 5.4 i.e., the creation 
of SAARC. Condition 1 and condition 3 are rather not that persuasive to 
explain this phenomena. For Bangladesh ( or any other member states) the 
creation of SAARC did not increase or decrease any of the existing threats to 
the physical, economic or political survival of the people/state/regim e. 
SAARC as has been founded with no powers to deal with the contentious 
issues faced by the member states is independent of vitalness. Hence, 
condition 1 is not appropriate for understanding its creation. Similarly, 
condition 3 also do not offer plausible answer. Regional cooperation without
119. Joy' in Bengali and Hindi means 'victory'. In Bengali it is spelled 'Joy' and in Hindi it is 
spelled Jai'. This word is widely used in India as a slogan, such as Jai Hind'. Again 
'Bangla' may also imply Greater Bengal i.e. Bangladesh and west Bengal.
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India is meaningless. Again when regional cooperation is the issue, then 
operating from a political orientation that is totally antithetical to India is a 
recipe for defecting the very purpose. Hence, disinclination cannot also 
explain the creation of SAARC. However, condition 2 does offer some 
explanation. According to condition 2, a ruler's ambition to become strong 
and effective and to transfer his country to a respectable and independent 
member of the international community might generate the motivation to 
defy and lead to non-compliant behaviour. It might be said that the idea of 
taking the initiative and the lead to create an organization (for regional 
cooperation) emanated from Zia's ambition; an ambition to see Bangladesh 
as a respectable partner in the conduct of regional and international affairs. 
In order to break down the previous image of Bangladesh led by Mujib 
regime who remained faithfully allied to India, both diplomatically and 
politically, Zia tried to make a real mark on international affairs. He 
founded the SAARC without paying attention to India's annoyance. Zia not 
only personally discussed the idea while visiting Pakistan, Nepal, India and 
Sri Lanka during 1977-80, he also sent personal letters and envoys to the 
heads of the six regional states. Given the political and security problems 
with India, Zia m ight have undisclosed motive to overcome India's 
intransigent attitude towards these problems through the goodwill he 
expected from regional cooperation.
Having discussed the condition of motivation to defy, we will now focus on 
the non-tangible power resources that contributed to the non-compliant 
behaviour demonstrated by Zia's regime. According to our contextual 
framework, non-tangible power resources such as leadership strength, 
external political support, people's power and geo-political leverage 
constitute the capability to resist. The framework also maintains that non-
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compliance is likely to follow if these power resources are present and strong 
while non-compliance is not likely to follow if these power resources are 
absent or weak. Three power resources may be identified which include 
leadership strength of Zia, external political support and anti Indian popular 
pressure, all operating in concert. As Bangladesh does not enjoy any 
geographical advantage in its relation with India (like Nepal), geopolitical 
leverage did not play any part in demonstrating non-compliance. Unlike 
Sheikh Mujib, Zia was assertive and independent. Examples of his 
leadership skills, initiative and assertiveness are numerous. In one instance 
when the entire nation was put in a state of utter disarray and chaos by the 
Pakistani army crack down on 25 March 1971, Zia deserted the Pakistan 
Army, seized Chittagong ( the port city of Bangladesh) Radio station on 26 
March 1971 and called the people to unite under his leadership to launch 
armed struggle against the Pakistani Occupation Forces. Zia's call was a 
hope and a guidance for the Bangladeshi nation for its freedom and marked 
the beginning not only of the liberation war but also of a nation state. Zia 
earned a great respect for his leadership contribution in the liberation war. 
He was a renowned freedom fighter who believed in himself. Unlike some 
of the political leaders who spent their time in the luxury and safety of 
Calcutta hotel suites during the war of liberation , Zia was in the war front 
leading his soldiers in the pursuit of victory. Hence, he was not under any 
undue obligation to India. Once he came to power in 1975, he took measures 
to consolidate power in his own hands and provided a strong leadership to 
Bangladesh. He was not inhibited in anyway about taking an anti-Indian 
stance. Thus, his assertiveness and leadership strength may be regarded as 
one of the factors that explain his regime's non-compliance.
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Besides, leadership strength, external p>olitical support also contributed to 
NCB. Bangladesh's political debut on the world stage substantially altered 
the tenor and substance of Indo-Bangladeshi relations. Bangladesh's entry 
into the UN made India's role of Bangladesh's advocate in world forums 
redundant, strengthened Bangladesh's bargaining position on economic and 
political issues with India, and em boldened Bangladesh to assert its 
independence from India. By way of internationalizing issues and actively 
participating in different international forums and lobbies Zia gained 
considerable support of the international community.
Added to these was the strong anti-Indian public pressure which contributed 
to strengthen the power profile of Zia's regime. Examples of-public 
demonstrations against India were very common in Bangladesh. These non­
tangible power resources seem to offer plausible explanation for non- 
compliant behavior.
It will be recalled that, unlike Zia regime Mujib regime lacked leadership 
strength and external political support. Mujib lacked assertiveness out of 
enormous gratitude. Bangladesh was Indo-centric and as such could not 
acquired external political support to defy India. A comparison of the two 
regimes provides the evidence which partly supports the proposition that 
the presence of leadership strength and external political support lead to 
NCB while their absence do not lead to NCB. This also explains w hy Zia 
regime was more non-compliant than Mujib.
From the foregoing analysis we may therefore conclude that given the 
motivation to defy generated from the conditions of vitalness of issues and 
the ambition of the ruler the non-tangible power resources such a leadership
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strength, external political support and people's power led Bangladesh to be 
defiant
ERSHAD REGIME (1982-1990)
The government of H. M. Ershad, more or less followed the footsteps of the 
late President Zia in the arena of foreign affairs. Like Zia, Ershad too 
reiterated the fact that Bangladesh should base its relationship with all other 
states upon the country's perceived need for foreign economic assistance 
rather than on ideological criteria. It was also stressed that Bangladesh 
should m aintain particularly close economic and political links with 
neighbouring Asian States so as to reduce its dependence upon India. In 
addition, Ershad further developed the ties that Zia had established with 
Muslim states. In fact, the government set out on taking more aggressive 
measures to realize the unfinished policies of the previous government. 
However, in respect of some issues in Indo-Bangladesh relations, the regime 
substantially deviated from the principles and policies pursued by the 
previous regimes, if not altogether abandoned them.
Immediately after Ershad came to power, 14 Soviet diplomats were expelled 
from the country and the Soviet Cultural Centre was closed down in 1983. 
The degree of warmth in the afterm ath of Bangladesh's independence 
between Bangladesh, India and Soviet Union was considerably reduced 
during the Zia regime. With the expulsion of the Soviet diplomats, the 
Dhaka-Delhi-Moscow relation came under severe strains.
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As it moved away from the Indo-Soviet axis Dhaka's relations with 
W ashington grew warmer. In 1983, Ershad paid an official visit to USA and 
became the first head of the government of Bangladesh to pay such a visit to 
USA. During his visit, several agreements were signed between the two 
countries and US agreed to provide $ 65 million under PL-480 to Bangladesh 
for buying food grain and edible oil from the USA.^^o jt may be mentioned 
here that most of the US aid focussed on population control, agricultural 
production, rural employment and energy resource development.
Relations with China, which had improved during Zia's period, were further 
cemented. China offered increased project aid to Bangladesh. In November 
1982, Ershad paid a six-day official visit to China. At the conclusion of his 
visit he said that his mission to China had been successful in every respect. 
He stated, "They will be by our side through the thick and thin."^2i China 
not only provided a sense of psychological security to Bangladesh against 
India, but also became a major arms supplier. It became Bangladesh's major 
arm s supplier after the Soviet Union scrapped all military assistance to 
Bangladesh following the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975. On 4 
Novem ber 1983, the two countries signed a five year agreement, under 
which they agreed to set up a joint economic commission to strengthen 
cooperation in trade, industry and technology. In late 1984, Bangladesh and 
China signed another five year trade accord of US $ 200 million in which 
Bangladesh's jute, jute products, and other commodities as well as light
120. The Bangladesh Observer. 5 November, 1983.
121. Morning News. 5 December, 1982.
288
industrial products were agreed to be exchanged for China's coal, pig iron, 
hardware and industrial e q u i p m e n t .^22
Relations with Arab countries also continued to improve. In February 1983, 
Ershad visited most of the Islamic countries in the Middle East to strengthen 
relations. During this regime, Saudi Arabia came closest to Bangladesh in 
terms of foreign relations. In May 1983, Bangladesh signed an agreement 
with Saudi Arabia to set up a Saudi-Bangladesh joint investment company 
with an authorized capital of 60 million dollars.
But the major concern for Bangladesh foreign policy in this period remained 
its relationship with India, which had deteriorated steadily in the past few 
years because the political development of the Bangladesh military regimes 
and their domestic and international outlook were unpalatable to New 
Delhi.
After assuming power on 25 March 1982, Ershad paid his first official visit to 
India with a view to solving the existing Indo-Bangladesh problem. At the 
conclusion of the visit, Ershad said that both he and Mrs. Gandhi had 
directed their respective administrations to remove the points of tension. 
But at the same time, he remarked cautiously: "Now it will be seen if these 
are removed.
Ershad, who initiated a move for improved relation with India, nevertheless 
made it clear what it wanted. Since the Ganges agreement was supposed to 
expire in November, Bangladesh wanted a new understanding to be 
reached. Hence, in the summit meeting of October 1982 between Ershad and
122. Bertocd, P. ]., 'Bangladesh in 1985: Resolute Against the Storms', Asian Survey. Vol. 
XXVI, No. 2, February 1986, p. 232.
123. Far Eastern Economic Review. 15 October, 1982,p. 28.
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Indira Gandhi, the vital issue of Farakka topped the agenda. In this meeting, 
both sides agreed that the 1977 Agreem ent has 'not proved suitable for 
finding a satisfactory and durable solution of the problem of an equitable 
sharing of the waters and the paucity of waters available in the dry season 
imposed sacrifice on both countries for an amicable settlement.' It was in 
this meeting that the "Guarantee Clause" of the agreement was dropped and 
the agreem ent was extended for ano ther 18 months. Under this 
"Memorandum of Understanding, 1982"; the two leaders reiterated again on 
the necessity of augmenting the Ganga and the JRC was entrusted with the 
task of finding the long-term solution. ^^ 4
Thus, this Memorandum of Understanding was neither a solution nor a fresh 
agreement but only an extension of the period of the 1977-Agreement giving 
a further chance to the JRC to agree to a 'particular' scheme of augmenting.
For most of the years since Farakka was opened in 1975 for what was 
euphemistically described as a trial run, many thousand cubic feet of water 
have been diverted away from Bangladesh and down India's short Hoogly 
river to rinse silt out of the major port of Calcutta into the Bay of Bengal. 
Since 1975, India has done little to help Bangladesh, which complains that 
loss of Ganges water has caused major salinity problems up to 200 miles 
inland. As a matter of fact, the Farakka issue is viewed by India as one of the 
m any intractable problems facing the country in its relations w ith 
Bangladesh and as such is in no great hurry to resolve them. A. Z. M. 
O baidullah Khan, the Agriculture m inister of Bangladesh said in an 
interview. Being on the receiving end of this great river, we cannot afford to put off
124. Government of Bangladesh, Updated Bangladesh Proposal. December, 1983, p. 1-10.
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the solution every two years. For us, finding a permanent solution becomes more 
important as time goes by. ^^ 5
India justified the diversion by emphasizing that 90 percent of the 1,200 mile 
main channel of the Ganges flows through India. Bangladesh countered that 
one-third of their country's population depends on the Ganges for drinking, 
fishery, agriculture and transport and that diversion has devastating 
consequences in the dry season.
In 1986, the augmentation of the flow of the River Ganges water between 
India and Bangladesh opened up when New Delhi accepted Nepal as a party 
to the scheme. Consequently, a meeting of the joint committee of experts 
(JCE) was held in Kathmandu.
After the expiry of the extension period of the MOU in October 1988, 
Bangladesh proposed a perm anent treaty. This was in line with the 
Memorandum of Understanding between India and Bangladesh. India has 
always been encouraging piece-meal and temporary arrangements for nearly 
all outstanding issues which is not acceptable to Bangladesh. At the same 
time Bangladesh launched a vigorous campaign in the wake of disastrous 
floods in favour of a four tier approach to the solution of the problem: 
national, bilateral, regional and international. This was naturally not 
palatable to India which insists on the bilateral approach alone as against 
regional and international options. India views Bangladesh's approach as an 
attem pt at mobilising international opinion against India.
In 1990, upon the Indian foreign minister's visit to Bangladesh, Bangladesh 
again put forward the proposal for permanent agreement. But I. K. Gujral,
125. International Herald Tribune. 26 January ,1983.
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the Indian foreign minister refused to accept the proposal. As Holiday 
reports, Mr. Gujral said that owing to rapid urbanisation, increased population 
growth and industrialisation in India, the downstream is going to get less and less 
water in future and so you have to go for a u g m e n ta tio n .Although Gujral did 
not elaborate on his augmentation suggestion a source said, he perhaps 
indicated the old "link canal formula." But the link canal proposal has been 
firmly rejected by Bangladesh.
Also during Ershad's regime i.e. in early 1984, India's decision to move 
ahead with construction of a 2,145 mile-long fence along the border between 
Bangladesh and Assam clouded Indo-Bangladesh relations. India's decision 
of fencing stem from what India claims is an unrelenting flow of 
Bangladeshis into that state and hence the source of the grave tensions 
exploding there in 1983. Resistance activities of Bangladesh citizens along 
the border area, including efforts to undermine the fence foundations, were 
accompanied by clashes between the two states' border security forces in 
April and to exchange of diplom atic protest notes. In the face of 
Bangladesh's opposition in both official and public level, the project could 
not be carried out and at long last it appeared that the plan has been shelved 
if not totally abandoned.
India agreed to hand over the disputed Tin Bigha corridor to Bangladesh. 
The Tin Bigha corridor connects two Bangladeshi enclaves in Indian 
territory- Angorpota and Dohogram consisting of 12,000 inhabitants- with 
the mainland. According to the border agreement signed on 16 May 1974, 
the Berubari and the adjacent enclaves which had a majority H indu 
population were given to India in exchange for the Dahagram  and
126. Holiday. 17 February, 1990.
292
Angarpota enclaves which had majority muslims population being given to 
Bangladesh. India also agreed to lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area 
of 178 metres by 85 metres near T in  Bigha' to connect Dahagram with 
Panbari Mouza of B a n g l a d e s h . ^ 2 7  Article 2 of the agreement provided that 
the "territories in adverse possession in areas already demarcated ... shall 
be exchanged within six months of the signing of the boundary strip maps 
by the plenipotentiaries", and Article 3 provided that "when areas are 
transferred, the people in these areas shall be given the right of staying 
where they are, as nationals of the State to which the areas are transferred". 
Article 5 required that the instruments of Ratification should be exchanged 
as early as p o s s i b l e . 2^ 8  Accordingly, Bangladesh handed over the Berubari 
enclave immediately to India but the latter has not yet transferred Tin Bigha 
to Bangladesh. India was also to provide the corridor to Bangladesh on lease 
in perpetuity but did not do it on this or that ground (court cases, difficulty 
in amendment of constitution for example). The terms of the lease were 
finalised during Ershad-Indira summit of October 1982. Yet the agreement 
remained unimplemented. The Calcutta High Court case had been disposed 
of. Land marking for the lease began and a monitoring cell was established 
in Calcutta for the sam e purpose. The basic problem  was in the 
non-ratification of the agreem ent in the Parliament. "The transfer of Tin 
Bigha has not taken place because of the resistance from the West Bengal and 
the slow and tardy process of demarcating its land boundaries," writes S. D. 
M u n i.129 To facilitate m atters in this regards, the Bangladesh Foreign
127. Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Publicity Division, 
Bangladesh Documents. Vol. 2, No. 4, April-June 1974, p. 15.
128. Ibid.
129. S. D. Muni, Friends in Need: New Realities in South Asia', Frontline. 12-25 October 
1991.
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Minister had a stop over in Calcutta on 19 October and had talks with Chief 
Minister Jyoti Basu. The Foreign Minister was, however, assured in New 
Delhi that the transfer process would be completed by the end of 1991.
Again Bangladesh's stand on the Kashmir issue was not liked by India. 
President Ershad while talking to a gathering of newsmen on March 8,1990, 
said that we are concerned at the oppression of our Muslim brothers in Kashmir. It 
should be stopped immediately.'^^ It may be mentioned here that Bangladesh 
had so long remained uncommitted to Kashmir issue under the disguise of 
'neutralism'. Obviously, the Indian media embellished Bangladesh's stand; 
for India it is easier to sell Kashmir internationally when the world's second 
largest Muslim state which happens to be a subcontinental remains silent. 
Previously, during the visit of the Indian foreign minister to Bangladesh it 
was reported that he made a request to Bangladesh not to change its stand 
on Kashmir. As such India strongly reacted to Dhaka's policy shift on 
Kashmir. India has categorically stated that Dhaka's locus standi on 
Kashmir is totally unacceptable to them.^^^
ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESHI BEHAVIOUR : ERSHAD REGIME
(1982-1990)
At the outset it may be said that in the arena of foreign relations, Ershad was 
less antagonistic to India than Zia, and considerably less pro Indian than 
Mujib. Bangladesh's non-compliant behaviour during this phase appeared
130. Courier. 16-22 Mardi, 1992, p. 23.
131. Ibid.
294
to be more related to its economic survival. Table 5.5 sum m arizes the 
instances of NCB, their nature (ie., initiative/responsive) along with the 
conditions of motivation to defy and the NTPRs. The Table 5.5 suggests that 
in case of all the instances condition 1, i.e., vitalness of issues offer the most 
plausible explanation. In 4 instances, the issues were vital for economic 
survival and in 4 instances vital for economic and physical survival. Table 
5.5 further suggests that leadership strength as a non-tangible power 
resources contributed tow ards non-compliance. Leadership strength 
worked in combination with either external political support or people's 
power which are also non-tangible power resources. The conditions, 
assumptions, contextualities (ie., policy contingencies) will now be explored 
in order to understand the NCBs demonstrated in this phase.
The non-com pliant behaviour during Ershad regime related to the 
strengthening of Bangladesh's relation with other states including the USA, 
Middle East (Saudi Arabia in particular), China and the developed countries 
at large; Sharing of the Ganges Water and the Kashmir issue. Condition 2 
and condition 3 do not offer satisfactory explanations for these NCBs. 
However, condition 1 does. We shall consider condition 2 and condition 3 
subsequently, but first we shall focus on condition 1. Condition 1 suggests 
that a behaviour is non-compliant when the motivation to defy emanated 
from the consideration of an issue is vital to the very survival of the 
state/regim e/people either physically, politically or economically.
Since coming to power Ershad persisted in making Bangladesh an Islamic 
state and moving closer to the Islamic Ummah.. He said, "Islam being the 
religion of the majority of the population will be given the highest place in 
the country's future constitution and Islamic provisions will be included 
wherever necessary." But the trend towards the Islamization of Bangladesh
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T ab le  5.5 A S um m ary  o f th e  In s ta n ce s  o f NCB d u rin g  E rshad  
R e g im e  (1982-1990) a lo n g  w ith  th e  C o n d itio n s  o f M o tiv a tio n  
to  D efy  an d  th e  N T PR s u sed  to  E xplain  them .
INSTANCES OF NCB NATURE OF 
NCB
MOTIVATION 
TO DEFY (The 
Conditions )
CAPABILITY TO 
RESIST 
(The NTPRs)
1. Adoption of Islamic orientation Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS
2. Strengthening of relation w ith  
USA.
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS
3. Strengthening of relation with the Arab 
countries particularly Saudi Arabia
Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS
4. Strengthening of relation with China. Initiative Condition 1 
(Economic 
survival)
LS, EPS
5. Insistence for a long term treaty on 
water sharing
Responsive Condition 1 
(economic and 
physical 
survival )
LS, PP
6. Rejection of Link Canal proposal Responsive Condition 1 
(economic and 
physical 
survival )
LS, PP
7. Inclusion of Nepal in the JRC Initiative Condition 1 
(economic and 
physical 
survival )
LS, PP
8. Dhaka's stand on Kashmir. Initiative Condition 1 
(economic and 
physical 
survival )
LS, PP
The letters LS, PP, and EPS respectively stand for leadership strength, peoples' power and 
finally external political support.
by Ershad government was viewed by India as unacceptable developments. 
Ershad declared that ninety million people of the country will continue their
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relentless efforts for building a happy and prosperous Bangladesh by 
keeping the banner of Islam high. Ershad followed the trend (initiated by 
Zia) which legalised all Islamic oriented political parties that were declared 
illegal immediately after independence. During his regime one witnesses 
Bangladesh giving high priority on forging closer ties with Islamic countries 
and the Western countries. Although after 1975, Bangladesh has directed all 
its efforts to cultivate and strengthen ties with the Middle East and the West 
( more specially with US), Ershad's regime seemed to have taken more active 
stance. The various denationalization measures and new industrial policies 
fostering free economy with a view to attract private investment further 
consolidated Bangladesh's relations with the Western countries during this 
phase.
War torn Bangladesh inherited a staggering economy. Political instability 
and natural disaster never allowed its economy to recover. Added to this 
was the problem of unemployment. Each year thousands of qualified 
people enter the job market in search of jobs that do not exist. The Middle 
East is thus important to Bangladesh not only as a region of trade and aid 
but also because of employment that they provide to Bangladeshi workers. 
The export of manpower both skilled and unskilled to the middle eastern 
counties have eased the problem of unemployment of Bangladesh as well as 
increased foreign exchange earning of the country. Their remittances have 
generated much needed foreign exchange for Bangladesh and it has been 
recorded that these remittances amounted to $ 617 million in 1987.^32 Also 
petro dollars coming from the Middle Eastern countries became a major 
source of economic assistance to Bangladesh. The flow of aid from the 
Islamic countries, although statistically much lower than what is received
132. World Development Report. 1989, p. 198.
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from western sources and the market for manpower served the vital interest 
of Bangladesh.
Again the generation of employment opportunities required building of an 
economic infrastructure that could sustain a vibrant economy, which in turn 
needed massive infusion of credits, technical expertise and know-how. This 
left Bangladesh with little option but to turn to western financial institutions 
and to countries capable of giving financial assistance. Floods, droughts, 
cyclones and the like have been hitting Bangladesh with ever-increasing 
intensity and frequency. It thus became necessary for Bangladesh to seek 
external assistance to mitigate the destruction caused by them.
In the context of ever growing stringent international economic situation and 
in view of seemingly passive East bloc role in that, Bangladesh's vital needs 
dictate strengthening its ties with USA, China, Japan and other Western 
donors. The same is true of its relation with the oil rich Arab countries 
which despite the continuing glut in the global oil market still occupy a 
significant position in the international financial market and with whom 
Bangladesh maintains close ties. Japan has in recent years became the 
country's leading aid donor. It is a hard fact of life that Bangladesh within 
the prevailing conditions cannot manage its economy without adequate aid 
commitments. Significantly enough, the overwhelming majority of the 
external resources comes from Japan, the developed capitalist countries of 
the west and the oil rich middle eastern countries; whereas only a very 
marginal portion of it comes from the socialist bloc
As against the Indian desire, Bangladesh's stand on Kashmir was another 
attem pt to express its solidarity towards Muslim brotherhood. The
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economic significance of such solidarity was just highlighted in the foregoing 
paragraphs.
Bangladesh's rejection of the link canal proposal is viewed in India as its 
obstinacy. In 1985, Narasimha Rao, then defence minister of India said, 
Bangladesh government's attitude of postponing things have been responsible for 
not solving the Farakka issue so f a r . But it is not a question of stubbornness 
or any other thing on the part of Bangladesh. Rather it is a question of the 
very survival of the people of the country who are affected by the Farakka 
dispute. India's link canal proposal is totally unacceptable to Bangladesh 
because the link canal proposal w ould unquestionably underm ine 
Bangladesh's economy, especially its food production sector. After 
experiencing the dire effects of the Farakka withdrawals in more than one- 
third of its territory, Bangladesh is apprehensive about water diversion from 
its other major river, the Brahmaputra. Bangladesh fears that such diversion 
would have untoward effects on the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra in 
Bangladesh, below the point at which water would be diverted for delivery 
into the link canal, which would further aggravate the existing damage and 
suffering inflicted by the Farakka diversion. Moreover, the excavation of 
such a canal would create untold trouble and repercussions in Bangladesh. 
It would not only cost hundreds of millions of dollars, but it would actually 
create a barrier between the northern part of Bangladesh and the rest of the 
country. It would also, pose grave engineering and hydraulic problems by 
intersecting various natural watercourses. And it would require thousands 
of acres of land, displacing innumerable poor peasants and taking an 
enorm ous quantity of fertile agricultural land out of cultivation with an 
inevitable adverse impact on the existing food crisis. Bangladesh estimated
133. Times of India. 4 March, 1985.
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that the link canal will entail a permanent loss of 1.3 million acres of land 
through water logging and land acquisition, an annual loss of crops valued 
at US $ 225 million, and the uprooting of 2.5 million people. It is a hard fact 
that each year Bangladesh is forced to im port massive quantities of 
food grains to meet the needs of its ever-increasing population. Bangladesh's 
inability to atta in  self-sufficiency in foodgrains creates perm anent 
dependence on ou tside  sources, which curta ils  its in ternational 
maneuverability, not to mention the severe drain that is imposed on its 
meagre foreign exchange reserves. Tied to all these are the environmental 
calamities which have undermined Bangladesh's economic well being in 
recent years. Aside from the massive physical destruction caused each year, 
the domestic production of foodgrains is also hit by the floods and droughts 
which have increased in frequency and intensity in recent years.
Since the expiry of the 1977 treaty in November 1982, Bangladesh had been 
experiencing uncertainty with every ad hoc, short term and piecemeal 
arrangem ents for the Ganges water sharing. In order to prevent such 
uncertainty, Bangladesh acceded to drop the guarantee clause but managed 
to secure an extension of 1977 treaty for only a period of 18 months. 
Nevertheless, Bangladesh persisted in its demand for a long term treaty and 
succeeded to have Nepal included in JRC to sort out long term resolution of 
the w ater problem. It has always been India's policy to keep the outside 
powers whether friends or adversaries out of regional affairs so that it could 
exert its power and influence to bear upon the countries of the region.
From the above discussion it appears that Bangladesh's non-compliant stand 
on the outstanding issues seems to have resulted from its need for economic 
survival thereby from its perception of vital ness of the issues. Having 
examined the instances in terms of condition 1, let us return to the point
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m ade earlier that condition 2 and condition 3 are inappropriate in 
understanding these instances. According to condition 2, non-compliance 
may be demonstrated if the ruler is ambitious. Ambition here involves an 
actualization of a dream- a dream to become a strong and effective ruler of a 
strong country. Surely the instances here are more fundamental than 
development of potential. It is more a question of life and death, a question 
of survival. Since the elements of vitalness are more conspicuous in these 
instances than ambition, condition 2 does not offer better explanation, than 
condition 1.
Similarly, condition 3 also does not offer satisfactory explanation, condition 
3 states that a political disinclination of the ruling party is likely to generate 
motivation to defy and lead to NCB while its inclination will not lead to 
NCB. Disinclination or inclination are opposite political orientations 
acquired by a political party through its subscription of some political ideas, 
views, beliefs and attitudes. In case of inclination there is a congruence of 
orientation between the dominant power and the small state. While in case 
of disinclination there is a divergence of orientation between the two. 
Taking condition 3 into consideration it is possible to argue that Ershad 
regime demonstrated non-compliance because it was politically disinclined 
towards India. Ershad's islamization policy do provides the indication of 
disinclination. There may be some tru th  in the assertion that political 
disinclination led Ershad regime to be non-compliant. However, such an 
explanation appears to be rather weak when compared with the explanation 
offered by condition 1. It is almost axiomatic that when existence is at stake 
utm ost priority is given to attend it. From this point, survival takes 
precedence over the rest, including political orientation. Hence,
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disinclination as an alternative explanation is not as satisfactory as is 
vitalness of issues.
So far, the conditions of motivation to defy were examined in understanding 
the instances of non-compliance during Ershad regime. According to our 
contextual framework, a state must also possess the capability to resist to be 
defiant tow ards its dom inant neighbour. The framework suggests that 
leadership strength, external political support, geo political leverage and 
people's power as non-tangible power resources that constitute capability to 
resist. If these factors are present and strong, non-compliance is likely to 
follow; if they are weak or absent non-compliance is not likely to follow. As 
mentioned before Bangladesh do not possess any geo political leverage 
against India. As such it did not play any role aiding Bangladesh to 
dem onstrate its NCB during the Ershad regime. Nevertheless, the other 
three elements did contribute towards Bangladesh's NCB during this phase.
Unlike Mujib, Ershad was not inhibited by any kind of personal gratitude or 
em otions tow ards India. Ershad's adm inistration appeared to be more 
assertive in implementing policy decisions. In matters of domestic policy, 
Ershad's regime faced far more public pressure and criticism than the Zia 
regime. He disregarded opposition, asserted his position and implemented 
his decisions. In matters of foreign relations, his assertiveness may be 
observed in his adoption of bold denationalization steps and new industrial 
policy to pursue closer ties with the West and the Middle East and chart a 
path independent of Indian influence. In addition to leadership strength, 
external political support and people's power have also contributed towards 
Bangladesh's defiance stance against India. Both these power resources were 
elaborated earlier in the analysis of Bangladesh's behaviour during Zia's 
reign which seem to have been further strengthened during Ershad's rule.
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CHAPTER 6
THE INDIAN RESPONSE AND THE EXTENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
OF NEPAL AND BANGLADESH
There are and always have been limits to how far the small states of South 
Asia can go in their resistance to Indian wishes, and if pushed too far India 
will not hesitate to respond. The focus of this chapter, therefore, is to 
understand the extent of non-compliance in the behaviour of the small states 
and to examine how their capability to resist (based on NTPRs) assist them to 
sustain the pressures exerted by the bigger state.
According to our contextual framework, given the conditions of motivation to 
defy, the extent of non-compliance is determined by the degree of capability 
to resist expressed in terms of non-tangible power resources (NtPR). The 
graphical presentation of the relationship between NCB and CR (based on 
NTPRs) is reproduced in the following page for reference. It was maintained 
that within certain policy contingency framework, as awareness of capability 
to resist increases, non-compliance is likely to increase. This stage is called 
the build-up stage. At this stage, with the increase of non-compliance the 
small state is likely to experience increasing counter resistance from the big 
power. Most small states may only defy upto a certain point called X. It is 
defined as the point at which the small state becomes aware that its capability 
to resist just balances with the coercive capability so far applied by the big 
state. The small state is also aware that if it crosses this point it is likely to 
evoke significant counter pressure from the big state which it finds extremely 
difficult to contain. Beyond point X, depending upon the changes in the 
policy contingency frameworks, three hypothetical behavioural responses are 
conceived. These responses are state of stalemate, sullen retreat and 
compulsive subjugation. If the small state chooses not to submit to counter
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Figure 6.1 : The Relationship between Capability to Resist
(CR) and Non-compliance
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pressures of the big states, then the increase in capability to resist (based on 
NTPRs) beyond point X is likely to lead to marginal or no increase in non- 
compliance due to its (small states) inability to withstand further counter 
pressure with the help of NtPRs. Line 'A' (state of stalemate) in figure 6.1 
represents this behavioural response which is characterized by a status quo in 
small states defiance. If the small state chooses to yield finding the counter­
pressure unbearable then two possible behavioural responses might follow: 
sullen retreat and compulsive subjugation. They are both compliant 
expressions and are represented by line B' and line 'C  in figure 6.1 
respectively. In case of sullen retreat (line B) the counter-pressure exerted by 
the big state on the small state is such that it only ensures small state's 
compliance without reducing the capability to resist (based on NTPRs). In 
case of compulsive subjugation, in addition to securing compliance the big 
state also attempts to reduce the small states' capability to resist.
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It m ay be noted that the NTPRs appear to be effective in certain policy 
contingency frameworks. In other policy contingency frmeworks they may 
only be effective to the extent of registration of grievances and not so much in 
influencing the stand held by the dom inant power. In these policy 
contingency frameworks, the extent of NCB demonstrated by small states 
(i.e., Nepal and Bangladesh) with the NTPRs depends on how hard the 
dom inant state (i.e., India) responds. The general trends in the behavioural 
expression of Nepal and Bangladesh, as emerged from this study, suggest 
that these states exhibited NCB (beyond registration of grievances) to the 
extent India allowed them to exhibit. It may, therefore, be acknowledged that 
the Ind ian  m otives played an im portant role in the extent of NCB 
dem onstrated by Nepal and Bangladesh. Although some attem pts were 
made to describe Indian response in general, the exploration of Indian motive 
in each instance of non compliance demonstrated by Nepal and Bangladesh 
could not be achieved.^ With this caveat in mind, the following analysis is 
geared to understand the extent of this in Nepali and Bangladeshi behaviour.
EXTENT OF NEPAL'S NON-COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR
The discussion in the earlier chapter on Nepal showed that the disposition of 
the regime of King Tribhuvan from 1950-55 lacked the motivation to defy and 
accordingly the government followed a compliant foreign policy. The main 
non-com pliance in the foreign policy of Nepal was witnessed in the 
M ahendra and Birendra regimes. Given their motivations to defy, both used 
their capabilities to resist (based on NTPRs) the dominant power, but their
1. The collection of data for such an exploration requires access to original sources (i.e., the 
Indian decision-m akers’ involvement in each instances, classified and unclassified  
official docum ents etc.). Data requiring detailed information was unavailable from 
secondary sources because of the lack of similar past studies. Securing such data was 
constrained by time, fund, access and other conditions of field setting.
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capability to resist acted as a countervailing force only up to a certain limit, 
beyond which it did not w ithstand Indian pressure, and Nepal reverted to 
compliant stance. The compulsions (highlighting the policy contingencies) 
which Nepal encountered while signing the trade and transit treaties with 
India exemplify the extent Nepal could stand up to its big neighbour. Nepal's 
experiences of economic pressures from India in 1962,1971,1975 and 1989 are 
points in this case. Basically, India exercised as much economic pressure as 
was necessary to ensure Nepali compliance. As one Nepali scholar holds,
the motives behind the various Indian pressures had never been 
economic; they were a concoction of politico-strategic concerns 
which India had expressed publicly and tried to deter Nepal 
effectively from deviating to a course which India felt was not in 
accordance with its interests.^
From the period 1955 to 1972 (with the exception of the period of Congress 
government from 1959-1960 ), one observes Nepal's growing defiance and its 
will to carry on its policies independently. During this period, in the foreign 
policy behaviour of Nepal, both the motivation to defy and the capability to 
resist were present. As a consequence of which, in the initial phase of this 
period , N epal's non-com pliance went to the build up stage. The 
establishment of relation with China, voting independently without following 
India's footsteps in the United Nations, the establishment of relations with 
India's staunch enemy Pakistan, dismissing the Congress led Parliament and 
directly ruling the country, and above all the introduction of the Panchayat 
system  are all instances of non-compliance in the build up stage of Nepali 
non-compliance. Nepal at this stage amassed all possible capabilities to back 
up  its non-compliant stance against India. For example, during King
2. Author's interview with a Nepali Scholar.
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M ahendra’s rule Nepal became stronger in terms of its leadership strength, 
gained external political support by cultivating and diversifying its external 
relations w ith third countries, and utilized its geopolitical leverage to the 
most by taking advantage of Sino-Indian rivalry. In effect, as Nepal went on 
to increase its power profile (with the non-tangible power resources), its non- 
compliant stance went on building up. Although India did not take Nepal's 
relations w ith China and other developments with ease, Kathmandu went on 
asserting itself against India. Indo-Nepali estrangement took another turn 
when Kathmandu signed a road building agreement with Beijing in 1961. 
The agreement was dubbed as an anti-Indian move and India accused Nepal 
as being liable to breach the Indian security system. This was the high point 
of Nepal's non-compliance. As Nepal gathered momentum in its non- 
compliant policy, Indian counter pressures became increasingly severe.
The first steps India took to make Kathmandu comply with its wishes, were 
to provide asylum to the Nepali rebels and encourage a terrorist campaign 
that was organized by the Nepali Congress leaders in India whose aim was to 
dismantle the royal regime. Nepal op>enly accused the Indian authorities for 
allowing the Nepali Congress and the affiliated political groups in India to 
organize and direct terrorist and other disruptive incidents in Nepal. In the 
beginning, the Congress activities were confined to sporadic attacks on 
governmental installations in areas adjoining the Nepal-India border. Later 
on their activities increased and became a cause of concern for the 
government of Nepal. A Nepali newspaper commented:
the mischief mongers come from India and run back to the Indian
territory after perpetrating their misdeeds. This is just like the
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American training of the Cuban rebels and helping them to stage 
revolt in Cuba. ^
India always maintained that the trouble had its roots inside Nepal itself. The 
Indian embassy in Kathmandu also issued similar denial. But as one Nepali 
scholar points out,
the widely publicized press conferences in Calcutta, and other Indian cities 
by the Congress leaders, who publicly avowed for the violent overthrow of 
the regime in Kathmandu, and armed raids into Nepal from organisation 
bases across the border were indisputable evidences of the usage of Indian 
territory for insurgent activities. ^
In fact, India was openly hostile to King Mahendra's overtures to Pakistan 
and China and hence was not at all inclined towards restricting the activities 
directed against the Kathmandu regime.
Kathm andu published a number of semi-official documents vehemently 
criticising India's alleged complicity in Nepali Congress sponsored terrorist 
activities in Nepal. Nepal also demanded of India not to provide sanctuary to 
the rebel leaders. But it was turned down by India on the ground that their 
action had not violated Indian law and they could not be subjected to 
extradition procedures. ^
On January 22 during King Mahendra's tour of Janakpur, a town in eastern 
Nepal, an assassination attempt was made on the king by throwing a bomb at 
the car on which he was travelling. Tulsi Giri, the foreign minister of Nepal,
3. Quoted in Sharma.Tagdish.Prasad..Nepal's Foreign Policy.1947-1962. an unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968,
4. Ibid.. p. 110.
5. Rose,Leo,E. Nepal: Strategy for Survival. Oxford University Press, p. 221.
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who was touring with the King charged India saying that the assassin had 
come from India. An anti-Indian demonstration took place in front of the 
Indian Embassy in Kathmandu on 26 January and effigies of Nehru and 
Congress leaders were burnt. Nepal consistently objected to the rebel use of 
the Indian territory for insurgent purposes. New Delhi however, refused to 
acknowledge the existence of such practices. Instead Nehru declared,
Nobody can guarantee an odd person not taking some guns or 
something of that kind (while crossing the border). But there is 
very little of it. Most of the trouble has been caused locally. ^
Nehru also advised the King rather bluntly while he was on a visit to New 
Delhi to open negotiation directly with the rebels. However, the tactics of 
armed raids with the connivance of the Indian authorities failed to repeat the 
success it had had against the Ranas in 1950-51. China provided the 
countervailing weight to the Indian support of the rebel cause. Also 
M ahendra had full public support which was engendered by India's 
paternalistic and patronising attitude towards Nepal in the aftermath of King 
Tribhuvan's restoration. This clearly indicated to the Indian government that 
the King was still not disposed to make the basic concessions demanded of 
him.
So far it appears that Nepal's power capability (generated from non-tangible 
power resources such as external political support e.g., China's support; 
popular pressure and popular support for King Mahandra and his leadership 
strength), withstood the Indian counter pressure with a certain degree of 
success and Nepal remained unchanged in its defiant stance. At this point 
Nepal's ability to maintain its defiant stance was overstretched when India 
added to its support for the Nepali rebels an unofficial and undeclared
6. Ibid.. p. 226.
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economic blockade of Nepal in September 1%2. This constituted a significant 
change in policy contingency framework. A num ber of minor incidents on 
the border were used to rationalize a total obstruction of trade transactions 
between the two countries. This blockade coincided with the Nepali national 
festival of Dashai and brought severe hardship for the Nepali population. 
Prices of daily necessities shot up overnight as a consequence of which Nepal 
suffered heavy damages along with a threat to its national security. This was 
a point described as 'Point X' in figure 6.1: a turning point of Nepali defiance 
tow ards compliance. After reaching this point, we notice a sort of sullen 
retreat (line B) in the behaviour of Nepal vis-a-vis. India.
This blockade, usually known as the Raxual Blockade, gave a shattering blow 
to Nepal and conveyed the message that landlocked Nepal should toe the 
line. Had the blockade continued for long, it would have been an economic 
cataclysm for Nepal.
Nepal was handicapped by its limited capability. As such King Mahendra 
subm itted to the Indian pressure and was compelled to alter its position of 
staunch defiance. Under these circumstances one would have expected a 
compulsive subjugation on the part of Nepal. Instead one finds Nepal only 
on the phase of sullen retreat. As a matter of fact. King Mahendra was on the 
verge of submitting to the Indian pressures had not there been instantaneous 
Chinese assurances of assistances. It appears that Nepal's level of capability 
to resist (based on popular support and popular pressure, leadership 
strength, external political support and geopolitical leverage) remained 
unchanged. However, Nepal realized that continued defiance would mean 
outstretching its power beyond the point at which such power capabilities 
w ould help contain Indian counter pressures. It may thus be maintained that 
such realization led Nepal to soften its position and comply to the Indian 
dem ands. The developments in the subsequent period appear to bear the
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point. For example, Nepal agreed not to allow the Chinese to act against 
India's vital interests in Nepal. This was evident from King Mahendra's 
subsequent decisions. He acceded to New Delhi's demand not to allow the 
Chinese to undertake any project in the Tarai region which is contiguous to 
Indian territory. He cancelled the agreement with China whereby the latter 
had undertaken to construct a portion of Nepal's East-West highway and 
handed it over to India. However, as mentioned earlier, such compliance 
cannot be treated as compulsive subjugation' rather may be treated as 'sullen 
retreat' (both as shown respectively by the lines C and B in figure 6.1) because 
the capability to resist (based on NTPRs) of Nepal still remained effective to 
some extent. As mentioned earlier that Nepal secured external political 
support in the form of Chinese assurances of assistance and used the 
geopolitical leverage gained from the Sino-Indian rivalry (with greater 
effectiveness particularly after the Sino-Indian war in October 1962 in which 
India received a humiliating defeat). Thus, at this stage Nepal did not comply 
unconditionally rather it was able to derive certain concessions from India by 
way of employing the NTPRs just mentioned. For example. King Mahendra 
secured Indian assurances that the Nepali rebels would not be allowed to 
organize themselves and operate against its political system. He also secured 
India's recognition to his Panchayat democracy and his agreement with China 
on the construction of the Kodari-Kathmandu road. He also secured Indian 
aid assistances along with India financed and executed schemes for Nepal's 
economic development.
These developments (i.e., the concessions given to India and the concessions 
received from India) roughly took place in a time span between the Raxual 
blockade and Sino-Indian war. The Raxual blockade that lasted only for a 
few days w as not so severe as compared to the subsequent blockades. 
Further, du ring  this period India's position in term s of security was
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precariously vulnerable due to the Chinese threats. Hence, for Nepal the 
sullen retreat was a very temporary phenomenon.
After the Sino-Indian war, China became an important factor in the foreign 
policy calculations of Nepal, and it started using China as a counterbalancing 
force to India. Besides m anipulating geopolitical leverages, King Mahendra 
actively sought to strengthen the capability to resist (based on NTPRs) by 
seeking international political support, by securing public confidence in and 
support for him and also by asserting his self more fully. As such in the later 
stage we see Nepal's non-compliance building up again.
The non-compliant stance reached another peak in Nepal's demand for the 
w ithdraw al of the Indian m ilitary mission and armed personnel from 
checkposts in the north along the Sino-Nepali border in 1969. Although India 
finally conceded Nepal's demand, it retaliated strongly by exerting pressure 
on Nepal by coupling the trade and transit treaty which was to expire in 
September, 1970, with the issue of the withdrawal of its military personnel 
from Nepal. The situation involving the trade and transit treaties reflected a 
change in policy contingencies and represented a volatile state (as shown in 
figure 6.1) signalling the approach of point X.
Nepal had always wanted India to concede transit rights in accordance with 
the UNCTAD resolution on transit trade of landlocked states. India did not 
refuse but made it clear that if international conventions were to replace 
bilateral transit arrangements, they should also apply to bilateral trade. The 
implications were not lost upon Nepal; it would mean drastic curbs on the 
existing bilateral facilities for free and unrestricted movement between both 
countries. Nepali business circle was alarmed at the suggestion, for they 
knew  their foreign trade was dominated by India.
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Dr. Tulsi Giri, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers in a Seminar in 
Tribhuvan University in August 1970, said that India and Nepal had different 
economic interests in spite of many common ones. Nepal could not be 
hoodwinked by the pretence that India had been giving Nepal all those 
facilities which a less developed country deserved. Why should India deny to 
a less developed country facilities it was itself demanding from the more 
developed ones?  ^ Hence, Nepal rem ained defiant and pressed for its 
demands despite Indian pressures and a stalemate was reached.
Failing to conclude a new treaty before the expiry of the 1960 treaty in 
September, 1970, Nepal proposed the extension of the existing agreement 
until a new one was concluded. India agreed to extend the treaty only until 
the end of 1970. This was again another pressure tactic to force Nepal to 
accept India's terms for negotiation, but further attem pts to reach an 
agreem ent before the end of 1970 also failed. Nepali spokesmen in 
Kathmandu asserted that their side made an "all out" bid to resolve mutual 
problems bu t it was India whose attitude was "unhelpful"®. Some veiled 
allegations were also made that New Delhi was inclined to destroy Nepal's 
economic development so that it would be perennially dependent on India.
Signs of stress began to appear in the Nepali economy. At the beginning of 
1971, Nepali trade and industry were plagued by an environm ent of 
uncertainty. The Nepalis organised public protests and demonstrations in 
front of the Indian embassy at Kathmandu and in Nepali towns near the 
border. Still rem aining defiant and pressing its points further, Nepal 
cam paigned against India in international forums that New Delhi was not
7. Far Eastern Eœnomic Review. September 19,1970 p. 69.
8. Far Eastern Eœnomic Review. 16 July, 1970, p. 45.
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providing due transit facilities for Nepal's overseas trade. However, all these 
efforts of the Nepali government to shift India from its position failed.
The failure of several rounds of negotiations to sort out trade and transit 
problems distressed Nepali trade and industry. When Prime Minister Kirti 
Nidhi Bista went to inaugurate the annual session of the Nepali Federation of 
Industry and Commerce, the federation chief complained that industry was in 
the dark about government measures to end the deadlock with India and said 
that the delay had led to a breakdown of industrial units in the private sector. 
The state run industries were equally hard hit by the absence of a trade treaty 
w ith India. The Soviet aided cigarette factory at Janakpur had to suspend 
production because raw materials failed to arrive from India. The cigarette 
factory was an important element in Nepal's policy of import substitution. 
On the strength of its production, Indian cigarettes had been pushed out of 
the Nepali m arket^ The synthetic textiles industry, developed in the mid 
sixties on the strength of imported raw materials from Japan and Hongkong, 
lost its m arket in India as a result of the Indian embargo. Nepal found the 
economic pressure exerted by India unbearable. Once again Nepal reached 
point X.
Domestic pressures for resumption of normal trading relations mounted. 
Business circles in Nepal grew critical of the administration. They were 
worried because they were saddled with heavy stock piles growing heavier 
for w ant of an outlet to the Indian market. Pressure continued to build up in 
trading and industrial sectors at Kathmandu over the absence of a trade 
agreem ent w ith India. But India remained indifferent. By taking advantage 
of Nepal's landlocked ness and its economic dependence, India exerted so
9. Far Eastern Economic Review. June 26,1971, p. 42.
10. Far Eastern Economic Review . July 17,1971, p. 17.
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much pressure by adopting such stalling tactics that Nepal could hardly 
match it with its capability to resist (based on NTPRs).
By m id -1971, the economy and trade of Nepal were so badly hurt that on 
August 13, 1971, Nepal was compelled to sign a less favourable trade and 
transit treaty with India. Mahendra met Indira Gandhi for 40 minutes and 
talked of the resolutions of all problems with goodwill and understanding.^^ 
Therefore, as a result of the changes in the policy contingencies Nepal was led 
to comply with Indian demands. However, such compliance, as before, was 
also a sullen retreat (line B in figure 6.1) because it did not involve curtailment 
of capability to resist (based on NTPRs).
The same drama was restaged in 1975 when strains developed over Nepal's 
impending demand for the signing of separate trade and transit treaties 
which India as a transit country was not willing to concede. This was 
followed by Nepal's proposal to declare itself a Zone of Peace and the anti- 
Indian dem onstration in Kathmandu organised against India's forcible 
annexation of Sikkim. When the Indians stepped into the Himalayan 
protectorate of Sikkim , the reverberations from their action shook the valley 
of Kathmandu also as it had shaken the rest of the world. The Nepalis filled 
with obvious alarm asked, "Who will be the next?" Anti Indian riots flared up 
in Kathmandu, and students smashed windows at the Indian embassy. India 
was furious. Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, warned Mr. 
Nagendra Prasad Rijal her counterpart, of unpleasant consequences if anti- 
Indian propaganda was not controlled.
The Indian Ambassador to Nepal Mr. M. K. Rasgotra immediately withdrew 
to New Delhi, had the trade talks stalled and threatened to seal the open 
border. Nepal was further told that all trade transactions would have to be
11. Far Eastern Economic Review . 10 fuly. 1971. p. 16.
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conducted in hard currency basis if N epal persisted in its policy of 
equidistance and independence. The Indian counter - pressure and its effects 
constituted changes in the policy contingency framework and Nepal failed to 
resist the Indian pressure. Thus, negotiations were held on Indian terms. The 
dilemma for a country short of foreign exchange reserve was obvious, and 
this, as Mrs. Gandhi recalled in February, 1980, "soon brought the Palace to its 
k n e e s . " ' 2  jsjot only that but overt threat also appeared in the Indian scholarly 
writing such as.
The time has come to speak plainly to the King and tell him that his 
proposal is an unfriendly act. If he persists in it, India will close 
the Indo-Nepal border, put adequate forces around it, as China has 
on the other, repatriate all Nepali aliens back from India to Nepal, 
and carry out a total crack-down on smuggling. Let King 
Birendra make his choice after weighing the full consequence of his 
gimmickry.
The language is reminiscent of instructions from a British Viceroy to a 
Resident on how he was to deal with a recalcitrant rajah. One Nepali scholar 
asks; is this a neighbourly reassurance or is this a declaration of war against 
the proposal of peace?
D uring this phase, Chinese friendship proved to be of limited utility to 
Kathmandu in terms of geopolitical leverage. In 1971 when India intervened 
militarily in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh against Pakistan, China did 
not do much to help its ally Pakistan except hurl some verbal abuse at India;
12. Kumar, Dhruba, "National Security and Foreign Policy of Nepal", in Malla, P Kamal, 
(ed.) Nepal: Perspective on Continuity and Chance. Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 
Kirtipur, Kathmandu, 1989,p. 387.
13. Mitra, N, "Meaning of Peace Zone for Nepal", Strategic Analysis. January 1982, p. 526.
14. Kumar, Dhruba, Op. Cit. p. 381.
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it was clear that the China connection had lost its value to Kathmandu as 
well. If China refrained from offering substantive support to protect 
Pakistan, it was unrealistic to assume that it would come to Nepal's rescue 
under a similar circumstances.
However, the behavioural expression of Nepal remained unchanged during 
this phase and we see Nepal responding the same way as we have seen 
earlier. Although China was no longer a strong factor in the foreign policy 
calculation of Nepal as it had been in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
nevertheless, other NTPRs such as popular pressure and popular support, 
external political support and leadership strength remained unchanged. 
Nepal's urge to non-comply was not totally shattered. Nepal persisted with 
its demand for separate trade and transit treaties.
Tension went on rising between India and Nepal over the latter's growing 
defiance and once again India affected an economic squeeze to bring 
K athm andu round to New Delhi's point of view. As one Nepali scholar 
recalls.
The stringent measures that India has taken to prevail upon its weaker 
neighbour and bring it to the negotiation table to accept Indian terms and 
resolve the problem are not unusual occurrences in the history of their 
relationship.^^
So w e have the same cycle of events: Nepali non-compliance behaviour, 
Indian counter-pressure, change in policy contingencies, Nepal's inability to 
contain Indian counter pressure with its NTPRs, point X, and sullen retreat. 
Unlike the previous situations, sullen retreat in this case, as discussed earlier,
15. Kumar Dhruba, ’Beyond 'Blockade': Some Long Term Policy Considerations For Nepal", 
in CNAS Forum. No. 10. October 1989, Kathmandu, p. 3.
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was associated w ith some decline (though not significant) of N epal's 
capability to resist.
In the subsequent period one observes the repetition for the fourth time of the 
same cycle of events; this culminated in India's imposition of economic 
blockade in 1989 but this resulted in compulsive subjugation in Nepal's 
behavioural expression.
In response to King Birendra's continued defiant stance, India once again 
began to exert pressure by manipulating the trade and transit vulnerability of 
Nepal. Indian pressure was particularly strong because of Birendra's 
insistence of the Zone of Peace proposal, which equated China with India and 
his purchase of arms for the Chinese sources. ___ ....
The economic squeeze of Nepal by India in 1989 was more serious than 
anything that had occurred since the 1960 change over of government in 
Nepal and India's overt disapproval of the King's action, and surprised and 
alarmed Nepal. Even the most harshly-worded Indian newspaper editorials 
felt that the 'big brother' in the relationship was behaving badly. They were 
concerned at the plight of the common Nepalis as a result of the blockade and 
voiced the need for interim measures to lessen the difficulties while new 
arrangements were to be worked o u t As the Daily Telegraph quoted one of
the Indian newspaper as saying, "As by far the larger of the two neighbours, it 
can afford to be generous". But the choice that India gave to Nepal was that 
they should choose either a "special" or a "normal" relation. By '"special" they 
m eant the pre-1955 relationship and "normal" m eant Nepal's process of 
equating China with India. Acceptance of a special relationship by Nepal i.e., 
complying w ith India's wishes, would be met by India with preferential 
treatm ent in both trade and transit matters. But if Nepal desired a normal
16. Daily Telegraph. April 6,1989.
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relationship with India and wished to carry on its policies independently, 
Indian policy would be tailored accordingly. One Indian newspaper warned 
Nepal,
If King Birendra and his advisers think the 'special relationship' can be 
terminated and Kathmandu can still negotiate a favourable transit treaty 
based only on international law and convention, they have made a serious 
mistake
The Indian pressure on Nepal continued unabated. On the stalemate of 1989, 
subsequent Nepali proposal to convene a meeting of Indo-Nepal Joint 
Economic Commission to sort out differences and begin fresh negotiations 
w as responded to negatively by India suggesting that the "forum is 
inappropriate to decide on matters related to present stalemate." When they 
failed to reach on an agreem ent by March 1, the Indian embassy in 
Kathmandu delivered a letter to Nepal's Minister of Commerce giving notice 
that the 1978 treaties would expire on March 23. India's general attitude was 
that if Nepal wanted a special economic relationship with India, and the 
generous economic treatment that implied, it would also have to accept a 
special security relationship.
Despite such pressure Nepal continued its defiance, thus contributing to the 
volatile state (as shown in figure 6.1). Kathmandu went on playing hard ball. 
Under the draft treaty signed in October, Nepal was to lift additional customs 
duties imposed on Indian goods and not extend such exemptions to any third 
country. Nepal said it would lift these duties only after treaties of trade and 
transit were signed. Kathmandu then proceeded, according to Indian press 
reports, to further ease customs duties on Chinese goods. Even after India 
gave notice in February that unless agreement on outstanding issues was
17. Indian Post, quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 May 1989,p. 24.
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reached by March 1 the old treaties would expire, Kathmandu refused to back 
down; it requested India to reconsider its proposal for a single treaty and 
offered to send a team to negotiate in New Delhi.
Indian pressure tightened rapidly. On March 31, 1989, a separate agreement 
expired under which Nepal had purchased oil from third countries. The non 
renewal of this agreement was a severe blow to Nepal's fuel supply. On June 
23 still another agreement, under which Nepal was allotted warehouse space 
in the Calcutta port, expired and was not renewed. Indian authorities also 
became particularly stringent in monitoring transit through the two crossing 
points that remained open, and they refused to supply railway wagons for 
the movement of goods between Nepal and Bangladesh. Under a swapping 
arrangem ent with the Indian Oil Corporation, Nepal had for many years been 
buying oil from third countries which was unloaded on the Indian coast, far 
away from the Himalayan kingdom. Because the country has limited storage 
facilities, it was stored in India and when it was needed, India supplied an 
equivalent am ount to Nepal from its own oil stores close to their common 
border. In return India was paid storage and handling charges.
The oil agreem ent between the two countries was to run until the end of 
March. But the supplies to Nepal were stopped more than a week before its 
expiry. In trying to justify this action, Indian diplomats argued that, since the 
export of oil was not normally allowed by India, its supplies were therefore, 
halted as soon as the trade and transit treaties ended. The government in 
Kathmandu, complained that oil bought by the Kingdom was in fact being 
stored in India, and not allowed into Nepal.
India had closed down 13 of 15 transit points on its border with Nepal. The 
two major crossing points at Raxual and Jogbani were left open to permit 
essential goods such as medicines, baby foods, and cement to reach the
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Nepali people against whom  India said it held no anim us. Under 
international law a landlocked country has a right to only one transit route to 
the sea, so leaving two open was a gesture of Indian magnanimity. This also 
allowed New Delhi to deny that it was blockading Nepal. Nonetheless, the 
message, according to an Indian government spokesman was : "Be prepared 
to reciprocate if you want special privileges."
A western diplomat in Kathmandu said, "Nepal has found it easy to have 
India portrayed as a bully, because it is a bully. Screwing the cordon tighter 
around this pitifully poor country is a reaction wildly out of proportion. But 
of course it fits well into the pattern of belligerent behaviour India has 
displayed in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and e l s e w h e r e .
A large number of entry points scattered across the border had enabled Nepal 
to procure goods at convenient places in India and take them in. But now 
with only two entry points, Nepal was faced with the daunting task of 
transporting all these goods first inside the m ountainous country and 
thereafter to the eastern and western parts. Within 72 hours of India's closure 
of the border points, strict rationing of petrol and kerosene was introduced 
throughout Nepal. Motor traffic on the road was halved. Cabinet ministers 
and top ranking officials were seen walking to their offices. At the peak of the 
tourist season, all this was particularly bad news for the Nepali economy. 
The government announced an immediate reduction in the price of electricity 
and firewood, which led to a sudden increase in the consumption of wood. A 
country already suffering from serious deforestation could hardly afford that. 
One former editor of a Pakistani newspaper commented that the attem pt to 
"starve" Nepal " . . .  is probably the most reprehensible act of domination by 
any bigger neighbour against a smaller neighbour in recent international
18. Quoted in The Times. June 30,1989.
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politics; far worse morally than what the Americans did in Grenada or the 
Russians in Afghanistan."
India's use of economic blockade, though less damaging than any overt 
military action, had nevertheless inflicted greater harm to Nepal's economy 
which cannot be easily quantified, and such measures in the long run create 
social dislocations and threaten the security interests of the country.
In the absence of the treaties, Nepal's landlocked geographical position and 
the distance to the nearest port in India tremendously raised the cost of trade. 
The discontinuity that followed, given Nepal's fragile economic base, has 
weakened the country's economy to the extent that a long recuperative period 
will be required. The economic ramifications of the crisis in relations with 
India have already been made clear; the growth in the national economy 
declined from the planned 5% to 1.5% in 1989-90.^®
Nepal still remained defiant. In September 1989, King Birendra met Rajiv 
Gandhi at the ninth Non-aligned Movement summit in Belgrade. The King 
urged the prime minister of India not to link security to the trade and transit 
issues, but Gandhi insisted on such a linkage. Meanwhile in Kathmandu, as 
news report confirmed, anti-Indian sentiment reached perilously close to 
mass hysteria.21 Students processions protested against India's "high­
handedness". The Tribhuvan University and colleges were closed to avoid 
demonstrations. In Kathmandu an Indian photographer came close to being 
assaulted. The Nepalis consider the treaty archaic and unreasonable. A
19. Quoted in Guardian. 17 May, 1989.
20. Kumar, D., 'Managing Nepal's India Policy?' Asian Survey. Vol XXX, No. 7, July 1990, p.
21. India Todav. May 15,1989,p.49.
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Nepali bureaucrat asks, "Why should we be tied to the apron strings of India 
and not have the liberty to get into collaborations with other countries".
The treatment meted out to the Lok Sabha Speaker Balram Jakhar, who had 
been invited to the Rastriya Panchayat {the Nepali Parliament) in 1989, 
show ed the extent of anti-Indian feeling prevalent in Nepal. In the 
parliam ent speaker after speaker reproached India and finally a member 
stood up and shouted slogans against "Indian e x p a n s io n is m " .^3 As Bista, a 
former prime minister of Nepal puts it,
We no longer have a special relationship. This is a thing of the past. The 
Nepalis will stick to their national aspirations. They have suffered and 
they will suffer. But they will never give up their rights as a landlocked 
country.
Nepal's Foreign Minister Shailendra Kumar Upadhya asserted that, 'any 
country when it asserts its independence in a situation like this, has to suffer. 
In the long run, suffering can produce good results'.
In the face of persistent Indian pressure, the NTPRs such as leadership 
strength, geopolitical leverage, popular pressure and popular support and 
external political support failed to provide the required strength to match 
Indian response and maintain continued defiance.
In fact, as noted earlier, the effectiveness of geopolitical leverage as an NTPR 
had greatly diminished. When Nepal approached China during the trade 
treaty negotiations for Chinese assistance, nothing substantial resulted. The
22. Quoted in Ibid.. p. 50.
23. Ibid.. p. 52.
24. Ibid. p. 55.
25. Quoted in Independent. 30 April, 1989.
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Chinese were sympathetic, however, they were in no position to offer the 
kind of political and economic help and assistance Nepal required to 
withstand India's demands, and made this clear to Nepal, Although 40% of 
Nepal's foreign trade is with India (down from 95% two decades ago), land­
locked Nepal is still dependent on India's goodwill. The fact that Nepal's sole 
viable access to the world being through India and not the thousands of miles 
through China, left Nepal with little choice. Moreover as Bhabani Sen Gupta, 
a close observer of Indian sub-continental politics observed,
India's military muscle acquired a punch which was tragically 
lacking in 1962. India also emerged as the world's fourth strongest 
military power, with a million plus strong armed force and 
significant armoured and air striking capabilities. With all its 
nuclear armour, China's conventional punch is probably less 
forceful today than it was in 1962.^^
Furthermore, as Nepal's economic hardship increased, popular pressure and 
popular support as an NTPR started to decline and mass discontent with the 
King's governm ent began to heighten. It was India's tactic to deliberately 
pursue the pace of a stalled trade negotiations to destabilize Nepal and then 
support anti-monarchy forces to bring about a radical restructuring of Nepal's 
political system. When the movement was launched against the King in 
Nepal in end 1989, Indian leaders and political parties gave their support. A 
section of the government controlled media in Kathmandu reported that the 
Indian embassy in Kathmandu had withdrawn Rs. 6 million (US$ 387,000) 
from the bank on the eve of student demonstration. The implication was that
26. Bhabani Sen Gupta in 'China as a threat’, World Focus Nov-Dee. 1989.
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the money was used to organize protests. Whereas the embassy countered 
that the money was withdrawn to pay pensions to Gorkha soldiers.^^
When Birendra government attem pted to check the crisis, both V. P. Singh 
and Rajiv Gandhi made statem ents condem ning the crackdown and 
described the measures as state violence. Various Indian political parties also 
gave encouragement and reportedly, financial support to the Nepali Congress 
and other parties. The Indian Janata party leader Chandrashekhar (who later 
became the prime minister of India) in a statement at a Nepali Congress 
meeting which commenced in January 9 at Kathmandu promised to help the 
Nepalis in their struggle to overthrow the present panchayat system in Nepal.
As a result of the mass movement encouraged and supported by India, 
Birendra in the end had to climb down. He dissolved the National Panchayat, 
lifted the 30 year-old ban on political parties, and asked opposition leaders to 
form a multi-party coalition government. On April 1990, the Nepali Congress 
Party's acting President, K. P. Bhattarai, was sworn in as prime minister. All 
these marked changes in the policy contingencies.
The new government signed the treaty complying with the Indian demands. 
Nepal's compliance at this phase represent compulsive subjugation as shown 
by the line C in figure 6.1. The preceding analysis reveals that India not only 
secured compliance but was also able to reduce the level of Nepal's capability 
to resist. Besides diminished effectiveness of geopolitical leverage, India 
successfully manipulated the popular pressure as an NTPR working against 
it. More importantly, India successfully removed the king and his leadership 
strength (an NTPR) from the vital position of decision making ^  Hence, given
27. Far Eastern Economic Review. 4 May 1989, p. 25.
28. The King is now only a nominal head of state
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the decline in capability to resist (based on NTPRs), Nepal's compliance at 
this stage may only be categorized as compulsive subjugation.
The analysis in this section reveals that Nepal with the help of non-tangible 
power resources remain defiant only to a limited extent. It also indicates that 
perhaps Nepal could have remained defiant a little longer (i.e., move the 
point X further) if it had commanded some tangible power resources such as 
stronger economy, or if it had been able to mobilise wider diplomatic support. 
But by now the attention of the World was focussed on the collapse of Soviet 
power.
EXTENT OF BANGLADESH'S NGN-COMPLIANT BEHAVIOUR
The discussion on the previous chapter on Bangladesh showed that the Mujib 
governm ent was more or less compliant to India. There was a considerable 
convergence of interests between the government of Bangladesh and the 
governm ent of India. The Awami League government subscribed to Indian 
political views and ideologies which in turn led India to consider Mujib as a 
loyal friend and Bangladesh as a faithful ally of India and believe that 
Bangladesh would subscribe to India's view of the world. But unlike the 
Awami League government, the governments of Zia and Ershad were defiant 
towards India.
Given their m otivations to defy, these two governm ents used their 
capabilities to resist (based on NTPRs) the dominant power. The NTPRs 
which constituted the capability to resist for these two governments were 
leadership strength, people's power and external political support. Given a 
certain policy contingency framework, these elements acted as a conterveiling 
force only upto a certain limit, beyond which their effectiveness tended to
326
diminish. The outcome of Bangladesh’s efforts to resolve the Farakka dispute 
(in its favour) exemplify the limit to which Bangladesh is capable of defying 
India with the help of its NTPR. Analysis of Bangladeshi behaviour from 
1975-1990 suggests a build up stage, two consecutive sullen retreats and a 
state of stalemate. Let us examine the extent of Bangladesh's NCB in some 
detail.
The government of Ziaur Rahman, after assuming power in 1975, had been 
increasingly defiant tow ards India. This government possessed both the 
m otivation to defy and the capability to resist (based on NTPRs). 
Consequently, at the initial phase, Bangladesh's non-compliance went to the 
build-up stage as shown in figure 6.1. Zia's government persisted in pursuing 
policies which were far less receptive to Indian sentiments and concerns. The 
condemnation of the peace and friendship treaty concluded by the Awami 
league government, the amendment of the constitution which transformed 
the country from the status of a secular nation to that of a Islamic state and 
from socialism to free economy, the warming up of relationship with the 
M uslim  countries and Pakistan, the United States and China, the 
internationalising of the water issue are all instances of non-compliance in the 
build up stage. Bangladesh at this stage amassed all possible capabilities to 
back up its non-compliant stances against India. As is shown in the previous 
chapter, Bangladesh became stronger in terms of leadership strength, gained 
external political support by coming out of the Indo-Soviet axis and 
diversifying its external relations and utilising them in its own favour. An 
additional resource during this stage was the presence of strong anti-Indian 
feeling. One notices that as Bangladesh went on increasing its power profile 
(of course with the non-tangible power elements), its defiance continued to 
increase. India, who was already apprehensive as a result of the change over 
of pow er in 1975, hardened its attitude and behaviour in response to
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Bangladesh's continued defiance. India began to take measures and 
increasingly exerted greater pressure on Bangladesh. For example, India 
began to provide political asylum to the opponents of Zia regime and started 
to assisting and arming them so that they may undertake armed incursions 
across the Indo-Bangladesh border. Moreover, Indian patronage and 
assistance to the insurgents in Chittagong Hill Tracts despite Bangladesh's 
repeated protests made the country increasingly vulnerable and politically 
unstable. Independent reports published in 1988 also confirmed the 
involvement of the Indian Intelligence Agency, RAW in anti-state activities in 
Bangladesh.29
At the same time, India also started extracting water unilaterally from the 
Ganges. Bangladesh protested that "India cannot unilaterally withdraw 
w aters from  common rivers w ithout due regard to the consequences 
dow nstream ."30 The then foreign minister of Bangladesh Prof. Shamsul Haq 
expressed concerns about India's unilateral action, citing Indian Press Reports 
which described the Ganges as an Indian river. The new regime said that 
India was using the Farakka dispute to upset the country to impose a more 
pliant regime. Despite the pressures, Bangladesh's remained unchanged in its 
defiant stance. It rejected the link canal proposal of India and handed over a 
report to India categorically stating that the "link canal proposal is legally 
unjustifiab le , technically impractical, econom ically and ecologically 
disastrous" and that "it is untenable and above all u n n e c e ssa ry ." 3 i India 
continued to put counter pressure on Bangladesh. When Bangladesh insisted 
for negotiations India adopted stalling techniques and expressed apathy 
tow ards the issue. All bilateral negotiations failed. Bangladesh needed
29. Asia Year Book. 1989, p. 128.
30. N ew  York Times. 6 October, 1976.
31. Dawn, 30 January, 1981.
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something more potent to arrive at a solution acceptable to it. Despite India's 
dislikings, Bangladesh began to internationalize the water issue. As a result 
of its efforts there was a growing awareness in the international community 
regarding Bangladesh's w ater problems. Financial Times of London wrote 
that Bangladesh was try ing  to secure help to dissuade India from 
withdrawing large amounts of water from the G anges.32 Dawn mentioned 
that India's unilateral withdrawals indicated its insistence on upper riparian 
country's privilege of acting a rb i tra r i ly .33 The People's Daily stated that since 
the change over of power in Bangladesh, India had been disregarding the 
vital issue of life and death and had been putting pressure on Bangladesh 
through withdrawing w ater u n ila te r a l ly .34 To muster diplomatic support 
Bangladesh took the issue to Islamic Conference and Com monwealth 
summit. In addition to seeking international support, the most significant 
step that it took was seeking international mediation by taking the water issue 
to the United Nations. Bangladesh requested in the General Committee 
meeting of the United Nations on 23 September 1976 to include the Farakka 
problem in the agenda of the General Assembly and to allocate it to Special 
Political Committee. India opposed this by arguing that the issue was 
bilateral. The Soviets also took to India's side and expressed their 
reservations. But Bangladesh received general support from the countries of 
all regions and succeeded to have the issue incorporated inspite of opposition 
from India and Soviet Union. However, in the face of Indian counter 
lobbying, Bangladesh failed to get what it wanted from the special political 
committee i.e., international mediation to arrive at a solution acceptable to it. 
That Bangladesh's move was frustrated by Indian counter-lobbying may be
32. Z. A. Khan, (ed.), Basic Documents on Farakka Conspiracy. Dacca, 1977, p. 185.
33. Ibid., p. 185.
34. Ibid. p. 179.
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evidenced by the statement of the then Defence Minister of India Jagjivan 
Ram on 10 August 1977 when he reminded Rajya Sabha that a stage had come 
when Bangladesh had taken the issue to the UN and that it was due to the 
efforts of the friends of the non-aligned nations the issue could be brought 
back to the bilateral negotiations.^^ In the Special Political Committee of the 
UN General Assembly no significant debate took place except Bangladesh's 
presentation of its case and India's reiteration of its position that the problem 
was bilateral. According to B. M. Abbas,
Most of the countries either because they were not familiar with the 
subject which was totally new to UN or because of their 
unwillingness to displease Bangladesh or India were not prepared 
to participate in the debate. A few countries such as Upper Volta,
Syria, Paraguya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China were prepared 
to participate in the general debate, but they were hesitant to speak 
out before ascertaining how the issue would develop and 
consequently were unwilling to be the first.^
Bangladesh realised that although some countries might have informally 
appreciated its cause, in international politics being sympathetic did not 
imply correspondence of interests. For Bangladesh it was a sort of political 
lesson to be aware of the realities of its position. Being one of the poorest 
countries of the world and dependent heavily on foreign financial assistance 
it d id  not have any effective influence to bear upon the political interest
35. Statesman. 10 August 1977.
36. Abbas, B. M., The Ganges Water Dispute. University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1984, p. 
59-60.
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groups in the international arena in support of its cause, genuine or
otherwise.37
Although external political support (EPS) failed to secure for Bangladesh 
what it had expected from the United Nations exercise, it did eventually help 
its obtain favourable terms in the 1977 Agreement on water. After the UN 
exercise, India realised that sympathy of the neutral observers was for 
Bangladesh. Jagjivan Ram's statement in the Rajya Sabha on 10 August 1977 
confirms it. In his statement he told the members of the Rajya Sabha to 
remember that in the international forum the sympathy was for the weaker 
party (Bangladesh).38 in addition, as India stressed on bilateralism in the UN, 
it w as under the obligation to prove to the international community that 
bilateralism works. India's realization of international community's support 
for Bangladesh and its obligation to prove the effectiveness of bilateralism led 
to India's softening of its attitude to some extent Hence, it may be inferred 
that as a result of Bangladesh's international exercise to gain EPS, India 
became relatively more responsive and willing to consider Bangladesh's 
position. What followed next was a process of hard and intense negotiation. 
Finally, Bangladesh was able to conclude a water agreement in 1977 with 
some favourable terms with the help of its NTPRs.
Following its success in concluding a favourable agreement, Bangladesh 
continued to strengthen relations with other countries particularly with the 
m uslim  countries, Pakistan and China. During this period Bangladesh forged 
closer cooperation with the neighbouring South Asian countries and 
cam paigned for the creation of South Asian Association for Regional 
C ooperation (SAARC). India had always rem ained apprehensive of
37. Begum, Khurshida, Tension over the Farakka Barrage: A Techno Political Tangle in 
South Asia. University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1988, p. 172.
38. Statesman. 10 August 1977.
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Bangladesh's diversification of relation particularly with China and Pakistan. 
It viewed Bangladesh's move for the creation of SAARC with great suspicion 
and considered the smaller South Asian neighbours as banding together 
against it. India also became suspicious on Bangladesh's proposal to include 
Nepal in resolving w ater dispute. Since, bilateralism , rather than 
multilateralism offered India greater freedom to manoeuvre, it opposed 
Bangladesh's proposal. In fact all these took place within the back drop of an 
hardened attitude of Congress government which succeeded the Janata 
government.
India once again began to m ount counter pressure on Bangladesh and 
Bangladesh proceeded tow ards point X. For example, Hasina Wajed, 
daughter of Shiekh Mujibur Rahman returned to Bangladesh from her asylum 
in India. It was believed by political analysts in Bangladesh that India 
engineered her return  to destabilise Zia government.39 Pressure was 
increased alm ost sim ultaneously. As a result of the changes in policy 
contingencies we have a sullen retreat in Bangladesh's behaviour. It complied 
temporarily perceiving itself unable to contain further Indian pressure with 
the help of its NTPRs.
This instance of sullen retreat is related to the ownership claims over the 
newly formed island of South Talpatty or as the Indians called 'New Moore' 
island. This small island was formed in the estuary of Haribhanga river out 
of silt depositions. The mainstream of the river marked the border between 
the two countries. As the river enters the Bay of Bengal it divides itself into 
several branches. The disagreement as to which branch constitutes the 
mainstream, gave rise to conflicting ownership claims. It may be mentioned 
here that the island was first noticed in 1971 by the Indian navy and its
39. Author's interview with a Bangladeshi political analyst.
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position was notified to the British and American navies so that it could be 
included as part of India on charts of the area. Bangladesh in an white paper 
detailing its position said, "This was at a time when the people of Bangladesh 
were engaged in a life and death struggle during its war of independence." 
However, Bangladesh pointed out that the former Indian Prime Minister 
Morarji Desai had agreed to a joint survey of the island. If that survey 
showed that the island belonged to India, one Bangladesh official indicated 
his country would give up its claim.40 But the government of Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi questioned whether Mr. Desai ever agreed to a joint survey and 
instead offered data from its ow n survey that it said proved the island 
belongs to India.^i
In May 1981, Indian naval ships carrying helicopters landed troops, built 
settlements and hoisted Indian flags on the New Moore Island. Bangladesh 
asked India to withdraw personnel it had landed on the island and dismantle 
settlements built there. In reply an Indian spokesman in New Delhi said that 
the question did not arise because the island was Indian territory.
Former editor of Indian newspaper Hindustan Times, Mr. B. G. Verghese, in an 
article published in India's Mainstream wrote: "India's procedure in New 
Moore (South Talpatty) Island has not merely aggravated relations with 
Bangladesh but must have undoubtedly alarmed Bhutan, Nepal and Sri 
lanka. W hatever procedure India adopted to assert its claim on the island 
smacked of chauvinism. "42
40. International Herald Tribune. 14 September 1981.
41. Ibid.
42. Quoted in Dawn. 26 July, 1981.
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Bangladesh denounced this action of India as naked aggression'43 Prof. 
Shamsul Huq, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh said that if India refused to 
honour its agreements and not remove its armed crafts, personnel, structures, 
materials and flags from South Talpatty Island, Bangladesh would decide on 
adopting "appropriate measures as the situation warranted."44 Leaders of 
various political parties of Bangladesh, labour and student's union and other 
organisations also denounced the Indian action and demanded immediate 
and  unconditional w ithdraw al of the Indians from the area. The 
demonstrators also burned the effigy of Indira Gandhi and raised anti-Indian 
slogans.
Subsequently, it was reported  that Bangladesh intervened militarily. 
Bangladeshi gunboats evoked responses from India. But Indian naval show 
dow n was so formidable that Bangladesh immediately withdrew. As Daily 
Telegraph reported, "Bangladeshi gun boats were said to be nosing around the 
island to try to frighten off the Indian Army contingent based there, and 
finally New Delhi sent there a gun boat of its own - or, rather a warship. The 
Bangladeshis have faced down "Big Sister" and continue their claims."45
Bangladesh's move to withdraw  its gun boats was clearly a sullen retreat. 
Bangladesh here had just reached Point X (figure 6.1). Given the Indian 
military strength, continued military presence of Bangladesh in the island or 
engagem ent with Indian navy would have meant evoking such response 
from India which Bangladesh could not in anyway contain. So Bangladesh 
decided to retreat thereby complying temporarily. Since, following the 
incident, India did not attem pt to size down Bangladeshi capability to resist
43. International Herald Tribune. 14 September, 1981.
44. Quoted in Dawn. 29 May, 1981.
45. Daily Telegraph. 25 May 1981.
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(based on NTPRs), Bangladesh's behavioural expression cannot be labelled as 
compulsive subjugation.
Following this sullen retreat we have another one rather in a quick 
succession. This time it was related to the water dispute. Although EPS had 
helped Bangladesh achieve some favourable terms in the 1977 Agreement, in 
essence, it (along with other NTPR) did not enable it to resolve the problem 
permanently. As the agreement was drawn for five years, it meant that rather 
than solving it permanently the problem was only deferred until a later date. 
It will be recalled from the foregoing chapter that the Congress Party was all 
along very critical of the agreement. Given that the Congress Party was in 
pow er with all its strong attitudes towards Bangladesh, Bangladesh could 
envisage nothing but trouble after the expiry of the agreement in November, 
1982. The experiences of dry season during 1975-77 terrified Bangladesh of 
the prospect of not having any agreement. All these marked changes in 
policy contingencies. The new government of Bangladesh realised that point 
X was about to be reached and if Bangladesh did not comply with India then 
it m ight have to pass through severe conditions of dry season again. 
Therefore, after the military government of Ershad came to power in March 
1982, the dialogue towards normalization of the relationship between the two 
countries was initiated. In October 1982, Ershad paid an official visit to India 
and held a meeting with Indira Gandhi. In that meeting, a Memorandum of 
U nderstanding -1982' on the water issue was signed between the two 
governm ents in which the 80% "Guarantee Clause" of Bangladesh's share of 
the Ganges w ater in the water Agreement of 1977 was dropped. These 
developm ents indicate a softening of Bangladesh's position by way of 
complying w ith the Indian demand. Hence, this may again be described as 
sullen retreat' on the part of Bangladesh. The Indian threat of non-renewal of 
the 1977 agreement forced Bangladesh to comply. However, it did not curtail
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Bangladesh's non-tangible power resources- leadership strength, external 
political support and people's power all remained unchanged. As the Indian 
counter-pressure did not affect the level of capability to resist (based on 
NTPRs), Bangladesh's behavioural response cannot be said to be compulsive 
subjugation (Line C in figure 6.1).
But after these two consecutive sullen retreats the subsequent developments 
showed that Bangladesh's non-compliance was resumed. The expulsion of 
the Soviet diplomats for their 'prejudicial activities' in Bangladesh, the 
strengthening of relationship with the muslim states, its role in the United 
Nations and Non-Aligned Movement, and its firm stand on Afghanistan and 
Kampuchea all testify to its non-compliant stance.
In 1983, Indian security forces blockaded Angarpota and Dahagram — two 
Bangladeshi enclaves surrounded by Indian territory. About 12,000 people 
faced starvation due to this blockade. New Nation, an independent English 
Daily of Bangladesh in a despatch from Panbari reported that some of the 
Bangaldeshi citizens mortgaged their land to Indian citizens to raise money 
for living since they could not come to the main part of Bangladesh for work.
Despite pressures Bangladesh went on asserting itself against India by 
diversifying its relationship with United States and the developed countries 
of the West. It also demanded a permanent treaty on the water issue and 
intensified its efforts at internationalizing the Farakka dispute. It also rejected 
Indian assistance during the flood by returning the Indian helicopters sent to 
help flood victims. Given the policy contingency framework, the events after 
the expiry of the MOU of 1982 in April, 1984 suggest a state of stalemate in 
Bangladesh's behavioural expression. If India had signed a perm anent 
agreement; or if India had renewed the agreement according to Bangladesh's 
desire everytime it expired; or if Bangladesh had acceded to Indian demands
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of its share of water and link canal proposal; or if Bangladesh had abandoned 
its prof>osal to incorporate Nepal in the water talks, then we could not have 
m aintained that Bangladesh was in a state of stalemate. But none of these 
happened, India did not sign a permanent agreement and did not renew the 
agreem ent when Bangladesh asked for or the way Bangladesh desired it. 
When Bangladesh requested for an extension of the 1982 MOU after its expiry 
on April 1984, India remained silent on the issue. India once again adopted 
stalling techniques and Bangladesh once again went through a terrible dry 
season (1984-85). However, subsequently the MOU was again extended in 
1985 for another three years term. After the expiry of the extension period of 
the MOU in October 1988, Bangladesh on several occassions approached 
India to reach a new agreement but India did not respond. In December 1988, 
Bangladesh also proposed a permanent treaty with terms similar to that of the 
MOU, but India again refused. Despite repeated efforts no agreement was 
reached after the expiry of the MOU in October 1988, and Bangladesh 
continued to pass through terrible dry seasons. These events illustrated that 
Bangladesh did not achieve further (than defying India by refusing to accept 
w hat India had demanded) with the help of its NTPR. Then again, 
Bangladesh did not comply significantly. Bangladesh consistently refused to 
accept India's demand for water at its expense and consistently refused to 
accept India's link canal proposal. Referring to the link canal proposal, Rajiv 
Gandhi had reportedly said once that:"We will dry and pour at our will 
unless you agree to the link-canal."46 But still Bangladesh did not accede to 
Indian demand and continued to bear the adversities caused by India's 
w ithdrawal of water throughout several dry seasons. It may be mentioned 
here that although there was a change of governm ent during 1981-82, 
Bangladesh's NTPRs (i.e., leadership strength, external political support and
46. Quoted in Courier. 16-22 February 1990.
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people's power) during this phase (i.e., Ershad regime) remained more or less 
same as the earlier phase (i.e., Zia regime). In addition to NTPR, Bangladesh 
during Ershad's regime also had the motivation to defy.
Under the prevailing policy contingency framework, Bangladesh with its 
capability to resist (based on NTPRs), was only able to defy India by refusing 
to accept w hat India had demanded of it but failed to defy further by 
asserting its will on India and achieve its goal of an acceptable share of water 
on a long term basis. This revealed extent of Bangladesh's non-compliance 
i.e., it was only able to refuse to accept what India had dem anded of it. 
Bangladesh's level of defiance remained constant through 1984 to 1990. It did 
neither comply nor did it defy further (despite its wishes) with the help of its 
capability to resist (based on NTPRs). This characterized a state of stalemate. 
India did not break the stalemate perhaps because it had nothing to lose as a 
result of the stalemate; in fact it was Bangladesh who had to swallow the 
effects of the stalemate.
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CONCLUSION
S u m m ary  of F in d in g s
There is a saying in South Asia that if you live in a river with a crocodile you 
should not fight him, but we have seen instances where Nepal and 
Bangladesh have defied popular wisdom by scuffling with the crocodile. In 
its relationship with both Bangladesh and Nepal, India is undoubtedly 
powerful. Nevertheless, the disposition of the small states to non-comply the 
big state is not inhibited. Their smallness did not deter them from 
registering their grievances and carving out an independen tsta tu s for 
themselves even to the annoyance of the big power. They have proved that 
they are not India's preserve. Nehru in his 'Discovery of India' had once 
written that the 'small nation state is doomed; it may survive as a cultural 
autonomous area but not as an independent political entity.' But history has 
proved otherwise. The small states have not only survived, they also 
challenge the status quo. The small states under study have been non- 
compliant and declined to yield to the wishes of the powerful on issues 
which impinged on their very survival (physically, economically and 
politically). The issues themselves were compelling and, as such, Nepal and 
Bangladesh were left with no choice but to stand up with the kind of 
behaviour unexpected by the big power, over trade and transit issues in the 
case of Nepal and, in the case of Bangladesh, water rights.
The trade and transit treaties of Nepal signed with India in 1950, 1960, 1971 
and 1978 regulated Nepal's trade and transit with India and rest of the 
world. These treaties were a source of constant conflict between the two 
countries because India used these treaties to maintain its economic edge
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over Nepal, while adopting various measures to negotiate for liberalizing the 
provisions of the treaties in its own favour.
One of the serious consequences of Nepal's landlockedness combined with 
the virtual imperviousness of the Himalayan range on the north, is that its 
trade transactions have to rem ain alm ost confined to India. These 
geographical determ inants also mean that Nepal has to depend on India 
absolutely for the access to the sea needed for extending its economic 
relations beyond India with the rest of the world. India, therefore, enjoys an 
exclusive and asymmetrical economic advantage in transactions with Nepal. 
This Indian advantage is not only a result of Nepal's landlockedness but also 
a product of the sheer influence of a far stronger contiguous economy. 
Hence, it is not surprising to notice citations in the literature describing 
Nepal as an 'appendage of the broader Indian economy'. Despite, these 
deterministic realities, Nepal has time and again strongly defied India when 
the issue was vital to its survival. In its economic and trade policies, Nepal 
faces the "hallmarks of vulnerabilities" that Singer has pointed elsewhere.' i 
Thus a country, which is already vulnerable, cannot afford to yield to the big 
power's demands when such a demand increases its vulnerability. While the 
big power's intention is hegemonic, the small power's interest is economic 
survival. For a small land-locked country like Nepal, which is struggling to 
develop the fate of its people, economic relations with India is certainly an 
issue where the very survival of Nepal is at stake .
In addition, the small states also defied when the ruling party was 
disinclined towards India. The incompatibility of the political outlook of the
1 Kumar, Dhruba, 'National Security and Foreign Policy of Nepal', in Kamal. P. Malla 
(ed.) Nepal: Perspectives on Continuity and Chance. Centre for Nepal and Asian 
Studies, Kathmandu, 1989, p. 382.
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ruling parties of Nepal and Bangladesh with Indian interests led them to 
follow independent paths and thereby defy India. Behaviours such as 
discarding special relations with India and the establishment of diplomatic 
relations w ith China and Pakistan were examples of disinclination 
determining Nepal's defiant stance. The rejection of assistance from India 
during the floods of 1988 when Bangladesh returned the Indian helicopters 
sent to help flood victims, speaks of its disinclination towards India. Further, 
in some instances the ambition of rulers determined the defiant stance of 
both Nepal and Bangladesh. The introduction of the Panchayet form of 
government and the participation in the international forums were instances 
in which Nepali defiance was determined by the ruler's anibition. A similar 
example in case of Bangladesh is its initiative to create SAARC.
This study also shows that Nepal and Bangladesh are not solely reactive; 
their behavioural repertoire is not devoid of initiative. The diversification of 
relationships, the introduction of the Panchayat form of government, the 
separation of the trade and transit treaties, the proposal to declare Nepal a 
zone of peace are examples of initiative non-compliant behaviour in the 
foreign policy of Nepal. Examples can also be cited from Bangladesh foreign 
policy behaviour of initiative behaviour such as diversification of its external 
relationships, internationalizing the water issue, and so on.
V a lid ity  o f  T h eo ry
Conventionally, the behaviour of the small states have been seen from 
traditional power perspective. As such, it has been widely believed that the 
small states cannot determine their own conduct. This kind of belief stems 
from the notion that since they lack the traditional components of power
341
they are but pawns in the game of great powers. They do what they are told 
and compliance has been seen as the only expression of their behaviour. But 
th is has not always been the case . We have seen that as empires 
disintegrate, big states crumble, more and more small states are emerging 
and challenging the widely recognised laws of power politics.
As a matter of fact, the 'realist' paradigm in international relations has treated 
non-compliance as the monopoly of the big states. This is because of the 
treatm ent of power as a universal phenomena. But it does not contribute to 
ou r understanding of why some small states prevail over their bigger 
counterparts when our general knowledge suggest that they be otherwise? 
W hat about the anomalies that clash with the prevailing conventional belief?
This indicates the inadequacy of an universal conception of power and the 
usefulness of contextual analysis of power. According to the contextual 
analysis of power, the motivation of the power weilder and the infungibility 
of the power resources offer a framework for understanding small states' 
non-compliance. The relationship of non-compliance of the small state with 
the big state is contingent on both the states involved in the interaction. 
According to this framework, certain conditions are likely to generate a small 
state's motivation to defy a big state. The motivation to defy is generated 
because under some conditions the small state perceives certain moves of the 
big state as threats to its goals, aspirations and interests. Vitalness of issues, 
ambition of the ruler and the political tilt of the ruling party were the conditions 
that constituted motivation of Nepal and Bangladesh to defy India. The 
conditions that generated the motivation to defy, ascribe meaning to the 
pow er resources as means to demonstrate non-compliance. The power 
resources which constituted capability to resist, were also contingent on the 
big state (i.e., the target of small state's defiance) for their effectiveness.
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Popular pressure and popular support, leadership strength, external political support 
and geo-political leverage were the power resources that constituted Nepal 
and Bangladesh's Capability to Resist. According to the contextual 
framework, the conditions of motivation to defy offer the answer to the why 
of non-compliance while, given these conditions, the power resources offer 
the answer to the how of non-compliance of Nepal and Bangladesh.
As a 'middle-level theory', a contextual framework is context bound. The 
theoretical significance of this framework is that, despite its contextual 
character, it is at the same time, a plausible conceptual organiser that 
facilitated the understanding of the specific incidents of NCB of Nepal and 
Bangladesh.
This research has dem onstrated that non-com pliance exists in the 
behavioural repertoire of the small states despite the fact that they are the 
weaker partner (in the conventional sense) in the international system. But, 
given a certain policy contingency framework, a small state with no tangible 
power resources can not sustain non-compliance in its interaction with a big 
state. Within such a policy contingency framework, the big state with all its 
tangible power resources, brings measures to bear upon the small state until 
the small state finds it can no longer resist. Hence, most small states can only 
go up to certain extent in demonstrating non-compliance in their behaviour.
Thus throughout the research, we have observed that under certain policy 
contingency frameworks, the small states behave more or less like their 
bigger counterparts, but their limited power capability does not take them as 
far as it takes the bigger states. Their non-tangible power capabilities put 
limits to their behaviour. Since most small states cannot sustain non- 
compliance for long, scholars who see the world through big power lenses
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are reluctant to recognise that except for the differences in capability (within 
policy contingency framework), there is no essential behavioural difference 
between the big and small state, and thus miss an opportunity to learn more 
about the basic nature of world politics from studying the behaviour of small 
states.
It may, thus, be said that the behaviour of the small states is not 
fundam entally different from that of big states. To suggest that the 
behaviour of small states is essentially different is a mistake. Rather it is 
something which enable us to see more clearly how big states behave.
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APPENDIX 3
Treaty of "Peace and Friendship" between the Government of India and the
Government of Nepal.
The Government of India and the Government of Nepal recognising the 
ancient ties which have happily existed between the two countries for 
centuries;
Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these ties and to perpetuate 
peace between the two countries;
Have resolved therefore to enter into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with 
each other, and have, for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries 
the following person, namely, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, HIS 
EXCELLENCY SHRl CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH, 
Ambassador of India in Nepal; THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, MOHUN 
SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RANA, Maharaja, Prime Minister and 
Supreme-Commander-in-Chief of Nepal, who have examined each other's 
credentials and found them good and in due form have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of 
India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually 
to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of each other.
ARTICLE 2
The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious 
friction or m isunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any 
breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.
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ARTICLE 3
In order to establish and maintain the relations referred to in Article 1 the two 
Governments agree to continue diploamtice relations with each other by 
means of representatives w ith such staff as is necessary for the due 
performance of their functions.
The representatives and such of their staff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy 
such diplomatic priveleges and immunities as are customarily granted by 
international law on a reciprocal basis: Provided that in no case shall these be 
less than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other State having 
diplomatic relations with either Government.
ARTICLE 4
The two Government agree to appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice- 
Consul and other consular agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other 
places in each other's territory as may be agreed to .
Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and consular agents shall be 
provided with exequaturs or other valid authorization of their appointment. 
Such exequatur or authorization is liable to be withdrawn by the country 
which issued it, if considered necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall 
be indecated wherever possible.
The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal basis all the rights, 
privileges, exemptions and im m unities that are accorded to persons of 
corresponding status of any other State.
ARTICLE 5
The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the 
territory of India, arms, am m unitionor warlike material and equipm ent 
necesary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this 
arrangem ent shall be worke ou t by the two Governments acting in 
consultation.
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ARTICLE 6
each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between 
India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national 
treatm ent w ithregard to participation in industria l and economic 
development of such territory and to the grant of concesions and contracts 
relating to such development
ARTICLE 7
The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to 
the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges 
in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and 
commerce, movement and privileges of a similar nature.
ARTICLES
So far as matters dealt with herein are concerend, this Treaty cancels all 
previous treaties, agreements, engagements entered into on behalf of India 
between the British Government and the Government of Nepal.
ARTICLE 9
This Treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both 
Governments.
ARTICLE 10
The Treaty shall remain in force until it is term inated by either party by 
giving one year's notice.
Done in duplicate at Kathamndu this 31st day of July, 1950.
(Sd.) CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD (Sd.) MOHUN SHAMSHER
NARAIN SINGH JUNG BAHADUR RANA
For the Government of India For the Government of Nepal
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Letter exchanged with the Treaty
KATHMANDU 
Dated the 31st July 1950
EXCELLENCY,
In the course of our discussion of the Treaties of Peace and Friendship and of 
Trade and Commerce which have been happily concluded between the 
Government of India and the Government of Nepal, we agreed that certain 
matters of details be regulated by an exchange of letters. In persuance of this 
understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments:
(1) Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other 
by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat, the two Governments 
shall consult with each other and devise effective counter-measures.
(2) Any arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for 
the security of Nepal that the Government of Nepal may import through the 
territory of India shall be so imported with the assistance and agreement of 
the Government of India. The Government of India will take steps for the 
smooth and expeditious transport of such arms and ammunition through 
India.
(3) In regard to Article 6 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship which 
provides for national treatment, the Government of India recognize that it 
may be necessary for some time to come to afford the Nepalese nationals in 
Nepal protection from unrestricted competition. The nature and extent to this 
protection will be determined as and when required by mutual agreement 
between the two Governments.
(4) If the Government of Nepal should decide to seek foreign assistance in 
regard to the development of the natural resources of, or of any industrial 
project in Nepal, the Government of Nepal shall give first preference to the 
Government or the nationals of India, as the case may be, provided that the
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terms offered by the Government of India or Indian nationals, as the case may 
be, are not less favourable to Nepal than the terms offered by any other 
Foreign Government or by other foreign nationals.
Nothing in the foregoing provision shall apply to assistance that the 
Government of Nepal may seek from the United Nations Organisation or, any 
of its specialized agencies.
(5) Both Governments agree not to employ any foreigners whose activity may 
be prejudicial to the security of the other. Either Government may make 
representations to the other in this behalf, as and when occasion requires. 
Please accept Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
(Sd. ) MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG 
BAHADUR RANA 
Maharaja, Prime Minister and 
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
of Nepal
To
His Excellency
Shri Chandreshwar Prasad Narain Singh,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India 
at the Court of Nepal, Indian Embassy,
Kathmandu.
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APPENDIX 4
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Peace Between India and
Bangladesh
INSPIRED by common ideals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism and 
nationalism,
HAVING STRUGGLED together for the realization of these ideals and 
cemented ties of friendship through blood and sacrifices which led to the 
trium phant emergence of a free, sovereign and independent Bangladesh,
DETERMINED to maintain fraternal and good-neighbourly relations and 
transform their border into a border of eternal peace and friendship,
ADHERING firmly to the basic tenets of non-alignment, peaceful co­
existence, mutual co-operation, non-interference in internal affairs and 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,
DETERMINED to safeguard peace, stability and security and to promote 
progress of their respective countries through all possible avenues of mutual 
co-operation,
DETERMINED further to expand and strengthen the existing relations of 
friendship between them,
CONVINCED that the further development of friendship and co-operation 
meets the national interests of both States as well as the interests of lasting 
peace in Asia and the world.
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RESOLVED to contribute to strengthening world peace and security and to 
make efforts to brin about a relaxation of international tension and the final 
elimination of vestiges of colonialism, racialism and imperialism,
CONVINCED that in the present-day world international problems can be 
solved only through co-operation and not through conflict or confrontation,
RE-AFFIRMING their determination to follow the aims and principles of the 
United Nations Charter, the Republic of India,on the one hand, and the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh, on the other, have decided to conclude the 
present Treaty.
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties, inspired by the ideals for which their respective 
peoples struggled and made sacrifices together, solemnly declare that there 
shall be lasting peace and friendship between their two countries and their 
peoples, each side shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the 
other side.
The High Contracting Parties shall further develop and strengthen the 
relations of Friendship, good-neighbourli ness and all-round co-operation 
existing between them, on the basis of the above mentioned principles as well 
as the principles of equality and mutual benefit
Article 2
Being guided by their devotion to the principles of equality of all peoples and 
States, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Paries condemn
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colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations and are determined 
to strive for their final and complete elimination.
The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate with other States in achieving 
these aims and support the just aspirations of peoples in their struggle against 
colonialism and racial discrimination and for their national liberation.
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties reaffirm  their faith in the policy of non- 
alignment and peaceful co-existence as important factors for easing tension in 
the world, maintaining international peace and security, and strengthening 
national sovereigny and independence. .........................
Article 4
The High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts with each other 
on major international problems affecting the interests of both States, through 
meetings and exchanges of views at all levels.
Article 5
The High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their 
m utually advantageous nd all-round co-opeartion in their economic, scientific 
and technical fields. The two countries shall develop mutual co-operation in 
the fields of trade, transport and communications between them on the basis 
of the principles of equality, m utual benefit and the most-favoured nation 
principle.
390
Article 6
The High Contracting Parties further agree to make joint studies and take 
joint action in the fields of flood control, river basin development and the 
development of hydro-electric power and irrigation.
Article 7
The High Contracting Parties shall promote relations in the fields of art, 
literature, education, culture, sports and health.
Articles
In accordance with the ties of friendship existing between the two countries, 
each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter 
into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from any aggression against 
the other party and shall not allow the. use of its territory for committing any 
act that may cause military damage to or constitute a threat to the security of 
the other High Contracting Party.
Article 9
Each of the High Contracting parties shall refrain from giving any assistance 
to any third party taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In 
case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting 
Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take 
appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the 
peace and security of their countries.
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Article 10
Each of the High Contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not 
undertake any commitment, secret or open, toward one or more States which 
may be incompatible with present Treaty.
Article 11
The present Treaty is signed for the term of twenty five years and shall be 
subject to renewal by mutual agreement of the High Contracting Parties.
The Treaty shall come into force with immediate effect from the date of its 
signature.
Article 12
Any difference in interpreting any article or articles of the present Treaty that 
may arise between the High Contracting Parties shall be settled on a bilateral 
basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.
Done in Dacca on the nineteenth day of March, nineteen hundred and 
seventy-two.
INDIRA GANDHI SHIEKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN
Prime Minister Prime Minister
for the Republic of India. for the P eople 's R epublic of
Bangladesh.
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications 
Division, Bangladesh Documents. Vol.11, New Delhi: Patiala House, 1972,pp.645-648.
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APPENDIX 5 
Trade Agreement Between India and Bangladesh 
28 March 1972
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH,
CONSCIOUS of the urge of their two peoples to enlarge areas of mutual co­
operation;
DESIROUS of strengthening economic relations between the two countries on 
the basis of equality and mutual benefit;
RECOGNIZING that the common people of both countries should be the 
beneficiaries of close co-operation between the two Governments in the fields 
of trade and development;
AWARE that this objective can best be secured by organizing trade between 
the two countries on a State-to-State basis as far as possible;
HAVE AGREED as follows:-
Article 1
The two Governments recognizing the need and requirements of each other 
in the context of their developing economies undertake to explore all 
possibilities for expansion and promotion of trade between the two countries 
on the basis of mutual advantage.
Article 2
The two Governments agree to an interim trade agreement as set out in 
Schedule 'A* attached to this Agreement
Article 3
Imports and Exports of commodities and goods produced or manufactured in 
India or Bangladesh as the case may be which are not included in Schedule
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'A' and, in the case of commodities and goods included in that schedule, 
im ports and exports in excess of the values specified therein shall be 
permitted in accordance with the import, export and foreign exchange laws, 
regulations and procedure in force in either country from time to time.
Article 4
In order to meet the day to day requirements of the people living within a 
sixteen kilometre belt of the border between West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, 
Tripura, and Mizoram on the one hand and Bangladesh on the other, and 
with a view to providing facilities to these people to dispose of their goods, 
border trade shall be allowed in specified commodities in accordance with 
Schedule B' attached to this Agreement.
Article 5
The two Governments agree to make mutually beneficial arrangements for 
the use of their waterways, railways and roadways for commerce between the 
two countries and for passage of goods between two places in one country 
through the territory of the other.
Article 6
Each Government shall accord to the commerce of the country of the other 
Government treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the commerce 
of any third country.
Article 7
The provisions of Article 6 shall not prevent the grant or continuance of :
(a), privileges which are, or may be, granted by either of the two Goverments 
in order to facilitate frontier trade,
(b). advantages and privileges which are, or may be, granted by either of the 
two Governments to any of their respective neighbouring countries,
(c). advantages resulting from a customs union, a free-trade area or similar 
arrangem ents which either of the two Governments has concluded or may 
conclude in the future.
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(d). advantages or preferences accorded under any scheme for expansion of 
trade and economic co-operation among developing countries, which is open 
for participation by all developing countries and to which either of the two 
Governments is or may become a party.
Articles
The two Governments agree to co-operate effectively with each pther to 
prevent infringement and circumvention of the laws, rules and regulations of 
either country in regard to matters relating to foreign exchange and foreign 
trade.
Article 9
The two Governments agree to accord, subject to their respective laws and 
regulations, reasonable facilities for the holding of trade fairs and exhibitions 
and visits of business and trade delegations sponsored by the Government 
concerned.
Article 10
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, the two 
Governments shall consult each other as and when necesary and shall review 
the working of the Agreement at the end of six months from the date of 
signature.
Article 11
This agreement shall come into force from 28 march 1972, and shall remain in 
force, in the first instance, for a period of one year.
L. N. MISHRA, M. R. SIDDIQUI,
Minister of Foreign Trade, Minister of Trade and Commerce,
Government of India. Government of Bangladesh
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Schedule 'A'
1. The tw o Governments agree that licences shall, where necessary, be 
granted in accordance with the laws, regulations and procedures in force in 
either country from time to time to permit the import or export of the 
commodities and goods in Lists I and II below, up to the value mentioned 
against each with aview to balanced trade in commodities of special interest
2. For the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of paragraph 1, the Local 
Head Office of the State bank of India at Calcutta and the bank designated by 
the bank of Bangladesh, dacca, shall open special accounts with each other, to 
be utilized solely for the purpose of of making payments to exporters in either 
country by the bank incorporated and resident in that country on behalf of its 
correspondent and resident in that country on behalf of its^^correspondent in 
that country. Subject to the laws and regulations as in force in the two 
countries from time to time, overdraft fadlitie shall be given by either bank to 
its correspondent in the other country. In the event f overdraft in ither 
account being in excess of the lim it stipulated by the relevant law or 
regulation as applicable to or in relation to that account, the Government of 
the countryin which the account is maintained will grant a special loan to the 
bank concerned provided that the total amount of such loan or loans together 
shall not be in excess of five crores of Indian rupees or five crore of 
Bangladesh takas. The said loan shall be granted free of interest by the two 
Governments. In exceptional circumstances the two government will agree to 
increase the limit of the loan in order to facilitate the continuance of trade. 
Such excess over rupees five crores will carry a rate of interest of six per cent. 
The am ount outstanding on the expiry of the agreement shall be settled in 
Pounds Sterling or in any other m anner mutually agreed upon. The Local 
Head Office of the State bank of India at Calcutta will, in consultation with 
the abnk designated by the Bank of Bangladesh, dacca, finalize the details of
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the banking arrangements in pursuance of the provisions of this article which 
would inter alia provide for adjustments of the overdrafts periodically.
3. In the event of a change in the parity rate of either the Indian rupee or the 
Bangladesh taka, while these arrangements are in force, the two Governments 
will consult each other with a view to reaching an agreed solution to the 
problem of adjustments.
4. Imports and Exports of the commodities and goods in lists I and II above 
which are in excess of the values shown against them and of commodities and 
goods which are not included in those lists shall, subject to import, export and 
foreign exchange laws, regulations and procedures in force in either country 
from time to time, be financed through authorized dealers in foreign 
exchange in either country acting through their correspondents in the other 
contry. Subject to the provisions of the exchange regulations in force in the 
two countries, an authorized dealer may grant to the correspondent in the 
other country an overdraft to such extent and on such terms and conditions as 
may be permitted by the Reserve bank of India or the Bangladesh Bank as the 
case may be. The settlement of amount due to from an authorized dealer 
from or to the correspondent in accordance with these arrangemnts will be in 
Pounds Sterling. The Reserve bank of India and the bangladesh bank will in 
consultation with each other endeavour to provide the maximum facilities 
possible for facilitating the flow of trade in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 3.
5. Subject to such exceptions as may be made by mutual agreement between 
the two Governments, commodities and goods imported into one country 
from the other shall not be re-exported to a third country.
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Schedule 'B'
Provisions relating to border trade referred to in article 4 of the Agreement.
1. These facilities shall apply to the trade across theland customs frontiers 
beteen West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram on the one 
hajid and bangladesh on the other.
2. These facilities shall be available only to persons living in areas, other than 
municipal areas, within sixteen kilometres of the land customs frontiers and 
holding special permits issued by their respective competent authority.
3. Every person holding such a special permit may carry across the border in 
each sector only goods and commodities and in such quantities as are 
specified, in the annexure to this schedule, and for this purpose may cross the 
border only once a day and only through such routes as amy be authorized in 
this behalf. If market conditions in a locality justify relaxation of the number 
of days in aweek on which persons holding special permits may cross the 
border in that locality, the additional days shall be mutually agreed between 
the concerned competent authorities in the two countries.
4. The carriage of such goods shall be free from import, export and exchange 
control restrictions as well as customs duty and customs formalities.
5. each person may carry in cah a sum not exceeding rupees one hundred in 
bangladesh or India currency when crossing the border from either country 
into the other.
6. Either Government may maintain such checks and take such preventive 
measures including the right to search as are considered necessary to ensure 
that these concessions are not exceeded or abused.
7. These arrangements shall be subject to review after a period of six months 
to consider whether they should be extended or amended in any way. If even 
befre the expiry of tis period of six months either country feels the need to 
w ithdraw or modify the facilities undet this Agreement, it would enter into
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immediate consultaions with the other country taking such measures as it 
may consider necessary.
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Publications Division, Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, New Delhi: Patiala 
House, 1972, pp. 648-656.
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